Abstract

England's merit pay plan yields higher pay for teachers, but evidence of a transformation of teacher effectiveness is patchy.
Like so many aspects of education policy in England over the past 20 years, performance-related pay has been an area of high-profile, frequently changing development. But has it been effective in improving what goes on in classrooms?
Unsurprisingly, opinions tend to diverge on this subject, which seems to be debated around the world. But one thing appears clear: The Labour government, elected for the first time 13 years ago, has expended considerable political energy on this topic.
In one sense, performance pay has a very long history in England. In 1862, a system of payment-by-results was introduced so that the government would reward elementary schools according to their pupils' performance in reading, writing, and arithmetic tests. This was abandoned in 1897 amid concerns about the narrowness of the teaching that resulted. The experience then appears to have cast a shadow over any possibility of performance pay for most of the 20th century.
However, this began to change in the 1990s. Almost as soon as they came to power in 1997, Labour ministers were keen to put forward the idea of merit pay. Then-Education Secretary David Blunkett told the House of Commons that merit pay would be part of a set of “radical,” “modernizing” reforms that would create a “new professionalism” among teachers.
The aim was clear. The government was unhappy with a system in which most teachers, unless they gained management responsibility, were simply paid according to their years in service. English schools control their own budgets and have some flexibility to reward teachers for excellent performance, but they still must abide by central government stipulations on teachers' employment conditions. The paper that proposed the new system said that fewer than 1% of teachers had actually received awards for excellent teaching.
So Labour sought to introduce an alternative. Instead of a single pay scale for all classroom teachers, there would be two. Teachers in their first five years in the profession would typically earn pay increases annually until they reached the top of this scale. They would then have the chance to cross a “threshold” to a higher pay scale if they could provide evidence of good performance to the school principal. The first “rung” on this new ladder, known as the Upper Pay Scale, was worth an extra £2,000 ($3,128, at today's rates) to the teacher. There were four more rungs, with progression in each case dependent on demonstrating continued strong performance.
Teachers had to present their principals with portfolios of evidence of their capabilities in eight categories laid down by the government. One of these related to the teacher's students making good progress in their test or in-class assessment scores, while the others were grouped under four headings covering the teacher's “knowledge and understanding,” “teaching and assessment,” “wider professional effectiveness,” and “professional characteristics.”
The first proved the most contentious, with the largest union, the National Union of Teachers (NUT), warning that linking pay to exam scores could lead to teaching to the test. NUT then launched a legal challenge on the ground that the government had not consulted properly on its plans. NUT won, forcing the scheme's delay in 2000.
However, months later, following consultation, the pay plan was implemented. And opposition dwindled, largely because, remarkably, almost all teachers who applied for merit pay got it: 80% of eligible teachers applied, and well over 90% of those applying were successful with their threshold applications in the first round.
The scheme has since been revised. In 2006, it was incorporated into schools' performance management policies for all staff, with other managers joining principals in reviewing the pay claims of teachers. For the first time, these reviewers actually went into classrooms to watch teachers teach. And the number of “rungs” in the Upper Pay Scale was shortened from five to three.
Whether England has a true performance system at all is debatable. Most teachers just progress through the pay scale as the years of service accumulate just as they did before.
Does the Reform Work?
After three years of experience, the question remains: Have teachers taught better as a result of merit pay?
A 2004 study suggested a positive link. Researchers at the University of Bristol found that students taught by teachers eligible for merit pay gained exam results half a grade better on the GCSE — the main test taken by 16-year-olds — than those taught by teachers ineligible for merit pay. The conclusion was, therefore, that teachers worked more closely toward ensuring good results than they would otherwise have done, though benefits weren't uniform across subjects. In mathematics, there were no demonstrable gains from performance pay.
Overall, firm evidence of a transformation of teacher effectiveness is patchy. There is overwhelming evidence that England's education system is now extremely results-focused, with maximizing the school's published exam scores dominating the thinking of management in many institutions. But, leaving aside the debate over whether this has been a positive development, the precise contribution of performance-related pay to its advent is unclear.
John Bangs, head of education at NUT, is skeptical. He argued in a book chapter last year, in a review of merit pay published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), that the English performance management system — of which performance pay is a part — “has had a moderately motivating effect on a minority of teachers.” However, most teachers felt it was “just another process they had to go through.”
Some 80% of NUT members surveyed by the union in 2008 still opposed having their pay progression linked to student results.
Nigel Middleton, an independent consultant who has advised thousands of principals on contractual issues and performance management and who supports the concept of performance pay, believes the policy in practice has been “pretty disastrous.” Top pay for a teacher with no managerial responsibility increased from £19,500 ($30,500) before the scheme to £36,000 ($56,000) now. But the key point, he says, is that almost all teachers applying for performance bonuses have received them. Whether England has a true performance system at all is debatable, he says: Most teachers just progress through the pay scale as their years of service accumulate, just as they did before.
Middleton said: “Basically, the government has paid teachers a lot more, but not tied that to a truly rigorous assessment that teachers' performance is at a sufficiently high level that the reward is justified.”
A version of performance pay is now well-established throughout England, and much of the controversy surrounding it has died down. But it's doubtful that it has fully achieved the aims Blunkett set out for it.
