Social scientists from a variety of disciplines have long been captivated by the simplicity and elegance of the two-person, binary choice prisoners' dilemma (2 × 2 PD). Over the years, the domain of the research has been extended and applied to events that are neither two person nor binary. We use a defining characteristic of the 2 × 2 PD to identify situations under which full levels of contribution are suboptimal. We propose, on the basis of that characteristic, an extended definition and categorization of prisoners' dilemmas to n-person and nonbinary situations. The new distinction is shown to point to differing normative and strategic imperatives for the different categories of games.
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