The Decision-Making Process and Impact of Individual Decisions for Joint Consumption

The Role of Felt Responsibility for Unsatisfactory Outcomes

Felt responsibility refers to the extent to which a decision-maker feels accountable for the outcomes of a choice. We propose that ID-Joint, which impact both the decision-maker's and the co-consumers’ satisfaction, amplify the decision-maker's feeling of responsibility for potentially unsatisfactory choices relative to ID-Self. Although objective responsibility rests with the decision-maker for ID-Joint, ID-Self, and ID-Other, we expect the subjective sense of responsibility to be more pronounced for both ID-Joint and ID-Other because the impact of the choice on others’ well-being increases motivation to avoid disappointing them. Joint consumption is inherently relational, heightening concern for others’ welfare (Liu, Dallas, and Fitzsimons 2019). People often feel moral responsibility for others’ well-being (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009), and actions harming others elicit stronger feelings of guilt than those only affecting oneself (Morey et al. 2012; Steffel and Williams 2018; Steffel, Williams, and Perrmann-Graham 2016).

Additionally, because the choice impacts others for ID-Joint and ID-Other, an unsatisfactory choice could negatively impact the others’ perception of the decision-maker and/or their relationship (Liu, Dallas, and Fitzsimons 2019). For example, gift-givers can be concerned that a poor gift may harm the recipient's perception of the giver (Otnes, Lowrey, and Kim 1993; Sherry, McGrath, and Levy 1993; Wooten 2000) or the relationship between giver and recipient (Chan and Mogilner 2017). We expect this is also true for ID-Joint. When making ID-Joint, the decision-maker may be concerned that a choice will be perceived as “selfish,” that is, as prioritizing the decision-maker's preferences over co-consumers’ preferences (Dzhogleva and Lamberton 2014; Lowe et al. 2019). The decision-maker may worry that if a co-consumer is unsatisfied, they may infer that the decision-maker prioritized their own preferences, negatively impacting the co-consumer's perception of and relationship with the decision-maker (Ruth, Otnes, and Brunel 1999). Overall, the decision-maker's concern about potential negative social effects is likely to heighten felt responsibility for ID-Joint and ID-Other, relative to ID-Self.

The Role of Confidence in Ability

While felt responsibility refers to the decision-maker's concern about the impact of their choices on co-consumers, confidence in ability refers to the extent to which the decision-maker feels capable and certain of their ability to make a satisfactory choice (Bearden, Hardesty, and Rose 2001; Berger and Mitchell 1989). We propose that ID-Joint negatively impact decision-makers’ confidence in their ability to make a satisfactory choice, driven by the lack or content of knowledge of co-consumer preferences.

When making ID-Self, decision-makers generally know or can construct their own preferences (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; Simonson 2008) and are unlikely to consider others’ preferences. For ID-Joint and ID-Other, decision-makers consider others’ preferences but are likely to have less knowledge about what others like (Belk 1976; Gorlin and Dhar 2012; Kim et al. 2022; Liu, Dallas, and Fitzsimons 2019). Research on ID-Joint often overlooks the role of knowledge about others’ preferences (see Table 1), either providing explicit information about others’ preferences (Garcia-Rada, Anik, and Ariely 2019; Kim et al. 2022; Liu and Min 2020; Wu, Moore, and Fitzsimons 2019) or not addressing others’ preferences (Brick et al. 2022; Etkin 2016; Garcia-Rada and Kim 2021). These approaches avoid questions of how differences in knowledge about others’ preferences might influence the decision-making process. Other research has assigned participants to joint or individual consumption without having participants make a choice (Hamilton 2021; Raghunathan and Corfman 2006; Ramanathan and McGill 2007; Web Appendix A); not choosing removes the challenge of considering one’s own and others’ preferences and any role of preference knowledge.

The Moderating Role of Knowledge About Others’ Preferences

We propose that knowledge about others’ preferences plays a critical moderating role in the impact of decision type on confidence in ability. We conceptualize three “levels” of consumer knowledge of others’ preferences. Consumers can have no knowledge of others’ preferences, can know that others’ preferences are incongruent with their own, or can know that they and others share congruent preferences (note that there could be an underlying continuum of congruity and preference knowledge). Effects of knowledge will depend on decision type.

We propose that when making ID-Joint, a lack of knowledge about others’ preferences decreases decision-makers’ confidence in their ability to make a satisfactory choice because they will tend to assume that preferences are incongruent. Consumers often experience a false uniqueness effect and expect their preferences to differ from others’ (Davis, Hoch, and Ragsdale 1986; Suls and Wan 1987). When co-consumers indicate a lack of preference, decision-makers infer that co-consumer preferences differ from their own (Kim et al. 2022). Overall, we propose that decision-makers for ID-Joint may expect that a single choice is unlikely to satisfy both parties and thus feel lower confidence in their ability to make a satisfactory choice.

In some cases, a decision-maker may know others’ preferences, for example, from past experiences (e.g., from a long-term relationship) or from learning new information. We propose that the impact of preference knowledge on confidence in ability will depend on the content of the knowledge and the decision type. Specifically, the congruity of others’ preferences with the decision-maker's own preferences will affect confidence in ability differently for ID-Joint compared with ID-Self and ID-Other. For ID-Joint we expect knowledge of incongruent preferences to result in low confidence in one’s ability to make a mutually satisfying choice. Conversely, we expect knowledge of congruent preferences to increase the decision-maker's confidence in their ability to make a choice that satisfies both themselves and co-consumers. While our focus here is on confidence in ability, we additionally explore whether knowledge of congruent preferences could moderate felt responsibility. It is possible that congruent preferences reduce the need to consider others’ preferences and lower felt responsibility. In contrast, it is also possible that any choice that impacts others may create some felt responsibility such that preference congruity would not have an effect.

Notably, the effect of incongruent preference knowledge marks a critical difference between ID-Joint and ID-Other. For ID-Joint, knowing others’ preferences are incongruent is expected to yield low confidence, similar to when others’ preferences are unknown. In contrast, for ID-Other, where the primary goal is to satisfy others’ preferences, all preference knowledge, irrespective of congruity with the decision-maker's preferences, should boost confidence in ability to make a satisfactory choice.

Downstream Consequences of ID-Joint: Decision Anxiety

We propose that ID-Joint result in greater decision anxiety than ID-Self and, when others’ preferences are known to be incongruent, ID-Other. Decision anxiety, a negative affective response to uncertainty (Kugler, Connolly, and Ordóñez 2012; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Raghunathan and Pham 1999), is expected to be heightened in ID-Joint due to the decision-maker's increased felt responsibility for unsatisfactory outcomes and reduced confidence in ability to make a satisfactory choice. Although the decision task itself (e.g., evaluating options, comparing attributes) is similarly complex and effortful across decision types, the heightened emotionality of felt responsibility and uncertainty underlying consumers’ lack of confidence is expected to increase decision anxiety. In contrast, decision difficulty, a more cognitive assessment of task complexity, should remain unaffected. We test this conceptualization in our experiments. Understanding when and why consumers experience decision anxiety is important for marketers for two reasons. First, consumers tend to avoid anxiety-inducing decisions (Kugler, Connolly, and Ordóñez 2012; Lee, Kim, and Vohs 2011; Luce 1998; Luce, Payne, and Bettman 2001), which can affect conversion rates, sales, and customer satisfaction. Second, anxiety influences the choices that consumers do make (Duhachek 2005; Raghunathan and Pham 1999), as we discuss next. For these reasons, mitigating decision anxiety through tailored marketing communications and strategic offerings can have economic consequences for businesses.

Downstream Consequences of ID-Joint: Choice Strategies

Consumers adopt various strategies to cope with anxiety and achieve a more positive emotional state (Duhachek 2005). When anxious about ID-Self, consumers often choose avoidant, status quo (Luce 1998; Luce, Payne, and Bettman 2001), or low-risk/low-reward options (Raghunathan and Pham 1999) and may pay more to alleviate anxiety (Etkin, Evangelidis, and Aaker 2015). For ID-Joint, it appears that one strategy is to avoid making an independent decision by asking co-consumers to participate in the decision, transforming the decision into a joint decision; however, co-consumers frequently decline to participate (Kim et al. 2022; Liu and Min 2020). Thus, it is important to identify additional choice strategies that consumers can use when making ID-Joint. Understanding these choice strategies can help marketers develop offerings and communications to effectively influence consumer choice in these decisions.

Since anxiety primes an uncertainty reduction goal (Raghunathan and Pham 1999), we propose that uncertainty-reducing strategies will be useful when making ID-Joint. One such strategy is choosing an “assortment option” that contains a variety of suboptions (e.g., multiple flavors or types), particularly when others’ preferences are unknown or known to be incongruent. This strategy is useful because (1) the multiple suboptions can increase the likelihood of satisfying diverse preferences, and (2) the decision-maker can delegate the final decision (i.e., from the assortment) to the co-consumers (e.g., co-consumers can choose from an assortment of cheeses). In some cases, an assortment can also provide the ability to meet co-consumers’ preferences at various points in time, rather than simultaneously, within a single shared experience. For example, a variety pack of games allows for different games, suited to different preferences, to be played during a game night. In contrast to research examining choices for multiple occasions suggesting consumers may be less likely to choose variety for joint (vs. individual) consumption (Etkin 2016), we propose that assortment options are more likely to be chosen for a single joint consumption event to balance own and others’ incongruent or unknown preferences. Conversely, assortment options should be less preferred for ID-Self or for ID-Other when others’ preferences are known, regardless of congruity, as consumers can select a single option that best aligns with their own or others’ preferences without the need to balance these preferences.

A second strategy that can reduce uncertainty is choosing an option based on a consensus cue, such as “popular choice” or “best seller,” that suggests that the option meets the preferences of many consumers (Barnes and Shavitt 2024; Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990; Warren and Campbell 2014). We predict that for ID-Joint when others’ preferences are unknown or known to be incongruent, decision-makers are more likely to select the consensus option to increase confidence in making a choice that satisfies both themselves and co-consumers. For ID-Self and ID-Other, consensus options should be less preferred when others’ preferences are known, even if incongruent, since consumers can select a preference-matched choice.

We propose that both an assortment or a consensus option can address the sources of decision anxiety in ID-Joint when preferences are unknown or incongruent. An assortment boosts confidence by offering “something for everyone” and decreases felt responsibility by enabling co-consumers to select their preferred suboption and share the responsibility for their satisfaction. Similarly, a consensus option assures the decision-maker that the choice is likely to satisfy all parties, reducing the risk of unsatisfactory outcomes, decreasing felt responsibility, and increasing confidence in ability. As we allude to previously, the use of these choice strategies for ID-Other depends on whether the decision-maker has knowledge about the other's preferences. When the other's preferences are unknown, an assortment or consensus option can ease decision anxiety. Conversely, when preferences are known, regardless of their congruity with the decision-maker's preferences, a single option that matches the other's preferences is likely to be chosen. This highlights how preference knowledge and congruity of preferences differentially impact the decision-making process and downstream consequences for ID-Joint and ID-Other (and ID-Self; see Figure 1 for conceptual framework). Further, it suggests that while assortment options and consensus cues are useful tactics for marketers targeting consumers making ID-Joint, they may be less useful when targeting those making ID-Self or ID-Other.

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Figure 1.

Conceptual Framework.

Method

Friends participated in pairs (N = 208; 104 dyads) for either course credit or a $6 gift card; we excluded eight participants who failed an attention check (two from the same dyad; N = 200; 103 dyads; M_age = 21.54 years; 51.4% female, 48.0% male, .6% nonbinary). All dyads played a five-minute communication game (questions from the Relationship Closeness Induction Task; Sedikides et al. 1999), as a pretext for attending the study together. Participants next answered a few questions about their friendship, including relationship closeness. Participants completed a second consent form and began a “second study” purportedly for a different research project. Each dyad was randomly assigned to consume a healthy drink together (ID-Joint with dyad partners randomly assigned the role of decision-maker or nonchoosing co-consumer) or alone (both partners assigned to ID-Self), establishing three between-participants conditions (decision type: ID-Joint, co-consumer-joint, and ID-Self). Both participants in the ID-Joint condition were informed that one would be randomly selected to choose a healthy drink, both would consume 6 oz. of the same drink, and they would rate and discuss the shared beverage. Following a simulated loading screen, each was randomly assigned a role as the decision-maker (ID-Joint) or the co-consumer. Both participants in the ID-Self condition were informed that each would choose for themself a 6 oz. healthy drink to consume, rate, and write about.

Participants wrote their thoughts and feelings about [making the decision/their friend making the decision]. Participants then rated how anxious, worried, and tense they felt about [making/their friend making] the decision (index of decision anxiety; α = .92). Participants rated how responsible, bad, and guilty they would feel if [they/their friend] made a disliked choice (felt responsibility; α = .84), and completed a three-item measure of confidence in [their/their friend's] ability to make the decision (confident in ability, know[s] what is needed to make a good decision, and capable of choosing a healthy drink that is appealing; α = .84). Factor analysis confirmed that responsibility and confidence represent two separate factors. ¹ Participants then rated expected decision difficulty, which was included to enable examination of its potential role (Kim et al. 2022). ID-Joint and ID-Self decision-makers chose one of six beverage flavors (e.g., Desert Bloom; pretest results in Web Appendix C1); all participants received 6 oz. of the chosen beverage. ID-Joint decision-makers and co-consumers could see each other's reactions while consuming the same drink and could discuss the experience at the end of the study. We report full stimuli and measures in Web Appendices C2–C8.

Results

As a confirmational manipulation check of ID-Joint versus ID-Self, we used LIWC to analyze participants’ pronoun usage. As expected, pronoun use indicated that participants considered their own and others’ preferences in ID-Joint but just their own preferences in ID-Self (see Web Appendix B for results for this and three other studies). As preregistered, we then applied a linear mixed model with a random intercept for “dyad ID” to analyze each dependent variable. We used a set of dummy codes to compare ID-Joint decision-makers (1) with ID-Self decision-makers and (2) with (nondeciding) co-consumers.

As expected, ID-Joint decision-makers felt more responsible for unsatisfactory outcomes (M = 3.83, SD = 1.61) than both ID-Self decision-makers (M = 3.02, SD = 1.50; Χ² = 10.22, p = .001, η² = .06) and co-consumers (M = 2.09, SD = 1.18; Χ² = 50.48, p < .0001, η² = .29). ID-Joint decision-makers likewise felt less confident (M = 5.01, SD = 1.08) compared with ID-Self decision-makers (M = 5.67, SD = .89; Χ² = 13.49, p < .001, η² = .09) and compared with the co-consumer's confidence in the decision-maker's ability to make a satisfactory choice (M = 5.78, SD = 1.03; Χ² = 24.63, p < .001, η² = .20).

ID-Joint decision-makers additionally reported greater decision anxiety (M = 2.32, SD = 1.46) than ID-Self decision-makers (M = 1.86, SD = 1.13; Χ² = 4.97, p = .026, η² = .03) and also felt more anxious than their co-consumers (M = 1.53, SD = .80; Χ² = 17.29, p < .001, η² = .14). We thus examined the mediation proposed in our conceptual model; this revealed indirect effects of felt responsibility and confidence on decision anxiety both when comparing ID-Joint with ID-Self decision-makers and when comparing ID-Joint decision-makers with co-consumers (Table 3). We next examined decision difficulty, which was not impacted by decision type (M_ID-Joint = 2.78, SD = 1.28 vs. M_ID-Self = 2.68, SD = 1.59 vs. M_Co-Consumer = 2.80, SD = 1.54; ps > .732).

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Table 3.

Parallel Mediation of Decision Anxiety by Decision Type.

	ID-Joint Decision-Maker vs. ID-Self	ID-Joint Decision-Maker vs. Co-Consumer
Felt responsibility	B = −.40, SE = .14, 95% CI: [−.70, −.13]	B = −.85, SE = .16, 95% CI: [−1.19, −.55]
Confidence in ability	B = −.16, SE = .07, 95% CI: [−.31, −.05]	B = −.19, SE = .08, 95% CI: [−.35, −.07]

Notes: Two separate bootstrapped parallel mediation models, each with one dummy code predicting decision anxiety, controlling for the other orthogonal dummy code to utilize the full data. Both models use 5,000 bootstrapped resamples and are Model 4 (PROCESS macro).

Last, we explored whether existing friendships, in which we expect greater knowledge about the other's preferences, might increase confidence. Relationship closeness predicted higher confidence (B = .13, Χ² = 9.38, p = .002, η² = .05), but did not impact felt responsibility (p = .76). When we accounted for relationship closeness by including it as a covariate in the preceding analyses, confidence levels remained significantly different between ID-Joint and ID-Self (Χ² = 17.75, p < .001, η² = .11), suggesting that even in close relationships, consumers feel less confident in their ability to make a satisfactory decision for the other than for themselves.

Discussion

Study 1 demonstrates that ID-Joint decision-makers felt more responsible for potentially unsatisfactory outcomes, felt less confident in their ability to make a satisfactory choice, and experienced greater decision anxiety, relative to both ID-Self and the nondeciding co-consumer. We also found that relationship closeness increased confidence, supporting our conceptualization that knowledge about others’ preferences may be heightened in close relationships (e.g., due to past experiences) and may moderate confidence in ability. We replicated this study in a second lab study, reported in Web Appendix D. Confirming our conceptualization, we found the expected effects of decision type (ID-Joint vs. ID-Self) on decision anxiety but no significant effects on decision difficulty. Participants were more anxious about choosing a drink for both themselves and their friend, but the choice itself was not more difficult. We further investigate both decision anxiety and difficulty in Study 2.

Method

Undergraduates (N = 173) participated for course credit; we excluded four who failed an attention check (N = 169; M_age = 20.2 years; 33.1% female, 66.9% male). Participants individually signed up for one of two spots in a lab session and completed the Relationship Closeness Induction Task to create close connections between strangers (Sedikides et al. 1999). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four between-participants conditions in a 2 (decision type: ID-Joint vs. ID-Self) × 2 (confidence and decision difficulty measure timing: before vs. after the decision) design.

As in Study 1, ID-Joint participants were told that one partner would be randomly assigned to choose a 6 oz. healthy drink for both partners to consume together, evaluate, and discuss. After seeing a simulated loading screen, each was informed that they had been assigned the decision-maker role and that their partner was informed of this. ID-Self participants were told they would choose a 6 oz. healthy drink to consume, evaluate, and write about. All participants rated their decision anxiety (α = .92) on the same scales as Study 1.

Participants in the “before” timing conditions rated how difficult they expected the decision to be (1 = “Not difficult,” and 7 = “Very difficult”) and how confident they felt about their ability to make the choice (1 = “Very confident,” and 7 = “Not confident”). All participants then chose one of five beverage options (e.g., Honey Vanilla Goat Protein Shake; Web Appendix C1) and wrote about their choice. Participants in the “after” conditions rated how difficult the decision was (1 = “Not difficult,” and 7 = “Very difficult”) and how confident they felt about the choice they had made (1 = “Very confident,” and 7 = “Not confident”). Participants then rated felt responsibility for unsatisfactory outcomes (α = .75; same scales as Study 1), drank their chosen beverage (ID-Joint participants were given identical opaque cups and told both had the same drink), and rated the experience on exploratory measures (e.g., enjoyment). We report measures and stimuli in Web Appendix E.

Results

A 2 (decision type: +.5 ID-Joint vs. −.5 ID-Self) × 2 (timing: +.5 after vs. −.5 before) ANOVA revealed that felt responsibility was higher for ID-Joint than for ID-Self (M_ID-Joint = 3.44, SD = 1.53 vs. M_ID-Self = 2.70, SD = 1.19; SE = .21; F(1, 165) = 12.40, p = .001, η² = .07); the main effect of timing and the interaction were not significant (ps > .291). A 2 (decision type) × 2 (timing) ANOVA revealed that confidence was lower for ID-Joint (M = 4.91, SD = 1.39) than for ID-Self (M = 5.52, SD = 1.29, F(1, 165) = 9.13, p = .003, η² = .05). The main effect of timing and the interaction were not significant (ps > .211), perhaps because participants in the “after” timing condition had not yet tried the beverage and still felt unconfident about their choice.

Decision anxiety was measured before the timing manipulation and thus was regressed only on decision type. Participants felt more anxious about choosing a beverage in the ID-Joint condition (M = 2.12, SD = 1.26) than in the ID-Self condition (M = 1.56, SD = .85; F(1, 167) = 11.39, p = .001; η² = .06). We conducted a moderated parallel mediation (Table 4), which supported that decision anxiety is greater for ID-Joint than for ID-Self because participants felt more responsible for potentially unsatisfactory outcomes and less confident in their ability to make the decision. As expected, confidence in the choice made (measured after choice) did not mediate anxiety.

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Table 4.

Parallel Mediation of Decision Anxiety.

	Indirect Effect (Timing: Before)	Indirect Effect (Timing: After)
Felt responsibility	B = .18, SE = .10, 95% CI: [.01, .41]	B = .27, SE = .11, 95% CI: [.08, .51]
Confidence in ability	B = .16, SE = .08, 95% CI: [.03, .35]	B = .07, SE = .07, 95% CI: [−.03, .21]

Notes: Parallel mediation model of decision type on decision anxiety moderated by timing of confidence measures (index of moderation not significant; 95% CI: [−.05, .29]). Model uses 5,000 bootstrapped resamples; Model 8 via the PROCESS macro in R.

We conducted a 2 (decision type) × 2 (timing) ANOVA to examine decision difficulty. Timing mattered such that expected decision difficulty (M = 2.97, SD = 1.52) was higher than retrospective decision difficulty (M = 2.46, SD = 1.29; F(1, 165) = 5.35, p = .022, η² = .03). However, the main effect of decision type and the interaction were not significant (ps < .431); replicating Study 1, ID-Self and ID-Joint were perceived as equally difficult.

Discussion

Study 2 provides convergent evidence in a real choice and consumption context that relative to ID-Self, ID-Joint consumers feel more responsible for potential unsatisfactory outcomes and less confident in their ability to make a satisfactory choice; parallel mediation results revealed that both felt responsibility and confidence in ability increased decision anxiety in ID-Joint. Decision difficulty, however, did not differ by decision type, indicating it is not a downstream consequence of ID-Joint, nor does it explain the heightened decision anxiety in ID-Joint relative to ID-Self. Another in-person lab study involving real choices and consumption of videos replicates these findings (see Web Appendix F).

Method

We recruited 329 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participants, excluding 37 who failed the attention check and 36 who asked for their data to be removed ² (N = 256; M_age = 36.74 years; 48.4% female, 51.5% male, .1% nonbinary). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions (decision type: ID-Self, ID-Joint–preference unknown, and ID-Joint–preference known). Participants imagined choosing a snack to eat alone (ID-Self) or to share with three friends (ID-Joint) while watching a movie. To manipulate knowledge about others’ preferences, participants read either “you do not know whether your friends prefer sweet or salty treats” (ID-Joint–preference unknown) or “you know that both of your friends prefer sweet treats” (ID-Joint–preference known; see Web Appendix G1 for manipulations).

After writing thoughts and feelings about making the choice, participants indicated their decision anxiety (α = .96), confidence in their ability to make a satisfactory choice (α = .92), and felt responsibility for an unsatisfactory choice (α = .87). All participants chose between Rosemary Parmigiano Reggiano or Cinnamon Sugar popcorn and then indicated their liking of 11 popcorn flavors, including the choice flavors, to reveal their own preferences.

Results

We regressed the dependent variables on two sets of dummy codes to compare ID-Joint–preference unknown with ID-Self (replicating Studies 1 and 2) and to compare ID-Joint–preference unknown with ID-Joint–preference known (to examine proposed effects of knowledge). We also compared ID-Joint–preference known with ID-Self for completeness (see Web Appendix G2 for coding details).

Replicating previous studies, participants felt more responsible for potential unsatisfactory outcomes for ID-Joint–preference unknown (M = 4.47, SD = 1.74) than for ID-Self (M = 3.15, SD = 1.69; F(1, 253) = 24.76, p < .001, η² = .09). While knowledge about others’ preferences attenuated responsibility, with participants feeling less responsible for ID-Joint when they knew their co-consumers’ preferences than when they did not (M_known = 3.79, SD = 1.864; M_unknown = 4.47, SD = 1.75; F(1, 253) = 6.34, p = .012, η² = .02), felt responsibility remained higher for ID-Joint–preference known than for ID-Self (F(1, 253) = 5.37, p = .021, η² = .02). Participants felt less confident in their ability to make a satisfactory choice in the ID-Joint–preference unknown condition (M = 4.95, SD = 1.40) than in the ID-Self condition (M = 6.04, SD = 1.25; F(1, 253) = 36.77, p < .001, η² = .03). Knowledge about others’ preferences moderated confidence; confidence was higher for ID-Joint–preference known (M = 6.30, SD = .82) than for ID-Joint–preference unknown (M = 4.95, SD = 1.40; F(1, 253) = 54.33, p < .001, η² = .18). Participants felt equally confident in the ID-Joint–preference known and ID-Self conditions (p = .157).

Choosing a snack induced more anxiety in the ID-Joint–preference unknown condition (M = 3.31, SD = 1.80) than in the ID-Self condition (M = 1.77, SD = 1.59; F(1, 253) = 39.11, p < .001, η² = .07; see Figure 2). As predicted, preference knowledge attenuated anxiety; ID-Joint–preference unknown induced more anxiety (M = 3.31, SD = 1.80) than ID-Joint–preference known (M = 1.97, SD = 1.49; F(1, 253) = 28.54, p < .001, η² = .10). Anxiety was the same for ID-Joint–preference known and ID-Self (p = .446). We found mediation by felt responsibility and confidence, and moderation by knowledge about others’ preferences (Table 5). Confidence was not a mediator in the comparison of ID-Self with ID-Joint–preference known, affirming the predicted moderation.

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Figure 2.

Knowledge About Others’ Preferences Reduces Anxiety for ID-Joint.

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Table 5.

Parallel Mediation of Decision Type on Decision Anxiety.

	ID-Self vs. ID-Joint–Preference Unknown	ID-Joint–Preference Known vs. ID-Joint–Preference Unknown	ID-Self vs. ID-Joint–Preference Known
Felt responsibility	B = −.42, SE = .12, 95% CI: [−.66, −.22]	B = −.22, SE = .10, 95% CI: [−.43, −.04]	B = .21, SE = .10, 95% CI: [.02, .41]
Confidence in ability	B = −.58, SE = .16, 95% CI: [−.92, −.31]	B = −.72, SE = .16, 95% CI: [−1.06, −.43]	B = −.14, SE = .09, 95% CI: [−.32, .02]

Notes: Three bootstrapped parallel mediation models with one dummy code predicting decision anxiety, controlling for the orthogonal dummy code to utilize the full data. Each model uses 5,000 bootstrapped resamples; Model 4 via the PROCESS macro in R.

Binary logistic regression revealed that when participants did not know their friends’ preferences, their flavor choice was the same for ID-Joint (49.5% Cinnamon Sugar) and ID-Self (54.6% Cinnamon Sugar; p = .585). When participants knew that their friends preferred sweet treats, they were more likely to choose the sweet option (83.5% Cinnamon Sugar), adjusting to their friends’ preferences, compared with when their friends’ preferences were unknown (Χ² = 21.43, p < .001) and compared with ID-Self (Χ² = 16.52, p < .001). Preference knowledge increased confidence, lowered decision anxiety, and enabled participants to consider others’ preferences in their choice.

Discussion

Study 3 extends our previous findings by establishing that knowledge about co-consumers’ preferences moderates confidence in one’s ability to make a satisfactory choice and attenuates anxiety. Three parallel mediation analyses reveal that both felt responsibility and confidence in ability explain the differences in anxiety due to preference knowledge. The null indirect effect of confidence in the comparison of ID-Self with ID-Joint–preference known further supports our conceptualized moderating effect of preference knowledge on confidence.

For ID-Joint–preference known, all participants knew that their co-consumers preferred sweet treats. Thus, participants who preferred sweet flavors knew that their co-consumers had congruent preferences, while those who preferred savory knew that their co-consumers had incongruent preferences. A post hoc exploratory analysis provides some initial support for our conceptualized role of preference congruity: Participants who preferred savory flavors (n = 36) felt more anxious making ID-Joint when co-consumers’ preferences were known (M = 2.54), compared with participants who preferred sweet flavors (n = 32; M = 1.66; F(1, 66) = 5.82, p = .019). We examine the role of preference congruity in the next study.

Method

We recruited 597 MTurk participants, removing 12 who failed an attention check and one who asked to be removed (N = 584; M_age = 39.89 years; 47.3% female, 52.1% male, .6% nonbinary). Participants were randomly assigned to an incentive-compatible 3 (decision type: ID-Joint vs. ID-Self vs. ID-Other) × 2 (preference congruity: congruent vs. incongruent) between-participants design. Participants first rank-ordered movie genres, activities, and wine (Web Appendix H1). Participants then read that in a second study they would choose an activity and that three participants would be randomly selected to receive a $40 gift card for their chosen activity. Participants read: “Imagine that you are traveling with a friend and you are planning an activity for the two of you to do together” (ID-Joint), “Imagine that you are traveling with a friend and you are each going to do an activity on your own” (ID-Self), or “Imagine that your friend is traveling and, as a gift, you decide to book an activity for your friend to do on their trip” (ID-Other). Participants then saw four activities of “roughly the same cost and time involved,” including their lowest-ranked and highest-ranked activities from the prior ranking task and two new activities (not previously seen). We manipulated preference congruity as follows: “You know your friend's favorite activity is: [participant's highest-ranked activity (congruent) or participant's lowest-ranked activity (incongruent)].” Participants indicated their decision anxiety (α = .94), felt responsibility for unsatisfactory outcomes (α = .84), and confidence in their ability to make a satisfactory choice (α = .92); chose an activity; and rated the extent to which they considered their friend's favorite when deciding (1 = “Not at all,” and 7 = “Extremely”). Activity vouchers were sent to three participants after data collection.

Results

Confirming our manipulation and supporting our conceptualization that the three decision types differ in the extent to which decision-makers consider their own and/or others’ preferences, we found that participants were more likely to consider their friend's favorite activity for ID-Joint (M = 5.42, SD = 1.97) than for ID-Self (M = 3.36, SD = 2.16; t(581) = −10.89, p < .0001, η² = .17), but less likely to consider their friend's favorite activity for ID-Joint than for ID-Other (M = 6.15, SD = 1.40; t(581) = 3.79, p = .0002, η² = .17). These results support that participants consider both their own and others’ preferences for ID-Joint, focus on their own preferences for ID-Self, and focus on the recipient's preferences for ID-Other.

We ran a 3 (decision type) × 2 (preference congruity) ANOVA on each dependent variable and regressed each dependent variable on dummy codes to compare ID-Joint with ID-Self, ID-Joint with ID-Other, and ID-Self with ID-Other when preferences are congruent and when preferences are incongruent, for a total of six focal contrasts (see Web Appendix H5 for coding).

A 3 × 2 ANOVA of felt responsibility revealed main effects of decision type (F(2, 578) = 7.10, p = .0009, η² = .03) and preference congruity (F(1, 578) = 3.92, p = .048, η² = .01), but no interaction (p = .340). Nonetheless, an exploration of contrasts revealed an interesting pattern. When preferences were congruent, felt responsibility was equally low (roughly the midpoint) across the three decision types (M_ID-Joint = 4.16, SD = 1.79 vs. M_ID-Self = 3.90, SD = 1.58 vs. M_ID-Other = 4.45, SD = 1.64; ps > .237). When preferences were incongruent, participants felt more responsible for potentially unsatisfactory outcomes for ID-Joint (M = 4.69, SD = 1.66) than for ID-Self (M = 3.88, SD = 1.70; B = −.76, SE = .24, t(578) = −3.16, p = .002), and for ID-Other (M = 4.64, SD = 1.60; B = −.81, SE = .24, t(578) = −3.39, p = .0001) than for ID-Self. Participants felt equally responsible for ID-Joint and ID-Other (p = .819).

A 3 × 2 ANOVA of confidence in ability revealed main effects of decision type (F(2, 578) = 5.80, p = .003, η² = .01) and preference congruity (F(1, 578) = 29.17, p < .0001, η² = .05), and an interaction (F(2, 578) = 4.77, p = .009, η² = .02). When preferences were congruent, participants felt equally confident across decision types (M_ID-Joint = 6.15, SD = .95 vs. M_ID-Self = 6.00, SD = 1.04 vs. M_ID-Other = 6.05, SD = .93; ps > .347). When preferences were incongruent, participants felt less confident for ID-Joint (M = 5.29, SD = .95) than for ID-Self (M = 5.82, SD = 1.27; B = .86, SE = .16, t(578) = 3.36, p = .0008) and ID-Other (M = 5.62, SD = 1.02; B = .33, SE = .16, t(578) = 2.13, p = .034), but felt equally confident for ID-Self and ID-Other (p = .205).

A 3 × 2 ANOVA of decision anxiety revealed main effects of decision type (F(2, 578) = 12.39, p < .0001, η² = .02) and preference congruity (F(1, 578) = 47.51, p < .0001, η² = .07), and an interaction (F(2, 578) = 6.82, p = .002, η² = .02; Figure 3). Regressing anxiety on the dummy codes revealed that when preferences were congruent, anxiety was equivalent across decision types (M_ID-Joint = 1.90, SD = 1.30 vs. M_ID-Self = 1.98, SD = 1.41 vs. M_ID-Other = 1.93, SD = 1.29; ps > .744). When preferences were incongruent, participants felt more anxious for ID-Joint (M = 3.50, SD = 1.98) than for both ID-Self (M = 2.48, SD = 1.66; B = −1.03, SE = .23; t(578) = −4.44, p < .0001) and ID-Other (M = 2.56, SD = 1.80; B = −.94, SE = .23, t(578) = −4.15, p < .0001). Anxiety was equivalent for ID-Other and ID-Self (p = .722).

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Figure 3.

The Effects of Decision Type and Preference Congruity on Decision Anxiety.

Multinomial logistic regressions of activity choice (Figure 4) on the dummy codes supported our hypotheses. When preferences were congruent, participants chose the shared favorite activity for all decision types (91.2% ID-Joint vs. 66.7% ID-Self vs. 93.7% ID-Other; ps > .201; it is interesting to note that for ID-Self some participants chose one of the previously unseen options). When preferences were incongruent, decision type affected choice. Participants were significantly more likely to choose their friend's favorite—and own least favorite—for ID-Joint (24.5%) than for ID-Self (2.2%; Wald Z = −4.05, p < .0001). Participants were more likely to choose their friend's favorite (i.e., own least favorite) for ID-Other (71.7%) relative to both ID-Joint (Wald Z = 5.14, p < .0001) and ID-Self (Wald Z = −6.58, p < .0001).

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Figure 4.

The Impact of Preference Congruity on Choice Depends on Decision Type.

Discussion

Study 4 demonstrates the moderating role of knowledge about others’ congruent versus incongruent preferences on confidence, decision anxiety, and choice for ID-Joint, ID-Self, and ID-Other. When preferences are congruent, ID-Joint decision-makers can satisfy both themselves and others, and ID-Other decision-makers know how to satisfy the recipient. Thus, decision type has little impact on confidence, felt responsibility, or anxiety, and decision-makers choose the shared favorite activity for all decision types. However, when ID-Joint decision-makers know preferences are incongruent, they feel more responsible, less confident, and more anxious, compared with ID-Self and ID-Other. ID-Joint decision-makers face uncertainty as to whether to satisfy their own preferences, satisfy their co-consumer's preferences, or opt for an option that neither is known to prefer. The challenge of balancing own and others’ incongruent preferences is reflected in choices: Some prioritize their own preferences (38%), some prioritize their friend's preference even though it is their own least preferred option (24%), and some forgo both their own and their friend's favorites in favor of an unknown option (38%). In contrast, ID-Self decision-makers typically choose their favorite activity, while ID-Other decision-makers typically choose their friend's favorite. These results highlight the unique influence of knowledge of incongruent preferences for ID-Joint relative to ID-Self and ID-Other.

Study 5a Method

We recruited and randomly assigned 401 MTurk participants (N = 400 after removing one who asked; M_age = 38.99 years; 40.8% female, 58.0% male, 1.2% nonbinary) to a 2 (decision type: +.5 ID-Joint vs. −.5 ID-Other) × 2 (knowledge about others’ preferences: −.5 unknown vs. +.5 incongruent) between-participants design. Participants rank-ordered sets of movie genres, popcorn, and wine. They then read that they were meeting a friend for a movie and were bringing a snack to share (ID-Joint) or to give as a gift (ID-Other). Participants imagined stopping at a store that had four flavors of popcorn: their highest-ranked and lowest-ranked from the ranking task and two new flavors. Participants either did not know their friend's preferences (unknown) or knew that their friend preferred the participant's lowest-ranked flavor (incongruent). They responded to measures of decision anxiety (α = .97), confidence in ability (α = .94), and felt responsibility (α = .87) and then chose between a pack of one flavor or of all four flavors, with both packs noted to have “the same total amount of popcorn” to eliminate possible size confusion. Participants then reported their postchoice decision anxiety (α = .94; Web Appendix I4).

Study 5a Results

A 2 × 2 binary logistic regression of choice revealed a higher likelihood of choosing the assortment option for ID-Joint (76.6%) than for ID-Other (55.4%; Χ² = 14.22, p = .0002; Figure 5). Incongruent preferences reduced the likelihood of choosing the assortment option (76.9% for unknown vs. 56.1% for incongruent preferences; Χ² = 16.16, p < .0001). These main effects were qualified by an interaction (Χ² = 22.99, p < .0001). When others’ preferences were unknown, the assortment option was equally preferred for ID-Joint (75.0%) and ID-Other (78.9%). When others’ preferences were known to be incongruent, the assortment option was again preferred for ID-Joint (78.1%), but significantly less so for ID-Other (33.0%).

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Figure 5.

Assortment Choice for ID-Joint Versus ID-Other × Knowledge About Others’ Preferences.

A 2 × 2 ANOVA of felt responsibility showed no main effects of decision type (p = .30) or knowledge about others’ preferences (p = .10), or interaction (p = .91), suggesting that felt responsibility is not moderated by preference congruity when comparing ID-Joint with ID-Other, replicating Study 4. A 2 × 2 ANOVA of confidence revealed no main effect of decision type (p = .36), a main effect of knowledge about others’ preferences (M_unknown = 4.90, SD = 1.37 vs. M_incongruent = 5.98, SD = 1.21; F(1, 396) = 71.93, p < .0001, η² = .15), and a significant interaction (F(1, 396) = 7.36, p = .007, η² = .02), affirming our conceptualization that incongruent preference knowledge helps consumers making ID-Other but not ID-Joint. Likewise, a 2 × 2 ANOVA of anxiety revealed no main effect of decision type (p = .705), a main effect of knowledge about others’ preferences (M_unknown = 3.02, SD = 1.66 vs. M_incongruent = 2.22, SD = 1.53; F(1, 396) = 25.97, p < .0001, η² = .06), and a significant interaction (F(1, 396) = 9.79, p = .002, η² = .02). When others’ preferences were unknown, anxiety was marginally lower for ID-Joint (M = 2.81, SD = 1.68) than for ID-Other (M = 3.24, SD = 1.63; F(1, 396) = 3.69, p = .055). When others’ preferences were known to be incongruent, anxiety was higher for ID-Joint than for ID-Other (M_ID-Joint = 2.50, SD = 1.59 vs. M_ID-Other = 1.94, SD = 1.43; F(1, 396) = 6.31, p = .01). Mediation results indicate that increased confidence drives the reduction in anxiety for ID-Other relative to ID-Joint when preferences are known to be incongruent (see Table 6).

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Table 6.

Moderated Parallel Mediation of ID-Joint Versus ID-Other on Decision Anxiety.

	Unknown Preferences	Incongruent Preferences
Confidence in ability	B = −.20, SE = .16, 95% CI: [−.52, .13]	B = .39, SE = .13, 95% CI: [.12, .67]

Notes: Bootstrapped moderated mediation model of ID-Joint (coded .5) versus ID-Other (coded −.5) predicting decision anxiety via confidence, moderated by knowledge about others’ preferences. Model uses 5,000 resamples; Model 8; PROCESS macro. Felt responsibility is excluded because of its expected equivalent role for ID-Joint and ID-Other. Significant index of moderation (B = .58, SE = .21, 95% CI: [.16, 1.01]).

Overall, results of this study suggest that an assortment option can be useful when others’ unknown (ID-Joint and ID-Other) or incongruent (ID-Joint) preferences result in lower confidence in one’s ability to make a satisfactory choice. While confidence was moderated by knowledge of incongruent preferences, felt responsibility was sustained across ID-Joint and ID-Other, likely because both decision types impact others. Last, we report an exploratory analysis of the difference in pre- and postchoice anxiety, dependent on participant's choice of an assortment and decision type, in Web Appendix I5, finding that choosing an assortment (vs. a single flavor) reduces anxiety more for ID-Joint than for ID-Other.

Study 5b Method

We recruited 200 MTurk participants, excluding three who failed an attention check and one who asked (N = 196; M_age = 37.92 years; 43.4% female, 56.6% male). Participants imagined a movie night with two friends and were randomly assigned to choose a snack to share (ID-Joint) or for their own consumption (ID-Self). To control for impression management, in both conditions the snack was consumed during the movie in the presence of friends (see Web Appendix J1). Participants completed measures of decision anxiety (α = .97), confidence in ability (α = .93), and felt responsibility (α = .84), then made an incentive-compatible choice of a box of either one or four flavors of popcorn and were entered to win one of three $25 gift cards for their choice. Participants then reported postdecision anxiety (α = .96).

Study 5b Results

A binary logistic regression of choice (0 = single flavor, 1 = assortment option) on decision type (ID-Joint vs. ID-Self) revealed the expected effect. While 82.5% chose the assortment when choosing a snack to share, only 43.4% chose the assortment when choosing a snack for themselves (Χ² = 33.25, p < .0001).

We regressed each variable on decision type. Participants felt more responsible for an unsatisfactory choice and less confident in their ability to choose a snack for ID-Joint (M_FResp = 4.25, SD = 1.85; M_Conf = 5.60, SD = 1.30) than for ID-Self (M_FResp = 3.53, SD = 1.73; SE = .26, F(1, 194) = 8.06, p = .005, η² = .02; M_Conf = 6.36, SD = .99; SE = .17, F(1, 194) = 21.03, p < .0001, η² = .10). Decision anxiety was higher for ID-Joint (M = 2.61, SD = 1.61) than for ID-Self (M = 1.68, SD = 1.43; SE = .22, F(1, 194) = 18.23, p < .0001, η² = .09). A serial parallel mediation analysis (Table 7) shows that both felt responsibility and confidence mediate decision type on decision anxiety, which in turn predicts assortment choice.

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Table 7.

Serial Parallel Mediation of Decision Type Predicting Assortment Choice.

	Indirect Effect
Decision type → felt responsibility → decision anxiety → choice	B = .05, SE = .04, 95% CI: [.004, .16]
Decision type → confidence in ability → decision anxiety → choice	B = .19, SE = .12, 95% CI: [.03, .51]

Notes: Model uses 5,000 bootstrapped resamples; Model 80 via PROCESS macro in R.

Using the same method as in Study 5a to compare anxiety reduction from choice for each decision type, we found that choosing an assortment yielded a larger decrease in anxiety (M = −.85, SD = 1.26) than choosing a single flavor (M = −.16, SD = .54, t(58.51) = −3.57, p = .0007) for ID-Joint. For ID-Self, choosing an assortment (vs. a single flavor) provided only a marginal decrease in anxiety (M_assort = −.51, SD = 1.37; M_single = −.12, SD = .62, t(55.40) = −1.75, p = .086).

Studies 5a and 5b Discussion

Studies 5a and 5b highlight a managerially relevant consequence of ID-Joint, showing that an assortment option (that includes multiple suboptions) is preferred for ID-Joint when preferences are incongruent (Study 5a) or unknown (Studies 5a and 5b). For ID-Other, knowing the recipient's preferences, even if incongruent with the decision-maker's, increases confidence, reduces decision anxiety, and shifts choice from an assortment to a single option that matches the recipient's preferences (Study 5a). These findings highlight the critical role of considering both own and others’ preferences when making ID-Joint and extends research on gift-giving by showing that knowing the recipient's preferences, even if incongruent, reduces decision anxiety and guides givers to different choices (i.e., a single option rather than an assortment). Study 5b (and an additional replication study presented in Web Appendix K) likewise shows the assortment choice strategy for ID-Joint versus ID-Self and rules out impression management as an alternative explanation (Ariely and Levav 2000; Ratner and Kahn 2002). Mediational evidence shows that preference for assortments in ID-Joint is driven by increased felt responsibility and reduced confidence in ability, which predict anxiety and thereby choice. Exploratory evidence from both studies suggests that the assortment choice strategy can reduce decision anxiety for ID-Joint relative to ID-Other (Study 5a) and relative to ID-Self (Study 5b).

Method

We recruited 300 MTurk participants who passed two screener questions (age > 21 years; frequency of wine consumption > “never”), removing seven who failed an attention check (N = 293; M_age = 42.7 years; 51.2% female, 48.5% male, .3% nonbinary). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three between-participants conditions; we manipulated the relative importance of other's versus own preferences by choosing a wine to celebrate a friend's or one's own promotion (ID-Joint friend's promotion vs. ID-Joint own promotion vs. ID-Self own promotion).

Participants first rank-ordered movies, wine, and music. In a second study, participants imagined choosing a bottle of wine either to share with a friend (ID-Joint) to celebrate their friend's work promotion (high importance of other's preferences) or their own work promotion (high importance of own preferences), or for themselves (ID-Self) for their own work promotion (a pretest supported this manipulation of relative importance; Web Appendix L2). Participants described their feelings about making the decision and rated their decision anxiety (α = .97), felt responsibility (α = .83), and confidence in ability (α = .95). They then chose a wine from four options rated in the first study: their highest-ranked wine; their third-ranked wine, labeled as “the most popular”; and two lowest-ranked wines (Web Appendix L3). We predicted that participants would be more likely to choose their third-ranked wine, labeled as “the most popular,” for ID-Joint when sharing to celebrate their friend's promotion, compared with ID-Joint own promotion or ID-Self.

Results

We regressed the dependent variables on two sets of two dummy codes (preregistered; coding in Web Appendix L4) to compare (1) ID-Joint friend's promotion with ID-Joint own promotion, (2) ID-Joint friend's promotion with ID-Self, and (3) ID-Joint own promotion with ID-Self. Participants reported greater felt responsibility when choosing a wine to share for a friend's promotion (M = 4.72, SD = 1.55) compared with their own promotion (M = 3.93, SD = 1.52; t(290) = 3.66, p = .0003, η² = .07) and compared with ID-Self (M = 3.73, SD = 1.50; t(290) = 4.57, p < .0001, η² = .04). Felt responsibility did not significantly differ between ID-Joint own promotion and ID-Self (t(290) < 1, p = .354). Confidence in ability was equal whether choosing a wine to share to celebrate their friend's promotion or their own (p = .173). However, confidence was higher for ID-Self (M = 5.65, SD = 1.12) than for both ID-Joint friend's promotion (M = 5.01, SD = 1.62; t(290) = −3.18, p = .002, η² = .02) and (marginally) ID-Joint own promotion (M = 5.29, SD = 1.40; t(290) = 1.81, p = .071, η² = .01). Participants reported greater decision anxiety when choosing a wine to share for their friend's promotion (M = 2.76, SD = 1.76) compared with sharing for their own promotion (M = 2.17, SD = 1.44; t(290) = 2.91, p = .004, η² = .09) and compared with ID-Self (M = 1.52, SD = .92; t(290) = 6.13, p = .001, η² = .03). Anxiety was also higher for ID-Joint own promotion compared with ID-Self (t(290) = 3.22, p = .001, η² = .03). Three parallel mediation analyses (Table 8) show that felt responsibility drives the effect of ID-Joint for own versus friend's promotion, both felt responsibility and confidence mediate the effect of ID-Joint friend's promotion versus ID-Self, and confidence mediates the effect of ID-Joint own promotion versus ID-Self.

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Table 8.

Parallel Mediation Analysis of Decision Type on Decision Anxiety.

	ID-Joint Friend's Promotion vs. ID-Joint Own Promotion	ID-Joint Friend's Promotion vs. ID-Self Own Promotion	ID-Joint Own Promotion vs. ID-Self Own Promotion
Felt responsibility	B = .20, SE = .07, 95% CI: [.07, .35]	B = .25, SE = .08, 95% CI: [.12, .42]	B = −.05, SE = .06, 95% CI: [−.17, .05]
Confidence in ability	B = .15, SE = .12, 95% CI: [−.07, .41]	B = .35, SE = .12, 95% CI: [.13, .61]	B = −.20, SE = −.10, 95% CI: [−.40, −.01]

Notes: Three bootstrapped parallel mediation models with one dummy code predicting decision anxiety, controlling for the orthogonal dummy code to utilize the full data. Each model uses 5,000 bootstrapped resamples; all are Model 4 of the PROCESS macro in R.

Two multinomial logistic regressions, one for each set of dummy codes, revealed that more participants chose the popular wine to share for their friend's promotion (47.5%) than for their own promotion (29.5%; Z = 2.71, p = .007) and for ID-Self (24.0%; Z = 3.57, p = .0004; see Figure 6). There was no significant difference in the (lower) rates of choice of the popular option between ID-Joint own promotion and ID-Self (p = .264). Three bootstrapped mediation models (PROCESS Model 4, 5,000 resamples) revealed that decision anxiety mediates choice in all three comparisons: ID-Joint friend's promotion versus ID-joint own promotion (B = .02, SE = .02, 95% CI: [.001, .07]); ID-Joint friend's promotion versus ID-Self (B = .06, SE = .03, 95% CI: [.01, .13]); and ID-Joint own promotion versus ID-Self (B = .03, SE = .02, 95% CI: [.002, .07]).

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Figure 6.

Importance of Considering Others’ Preferences Increases Popular Choice.

Discussion

This study demonstrates increased use of a consensus cue (“the popular choice”) as a decision strategy when decision anxiety is heightened by ID-Joint. The findings that the relative importance of own versus others’ preferences moderates the effect of ID-Joint on decision anxiety and the use of a consensus cue as a decision strategy underscore the critical role of considering own and others’ preferences in ID-Joint. When the co-consumer's preferences were relatively more important (friend's promotion), decision anxiety increased, leading to a higher likelihood of choosing the popular option. Conversely, when it was less important to consider the co-consumer's preferences (own promotion) participants felt less responsible, leading to lower decision anxiety and a lower likelihood of choosing the popular option. A replication of these results, manipulating the importance of co-consumers’ preferences via social power, is reported in Web Appendix M.

Theoretical Contributions

Our research extends the literature on joint consumption by establishing a framework for understanding the decision-making process for ID-Joint. Prior research on joint consumption has either focused on JD-Joint or identified contextual factors that impact consumers’ choices in ID-Joint (see Table 1). While recognizing that ID-Joint involve consideration of own and others’ preferences, prior research did not examine the mechanisms underlying the decision-making process. By comparing ID-Joint with ID-Self and ID-Other, we show that considering own and others’ preferences increases felt responsibility for potential unsatisfactory outcomes and decreases confidence in ability to make a satisfactory choice, which in turn heighten decision anxiety and influence consumers’ choice strategies.

Our research highlights the critical role of knowledge about others’ preferences in ID-Joint. Extending beyond previous research in which decision-makers either had preference knowledge (Brick et al. 2022; Etkin 2016; Garcia-Rada and Kim 2021; Tu, Shaw, and Fishbach 2016) or did not (Garcia-Rada, Anik, and Ariely 2019; Kim et al. 2022; Liu and Min 2020; Wu, Moore, and Fitzsimons 2019), we manipulate knowledge of others’ preferences to understand its impacts on the decision-making process and outcomes. Extending Kim et al.’s (2022) finding that consumers expect their own and co-consumers’ preferences to be incongruent, we examine how preference congruity differentially impacts the decision-making process and choices for ID-Joint, ID-Self, and ID-Other.

Recent research on JD-Joint finds that consumers often solicit co-consumers’ preferences to make joint decisions easier but that when co-consumers refuse to provide their preferences, the requesting consumer tries to infer the co-consumer's motives, which makes the decision process more difficult and the co-consumer less likable (Kim et al. 2022; Liu and Min 2020). We demonstrate in four studies (Studies 1 and 2; Web Appendices D and F) that in the absence of the co-consumer withholding preferences, consideration of own and others’ preferences for ID-Joint increases decision anxiety but does not make the decision itself more difficult. These findings highlight the impact of social interactions and co-consumer involvement (or lack thereof) in joint decisions, in contrast to the individual processing in ID-Joint, ID-Self, and ID-Other. While social inferences impact decision difficulty in JD-Joint, we reveal that the need to individually consider co-consumer preferences in ID-Joint impacts decision anxiety.

Our research also contributes to the literature on consumer choices for joint consumption. We demonstrate that ID-Joint increase use of two choice strategies: selecting an assortment or a consensus option. We support choice of an assortment as a way to handle potentially incongruent preferences, rather than a tool for impression management; even when the choice is consumed in the presence of others, ID-Joint lead to greater assortment choice than ID-Self. Additionally, while some research suggests that consumers will tend to “selfishly” make choices that align more with their own preferences than with their co-consumers’ preferences (Gorlin and Dhar 2012; Tu, Shaw, and Fishbach 2016; Wu, Moore, and Fitzsimons 2019), we, like Kim et al. (2022), show that consumers often make unselfish choices for ID-Joint. We provide the additional insight that some decision-makers tend to either make choices that align with their co-consumers’ preferences or choose an assortment or a consensus option, even at the cost of forgoing their own preferences.

We likewise contribute to the gift-giving literature. Earlier research uncovered impression management as a source of anxiety in the ID-Other of gift-giving (Otnes, Lowrey, and Kim 1993; Sherry, McGrath, and Levy 1993; Wooten 2000). Our results identify felt responsibility and confidence in ability as additional factors that increase anxiety and demonstrate that knowledge of recipient preferences can reduce anxiety and impact gift choice. In contrast to research showing that prediction of recipient preferences leads to choices that do not match recipient preferences (e.g., Baskin et al. 2014; Flynn and Adams 2009; Gino and Flynn 2011; Steffel and Le Boeuf 2014), we show that knowledge of recipient preferences leads to preference-matched choices. Extending research suggesting that anxiety increases when the recipient is perceived as different from the giver (Wooten 2000), we find that knowing that the recipient is different (i.e., has incongruent preferences) can lower anxiety by boosting the giver's confidence in their ability to choose a satisfying gift. Importantly, any knowledge of the recipient's preferences, regardless of congruity, reduces anxiety and choice of assortments or consensus options for ID-Other.

Implications for Marketers and Consumers

Our findings can help firms develop offerings and communications to address consumers’ decision processes and choice. For example, for product categories frequently individually chosen for joint consumption, such as snacks, beverages, party games, venues, and restaurants, marketers can create and promote variety packs, extensive menus, or multiexperience products (e.g., areas for games and quiet conversation) to cater to diverse preferences. Retailers could design store layouts and displays to guide ID-Joint decision-makers to assortments (e.g., a “friends and family favorites” section in a games aisle). Marketers can emphasize that assortments can meet diverse preferences (e.g., “make everyone happy with our variety pack”) or can share the decision-making load (e.g., “with a variety pack, everyone gets to pick their favorite”). When offering products with less variety, marketers could emphasize the importance of own preferences (e.g., perfect to celebrate your birthday or work promotion), or instead target ID-Self consumers and highlight the match with individual preferences (e.g., “made for you,” or “unique to you”). Marketers could position assortments for consumers making ID-Other when others’ preferences are unknown (e.g., thank-you gifts for teachers, welcome gifts for new employees), while single options could be positioned for contexts in which others’ preferences are more likely to be known, such as holidays where gifts are given to close loved ones (e.g., Mother's Day, Valentine's Day). These strategies can help marketers appeal to their target consumers, decrease consumers’ decision anxiety, and increase overall well-being.

Likewise, our findings on the power of consensus cues suggest that marketers should track product popularity and promote items as the “most popular” or “top seller” to target and help consumers making ID-Joint, keeping in mind that the appeal of specific consensus cues may vary across cultures (Barnes and Shavitt 2024). In contrast, providing popularity information or tapping into popular trends may be unnecessary when targeting ID-Self, ID-Joint when decision-makers focus on their own preferences (e.g., for personal celebrations), or ID-Other when the recipient's preferences are known.

Both marketers and consumers can benefit from greater understanding of how ID-Joint evoke anxiety. Uncertainty and anxiety can lead to no choice (e.g., staying with the status quo; Luce 1998), potentially leading to lost sales. Marketers could thus implement tactics to increase confidence or decrease felt responsibility to mitigate anxiety. For example, providing detailed product descriptions, user reviews, and Q&A sections that highlight the offering's ability to satisfy multiple preferences can boost confidence. To decrease felt responsibility, marketers can offer satisfaction guarantees or flexible return policies to reassure consumers about their choices, and train customer service teams to provide recommendations, partially assuming some of the decision-making burden. This research can also empower consumers to navigate ID-Joint more effectively. When others’ preferences are unknown or incongruent, choosing assortments or popular items can reduce the uncertainty of matching both own and co-consumers’ preferences. Consumers can even create assortments (e.g., purchasing various types of snacks or allowing bridesmaids to choose their own dress style) or use online reviews to assess popularity.

Directions for Future Research

Much research on joint consumption involves assigning participants to consume individually or together, without making ID-Joint (see Web Appendix A for literature review). While such research finds benefits of shared consumption, including increased enjoyment (Raghunathan and Corfman 2006; Ramanathan and McGill 2007), it does not explore how enjoyment might be impacted by making ID-Joint prior to consuming. It is possible that the decision anxiety that arises in ID-Joint could negate the enjoyment found in earlier research. Indeed, we found no effect of ID-Joint versus ID-Self on measured enjoyment in Studies 1 and 2 (see Web Appendix C8 and E3). We look forward to future work that examines how making ID-Joint impacts the enjoyment of shared consumption or whether and when the anxiety associated with ID-Joint leads consumers to avoid joint consumption. Given the benefits of joint versus solo consumption (Raghunathan and Corfman 2006; Ramanathan and McGill 2007), understanding these reactions could provide insight into consumer satisfaction and well-being.

We examine ID-Other in the context of gift-giving and expect other types of ID-Other (e.g., caregiving and favors; Liu, Dallas, and Fitzsimons 2019) to operate similarly due to heightened focus on the other's preferences. However, it would be interesting for future research to explore the nuances of different types of ID-Other, for example, those in which the decision-maker's preferences might have heightened importance (e.g., caregiving). Additionally, we hope to see future research that examines factors such as power and status or the extent of consensus versus conflict among multiple co-consumers’ or gift recipients’ preferences, or that identifies additional choice strategies to further develop our novel framework for understanding the decision-making process for ID-Joint and other types of decisions.