Abstract
On 16 December 2024, the Appellant was convicted of the murder of his mother and sentenced to the mandatory life sentence with a minimum term of 31 years (minus the period of time spent in custody on remand) (at [1]). At trial, the Appellant had not given evidence but had run defences of both denial and, in the alternative, of diminished responsibility; however, both were rejected by the jury (at [3]).
In 2020, the Appellant's father (and the victim's husband) had died, and the Appellant was under the delusional belief that the house in which his mother resided was his (rather than hers) and that his father's will had not been fulfilled (at [8]). The Appellant believed that the house belonged to him; he had a series of confrontations with his mother (including demanding she leave the house, taking her bank card, stealing her jewellery, and suggesting that she commit suicide) which culminated in her fear of the Appellant (at [5]). The victim repeatedly changed the locks of her house; however, the Appellant was always able to gain access (at [5]). The victim made statements to the police several months and a couple of weeks before her death (at [7]).
On the day of the murder, the Appellant went to the victim's house and let himself into it. According to the Crown, the Appellant subjected the victim to a savage beating which caused widespread bruising and bleeding to her head, face, arms and body, before placing a plastic bag over her head and smothering her (at [3]). The Appellant cleaned up the house and went out and bought tools to bury the victim's body; however, he was disturbed by his sister, who called 999 (at [3]).
In sentencing the Appellant, the trial judge concluded that the appropriate starting point under the Sentencing Act 2020, Sch. 21, was 30 years as a murder done for gain (para. 3(2)(c)) (at [12]). In regard to aggravating features the judge concluded that the victim was vulnerable (para. 9(b)), there was previous controlling and coercive behaviour (para. 9(ba)) and an attempt to concealment the body (para. 9(g)) as well as the killing taking place in the victim's home and an intention to kill the victim (at [14]). In regard to mitigating features, the judge concluded there was a lack of premeditation (para. 10(b)), the victim's loss of consciousness would have been rapid to remove any period of suffering and his mental illness (para. 10(c)) (at [14]). Balancing of all these features, the judge reached a minimum term of 31 years (at [14]).
The Appellant sought to appeal against the minimum term with permission of the single judge (at [1]).
Commentary
Two matters are raised in this comment: first, was this a murder for gain, and second, should intention have been used as an aggravating factor?
Was This a Murder “for Gain”?
Whether a murder is done “for gain” is an ambiguous area when considering a minimum term. Very few murders are done for gain by professional criminals, in which payment is received for the carrying out of the killing of another. Rather, the majority of such killings are carried out in a domestic or family setting and fall into the categories of (i) expected or immediate gain and (ii) potential or delayed gain.
An expected or immediate gain could be described as a killing carried out in the expectation of immediate financial gain. For example, as in this case, a son kills his mother in the hope of receipt of a house, or a person kills another as they are the beneficiary of the victim's will. A potential or delayed gain could be described as a killing carried out in the hope that the killing would lead to gain in the future, but the killer receives no immediate financial gain. For example, a person kills someone as they are an impediment to their future gain. This latter category is the plot of many a crime novel: the unscrupulous killer removing a person standing in the way of potential riches in the future (the plot of Kind Hearts and Coronets springs to mind). Whilst fanciful, they do provide examples of how murder “for gain” is not as clear cut as one would expect.
A true murder for gain is rare, and it is only this action carried out by professional criminals that carries a starting point of 30 years. There is authority to this effect which emphasises the differing categories referred to above. In R v Taylor [2007] EWCA Crim 1564 the Court of Appeal held that a 30-year minimum term should be discounted where gain was only one of a number of mixed motives and was not the predominant motive, and that a distinction should be made between cases in which a person is paid to commit murder and one where a person stands to gain from it.
In this case, the Court concluded that this was a murder for gain (at [28]). But what would the Appellant have gained? He could have potentially gained by either possession or sale of the house upon his mother's death; however, the Appellant was under the delusional view that he already owned the house. From the Appellant's point of view, would he have gained in the way Parliament had intended to mean? This again highlights how ambiguous this area can be and affirms the differing categories above.
Intention as an Aggravating Factor
As every law student knows, the mens rea for murder is an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. Whilst an intention to only cause grievous bodily harm may be a mitigating factor (Sentencing Act 2020, Sch. 21, para. 10(a)), the reverse is not necessarily true for an intention to kill as an aggravating factor.
If the Crown's case is that a Defendant intended to kill the victim, this is generally considered to be more serious than had they intended to cause grievous bodily harm (though not always), and this is reflected in Sch. 21 para. 10(a) (R v Peters [2005] EWCA Crim 605 (at [13]). However, no distinction is made between an intention to kill and an intention to cause grievous bodily harm in any of the starting points in Sch. 21 (R v Peters at [14]). To transpose an essential element of the offence into an aggravating factor has an air of double-counting: once as an element of the offence and once as an aggravating factor. The best approach is to leave any form of intention as neutral when considering the minimum term. In this case, the Appellant's mental illness did render it neutral.
