Abstract
This article focuses on the positioning of Belgian trade unions (TUs) toward a universal basic income (UBI). While there is some previous empirical work suggesting that TUs are unlikely to support this potential welfare reform because of ideological and strategic motives, we still lack a broader understanding of the factors influencing unions’ hostility toward a UBI. This study aims to fill this gap by adopting a multifactor approach that considers the impact of (1) the broader institutional, political, and socioeconomic context; (2) unions’ ideologies and values, and (3) the relation to their members’ attitudes. Based on in-depth interviews with Belgian union leaders, we untangle how their positioning is shaped by multiple considerations. We find that Belgian TUs are concerned about the budgetary implications of a UBI, as well as the uncertainty of politically tinted UBI proposals. They want to maintain the current social insurance system and their prominent institutional role within that system. We note that the rationale behind their opposition is shaped by their union-specific philosophical tendencies and their attachment to work. Lastly, their constituencies’ attitudes do not affect their positioning. By contrast, we find a top-down approach, as they emphasize their role in “educating” their members about a UBI.
Introduction
Since the early twentieth century, and especially in the post-World War II period, trade unions (TUs) have been pillar actors in the construction of European welfare states. As essential stakeholders in welfare states, TUs strive to keep shaping the development of social policies (Hyman, 2001) and to secure the social acquis. This also implies that they remain cautious regarding reforms that could end up as retrenchment strategies. These new elements that affect the sociopolitical reality, along with labor market evolution, have led to a “disadjustment of the welfare state” (Carbonnier and Palier, 2022). In this regard, reforms are proposed in order to make welfare states more adapted to the current social evolutions and context.
Among these, the proposal of a universal basic income (UBI) is the object of growing scrutiny, and both scientific and political discussions tend to take a more concrete turn (see e.g. De Wispelaere and Noguera, 2012; Geels, 2023; Van Parijs, 2004). In its canonical form, a UBI can be described as a certain amount of money, granted to every member of a political community without any obligation in return, and regardless of recipients’ personal and financial situation. Three characteristics thus define UBI: its individuality (a cash income granted to an individual rather than a household), its unconditionality (no behavioral requirements), and its universality (all adult residents of a community are entitled to receive it) (Dumont, 2022; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). However, the concept of UBI is multidimensional (Laenen et al., 2022). UBI proposals can vary along different axes (such as the amount, financing, and integration within the existing welfare system) and there is thus no predefined form or design for a UBI.
Specialized literature has mostly argued that TUs are likely to oppose the introduction of a UBI for various reasons (Offe, 2009; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). The reasons given are usually of both an ideological and a strategic nature, for example, comprising the idea that a UBI would reduce TUs’ collective bargaining power and goes against deeply valued work ethics. Nevertheless, what is still generally lacking is empirical research delving into which factors influence the actual positions taken by trade unions and their representatives (see Vanderborght, 2006 and Cigna, 2021 for notable exceptions). The scarce research that is available has mostly focused on TUs’ ideological opposition to (or support for) a UBI (see Cigna, 2021 for an excellent example), thereby downplaying the fact that there are likely to be multiple factors simultaneously contributing to their positioning.
This article builds on the theoretical “Welfare Reform From Below” framework developed by Ebbinghaus and Naumann (2018) to uncover how TUs’ positioning toward a UBI is influenced by (1) the broader (institutional, political, and socioeconomic) context in which TUs operate, (2) their ideologies and values, and (3) the relation to their constituencies’ attitudes. The article contributes to existing scholarship in three essential ways. First, to better understand the various reasons why TUs oppose or support a UBI, we adopt a multifactor and fine-grained empirical approach that goes beyond the main focus of previous research, which typically considers only ideology or strategy. Second, this is the first study to empirically compare the positions of different TUs within a country to test whether their positions diverge according to their distinct ideologies and the attitudes of their constituencies. Third, we analyze the link between the positions expressed by trade union representatives and the attitudes of their members. Some scholars, such as Laenen (2023), have argued that rank-and-file members may very well have different interests and opinions than their top representatives, who could be particularly influenced by concerns that a UBI might enhance workers’ individual bargaining power at the expense of their collective strength. To our knowledge, we are the first to connect the UBI positions of the “heads” of TUs (their most senior representatives) to those of the “body” (the union members) in an empirical analysis.
In the following, we first present a review of the state of the art and explain how we apply Ebbinghaus and Naumann's theoretical framework to the specific welfare reform of UBI in the context of the Belgian welfare state. We argue that Belgium is a relevant case to consider, because the different TUs continue to play an important part in social policymaking (due to their institutionally embedded roles; Faniel, 2018; Van Rie et al., 2011; Vandaele, 2006). Further, UBI has recently been discussed as a more serious welfare reform option (mainly in the French-speaking part of the country; see Geels, 2023), and Belgium has high-quality survey data available on TU members’ attitudes toward different UBI proposals (gathered as part of the Basic Income in Belgium survey, which purposefully over-sampled TU members; see Laenen et al., 2023). Second, we provide more information about the collection and analysis of in-depth interviews that were held with Belgian TU representatives. Third, we build on these interviews to explore the role played by the main factors identified in the theoretical framework: the macrolevel (the Belgian context), TUs’ ideology, and constituencies’ attitudes. Lastly, we summarize the main conclusions and reflect on the transferability of our findings to UBI proposals in other countries and to other welfare reforms.
Theoretical framework
Theoretically, this article starts off from Ebbinghaus and Naumann's (2018) analytical framework about the policy positioning of interest groups (see annex for the original framework), as this framework adopts a multifactorial approach to understand interest groups’ positioning toward welfare reforms. This framework identifies three main factors: the institutional and socioeconomic context, the reform itself, and public attitudes. Within the context of this research, we revisited the framework as presented in Figure 1, by specifying the three elements that are relevant to our study: the macrolevel context, TUs’ ideologies, and TUs’ relation to the attitudes of their constituencies (rather than the public, as in the original framework). These elements are essential, because they take into account both the specific overarching context that affects all unions equally, and the possible variation between different unions within the same national context. This is reflected in the fact that different TUs can vary in terms of (1) their ideological identities and emphasis (cf. factor “TU ideology”) and (2) the policy preferences of their respective constituencies (cf. factor “constituencies’ attitudes”).
The revisited framework is developed by essentially applying Ebbinghaus and Naumann's (2018) broad category of the institutional and socioeconomic context to the macrolevel context (indicated by arrow a in Figure 1). This category refers to the specific sociopolitical reality, comprising different societal actors operating within a similar economic and institutional context that shapes their actions. Second, we add two novel elements. On the one hand, TUs’ ideologies (indicated by arrow b). This aspect emerged from our reading of the limited literature on TUs’ positioning toward a UBI (most notably Cigna, 2019, 2021). In this regard, limited empirical research has previously been conducted to investigate TUs’ attitudes toward a UBI. As one of the few, Vanderborght's (2006) document analysis shows that the reasons for unions’ suspicion of UBI are linked to their work ethic and their fear of losing institutional power. The fact that a UBI questions the centrality of paid work would make the balance of power unfavorable to unions. Exploring TUs’ positions in four different national contexts, Vanderborght (2006) came to the conclusion that the institutions could influence their stance, but adherence by a majority of union members would still be hard to acquire due to the insider/outsider fracture. Other UBI scholars emphasize the risk of weak support from unions for a UBI due to their laborist philosophy (De Wispelaere and Noguera, 2012), or out of fear of loss of responsibility and power (Offe, 2009). In a similar vein, Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017) argue that unions would dread the possibility of a UBI lowering the general wage level, subsidizing low-paid jobs, and replacing the whole social system. Unions also suspect that it would affect their bargaining power, as wages would no longer be central, implying more dispersed collective action (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017).
Revisited theoretical framework.
Overall, most research on TUs and UBI has tended to consider unions’ dismissal of UBI proposals as a given, overlooking the concrete reasons behind it. In his study, Cigna (2019, 2021) empirically investigated the attitudes of various European TUs toward a UBI, building on in-depth interviews with TU representatives. Four explanatory factors influencing the positions of unions in developed countries are identified: the national level of economic insecurity, unions’ attachment to work ethics, their degree of institutionalization, and the generosity of the welfare state. Cigna argues that less institutionalized unions in weaker or “deregulated” welfare systems facing economic precarity may be keener to support a UBI than their counterparts in continental or Nordic systems, as they see the proposal as a potential improvement to their feeble welfare system. By contrast, in “continental” welfare states, such as Belgium, unions are deemed to oppose a UBI for several reasons. On idealistic grounds, they fundamentally reject the idea of a universal and unconditional benefit because of their strong work ethic. On a more strategic practical basis, they perceive a UBI as a threat to their institutional power and as conducive to a more segmented and powerless workforce (Cigna, 2019, 2021).
It is nevertheless important to note that our understanding of TU ideologies differs somewhat from that proposed by Cigna (2019, 2021), who interprets TUs as monolithic blocks that share similar values and norms within countries, insisting on union profiles related to the type of welfare regime in which they are integrated, rather than adding differentiations between unions within countries. By contrast, our approach acknowledges this within-country variation, focusing on the specific ideological and philosophical stances that different TUs maintain regarding a UBI. Moreover, our understanding of TU ideology aligns closely with Hyman's (1997, 2001) seminal contributions, as we highlight that the “dominant identities” of TUs are shaped by the specific context in which these organizations have developed, and that unions have divergent ideological orientations (market, society, and class) that shape their behavior. In addition, TUs’ relation to their constituencies’ attitudes was not extensively explored in Cigna's research, while it is integrated in our framework. This relation (indicated by the double sided arrow d) is inferred from Ebbinghaus and Naumann's (2018) suggested complex interplay between a “logic of influence” and a “logic of membership.” The former pertains to the long-term interests of TU organizations seeking to safeguard their hard-won position as “social partners” by actively participating in the development of social policy (Hyman, 2001). Within this strategic position, they will inform and mobilize their members—their constituencies—to advance their political agenda. For instance, this rationale manifests in strike actions or other forms of resistance in response to political decisions deemed to be unfavorable to them. The “logic of membership” refers to their constituencies’ short-term (self-)interests that may differ from the greater purpose toward which TUs are striving. This distinction is relevant, because it highlights the ambiguity that can arise when operating as an intermediary organization between the political realm of policymaking and public opinion (Ebbinghaus and Naumann, 2018: 4). Accordingly, the framework argues that TUs and their representatives should to some extent be responsive to their members—although perhaps more to some (such as labor market insiders) than to others (such as like their outsider counterparts)—but are also likely to try and influence their constituencies’ attitudes through framing and information provision.
In this regard, previous research points to the importance of their members in the historical process of acquiring an institutionalized political and regulatory role, and achieving gains in key policy areas (such as reducing working hours). One of the main sources of power for unions therefore lies in the mobilization of their constituencies (Ibsen and Tapia, 2017). In return, TUs commit to vigorously promote the interests of their members at the various levels of bargaining (Cigna, 2021). Ebbinghaus and Naumann (2018) nevertheless suggest that TU organizations can take policy positions that are at odds with the interests of their members for strategic considerations. For example, in the case of the Statutory Retirement Age reform (SRA) in Germany (a reform raising the statutory retirement age to 67), TUs ceased opposing the reform to the detriment of their (immediate) members’ interests and opinions. This is because they considered the decision to be beneficial to them in terms of strategic outcomes (Klitzeke, 2018). In a similar vein, Butler and Dynes (2016) argue that political actors often disregard opinions of their constituencies that contradict their ideological or strategic position. This process is called “disagreement discounting” and refers to a process of rationalizing differences in opinions by minimizing the actual knowledge of their constituents about a specific topic. In sum, these examples clearly show that the positioning of TUs toward a specific reform is highly dynamic and, in particular, subject to different and sometimes contradictory considerations they have to navigate between.
The case of a UBI is evidently not comparable with the SRA reform, since the UBI proposal has not reached the stage of policy implementation. Nevertheless, a similar confrontation of competing interests could arise, as several scholars (Cigna 2021; Laenen, 2023; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017) argue that a UBI could be a topic of interest from the perspective of TU members. For instance, they point to its potential to increase the individual power of workers and to transform the nature of labor relations, giving workers the “power to say no,” an “exit option,” and refusing poorly paid jobs or detrimental work conditions (Vanderborght, 2006; Widerquist, 2013). A UBI could offer resources for collective actions, such as strike funds (Raventós and Raventós, 2013; Vanderborght, 2006), and strengthen and unify the working class (Raventós and Raventós, 2013). However, other scholars (see e.g. Laenen, 2023) argue that TU members may also have good reasons to oppose a UBI, for example, because of its unconditional nature that is at odds with their strong work ethic. That is, unions traditionally defend the centrality of a fairly paid and stable employment with good working conditions in people's life (Vanderborght, 2006). Many union members might think that a fully unconditional UBI would disincentive paid work, thereby undermining its societal importance. Overall, quantitative survey research on the attitudes of TU members toward a UBI is inconclusive about the precise effect of union membership as this variable has no statistically significant effect in most existing studies (Parolin and Siöland, 2020; Vlandas, 2019: 63), meaning that union members do not hold significantly different attitudes than nonunion members. It should be noted, however, that this might be due to low sample sizes in previous surveys, which were not designed to test the impact of TU membership specifically (as was the survey discussed below).
Trade unions in the Belgian context
Belgium is a Bismarckian (Esping-Andersen, 1990), or contributory welfare state. This means that social policies are historically based on workers’ and employers’ contributions. However, assistance mechanisms have also been integrated progressively. Some means-tested social allowances are now funded from public contributions (e.g. state subsidies and VAT income) to help people in need, regardless of their work contribution (Dumont, 2022). In Belgium, the so-called social partners (TUs and employers’ organizations) are institutionally designated to lead social negotiations, representing the interests of their members. This social dialogue model (Capron et al., 2013) implies that TUs and employers’ organizations are also part of many interprofessional interest committees (Arcq and Blaise, 2007). From originally being dual, this model has progressively become a tripartite scheme by including the state in the negotiations. It has also progressively been extended to the regional level, transferring some competences to regional committees (Guisset, 2019). At the national level, federal authorities have the final say and the power to enforce a decision in case of nonagreement between social partners. The decision-making process between the state and interest groups is thus organized in line with this neocorporatist model (Schmitter, 1974).
TUs remain major players in the institutional Belgian scene. The trade union density was just above 50% in 2019, indicating only a small decline over the years (it was 56% in 2000). By comparison, the estimated OECD average reached only 15% in 2019 (OECD, 2022). Belgium has also been described as a de facto or partial Ghent system (Van Rie et al., 2011): trade unions administer payments of unemployment insurance, financed by social contributions. In the Ghent system, unions are responsible for managing unemployment insurance, allowing them to “recruit and retain union members within all occupational groups and retain unemployed workers” (Ibsen and Tapia, 2017). However, it is not a “pure” form of the Ghent system, because unemployment insurance is compulsory and there is an additional agency, not linked to any unions (Van Rie et al., 2011). Trade unions thus have strong institutional roles. Economic and political contexts also influence their positions and arguments in welfare politics. Indeed, in the context of a globalized economy and binding (or not) European standards, the Belgian economic landscape is shaped by injunctions to respect budgetary orthodoxy, foster territorial competitiveness and limit the expenses of social security (Evrard and Piron, 2023). Unions are aware of such constraints and, as will be explored in the analysis part (see the Belgian context unfavorable to a UBI section), try to adapt their positions to it. Besides, the Belgian political context is characterized by a fragmentation of the political landscape, with a high number of political parties structured around different cleavages, but parties remain predominant actors in the decision-making process (Delwit and van Haute, 2021), which pushes other “gatekeepers” such as TUs to take a stance in relation to what parties do, as will be touched upon in the development of this article's arguments (see the Belgian context unfavorable to a UBI section).
It is interesting to note that unlike almost all political organizations in Belgium—such as political parties or other interest groups—Belgian union confederations are still national (rather than regional) and have centralized (rather than decentralized) decision-making bodies. The structure of Belgian unions encompasses regional and sectoral subsections to which the head is accountable (illustrating the “logic of membership” mentioned above). This national and interprofessional “head” of the trade union is in charge of coordinating the different levels and orienting the whole movement with common positions (logic of influence) (Boulet, 2013). One of the reasons behind this is that their core interests concern competences that are still mostly prerogatives of the federal level, including social security and the defense of workers’ rights (Fraussen et al., 2017). However, the day-to-day organization is divided between linguistic sections and influenced by different sociopolitical contexts from one side of the language frontier to the other. Indeed, these sociopolitical contexts are not shaped the same way, as, according to Dandoy and Lebrun (in Delwit and van Haute, 2021: 104): “The political center of gravity is more to the right in Flanders, while it is comparatively more to the left in the French-speaking region.” 1
Belgium has three main trade unions: a socialist, a Christian, and a liberal one. The socialist union, the ABVV-FGTB, was instituted in 1945, although its history can be traced back to 1898 as the unionist commission of the former communist party. This trade union is the strongest in Wallonia, and its membership base amounts to 1,535,000 members (FGTB, 2024). The Christian union, the ACV-CSC, is the largest in Belgium with 1.5 million members (CSC, 2024) and is the strongest in Flanders. The first Christian union was founded in 1886, but the ACV-CSC was officially established in 1912. Lastly, the liberal trade union, the ACLVB-CGSLB, finds its roots in craft unions started in Ghent in 1857 (basis of the so-called Ghent system), inspiring the first strictly liberal trade union in 1893, in opposition to the socialist and Christian nature of other unions (Faniel, 2018). After the emergence of a Flemish liberal union in 1920, the ACLVB-CGSLB took its current form in 1939. It had 307,737 members in 2022 (CGSLB, 2024).
Belgian TUs are historically rooted in a “pillarized” society. The pillarization refers to the historic division of the sociopolitical context and the existence of three main pillars in Belgium: the Christian, the socialist, and the liberal one. They are defined as networks of organizations, including a political party, centered around a common ideological base (CRiSP, 2021). Broadly, this means that respective unions’ ideologies have been shaped over decades by the “pillar” to which they belong, and the three of them have specific core values and organizational structures. This pillarized organization also implies that unions have historically maintained close links to civil society and social movements through the sister organizations of their pillar, and have embodied a vital role as an intermediary between civil society and the state. To put it simply, the socialist union has always placed emphasis on the class struggle, the Christian one on reaching an inclusive society, promoting constructive dialogue and compromising with the employers’ side. Lastly, the liberal union embraces the liberal philosophy, a Belgian exceptionality (Faniel, 2018), and has built its identity in opposition to both the socialist ideology and the Christian influence. This also implies that trade unions were historically close to their party counterparts, although this tie has tended to fade over the years, to varying extents in each pillar (Delwit, 2021a). For example, the socialist union tends to maintain closer links to the socialist parties PS and Vooruit, although it is increasingly connected to the “Belgium's Party of Work” (PTB-PVDA, of Marxist obedience) (Delwit, 2021b) than the two other unions have with, respectively, the liberal and Christian parties.
In addition, labor unions are highly visible in social movements and within civil society (Faniel, 2018), and act as political actors embracing ideological positions and values. While some of them are shared, because they are inherent to the role as workers’ representatives—such as the defense of solidarity—others depend on their respective philosophicopolitical line. This will be detailed in the analysis section. Despite their ideological differences, it is important to note that unions’ mobilizations and actions are also marked by a strong culture of forming a “united front” (front commun syndical) (Faniel, 2018), for example, standing together in opposing austerity measures, taming their interunion differences touched on in the previous paragraph.
Analysis
Methods
Our study of the positioning of Belgian TUs toward a UBI is based on qualitative research. First, we conducted a thorough gray literature review in order to become familiar with the unions’ main arguments and positions concerning UBI. This included analyzing internal documents, press interviews, union websites, or conferences in which union officials intervened on the UBI theme. These do not provide a full understanding of why TUs oppose or support a UBI, and we accordingly conducted a series of in-depth interviews with senior TU representatives. The initial exploration of the gray literature nevertheless helped us to design our interview grids. The arguments presented in the internal documentation were made more explicit and developed during interviews. For this reason, we primarily present interview quotes rather than gray literature elements in the article. The second stage consisted of semistructured in-depth interviews with a total of nine TU representatives from the different Belgian TU confederations. We contacted senior leaders of these unions by email and favored face-to-face interviews. The semistructured format offers a double advantage: being minimally formalized, predesigned questions enable us to grasp information on the main issues in our research, but at the same time this guideline can be deviated from, in order to react to an interviewee's answers with follow-up questions (Coman et al., 2016).
The first wave comprised interviews held at the end of 2022 with Francophone representatives of the national heads of confederations. Our interview grid was structured along two axes: first, the official position of the TUs concerning UBI, the reasons behind it, and its link to the current system were explored. Second, the internal logic and relationships between the head of the organization and the members’ attitudes were investigated. To this end, we presented representatives with information regarding their members’ levels of support for different UBI design features, which we designed ourselves (Supplemental Appendix C), following a multidimensional approach (Laenen et al., 2022) and based on the BABEL survey (see Laenen et al., 2023 for more information on the data). This was a large-scale opinion survey conducted in spring 2021, to assess the extent to which support for the introduction of a UBI in Belgium is influenced by its policy design and predicted outcomes. The interview grid and the percentages of the level of support per confederation can be found in the Supplemental Appendix (respectively, Supplemental Appendices A2 and C). For the survey, trade union members were purposefully over-sampled (N = 1000). For the first wave of the qualitative interviews, we met the President of ABVV-FGTB (the socialist union) on 29 November 2022, the National Secretary of ACLVB-CGSLB (the liberal union) on 30 November 2022, and both the General Secretary and the Political Secretary of ACV-CSC (the Christian union) on 14 December 2022. All the interviews lasted between 70 and 755 minutes, were held in French, and were recorded and transcribed. They took place at the unions’ respective headquarters in Brussels.
The second wave of interviews aimed at diversifying our sample. Although the unions are nationally centralized, the differences in sociocultural contexts between the north and south of Belgium pushed us to interview Dutch-speaking leaders in order to reach better diversity in the sample. Further, unions are not only composed of overarching national bodies, but also of interprofessional, regionalized unions. To grasp the full picture of the unions’ diverse subgroups, we additionally interviewed representatives of these “centrales.” The interview grid was also adapted: we included sections relating to the characteristics of their centrale to their decision-making process, their affiliates, and their self-assessed role in future society (see Supplemental Appendix A3). Focusing on these two profiles in the second wave allowed us to reach data saturation, as information we collected from these interviews began to be superfluous with regard to our research questions. The interviews in this wave were held with the National Secretary of the ACV-CSC (10 May 2023), the President of the Employees, Technicians and Managers union (SETCa - BBTK, ABVV-FGTB, 30 March 2023), the vice president of the SETCa-BBTK (ABVV-FGTB, 31 March 2023), the President of the General Centrale and of the East-Flanders regional centrale (ABVV-FGTB, 13 April 2023), and the National Secretary of the Employees National Union (CNE, ACV-CSC, 5 May 2023).
With regard to the content of the primary qualitative data, this was analyzed through thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis allows for an iterative process combining inductive and deductive reasoning through going back and forth between the qualitative data and the findings in literature (Paillé and Muchielli, 2021; Sabbe et al., 2021). Our analytical journey was inspired by abductive thematic analysis (Atkinson et al., 2003; Thompson, 2022): this means that we both engaged with existing literature and raw empirical data to investigate our dataset and exert theoretical findings. This continuous thematization process comprised different steps (Sabbe et al., 2021). As mentioned, we held a first round of interviews, followed by an inductive sequence of coding. Based solely on the data (fully transcribed interviews), notable quotes and main topics were identified during this sequence. This allowed us to pinpoint three streams of arguments used by interviewees to justify their opposition to a UBI. The interview grid for the second round of interviews was built on the previous steps, and on the identification of gaps in our dataset. After having fully transcribed these four interviews, we worked on a common coding scheme. The coding categories were designed in a more deductive fashion, to a large extent based on the theoretical frame presented above. We tested a first version of this coding scheme, allowing us to refine it and add elements we retrieved from the second round of interviews. The final version of our coding scheme (Supplemental Appendix B) was the result of this long iterative process between theory and empiricism, resulting in coding categories of both an inductive and a deductive nature. Our revisited framework based on Ebbinghaus and Naumann (2018) thus guided the analysis and helped us structure the data, while the inductive approach allowed us to navigate the data with more flexibility and complement the analysis with unexpected results. We lastly coded all our interviews following this scheme and extracted coding units by themes to facilitate the analysis.
As stated earlier, our analysis explores how the Belgian context, unions’ ideologies, and their constituencies influence the positioning of Belgian TUs toward the proposal of a UBI. To this end, the following paragraphs are arranged in three categories based on our theoretical frame and our thematic analysis: TUs and the Belgian context, TUs’ ideologies, and TUs’ structures and relation to their constituencies. The following paragraphs show a more nuanced picture than portrayed in previous research concerning TUs’ relationship with a UBI. Our approach integrates the influence of the socioinstitutional context, the ideologies of the respective unions, their relations with their constituencies. This comprehensive approach is novel in the field and allows us to go beyond the simplistic claim that unions’ rejection of UBI is solely due to their labor philosophy or fear of institutional power loss. We will show that determining an official stance toward a UBI is a complex process involving multiple factors and actors.
Belgian context unfavorable to a UBI
As touched on, Belgian TUs have an important institutional role and participate in the management and reforms of social security. This section explores how the Belgian context, in its specific institutional—but also sociopolitical and economic—dimension, influences unions’ positioning toward a UBI.
First, in the context of neoliberal economic orthodoxy and budgetary constraint, all unions assessed that a UBI would not be financeable, stressing the limited nature of public funds. In such circumstances, the UBI reform is deemed to be a waste of resources and that one could “better spend this amount giving more to those who are in complicated situations rather than to those who aren't” (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB). Assuming a budget-neutral environment, leaders maintain there would be “a budgetary problem” (President ABVV-FGTB), because the transformation of current social protection funds into a UBI would either grant less to some people than what is needed to live in dignity (President ABVV-FGTB), or greatly exceed current social spending and create public deficit if its amount is more substantial (President SETCa—BBTK, ABVV-FGTB). The rationale of this type of argument is the assumption that it should be better to use current resources, through existing mechanisms and public services rather than to “dispatch” them indiscriminately to the whole population.
Next, it stands out from all interviews that each union confederation is strongly attached to the social insurance principle and system, as also suggested by Cigna (2019, 2021). We see here the importance attached to a solidaristic system and targeted schemes to help those in need. The very features of UBI are objects of strong resistance. On the one hand, UBI's universal characteristic is deemed to contradict the principle of solidarity because everybody receives the same amount regardless of their specific needs: “the difficulty with universal benefit or basic income is that it assumes that everyone is somewhat equal” (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB); “we give money to people who do not need it” (President SETCa—BBTK, ABVV-FGTB). On the other hand, unions reject the proposal as it contravenes the logic of receiving according to one's needs and contributing according to one's means.
In addition, unions are organizations acting as workers’ defenders and striving to maintain unity within the labor world. Their participation in various councils and social dialogue institutions offers an opportunity to voice claims in favor of workers’ rights and good working conditions. We find, as explained elsewhere (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017), that they fear a UBI could undermine both working conditions and their institutional capacity to defend workers. One representative wondered whether UBI “is not a trap in relation to quality employment” (President SETCa-BBTK, ABVV-FGTB). Unions also care about the representation of workers’ interests and a UBI is seen as threatening this whole representative system: “If that social security no longer exists, then the role of trade unions there will be completely eliminated. That also means workers will no longer be represented” (President of the General Centrale, ABVV-FGTB). This echoes Vanderborght's (2006) argument of TUs’ fear of institutional power loss.
Belgian unions can nevertheless act as strategic players, and their opposition to a UBI is also informed by a desire to maintain the status quo. We find the consideration here that their organizations’ interests could be diminished if a UBI were implemented. This is particularly striking in the socialist TU leaders’ argumentation, which is clearly linked to their dedication to the class struggle. They emphasize the importance of collective bargaining, and of the power relationship between labor and capital. In their view, the implementation of a UBI would be detrimental to the global balance of power, making it lean toward the “capital side.” More specifically, unions would have greater difficulties in their bargaining: “progressively, the wage will decrease, and it will be difficult to pressure employers when they can already offer less than €700. It is already difficult to have workers in strike movements” (President ABVV-FGTB). The leader of the Christian Employees Union (CNE, ACV-CSC) is also conscious of the change in balance of power a UBI could bring about, as it would “necessarily relativize unions’ importance.” The logic behind this being that “if labor becomes an additional revenue compared to basic income, then it seems logical that an organization defending working conditions, defending wage levels, defending dignity at work […] proportionally, would become less important.” We see here that, in comparison with the socialist union, the fear of power loss is less class-oriented. Interestingly, such class-struggle arguments did not feature much in the interviews we conducted with the representative of the liberal union.
Similarly, TUs act as strategic actors embedded in a competitive political environment. This means they are also inclined to take positions in relation to political parties’ stances: “the more there are political proposals, of course, really diverse on the topic, the more it provokes fuzziness about what we should discuss. […] And thus it has a negative effect on our capacity to grasp this notion and try to work on it” (General Secretary ACV-CSC). We observed that despite their historic links to Belgian parties (Delwit, 2021a), unions tend to distance themselves from political reforms or proposals that could be perceived as retrenchment strategies. This is striking in the case of the UBI proposal of George-Louis Bouchez, president of the Francophone liberal party at the time of writing (see Geels, 2023). His ideal UBI scheme, a neoliberal type replacing most of the existing welfare structure, has a strong negative effect among unionists (President ABVV-FGTB; President SETCa—BBTK, ABVV-FGTB; President of the General Centrale, ABVV-FGTB), and the liberal union has distanced itself from Bouchez's proposal. According to the interviewee, the motivation behind this type of UBI would be to “not to have to care to provide social assistance to those who most need it in society, and to say ‘you all have a universal allowance, you’re on your own.’” This reasoning is not endorsed by the union, as he stated “we are in a liberal philosophy in the historic sense, in which freedom has a certain importance, but in which, in our values, solidarity remains an essential element” (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB).
In a nutshell, the position of the three confederations is to improve the social security system from within rather than implementing a UBI reform deemed to be either deleterious, a “source of aggravated difficulties” (National Secretary CNE, ACV-CSC), or too unpredictable. In this regard, a representative stated: “our position is that we are not in favor of basic income because there are a lot of uncertainties” (Vice-President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB). The organizations’ leaders outlined the fact that a UBI would not succeed in addressing social needs, especially for the most precarious in society. Union leaders are in fact acutely aware of social protection's deficiencies, and all of them have concrete proposals to reform and renew it. Each union family insists on specific alternative proposals more in line with their ideological inclinations and priorities. The Christian union strongly advocates more accessible and free of charge public services, and insists on better integration and protection of the youth within social security, in line with their ethos of a more inclusive society for everyone. The socialist confederation pleads for greater high-income and capital taxation, while raising the minimum wage, insisting on the two sides of the labor–capital fight. Lastly, the liberal union proposes a “tax shift,” decreasing income tax but raising capital tax, and is the only union mentioning the fact that “we should give more resources to the weakest [of society] and to the middle class.”
As mentioned previously, unions nevertheless also share common ideals and common fights. Some proposals are thus widely discussed and accepted among the different confederations. The three TUs advocate for the defamilialization of the social system, better financing, and strengthening the structural resources of Belgian social security, or a more automatic guarantee of social rights. These alternative reforms also fuel their common rejection of a UBI.
To conclude, unions do not strive to maintain the existing system from fear of novelty, but they consider it to be a good apparatus to help people in need, assure people's social rights, and contribute to general wellbeing: “We have an incredible social security system!” (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB), “We still believe that the benefits have to be part of social security because a social allowance, whatever it is, creates rights and integrates people in the system” (General Secretary ACV-CSC).
They would thus rather improve the existing system, and add progressive welfare reforms within the current structure, than implement a UBI that is deemed to threaten not only their position, but also workers’ rights and precarious people's conditions.
UBI contrary to TUs ideological principles
Belgian TUs are also fundamentally shaped by norms and values. In fact, their historical origin of pillar organizations has always made each of them inclined to endorse specific visions of society, and the philosophicopolitical objectives to be followed. The union leaders recognize this political vision in their statements and claim the importance of defending main values: “The CNE is […] a union where the training and the ideology are relatively important” (National Secretary CNE, ACV-CSC). “We have a vision of an integrative society, not just the sum of individuals” (General Secretary ACV- CSC). “I keep seeing ourselves [the organization] as a vehicle for progress” (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB). As detailed in our theoretical section, this ideological side is deemed to influence unions’ positioning. Our analysis shows that values effectively play a role here.
The TUs’ opposition to a UBI is thus also of a normative nature, informed by principled arguments. The three union confederations espouse specific principles linked to the pillar they belong to. The representative of the liberal union, for example, invoked his union as “a liberal philosophy, in the historical sense” and was the only one to mention the importance of “individual solutions” and of “freedom” (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB). For example, the interviewee used the freedom argument when asked about the idea of a participation income (i.e. an income whose payment would be conditional upon an obligation to contribute to society, whether through paid employment, caregiving activities or volunteer work; see Atkinson, 1996): this would not be a good option, because it would contravene the individual freedom to choose to be a volunteer or not. Paradoxically, these precepts have been used by UBI advocates, but do not seem to lead the liberal union to a more favorable approach to a UBI. In turn, the rhetoric of labor versus capital and the social class fight is solely used by socialist union leaders. It also influences their positioning toward a UBI, as the way “to make ‘capital pay’ is through social contributions. […] It is a main socio-economic principle to which we’re attached. This is capital participation” (President ABVV-FGTB). A UBI would, to them, impede “capital” to participate in the social security system (Vice President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB; President of the General Centrale, ABVV-FGTB).
In addition, another element of the argumentation common to the three confederations is the importance of solidarity and social cohesion. Union leaders consider a UBI as precisely endangering their project of an inclusive and redistributive society: “We have mechanisms of wealth redistribution toward targeted people, considered to be people needing society's solidarity the most, which I don't find with universal income” (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB). “We say that the amount should not be the same for everyone, but should be allocated depending on needs. It is actually about what inter- and intragenerational solidarity we, as a society, want” (National Secretary ACV-CSC). As mentioned in the previous section, these values lead them to strongly advocate the social insurance principle, and specifically its contributory nature: “insurance principles and solidarity principles are the bases of social benefits. [The principle] is to contribute together, to distribute it when we need it to people who need it” (President SETCa—BBTK, ABVV-FGTB).
As mentioned in the state of the art section, previous research suggests that another reason for unions’ reluctance concerning a UBI is their strong work ethic. In this regard, the unconditionality of UBI is the object of skepticism: “the unconditional character is something quite tense” (General Secretary ACV-CSC). The socialist union considers it is “still always good that people work” (President of the General Centrale, ABVV-FGTB), and that “there is an attachment […] to the link to work” (President ABVV-FGTB). Moreover, some of them fear for the quality of work and that a UBI would be “a trap regarding high-quality employment” (President SETCa—BBTK, ABVV-FGTB). Yet union leaders do not always view work, understood as employment, in the same way. Some representatives of the Christian union seem to put this laborist philosophy in perspective, emphasizing work as an activity rather than employment (General Secretary ACV-CSC). This relativizes to some degree the assumed strong “laborist philosophy” (Cigna, 2019, 2021; De Wispelaere and Noguera, 2012) of TUs that appears here to be more of a plea for social integration through occupation. One interviewee even mentioned that “work takes too much space in people's lives” (National Secretary CNE, ACV-CSC). However, we assume that such a bold claim is specific to this centrale of the Christian union, which holds “a project of society quite radically feminist, ecologist, and antiracist” and entertains “difficult relations” with the national head, often being “marginal.” By contrast, the National Secretary of the Christian union ACV-CSC still maintains that “proper income comes first from labor. Of course, labor is not the only means of earning but it should still be the first option.”
Dismissal of constituencies’ attitudes on UBI
We note that all three federations stated a UBI is not (yet) a priority issue, meaning that they are not actively working on the matter. This could be one reason why the various TUs were somewhat hesitant to participate in this study. However, some unions have already explored the proposal, for example, when new political proposals were made or as a result of internal demand (National Secretary ACV-CSC; President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB), which led them to be reluctant concerning the idea. In this process of defining their position, the socialist union asserted that their starting point was a form of democratic debate in which “we start from an open discussion, a blank sheet. We inform ourselves, let supporters and opponents speak. Arguments are weighed up and then it is a matter of strategy” (Vice President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB). This was also the case for the Christian union, which organized focus groups and a “debate and reflection day” on the UBI topic in 2017 and discussed the matter during their general Congress in 2019. During these events, they invited speakers with different views and they concluded that a UBI is not “the right solution” for existing social problems (National Secretary ACV-CSC). As for the liberal confederation, they held a “day of reflection” to exchange views and define a position on the matter, leading them to maintain a cautious approach toward a UBI (National Secretary ACLVB-CGSLB).
Furthermore, we find no significant regional differences between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking TUs, in the sense that there is a “consensus” among all interregional entities on the subject of a UBI. This can be explained by their federal organizational structure, which results in all decisions being made at the highest level and applied by all. This was confirmed by a statement from one of the officials: “We are a federal center, we always take our position at the federal level. It is not excluded—we work very democratically, so with a vote based on membership. Ultimately, each department takes a position, but there it was very clear, both in the Brussels Region, the Walloon Region and in Flanders, the position was clear that we were not in favor of that” (Vice President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB). A similar rationale was applied by the ACV-CSC and the ACLVB-CGSLB.
With regard to the opinions of their constituencies, TU officials do not think a UBI is truly resonating among their members based on the contacts they have had with them: “It's not a topic of discussion” (General Secretary ACV-CSC). They also asserted that: “I’ve never heard anyone come up to me and say, ‘So, when do we get it [a basic income]?’” (President SETCa—BBTK, ABVV-FGTB). To find out what their members think, Belgian TU representatives rely on lower-level delegates to inform them about the daily concerns of their membership. Delegates are elected officials who are active in various interprofessional sectors, and they are supposed to liaise between the members and the top level of the unions. Their input is of great value, as “a union always works from the shop floor to the top. If I say something here [during the interview], I have to have a mandate for that and therefore a discussion on the shop floor has to happen” (Vice President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB). If a delegate fails to translate workers’ needs and concerns then “they are simply not re-elected” (President ABVV-FGTB). In this way, TUs are certain to be in touch with their membership, as was the argument in most of the interviews.
Nevertheless, the relationship between members and unions is very much reciprocal (as seen in Naumann and Ebbinghaus, 2018), as one interviewee put it: “It's a two-way street, isn't it? We need to hear the aspirations of workers in the sector, but our delegates, our permanent staff, also have a role to play in popular education and in convincing people of our messages” (National Secretary CNE, ACV-CSC). Unions are committed to informing and educating their members about their action plans and official positions, notably through campaigns, information brochures, seminars, and leaflets. However, this does not guarantee that everyone is aware of the organization's activities. The various TU leaders made a distinction between active and passive members (Vice President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB), based on the extent to which they are involved in TU activities. Despite the importance of translating their members’ needs and concerns into concrete action plans, TUs also recognize the need to take into account broader “feelings” in the population (National Secretary ACV-CSC) through, for instance, opinion surveys.
Before presenting the results of the survey on their respective members’ opinions (see Supplemental Appendix C), we asked union officials to reflect briefly on whether there is room for dissenting voices within their organizations. Specifically, we wanted to know the extent to which they thought there could be union members who held views that differ from the official ones. In this regard, TU officials are convinced that they are “democratic organizations, where everyone can say what they want. There isn't someone who's going to say, ‘why did you talk about basic income?’”(Political Secretary ACV-CSC). Along similar lines, the Vice President of BBTK-SETCa (ABVV-FGTB) stated that “members don't slavishly follow everything,” but instead they are individuals who join unions for various reasons that are “separate from discussions about a basic income.” TU officials are thus aware that their organizational views may differ from those of their individual members. Specifically, they all believe that the topic of a UBI is an “attractive idea” especially for low-qualified people or those on a low income, and/or precarious workers who may perceive a UBI as a financial relief. However, all the TUs appear quite firm in not believing that a UBI would contribute to the financial wellbeing of these people. They are worried about a UBI being a “nice package, but if you open the package, you can see a rotten apple in it” (Vice President BBTK-SETCa, ABVV-FGTB). Above, we have discussed many of the reasons underlying this belief.
As we presented union officials with the survey results on their members’ opinions about different types of UBI proposals (see Supplemental Appendix C for the full results), we first observed a strong resistance to comment on these findings. Although the survey complies with scientific standards of opinion research (see Laenen et al., 2023), the majority of the officials openly challenged the validity and generalizability of the results. Nevertheless, they agreed to comment briefly on the various results, suggesting a more supportive attitude toward the idea of a UBI among unionized respondents compared with nonunionized respondents (see Supplemental Appendix C for full results). In this regard, we find that there are differences across unions in members’ opinions on the universality and generosity dimensions of a UBI. For the generosity dimension, we see that compared with the Christian union, members of both the socialist (77.9%) and the liberal union (68.7%) are in favor of the most generous amount of €1500. Members of the Christian union seem more hesitant to choose between the amount of €1000 and €1500. With regard to the universality dimension, members’ opinions seem to vary more between the TUs. Among liberal union members, it is clear that there is a strong preference for attaching a residency requirement to a UBI. By contrast, Christian and socialist members, respectively, have a slight preference for a fully universal basic income that includes newcomers (59.65%) and one that imposes nationality requirements (64.9%). The various union representatives expressed surprise at these differences among members, and subsequently adopted specific strategies to address them.
We observed two main reactions among union representatives: first, they indicated that a topic such as that of a UBI should be the subject of more thorough discussions, in which they would provide “training” to explain “what is at stake” (Political Secretary ACV-CSC), which would be followed by discussing the pros and the cons of the proposal (General secretary ACV-CSC). We noted a similar reaction from the president of the General Central (ABVV-FGTB), who asserted that “I'm sure if I explain to members what that means for our social security, they’re going to react very differently.” Second, we found that their responses varied depending on the extent to which specific findings conform to the positions of their respective union. For instance, the National Secretary of the Christian Union (ACV-CSC) reacted enthusiastically to the finding that her constituency is in favor of a UBI that includes newcomers, with regard to which she said that “I am happy with this result. It means that our internal functioning is working well. We have an internal functioning of militants with or without official documents. We have made our positioning on undocumented migrants clear at congresses. So, perhaps we have succeeded in informing and sensitizing people sufficiently on this issue. I believe in that.” By contrast, when asked whether these results would be the subject of further investigation or a change in position toward the introduction of a UBI, the president of the ABVV-FGTB, stated the following: No, we, trade unions, also have an important role to play in continuing education. So, for the time being, we’re relatively, if not totally, convinced that overall it wouldn't be a step forward for the world of work. So, what I’ve taken from the graphs you’ve given—and what I’m going to do—is to approach the various regions—for training, it's really the regions, Liège-Waremme, Charleroi, La Louvière, etc. I’m going to appeal to all the regions to say that as part of the training of delegates and the continuing education we provide, we need to put a little more emphasis on—so the aim won't be to brainwash—but at least put this back into the continuing education programs so that we can have exchanges with our affiliates on this subject, and so on.
These reactions correspond to a form of disagreement discounting (cf. Butler and Dynes, 2016), in which political agents—in this case TU representatives—clearly minimize glaring discord between themselves and the rank-and-file members by using arguments around a potential lack of knowledge and/or understanding of the UBI proposal. Instead, they opt for a pedagogical approach that consists of emphasizing their role in “educating” their members, or in other words, ensuring that the organizational position toward a UBI is widely known, in order to achieve ideological consensus. By contrast, when presented with results aligning with their organizational position, their reaction was quite the opposite. In that case, they seem to take pride in the fact that their members’ opinions align with the organizational position.
Overall, the results discussed above suggest that Ebbinghaus and Naumann's (2018) dynamic between the logic of membership and the logic of influence clearly is at play in the context of Belgian unions and their positions toward a UBI. Following the logic of membership, we note that unions report great interest in their members’ opinions about a UBI because they consider themselves to be the legitimate representatives of their voices. Through various mechanisms, such as the events they organize (e.g. the day of reflection) or the presence of intermediaries (e.g. delegates), the top of the union claims to be informed about the daily concerns of their constituencies. Moreover, the various unions explicitly mention that they are democratically structured, as evidenced, for example, by the members’ vote at congresses. Nevertheless, when it comes to the concrete treatment of their constituencies’ opinions, especially in the context of a UBI, unions find themselves in a difficult position where they have to balance their members’ opinions against their own organizational interests. More specifically, we find that they adopt a top-down approach, in line with the logic of influence, which is to prioritize their own (strategic) policy agenda and minimize disagreements within the union through specific political strategies (cf. disagreement discounting).
This top-down approach is rather surprising since it goes against their own rhetoric about democratic governance.
Conclusion
In light of growing societal and political debates on a UBI, this article investigated how and why the three main Belgian TUs position themselves toward this welfare reform proposal. Our qualitative analysis of a series of in-depth interviews shows that most union representatives loathe the idea of introducing a UBI in the Belgian welfare state, and do so for various reasons.
First, their opposition is partly influenced by the overarching institutional context that affects all unions equally. As highlighted by prior research (Cigna, 2021), TUs in continental welfare states such as Belgium are deeply rooted in a strong work ethic and contribution-based logic of social insurance, coupled with notions of need-based social solidarity. Similar “self-preservation concerns” (see Cigna, 2021; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017) are evident across all TUs, as they fear that the introduction of a UBI would weaken workers’ collective power—and hence unions’ power, as workers’ representatives. Some of them fear that it would also jeopardize their institutional position in the existing social security system, and reduce their bargaining power. Additionally, specific to the Belgian political landscape, TUs oppose a UBI as a strategic response to policy proposals made by their political adversaries, most notably by the president of the Francophone liberal party (Georges-Louis Bouchez of the Mouvement Réformateur). Even the liberal union, which champions the defense of freedom and individuality, rejected this proposal. Nonetheless, we also find divergences among the unions. While agreeing on the financial infeasibility of a UBI, given budgetary constraints, their concrete reform proposals aiming to reform the system from within align more closely with their ideological roots. Second, and in line with this last point, our article emphasizes ideological differences between Belgian unions in the arguments used to oppose a UBI. For example, while the socialist representatives say it would tilt the balance of power completely over to the capital side of the class conflict, representatives from the Christian and liberal unions do not use such class-based arguments. This component is highly relevant, as it shows that despite the common rejection of the UBI idea, the various TUs still differ—both in the strategies and the arguments they adopt to oppose the proposal. Third, we explored uncharted territory in the field of interest groups’ attitudes toward a UBI: the leadership–membership relationship. The interviewed TU representatives were generally dismissive of the survey results that were presented to them, even though these show their members are fairly supportive of a UBI. In fact, the dominant response was to either discredit the survey (when the findings were not in line with the official TU position) or to highlight the need to “educate” members on the issue of a UBI and present why it would not be an improvement (so as to bring them in line with the TU position).
These findings add important empirical insights to a predominantly speculative literature on the positioning of TUs toward a UBI. We provide ample evidence that the broader economic, institutional, and political context has a strong impact on Belgian TUs’ positioning in this regard. As we have shown, this is nevertheless not just a matter of country-level determinants (see Cigna, 2021), but is also the result of a specific within-country multifactorial process that has to be considered to fully understand the nature of the opposition of TUs to a UBI. With regard to the “Welfare Reform from Below” framework of Ebbinghaus and Naumann (2018) that forms the theoretical backbone of our qualitative analysis, we note that the importance of historically acquired normative beliefs—which we conceptualize as “union ideology”—is particularly relevant in the context of the Belgian welfare state, because these beliefs provide ideological justification for TUs’ organizational positioning toward the proposals. By contrast, constituencies’ attitudes, another crucial factor in the framework, do not seem to affect TUs’ stance on UBI. In our view, this may be due to the specificity of the Belgian context and/or the reform proposal of a UBI itself. With regard to the former, it is important to remember that Belgium has a relatively high and stable union density compared with many other European countries, as approximately half of all employees are members of a TU. This could imply that Belgian TUs are less responsive to the attitudes of their members, because they can “afford to lose” a few of them. In countries where membership is already very low, TUs may be more eager to follow the opinions of their remaining constituency. This logic has been confirmed in research on political representation, showing that popular politicians and parties are less responsive to public opinion (e.g. Bernardi, 2020), but it could equally apply to TUs and their representatives. At the same time, it is also possible that the TU representatives we interviewed are unresponsive to members’ attitudes because “the signal” is not sufficiently loud and clear. Again, it is a common finding in literature dealing with political representation that politicians are more responsive when the policy issue at stake is highly salient and public opinion is very clear (e.g. Shapiro, 2011). According to the TU representatives, UBI is not a topic of concern for their rank-and-file members and they had experienced very little pressure from below to put it on the policy agenda. Whether this accurately reflects reality or (partly) constitutes motivated reasoning on the part of the representatives is unclear, but it does show that a presumed lack of salience of UBI among the membership base was given as a justification for being unresponsive to the survey results (Butler et al., 2024).
More broadly, the question arises as to what extent the empirical findings and their theoretical implications are transferable to other contexts than the Belgian welfare state, and to other welfare reforms than UBI. With regard to context, it seems likely that many of our findings will “travel” well to other countries where TUs remain powerful political actors due to a high union density rate and/or a strongly entrenched institutional role in the administration and regulation of social security. In fact, we would expect to find similar ideological and strategic opposition to a UBI, and similar unresponsiveness to members’ attitudes in other continental European or in Scandinavian welfare states. In many other countries where TUs have fewer power resources (such as in liberal or Mediterranean welfare states), it seems relatively unlikely that they will strategically oppose a UBI because it threatens to erode their institutional position. As shown by Cigna (2021), TUs appear to be somewhat more supportive of a UBI in these countries, presumably because it could offer greater income security in contexts of weak welfare states and deregulated economies. Nevertheless, these TUs may have other strategic or ideological reasons to oppose a UBI that are similar to those of Belgian TUs, such as calculated position-taking in response to policy proposals by political adversaries, a preference for a need-based rather than universal welfare system, and concerns regarding the financial and political feasibility of a UBI.
With regard to the transferability of our findings beyond the specific case of UBI, it seems reasonable to expect that TUs with large power resources would rather advocate policy proposals aimed at improving current social insurance mechanisms, hence strengthening their position as “gatekeepers” of the social state. Their advocacy might thus, as in the Belgian case, point to reforms such as the individualization and more automatic guarantees of social rights, increase of the social minima, or more (and cheaper) public services. TUs may tend to follow their constituencies’ aspirations and demands with regard to social needs to ensure they remain the main intermediary between the state and civil society. By contrast, we expect that proposals that would radically alter the system or TUs’ dominant position in it—such as an erosion of the contributory logic in favor of more means-tested allowances, the privatization of public services, or a change in their institutional prerogatives—would be strongly opposed. For example, most Nordic unions have long been skeptical of statutory minimum wage legislation, as they consider their mostly sector-based and decentralized collective bargaining model to be more suited for wage setting than national or European regulation, and more encouraging of trade union membership (Furåker, 2020). Consequently, if their members are favorable toward such reforms, it is equally plausible that TUs would disregard their attitudes. In light of these considerations, we recommend that future research should investigate how TUs and their representatives position themselves toward different types of welfare reform in different countries. In particular, we believe further research is needed on how TU representatives respond to their members’ attitudes, and how this relationship is influenced by the organization's official position and the (perceived) salience of the reform proposal under consideration.
Supplemental Material
sj-pdf-1-jir-10.1177_00221856251314134 - Supplemental material for What's not to loathe? A qualitative study of the factors influencing Belgian trade unions’ positioning toward a universal basic income
Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-jir-10.1177_00221856251314134 for What's not to loathe? A qualitative study of the factors influencing Belgian trade unions’ positioning toward a universal basic income by Floriane Geels, Marie-Laure Mulayi and Tijs Laenen in Journal of Industrial Relations
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office (grant number B2/191/P3/BABEL).
Supplemental material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
Biographical notes
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