Abstract
Recent decades have seen a surge of scientific interest in happiness. However, its theoretical conceptualization is a work in progress. Much of the literature focuses on two main forms: hedonic (encompassing life satisfaction and positive affect) and eudaimonic (encompassing phenomena such as character development and meaning in life). However, this binary has been critiqued as being incomplete, in part because it reflects a Western-centric perspective that overlooks forms emphasized in non-Western cultures. As a result, scholars have begun to highlight other forms besides hedonia and eudaimonia. This article surveys the literature to identify 16 potential forms in total, classified according to whether they primarily pertain to feelings (hedonic, contented, mature, chaironic, and vital), thought (evaluative, meaningful, intellective, aesthetic, and absorbed) or action (eudaimonic, masterful, accomplished, harmonic, nirvanic, and relational). This article thus offers a more expansive, albeit still just provisional, taxonomy of this vital and still-evolving topic.
Few concepts are as cherished in the modern era as happiness. Indeed, variants of this state have been a human concern throughout history (Lomas, Case et al., 2021). Yet few phenomena are perhaps so contested, with little consensus on its nature. That said, recent decades have seen an expansive scholarly effort to conceptualize and study the topic. This paper explores this process of conceptualization, offering a provisional typology of different forms of happiness.
What is Happiness?
Before delving into the various forms, it is worth contextualizing and defining the concept of happiness itself, and situating it vis-à-vis other related notions. To that end, the following is a basic set of orienting definitions that, although by no means the only way of configuring the territory, aligns with most of the relevant literature. It will help to begin with wellbeing, which most scholars regard as an overarching concept that includes happiness within. Our reason for starting with wellbeing is to situate happiness within a broader framework of relevant ideas, thereby allowing a more comprehensive understanding of its nature and significance. One issue with happiness research is that it is often unmoored from other similar concerns and related fields, with different disciplines which share areas of interest speaking past each other. Consider that arguably the most prominent concept in happiness scholarship is Diener’s operationalization of subjective wellbeing (SWB), featuring two main components: affective (i.e., positive affect), and evaluative (i.e., life satisfaction/evaluation) (Diener et al., 1999). We are indebted to Diener’s pioneering work, which has inspired decades of excellent research. However, much of this does not elucidate how SWB relates conceptually to the myriad other concepts that deploy the term “wellbeing,” qualified with various adjectives. Take for instance the World Health Organization’s (WHO, 1948) influential definition of health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity.” All three dimensions can be experienced subjectively, but that usually is not what psychologists have in mind when they invoke the specific and narrow construct of SWB, and rarely does work on SWB attempt to place the notion in relation to these dimensions, nor to the many other wellbeing-related constructs in the literature, from spiritual wellbeing (Larson, 1996) to economic wellbeing (Bakar et al., 2015). Instead, SWB frequently tends to be a free-floating psychological construct—just an independent or dependent variable of interest—without much articulation of its status in a wider taxonomy of wellbeing.
Our position is that happiness constitutes a subset of wellbeing, and specifically one pertaining to mental wellbeing. To explicate this conceptual nesting, it is necessary to first outline an understanding of wellbeing more broadly, within which we can then situate happiness. We have begun to develop a theoretical framework of wellbeing—and related concepts like health and flourishing—at length elsewhere (Lomas & VanderWeele, 2022; VanderWeele & Lomas, 2022), of which we offer a brief summary here to allow our taxonomy of happiness to be placed within this broader context of ideas. With wellbeing, as per happiness, this too has been notoriously difficult to operationalize. Reviewing trends in conceptualizations of wellbeing for the 2022 World Happiness Report, Barrington-Leigh (2022) suggests that while its use has risen sharply recently, it is “typically poorly defined.” Given this confusion, we have formulated our own conceptualization of wellbeing, which involves two subtly different definitions, both with the same key words. First, we view wellbeing as the quality of one’s personal state. We use “personal” to differentiate it from flourishing, which we regard as personal and systemic: while wellbeing applies specifically to humans (and other living beings), flourishing applies to humans and the myriad contexts—both human (e.g., communities) and nonhuman (e.g., the natural environment)—in which they are situated. “State” signifies a condition or mode of living that is not permanent, but can vary widely in duration (from a fleeting emotion to a durable way of being that could even last for years). Finally, we harness the idea of “quality,” as deployed in notions of quality of life, a common framing in work on wellbeing (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993), and which has further been explored by Pirsig (1974), for whom it represents a fundamental and irreducible sense of a phenomenon being deemed good or valuable in some way (Reeves & Bednar, 1994).
We can then define the parameters of this state using the concepts of illness and health. Illness denotes a relative absence of wellbeing, as signified by undesirable phenomena known collectively by terms such as diseases, disorders, and injuries. Conversely, health can describe not merely the absence of those undesirable phenomena, but the active presence or attainment of certain desiderata. Thus, we define health as a personal state of quality, and conversely illness as a personal state lacking quality. Crucially, the relative absence of illness is not the same as the active presence of health. Such insights have been especially prominent in the realm of mental wellbeing. Traditionally the field has focused more on mental illness, as acknowledged by Freud, who saw the goal of psychotherapy as generally limited to turning “hysterical misery into ordinary unhappiness” (Breuer & Freud, 1955, p. 308). However, a growing movement of scholars—led by humanistic psychologists like Maslow (1962)—has argued that being ostensibly free of mental illness does not necessarily mean a person is actively thriving. Instead, they may just be languishing—not ill per se, but not excelling either (Keyes, 2007). Thus, these scholars argued for also attending to positive forms of health. As Maslow put it, “It is as if Freud supplied us the sick half of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half (p. 5). So, using these definitions, wellbeing serves as an overarching concept, encompassing illness and health. However, in common language wellbeing can also be used, as per health, to describe the attainment of desirable forms of that state. As such, our second definition of wellbeing is the same as that for health: a personal state of quality.
These definitions may seem sparse or generic compared with others in the literature. However, these initial formulations serve as semantic building blocks, upon which more specific forms of wellbeing can be operationalized by adapting the definitions as needed. This includes tailoring the definitions for different forms of happiness, as outlined below. First though we can start by applying them to different dimensions of existence. There are many ways of conceptualizing this complex ontological terrain, but one common framing is to acknowledge physical, mental, and social dimensions of existence, as per the WHO’s definition of health. In addition, some scholars suggest that we ought to recognize spiritual wellbeing (Larson, 1996; VanderWeele, 2020). Together, we refer to these four dimensions as the “WHO+” ontological framework. We can therefore adapt the generic definitions of wellbeing to apply to these dimensions specifically. For example, one can describe mental wellbeing as pertaining to the quality of one’s mental state (Definition 1)—with “personal” now omitted as superfluous, since mental states are inherently personal—and its attainment (i.e., mental health) as a mental state of quality (Definition 2), while mental illness is a mental state lacking quality. One could similarly adapt these for the other dimensions by switching the operative adjective.
Here is where happiness re-enters the conversation. Essentially, we deploy this term expansively to denote almost the entire positive territory of the mental wellbeing dimension. Thus, we define happiness as a mental experience of quality (with “mental” encompassing all qualia, including emotions). Note this is very close to, but subtly different from, the definition of mental wellbeing, as it refers to an experience rather than a state. The reason is that happiness may not cover the entire realm of mental wellbeing, which also involves the various faculties of the mind—attention, perception, memory, and so on—broadly “working well.” So, we describe this entire realm using “state,” within which is the narrower terrain of subjective experience, for which we use the label happiness. Again, we note this definition of happiness may seem sparse or generic and even unusual compared with others. However, as per our operationalization of wellbeing, it is constructed to fit within a broader framework of ideas, and moreover to be adapted to different types of happiness, of which we identify 16 forms. In conceptualizing happiness in this way, we explicitly advocate an expansive vision of the topic, encompassing a significant range of psychological territory. Like many interesting signifiers, happiness is a contested construct. Some people use it narrowly, perhaps as merely synonymous with pleasure. By contrast, others—us included—use it far more expansively, encompassing a wide swathe of positive mental states. This linguistic point can be understood using a cartographic metaphor. One function of language is to map our experiential world (Lomas, 2018). In that respect, some words cover more “ground” than others, and encompass related words within. Love, for instance, has been described as an “empire uniting all sorts of feelings, behaviours, and attitudes, sometimes having little in common” (Murstein, 1988, p. 33). Then, within that empire, one can find words covering specific regions, from “passion” to “care.” Our view of happiness is similarly broad, covering nearly the entire positive territory of mental wellbeing, from the lowest possible increment into this realm (e.g., the mildest, briefest moment of positive affect) to its farthest possible reaches (e.g., the most intense and long-lasting positive experiences conceivable). In that respect, this paper offers a typology of forms of happiness within this broad territory. That said, this taxonomy is also still useable and relevant for people who define happiness more narrowly, and who may prefer to regard some forms here as simply aspects of mental wellbeing rather than happiness per se.
An Evolving Taxonomy
In the 80 or so years since the likes of Maslow first emphasized the importance of attending to the positive terrain of mental wellbeing—which we label broadly as happiness—research and theory has steadily accumulated. This evolving body of scholarship is illustrated in Figure 1, which presents the 16 forms of happiness in our taxonomy in terms of five different “bands.” These bands have two related functions, indicating both: (a) conceptualizations of happiness in terms of narrowness-broadness (with Band 1 the narrowest, and Band 5 the broadest); and (b) chronological emergence (with 1 the earliest main focus of academic scholarship, and 5 the most recent). Overall, most work has tended to focus on two main types, hedonic (Band 1) and eudaimonic (Band 2). This distinction has a long pedigree, usually traced to Aristotle (1986), who depicted the former as simple states of pleasure, and the latter as deeper forms of happiness arising through self-cultivation, being the “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” (p. 11). However, we suggest this binary actually incorporates other experiences which warrant treating as distinct forms, as elucidated below. Initially, most work focused on hedonic happiness, particularly through the prism of SWB, which emerged in the 1950s before coming to prominence especially through the work of Diener in the 1980s (Diener et al., 1999). This is represented as Band 1, in which we use “hedonic happiness” only for the affective component of SWB, and present its evaluative component (i.e., life satisfaction) as a separate form of “evaluative happiness.” This early interest in hedonia was soon augmented by a growing interest in eudaimonic wellbeing, which can be traced back to humanistic psychologists like Maslow, but especially attracted attention following Ryff’s (1989) work on “psychological wellbeing.” This strand of theorizing constitutes Band 2, which involves eudaimonic happiness per se, as well as three other forms which are usually bound up with eudaimonia—which in modern scholarship has swelled to often become a catch-all for anything non-hedonic—but which we treat as distinct forms, including meaningful, masterful, and accomplished happiness.
An Emergent Chronology of Happiness Constructs.
However, as important as hedonia and eudaimonia—and the four other forms we have extracted from them—may be, they do not exhaustively cover the broad terrain we designate as happiness. To start with, in Authentic Happiness, Seligman (2002) suggests “engagement” constitutes one of three “pathways” to mental wellbeing (alongside hedonia and eudaimonia). This third pathway is reflected in Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) notion of flow, which we label as “absorbed happiness,” accompanied in Band 3 by two newer proposed forms that also pertain to engagement (aesthetic and vital). From there, happiness research has continued to develop. To begin with, Wong (2011) formulated the idea of positive psychology 2.0, also known as the field’s second wave (Lomas & Ivtzan, 2016). This critiqued the field for initially focusing mainly on positively valenced phenomena, and overlooking the relevance to wellbeing of states that are neutral or even negatively valenced. This work is represented as band 4, featuring three types proposed by Wong (contented, mature, and chaironic).
Building on this scholarship, Lomas, Waters et al. (2021) developed the idea of a third wave of the field. A driving force behind Wong’s work is the recognition that happiness research—and psychology as a whole—is Western-centric, as reflected in Henrich et al.’s (2010) influential charge that the vast majority of research in psychology has been conducted by and on people in contexts deemed relatively “WEIRD” (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic). Thus, drawing on his Chinese background, Wong proposed happiness forms that have been especially valued in Eastern cultures. Lomas et al. then suggested this work was part of a broader third wave of scholarship that was expanding beyond the field’s Western-centricity and engaging with happiness-related ideas from across the globe. This shift is exemplified by the Global Wellbeing Initiative, which involves developing new items for the Gallup World Poll that reflect non-Western perspectives on wellbeing, including ones relating to four forms detailed below (contented, eudaimonic, harmonic, and relational), as featured in the 2022 World Happiness Report (Lomas, Lai, et al., 2022). Thus, from this third wave are emerging still newer proposed constructs pertaining to happiness, labeled here as Band 5, including harmonic, relational and nirvanic. Moreover, these developments are not limited to positive psychology: Lomas (2022a) suggests its third wave is part of a broader new wave of “global wellbeing scholarship” that not only involves other kinship fields within psychology (e.g., humanistic psychology), but other academic disciplines, such as Tay and Pawelski’s (2022) emerging “positive humanities” paradigm. Indeed, it is possible and even likely that these new movements—which are still in their early phases—will identify other forms of happiness beyond the 16 included here. The first author for instance has recently received a grant to explore Muslim perspectives on wellbeing, which have hitherto received little attention in psychology. It may be that such projects will mean the taxonomy will need updating, with new forms perhaps added to band 5, and indeed future research may well generate further emergent bands we cannot yet even envisage (see, for example, Lomas, 2022b, for speculations regarding future directions in wellbeing scholarship, which include the possibility of considering non-human forms of wellbeing, including in relation to other animals, AI systems, and even extra-terrestrial entities).
As such, even while this present paper represents our best attempt to survey the terrain of happiness as it stands, it is a dynamically evolving picture, so our framework is only a provisional account of the current literature and may need revising with future scholarship. Moreover, we acknowledge that scholars differ in how expansively they view happiness, and might not regard all these types as constituting happiness per se. Some may prefer to use the term only for SWB, and will regard the forms in bands 2-5 as outside the remit of happiness. Others may have a slightly wider scope, perhaps expanding to bands 2 and 3. Yet others—including us—take a still broader view, encompassing all five bands. Whatever preference people have is fine; regardless of labels per se, all these forms will still likely be of interest to all these scholars. Thus, for those who take a narrower view, whichever forms are regarded as outside the realm of happiness could simply be labeled as forms of mental wellbeing. Then, in addition to grouping the forms by bands in an emergent chronology, we have also sought to bring a different conceptual order to the taxonomy by classifying types according to whether they primarily involve one of three main experiential modalities, as illustrated in Figure 2: feeling (types 1–5); thinking (6–10); and doing (11–16). Of course, every form likely involves all three modalities in some way, as experience is generally multidimensional. Moreover, a given experience of happiness may well combine several types, as if distinct flavors mixing to form a unique taste. Nevertheless, this classificatory approach is a useful heuristic. We have also sought to bring consistency to the taxonomy by using our basic definition of happiness (a mental experience of quality) and building upon it in various ways to identify specific forms. Moreover, using this basic definition in turn allows this taxonomy to be situated within our broader framework of wellbeing-related concepts. As a final point, we recognize this is a novel framework that requires validation in future research. As such, for each form we offer suggestions for research angles and hypotheses that could be explored in relation to it, followed in the conclusion by some broader ideas for a research program into this new taxonomy.
An Expanded Taxonomy of Happiness.
Feeling Types
Hedonic
These first five forms pertain primarily to feelings. By far the most widely studied is what is often called “hedonic” happiness. The dominant construct here is SWB, which as discussed above comprises two main dimensions: cognitive (life evaluation/satisfaction) and affective (hedonic tone). We reserve hedonic happiness for the latter though, and regard the former—which is not really about hedonism, conventionally understood—as constituting a distinct form of evaluative happiness, discussed below. This affective dimension pertains to how people feel right now (or relatively recently), usually conceptualized in terms of a ratio of positive to negative affect (Watson et al., 1988). Calculations of this ratio thereby generate an appraisal of the affective dimension of SWB, hence—on our conceptualization here—of hedonic happiness. Appraisals of positive affect usually focus on high arousal forms, possibly reflecting the valorization of such emotions in Western cultures (Tsai et al., 2006). As such, low arousal forms—like calmness—tend to be overlooked. One option would be to ensure hedonic happiness includes these. However, to emphasize their distinctiveness, we treat low arousal states as a separate form of contented happiness, considered next. So, we define hedonic happiness as a mental experience of quality in relation to one’s present emotions and feelings, with particular emphasis on higher arousal varieties. Another potentially relevant point of distinction may be attention, which thus offers a possible line of future research in terms of differentiating these forms. Although hedonic happiness has higher levels of arousal than contented, we predict it may actually have lower attentiveness, particularly orienting and executive forms of attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990), since the latter are primarily about attentional control, and evidence links high arousal pleasure to reduced attentional control (Schwebel et al., 2009).
Contented
This first neglected form of happiness covers the emotional territory of low arousal positive affect (McManus et al., 2019). While often overlooked in favor of high arousal forms, as noted above, scholars are now paying greater attention to cultural perspectives that emphasize these emotions. In psychospiritual traditions like Hinduism and Buddhism, for instance, qualities of equanimity and detachment are valorized as reflecting an ability to eschew attachments (seen as a cause of suffering), as captured by the Quiet Ego scale (Wayment et al., 2015). To that point, such traditions corroborate our hypothesis that attentiveness may be higher in contented than hedonic happiness, since they have a wealth of meditative practices which, (a) function primarily by training attention, and (b) are associated in particular with contented happiness (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). This observation prompts another hypothesis: since research on meditation shows attention can be trained, this suggests that contented happiness can be more readily cultivated (e.g., through meditation) than hedonic happiness (which is less about attentional control, so in that respect is less easily generated). Moreover, such happiness may be more universally valued than is often appreciated. Exploring lay perceptions of happiness in 12 countries across five continents, Delle Fave et al. (2016) found the most prominent definition was one of “inner harmony,” involving inner peace, contentment, and balance. Similarly widespread patterns were also observed in the Global Wellbeing Initiative, which found that low arousal states were universally sought and experienced (Lomas, Lai et al., 2022). While some scholars may prefer to expand hedonia to encompass these forms, the connection between hedonia and high arousal is so established—as are broader cultural associations with hedonism—that low arousal forms are better treated as their own distinct form, defined as a mental experience of quality in relation to one’s present emotions and feelings, with particular emphasis on lower arousal varieties.
Mature
While contented happiness covers relatively neutral positive emotional states, some theorists argue that happiness can even encompass negatively valenced states. To that point, Wong has proposed the notion of “mature happiness” (Wong & Bowers, 2019). A key influence here is Frankl (1963), who powerfully argued that meaning and redemption can be found even amid the difficulties of life. Going further, these issues may even be sources of positive mental states. This insight rests on the recognition that people’s very experience of suffering may actually be potentially causally connected to subsequent experiences and appreciation of wellbeing—an insight similarly recognized in the literature on post-traumatic growth, described by Tedeschi et al. (1998) as “positive changes in the aftermath of crisis.” However, this realization does not necessarily come easily, but may require hard-won experience and insight, hence “mature.” This form might thus be conceived as a mental experience of quality regarding the way one has dealt with suffering in one’s life. Although a relatively new construct per se, Wong and Bowers’ Mature Happiness Scale has begun to receive empirical validation (Carreno et al., 2021). Moreover, there is an extensive literature on phenomena pertaining to mental wellbeing that can be viewed through the lens of mature happiness, including post-traumatic growth, work on “redemption narratives” (McAdams et al., 2001), and new research on people’s preference for a “psychologically rich life,” involving diverse experiences and emotions, including negatively valenced ones (Oishi & Westgate, 2021). In terms of better understanding the dynamics here, an intriguing research question concerns the distinction between affective versus cognitive valence (i.e., thoughts being positive or negative in tone). Even if mature happiness usually has negative affective valence, we suggest it is likely to be characterized by positive cognitive valence, with even negative emotions interpreted in constructive ways.
Chaironic
Although hedonic happiness focuses on high arousal forms of positive affect, it tends not to broach its most intense or significant forms (instead invoking less highly charged states like enjoyment and pleasure). As such, Wong (2011) has also proposed the idea of chaironic happiness, based on the Greek term chairo, which has meanings like gladness, joy, bliss, grace and blessing. Given its etymology, one might construe this as a form of spiritual happiness, defined as “feeling blessed and fortunate because of a sense of awe, gratitude, and oneness with nature or God” (p. 70). Again, while a relatively new construct, it rests upon a substantial literature connecting spirituality to happiness and wellbeing more broadly, a paradigm known as the “religion health connection” (Ellison & Levin, 1998). Although most such work treats spirituality as a factor which influences happiness, some presents spirituality itself as a form of happiness (Fisher, 2010), which we thus label “chaironic happiness,” defined as a mental experience of quality in relation to some kind of spiritual or transcendent reality. This of course overlaps with the subtly different idea of spiritual wellbeing, with chaironic happiness being an experience of such spirituality, rather than the state of spiritual wellbeing itself. Spirituality is itself a complex and contested construct (Hill et al., 2000), so more research is needed to further elucidate this form. To that end, we suggest different forms of happiness may vary in the frequency with which they are experienced. So, drawing on ideas such as Maslow’s (1962) concept of peak experiences, we hypothesize chaironic happiness may be among the rarer and less easily attained forms, both in terms of populations (i.e., relatively few people experience it compared to other forms), and people themselves (i.e., those that attain it do so relatively infrequently).
Vital
Of the five forms classified as primarily involving feelings, this last brings into consideration the different ontological territory of the body. Among the 16 forms, three branch away from mental wellbeing and intersect with other wellbeing dimensions. Chaironic happiness links to spiritual wellbeing, and below relational happiness is associated with social wellbeing. Completing the trifecta, vital happiness pertains to physical wellbeing. Just as we use “happiness” for positive mental health, one might deploy “vitality” to cover the realm of positive physical health. However, from a critical perspective, the whole distinction between physical and mental is somewhat artificial and constructed, as the mind permeates the body and vice versa (Bostic et al., 2000). In objective terms, the physical body and brain constitute one interconnected system. Likewise, subjectively, qualia tend to involve both embodied physical sensations and mental manifestations. In that respect, in objective terms, vitality might mean high physical energy or skill, while subjectively it could include feelings of zest and vigor (Ryan & Frederick, 1997). As such, although vitality fundamentally pertains to physical wellbeing, conceptually and experientially it “overlaps” with mental wellbeing (Lomas, Ritchie-Dunham et al., 2022). Indeed, aspects may pertain more to mind than body, with Ryan and Frederick's (1997) Subjective Vitality Scale described as indexing “a positive feeling of energy and aliveness.” Elucidating this, they share our view of vitality as straddling the physical and mental dimensions, describing it as “a reflection of both organismic and psychological wellness” (p. 532). Other scales likewise overlap the dimensions, such as the Vitality Plus Scale (Myers et al., 1999), which collectively have generated a broad literature (Lavrusheva, 2020). We therefore refer to the more mental manifestations of vitality as “vital happiness”: a mental experience of quality with respect to one’s physical being. Given the affinities between vital happiness and physical wellbeing, we hypothesize that vital happiness may be especially impaired—even more than other forms of happiness—by physical issues and behaviors, from overwork to impaired sleep quality (Sampaio et al., 2014).
Thinking Types
Evaluative
These next five forms pertain primarily (though not only) to thinking. This first is the most widely studied form of happiness, involving the great wealth of research into the cognitive component of SWB. Over the years many influential concepts and measures have been developed in this area, from Cantril’s (1965) “ladder” to the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985). These usually reflect a global assessment (i.e., all elements of life together) of one’s life in general (i.e., over a reasonable span of time). Although this tends to be conflated with hedonia, as noted above, we regard it as a distinct form, as evaluative happiness is primarily cognitive, being a mental experience of quality with respect to evaluating one’s life, either as a whole or in specific domains. Given the vast literature on this form, we need not dwell further on its details. One salient point to address though is the suggestion that since such evaluations concern life as a whole, this form might offer an ultimate summary assessment of happiness, or even all wellbeing. However, someone may be dissatisfied with life overall (there are aspects with which they are unhappy), yet satisfied in what matters most to them (e.g., chaironic happiness). It is not clear such people would trade the latter for the former. Indeed, research on Nozick’s “experience machine” thought experiment suggest many people would not want a simulated existence of perfect satisfaction, and instead prefer a real life in all its vicissitudes (Hewitt, 2010), a point also borne out by the notion of a “psychologically rich life.” That said, such speculations are relatively untested. As such, we might propose that, (a) if asked to rank forms of happiness in terms of importance to them, most people would not place evaluative happiness at the very top; moreover, (b) of these people, if asked whether, to preserve their experience of their most valued form, they would significantly sacrifice evaluative happiness—for example dropping several rungs on Cantril’s ladder—a significant minority would assent.
Meaningful
This next form broaches territory usually associated with eudaimonia, as captured by Ryff’s (1989) model of “psychological wellbeing” (with its six dimensions of self-acceptance, positive relationships, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, and personal growth). However, as noted above, eudaimonia has now become a catch-all for anything happiness-related outside SWB, so an expanded taxonomy allows some qualities often bundled up within it to be acknowledged as distinct forms of happiness in their own right. In so doing, we reserve eudaimonia for self-development—the cultivation of character and virtue, as elucidated below—as this more closely aligns with classical theorizing on the concept. Doing so moreover allows other dimensions in Ryff’s model to be valued on their own terms. After all, some do not necessarily involve any such self-development, removing them from the scope of eudaimonia as classically understood. This concern applies to the notions of meaning and purpose. Extensive research has shown these to be integral to mental wellbeing, such as work using Steger et al.’s (2006) Meaning in Life Questionnaire. However, while cultivation of meaning/purpose may well involve self-development, crucially, people can experience these without any such development. For example, Seligman (2011) suggests meaning/purpose are above all found in “belonging to and serving something that you believe is bigger than then self” (p. 17). Crucially, many people find meaning in forms of communal participation, like supporting a sports team, that require no self-cultivation per se. So, distinct from eudaimonia, there is merit in identifying a separate form of meaningful happiness, being a mental experience of quality with respect to one’s meaning and purpose in life. That said, we might nevertheless predict that a given state of meaningful happiness would be stronger if it is combined with feelings of eudaimonic happiness (i.e., a sense of one’s own development).
Intellective
This next form also relates to eudaimonia, but tends to be overlooked by modern researchers. Nevertheless, it was certainly present in classical theorizing. In his Nicomachean Ethics—pivotal in elucidating the idea of eudaimonia—Aristotle suggests the highest happiness comes from the highest exercise of virtue, namely, the reflective study, contemplation, and understanding of what is best and most noble in life. For people spiritually inclined, such contemplation may take on a religious character (thus overlapping with chaironic happiness). In his interpretations of Aristotle, St. Aquinas for instance depicts such contemplation as a perfect happiness, involving a full, final intellective vision of God. Such considerations suggest one may attain elevated and rarefied states of being in thoughtful contemplation or understanding of some great good. We thus call this “intellective happiness”: a mental experience of quality relating to one’s intellectual or contemplative life. Although some scholars might simply enfold this within an expanded eudaimonia, we suggest it is distinct enough from self-development per se to merit its own form. That said, not only is the construct of “intellective happiness” new, there does not appear to be any empirical work pertaining to it (unlike most others, where even if the label is novel there is still a substantial research base). So, work will especially be needed on this. One line of enquiry is whether there are individual differences in people’s likelihood of valuing, seeking, and experiencing specific happiness forms. In that respect, we might envisage that intellective happiness will be higher in people with greater cognitive capacities (e.g., as indexed by IQ), and/or with a personality profile characterized by traits such as conscientiousness, introversion, and openness.
Aesthetic
While intellective happiness is an experience of quality relating to the contemplation and cognitive understanding of an object or idea, this is not the only kind of valued relationship one can have with such phenomena. Many people experience happiness through perceiving and appraising someone or something as beautiful (or aesthetically pleasing in other ways); likewise, for millennia humans have produced art forms that appeal, at least partly, to sensual appreciation. While such experiences may involve the intellect, they do not necessarily do so principally, and many may elude cognitive understanding altogether. In this realm for instance one might include states of awe, which Keltner and Haidt (2003) describe as “a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion . . . on the upper reaches of pleasure and the boundary of fear” (p. 297). Thus, aesthetic experiences could be deemed a distinct class of happiness experience: not merely a factor that influences it, but a form of happiness in its own right (Lomas, 2016), being a mental experience of quality concerning one’s sensual perceptions. While there is currently not much work on this notion, there is certainly a substantial literature on the psychological dimensions of aesthetics—such as the Desire for Aesthetic Experience Scale (Lundy et al., 2010)—which could be interpreted through the lens of our definition. Nevertheless, more research will be needed to explore this form. One resource for exploring its dynamics is Keltner and Haidt’s work on awe, which draws upon Romantic notions of the “sublime.” A particularly interesting aspect of that construct is that it may not only involve positively valenced emotions, but sometimes negatively valenced ones too, as explored by second wave positive psychology (Lomas & Ivtzan, 2016; Wong, 2011). Indeed, one might speculate that the most powerful experiences of aesthetic happiness will involve some negative emotional valence—combined with positive valence in a potent mixed emotion (Lomas, 2017)—thereby elevating the experience in complexity and profundity beyond those that are just positively valenced.
Absorbed
The fifth form relating to thinking uses this term in its broadest sense, referring to cognition in general. This form concerns the way attention modalities are deployed, involving valued states like absorption, engagement, and flow. A key notion in this space is Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) concept of flow, involving activities experienced as intrinsically rewarding and well matched to one’s skills, with an accompanying sense of total involvement, absorption, or concentration, such that one is completely task-focused (e.g., no extraneous thoughts). Such activities are not exactly enjoyable per se—otherwise they might be classed under hedonism—even if people describe enjoying them afterwards; essentially, emotional valence is not a central aspect of the experience. This terrain also encompasses the multitude of meditative practices and states, all of which involve training and developing attention skills, such that one can deploy these to benefit one’s wellbeing (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). We view such states as “absorbed happiness”—a mental experience of quality relating to one’s attentional engagement—though adjectives like engaged or attentive also suit. Indeed, as noted above vis-à-vis band 3, Seligman (2002) suggests engagement is one of three distinct pathways to overall mental wellbeing—alongside pleasure and meaning—with each described as “neither sufficient nor redundant; therefore necessitating cultivation of each to achieve the full life” (Schueller & Seligman, 2010, p. 253). In terms of further research, an interesting question is what differentiates mindfulness and flow. Although sometimes treated as similar or even identical, scholars are increasingly sensitive to potential differences (Cathcart et al., 2014), with a possible point of divergence being “self-presence”—how self-conscious versus selfless a state is (Millière, 2020). While selflessness is an ultimate goal of many forms of meditation, we predict that overall it is more easily and frequently attained during flow than mindfulness.
Doing Types
Eudaimonic
The final six forms are primarily about “doing,” of which the most well-known and studied is eudaimonia. However, although this term often serves as a catch-all for all happiness-related experiences outside SWB, as discussed above, we use it more narrowly to refer to self-development—aligning with classical depictions of the concept—being a mental experience of quality in relation to one’s sense of character development. Such development may be somewhat intangible and difficult to experience in the moment; it is more an appraisal that requires a person to observe and assess their life from some distance, over time. Nevertheless, one can, at a given moment, sense whether one is progressing toward one’s ideal version of oneself. In Ryff’s (1989) model of psychological wellbeing, for example, the personal development subcomponent is exemplified by someone who “has a feeling of continued development; sees self as growing and expanding. . . [and] sees improvement in self and behavior over time.” In terms of research questions, one suggestion pertains to us situating eudaimonia as primarily a form of doing. Our reading of eudaimonia leads us to hypothesize that, while it can be experienced when one is relatively quiescent (e.g., sitting in reflection), it is more likely encountered in the midst of physical behavior (e.g., action in service of one’s values). Moreover, this form of happiness may also involve negatively valenced emotions; indeed, one sign that a person is making progress is they are outside their comfort zone, mentally, physically, socially, or spiritually. Doing so may feel challenging, but ultimately can be integral to a sense of development. So, we further suggest the more difficult/challenging the behavior, the greater the eudaimonia.
Masterful
We now consider two further forms which are usually included in eudaimonia, but which also fall outside its boundaries as classically conceived, and are better valued on their own terms. This first refers to skilfully navigating life—captured in Ryff’s (1989) model as “mastery”—defined as a mental experience of quality concerning the development and use of one’s skills. While eudaimonia is primarily about character, mastery concerns skills, and although skills and character sometimes overlap, they are not identical (one can be skilled at abilities that matter little to one’s personal values but are nevertheless conducive to wellbeing). Moreover, skills are not necessarily about blossoming into one’s “best self”—the essence of eudaimonia—but the fit between oneself and one’s environment, and tend to be context-dependent and situationally relevant. This form of happiness also encompasses the rewards one may receive from successful skill use, both social (e.g., status) and nonsocial (e.g., material benefits, like safely negotiating one’s environs). Although this form lacks a research base per se, it pertains to phenomena with a vast literature—and associated construct and measurement development—especially coping and resilience. Although these latter constructs are usually explored in the context of mental illness rather than health, there are also moves to consider these in relation to positive wellbeing. For instance, Akin and Akin (2015) found that “coping competence” mediates the relationship between mindfulness and SWB. Moreover, we submit that such mastery is not only associated with happiness, but itself constitutes an experience of quality, hence being a form of happiness in its own right. The experience of acting masterfully can itself be rewarding, as shown by an extensive literature connecting work engagement to mental wellbeing (Li et al., 2022). While this form overlaps with absorbed happiness, it is temporally broader, extending beyond specific states of absorption per se; indeed, of all happiness forms, we suggest masterful may be among the most long-lasting (in an extended, continuous sense).
Accomplished
Closely related to mastery—yet worth differentiating—is accomplishment/achievement. Mastery often, but not always, leads to achievement, while achievement will sometimes but not always require mastery. Independent of mastery, accomplishment is a pillar of Seligman’s (2011) PERMA model of flourishing (with positive emotions, engagement, relationships, and meaning, which align respectively with hedonic, absorbed, relational, and meaningful happiness). While mastery concerns skill use in the present, accomplished happiness is more about the past and the outcome, constituting a mental experience of quality in relation to what one has achieved. Once again, although as a specific construct this is a novel proposition, a wealth of research can be interpreted through its lens, including extensive literatures on the interrelated topics of motivation and goals, both of which intrinsically involve accomplishment (Covington, 2000). Indeed, a common way to understand the very concept of valence is through notions of approach versus withdrawal, with feelings of pleasure and reward arising in relation to the extent one is progressing toward a goal. So, although construing accomplishment as a form of happiness per se is novel, there is a substantial scholarly basis for viewing such experiences as mental states of quality. In further exploring this form, an interesting angle is the question of moral worth (Nash et al., 2013). In that regard, we predict accomplished happiness will be heightened to the degree one appraises the successes it reflects as having such worth.
Harmonic
A key finding of the Global Wellbeing Initiative is the importance of balance and harmony in life. As with contented happiness, these notions are closely associated with Eastern cultures, and likewise are linked to low arousal positive emotions. However, as with the latter, the World Poll data shows balance and harmony are experienced and valued globally (Lomas, Lai, et al., 2022), as did Delle Fave et al.’s (2016) analyses of lay perceptions of happiness. The importance of these ideas has also been captured by Kjell et al.’s (2016) Harmony in Life Scale, focusing on “psychological balance and flexibility in life.” In this and follow up work by Kjell and Diener (2021), the authors suggest such harmony constitutes a distinct aspect of the cognitive component of SWB. Rather than this component being unidimensional (just life satisfaction), they argue it has two factors (i.e., also involving harmony in life). Such findings augment the process of granular disaggregation we have deployed here with SWB, where we separated its cognitive aspect into its own form of evaluative happiness, and differentiated the affective aspect into two forms—high arousal (hedonic) and low arousal (contented). Complementing this process, Kjell’s work suggests we should likewise differentiate the cognitive component into evaluative and harmonic happiness, the latter being a mental experience of quality with respect to how well the different elements of one’s life are ordered and operating together. This is still a new area of enquiry though, so more work is needed. In terms of hypotheses, we suggest harmonic and evaluative happiness ought not to be too highly correlated (e.g., at least below 0.7), which would justify Kjell and colleagues’ suggestion of treating them as separate components of SWB’s cognitive dimension.
Nirvanic
This taxonomy has mainly drawn on contemporary academic concepts relating to happiness. However, many religious/spiritual traditions have also developed detailed ideas in this area, and moreover continue to meaningfully contribute to our understanding of this topic, including insights presently not well understood by modern science. Buddhism in particular has a wealth of psychologically-oriented theories about happiness of all kinds. Uppermost is its ultimate goal, nirvāṇa, a complex concept which alludes to the complete and lasting cessation of duḥkha (roughly, suffering), and attainment of mokṣa (total freedom), resulting from following the Buddhist path (Collins, 2010). This path involves various actions (e.g., ethical behavior), hence positioning this form as relating to “doing.” Thus, nirvanic happiness might be conceived as a mental experience of quality with respect to one’s capacity to be relatively permanently free of suffering. While rarefied and even esoteric territory, such teachings remind us we have yet much to explore and understand in this arena. To that point, although this form lacks a substantial modern empirical research base, a voluminous literature has developed within Buddhist and other traditions over the centuries around such states, elucidating their properties in depth. We accord with modern scholars of such accounts in taking them seriously as illuminating significant potentials of the human condition (Fontana, 2007). Indeed, some empirical inroads are being made: there is now considerable research on the neurophysiology of meditation, for instance, including advanced transcendent states (Wahbeh et al., 2018). Still, much more work is needed. To that point, while this form is ostensibly linked to Buddhism, similar themes appear in other traditions, and many cultures have concepts that represent a similar apotheosis. Thus, we predict mental states with significant similarities to nirvāṇa will be found across cultures and religious/spiritual traditions.
Relational
This final form is—as per chaironic and vital happiness—of a different ontological order to the rest: happiness as a relational phenomenon. The others can all be conceived essentially as individual-level phenomena. Even if they involve other people—for example, relationships are one component of Ryff's (1989) notion of psychological wellbeing—all are conceptualized as existing within the person as an inner psychological state, potentially reflecting the individualism of the Western cultures that shaped psychology (Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008). By contrast, some other cultures—especially those seen as “collectivistic”—prioritize perspectives on happiness that are fundamentally relational (Izquierdo, 2005). However, even in relatively individualistic Western cultures, people still need close relationships and recognize their importance, as per the voluminous literature on social capital (Putnam, 1995). Indeed, Western cultures may actually be less individualistic than their common stereotype suggests; the 2020 Gallup World Poll included an item asking “Do you think people should focus more on taking care of themselves or on taking care of others?,” and the percentage of people endorsing the latter other-oriented option was higher overall in Western rather than Eastern cultures (Lomas et al., 2023). In any case, arguably the apex of relational happiness is love, which most people would surely regard as universal. Such relational happiness—which Hitokoto and Uchida (2015) call interdependent happiness—is intersubjective, existing at the level of multiple people as an emergent gestalt phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is still experienced by individuals, so can be defined as a mental state of quality arising from an interpersonal dynamic. This of course overlaps with social wellbeing, as vital and chaironic happiness do with physical and spiritual wellbeing. However, as in those cases, it is also worth having this as a mental experiential concept. The key point here is that relationships are not merely a factor that influences happiness, but in themselves may constitute a form of happiness, one which only exists in an interpersonal way. More work is needed to explore this form, though some progress has already been made through Hitokoto and Uchida’s (2015) Interdependent Happiness Scale, which has started to be explored in contexts like Italy and Poland (Mosca et al., 2021) and Turkey (Demirci, 2022). In that respect, inspired by the findings in the Gallup World Poll, we predict relational happiness will be more highly sought, valued, and experienced in Western cultures than many people may assume or expect (given these places’ reputation as individualistic).
Conclusion
This paper has proposed an expanded taxonomy of happiness, featuring 16 distinct forms. However, this is a novel framework, and will require corroboration in future research. To that end, for each form, we offered a hypothesis that may help establish its validity. Building on these predictions, we conclude here by adding some general hypotheses and considerations that apply across all forms, and provide a roadmap for exploring the contours of happiness in greater detail. First, a general principle is that for the taxonomy to be upheld, it should be possible to differentiate the forms empirically. Thus, an overall prediction is that self-report scales for the forms ought to not correlate too highly, while there will nevertheless be some correlation. One might envisage that, just as any given set of intelligence tests tends to result in a common “g” factor (general intelligence), so might we find a common “h” factor, where overall a person’s scores on different forms of happiness tend to coalesce around similar levels—influenced for instance by genetically-influenced temperament (Lomas, Bartels, et al., 2022). Indeed, several overarching constructs have been proposed that might serve as a potential unifying factor, including positive orientation (Caprara et al., 2010) and the joyful life (Robbins, 2021). A fruitful line of enquiry will be to explore the extent to which these concepts map onto and potentially—if serving as an overarching h factor—encompass all 16 forms. If assigning figures, we might expect a range of correlations between the forms of .3 to .7 (based on Ryff’s (1989) work on psychological wellbeing, which had correlations between its dimensions ranging from .32 to .72). Currently not all forms have scales—notably intellective and nirvanic happiness—and their development will be a key aspect of future research. As for the remaining 14, these do have scales that would serve as a basis for empirical enquiry.
Where possible, psychometric analyses could ideally be augmented by other methods, especially qualitative and neurophysiological approaches. First, gaining rich qualitative data about the forms would help elucidate their nature (in addition to any psychometric analysis). Participants could perhaps be recruited based on experiencing a given type, and asked about it through in-depth interviews, with the results analyzed by a method such as Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, which allows in-depth exploration of subjectivity. Complementing such analyses are neurophysiological assessments of these states. For example, there are already hundreds of such studies of meditative states, giving valuable clues about their neurophysiological signatures (Lomas, et al., 2015). Even more powerfully, the neurophenomenology paradigm combines both approaches, triangulating phenomenological analysis of qualia with neurophysiological analyses of brain states, providing integrative accounts of how realms might intersect (Cahn & Polich, 2006). This kind of program could be employed to explore all forms of happiness. This would require inducing these while a person is connected to a relevant neurophysiological recording device. One possibility is using virtual/augmented reality technology to immerse people in digital environments geared toward generating specific forms of happiness. For instance, Chirico et al. (2021) used virtual reality to induce experiences of the sublime (a concept discussed above in relation to aesthetic happiness). Although they did not conduct neurophysiological assessment during this experience, one could conceivably add it to the paradigm. In such a way, we would obtain a neurophysiological signature of the sublime. One could then augment this approach with qualitative interviews to truly obtain a detailed picture of this state. One could aim to similarly elicit and study all happiness forms in this manner, thereby developing detailed understanding of not only their subjective dynamics, but how these dynamics relate to their corresponding neurophysiology, which will truly allow us to chart the fine-grained forms of happiness in all their rich complexity.
Finally, future work would also ideally trace the relationships between this taxonomy and other theories and frameworks that likewise pertain to the broad terrain we are labeling happiness—or more generically, mental wellbeing—but which conceptually carve it up in other ways. One important example is Maslow’s work on self-actualization, as for example interpreted by Kaufman (2023), whose new scale of self-actualization features ten dimensions, in which one can arguably see refracted the various happiness forms, including: continued freshness of appreciation (e.g., absorbed, aesthetic, chaironic, and intellective); acceptance (contented, evaluative, harmonic, and mature); authenticity (eudaimonic, masterful, and mature); equanimity (contented, mature, and nirvanic); purpose (accomplished, masterful, and meaningful); efficient perception of reality (absorbed, aesthetic, and intellective); humanitarianism (harmonic, meaningful, and relational); peak experiences (chaironic, hedonic, and nirvanic); good moral intuition (eudaimonic and relational); and creative spirit (aesthetic and intellective). As one can see, these dimensions potentially capture all forms here, except perhaps vital, interestingly, which possibly reflects the way the body has largely been overlooked by psychology. Another key framework in the arena of mental wellbeing is self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Again, one can picture how the happiness forms might pertain to its core needs of relatedness (especially relational happiness), achievement (especially accomplished, evaluative, and masterful happiness), and autonomy (with the most relevant form perhaps being eudaimonic happiness, albeit less directly). However, that the latter lacks an obvious candidate speaks to the fact that our taxonomy may not be exhaustive, and may warrant including additional forms. Vis-à-vis autonomy, for instance, one might imagine a further form centered on experiences like individuation, liberation, freedom, etc., perhaps as a form of “liberated happiness.”
In addition to these multidimensional frameworks are various specific constructs which also pertain to mental wellbeing and which we would likewise want to situate in relation to our taxonomy. Indeed, in the sections above we already identified numerous concepts ones that pertain to different forms. However, some are not so easily pigeonholed, and are more overarching, spanning numerous forms. We noted above that positive orientation and the joyful life potentially cover all forms. Besides these are various others which, if not as all-encompassing, at least pertain to several forms. Resilience for example not only relates to coping and adaptation, but has been explored from a virtue perspective as “a positive by-product of having endured adversities while transforming them into insightful opportunities for renewal” (Kim et al., 2018, p. 195). Such qualities would appear integral to numerous forms, not only masterful (as discussed above), but also accomplished, eudaimonic, mature, and nirvanic. Another fecund concept is love of life (Abdel-Khalek, 2007), which taps into many forms, especially absorbed, aesthetic, chaironic, hedonic, and nirvanic. Finally, besides relating the taxonomy to other ideas concerning mental wellbeing specifically, it will also be valuable to situate it relative to concepts across psychology more broadly. A prime example is the Big Five model of personality; indeed, not only have factors like extraversion been linked to happiness (Lucas & Fujita, 2000), but “stable extraversion” has been proposed as constituting happiness (Frances, 1999). However, such research tends to focus on hedonic and evaluative happiness, and it is unclear how personality dimensions would map onto other forms. That said, one might hypothesize that openness to experience may pertain especially to absorbed, aesthetic, and intellective happiness, agreeableness to contented, harmonic, and relational happiness, and conscientiousness to accomplished, eudaimonic, and masterful happiness. However, these conjectures will need exploring in future. At the very least, as this conclusion has indicated, there is fertile ground to explore not only in developing an enriched conception of happiness, but situating its constructs within the broader network of ideas in psychology, and beyond that within the still-wider web of concepts across the myriad fields interested in wellbeing. It is hoped this paper will provide a foundation and impetus for this kind of enquiry, allowing us to develop a better understanding of these vital topics.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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