Abstract
From the late 1920s, Joseph Stalin spearheaded a transformation of the Soviet Union, catapulting the country to the status of a superpower in just two decades. Prioritizing heavy and military industry, Stalin created a garrison state designed to fight total war. All of this was done on the backs of the Soviet people, who suffered immeasurably under a hyper-centralized and repressive state. Because Stalin had been so central to the operation of the dictatorship, as soon as he died in March 1953, it was natural for Soviet citizens, politicians (and also foreign observers) to anticipate change in the USSR. Yet it was impossible to know how far reaching this change might be, if it occured at all. In The Last Days of Stalin – a lively account of the final years of Stalin’s life and the transition period – Joshua Rubenstein convincingly demonstrates that Stalin’s death was as much a spark for purposeful reform as it was a striking missed opportunity.
With a narrative that moves back and forth across Stalin’s final years, Rubenstein effectively captures the increasing tension inside the Soviet Union in the final years of the dictator’s life. Much of this stemmed from the final antisemitic xenophobic campaigns launched by Stalin (culminating in the investigation into the so-called Doctors’ Plot to which Rubenstein devotes a chapter). However, Rubenstein is as much concerned with the dictator’s sudden disappearance from the Cold War and the serious lack of foresight displayed by the Eisenhower administration.
One of the striking themes in the first chapter, in which Rubenstein provides a gripping account of Stalin’s collapse in his dacha and final days, is the extent to which the dictator had placed himself in a vulnerable position. Despite enhanced security surrounding Stalin’s residences and multiple protocols to ensure the dictator’s safety, as Rubenstein notes, this in the end only heightened his vulnerability: ‘When he collapsed, his security arrangements made it harder for his staff to know what was going on, to assist him, to summon help’ (p. 13). Stalin’s obsession with his personal security ultimately put him at risk.
The doctors belatedly trying to save Stalin after his collapse had good reason to find their hands shaking. In his chapter on Stalin’s campaign against Jewish nationalism and ‘cosmopolitanism’, Rubenstein shows in gripping detail the widening antisemitic campaign from 1952 that culminated the investigation into the so-called Doctors’ Plot, a conspiracy theory that saw predominately Jewish doctors accused of plotting to kill senior party figures. Rubenstein argues convincingly that had Stalin not died in March, this may well have developed into a new purge with possible mass deportations of Soviet Jews. Much of course remains uncertain about the final trajectory of the investigation, but Rubenstein’s view that the antisemitic campaign was gathering towards a ‘terrifying conclusion’ is convincing (p. 93).
What is also striking in Rubenstein’s narrative is how quickly Stalin’s successors moved to enact domestic reform after his death. Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria, and other senior members of the leadership, had looked with alarm on Stalin’s expansion of the Politburo into a larger Presidium and the promotion of younger party members. Alongside what seemed like deliberate targeting of older comrades, this looked like a shake-up of the Soviet leadership who all remembered the 1930s. With Stalin gone, his successors thus moved to shore up their positions and reform was quickly unleashed. Alongside a public disavowal of the Doctors’ Plot that proclaimed it a fabrication, around one million prisoners were released from the Gulag camps; the camp administration itself was brought under the control of the Ministry for Justice; large construction projects using forced labour were abandoned; food prices were lowered, giving ordinary Soviet people welcome relief (p. 139). The speed of these reforms proves that Stalin’s successors had long-realized the need for substantial change in the system and were merely awaiting the dictator’s death. What is more surprising is how much of this change was spearheaded by the notorious Lavrentiy Beria. Rubenstein’s portrayal of Beria, however, is not always clear. On the one hand, Beria is shown as the architect of several reform efforts (particularly inside the apparatus of repression); on the other hand, Rubenstein suggests that Beria had only personal motives in avoiding culpability for Stalinist era repression and knowingly presented himself as a moderate. Questions continue to surround Beria’s intentions.
The final chapters analysing the reaction from the Eisenhower administration to Stalin’s death are where Rubenstein is most clear in stressing the missed opportunity of 1953. Eisenhower and his closest advisors proved totally unprepared for the dictator’s death and ineffectively scrambled for a coherent response. However, rather than take Soviet peace feelers at face value – particularly concerning the Korean War – Eisenhower, and especially John Foster Dulles, were convinced that the Soviets were simply carrying out a ‘calculated strategy to dilute the fear of Soviet aggression’. Quite the opposite: Rubenstein is clear that Stalin’s successors were not carrying out ‘an exercise in subtle propaganda’ (p. 187). Dulles rejected outright the notion of meeting face-to-face with Soviet leaders. Disregarding Winston Churchill’s urging to seize the unexpected opportunity Stalin’s death presented for international relations, the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to see the post-Stalin USSR as anything but an aggressive totalitarian state in the Stalinist mould. In the end, while Rubenstein rightly eschews counterfactuals, it is clear that Eisenhower threw away his best chance to ease international tensions.