Long Road to Freedom: Factors Delaying Prisoners’ Early Release from Prison

Abstract

The purpose of the study was to identify the factors that delay the granting of early release to prisoners who are eligible for early release according to the Israeli law. The study is based on participatory observations of parole board hearings, interviews with parole board members, and content analysis of protocols of parole boards and legal rulings. The main factors identified in delaying release are related to the numerous postponements of hearings and delays in receiving documents from relevant parties. These factors are discussed in detail, offering recommendation for improvement and thus increasing the number of early releases.

Keywords

prisoners early release parole board reintegration licensed inmate community supervision

Introduction

Parole is the release of a prisoner into the community before completion of the entire term of his/her sentence. It is a privilege granted on the basis of positive behavior in prison, during which the licensed inmate must meet certain conditions during the period of the residual prison term (Petersilia, 2003). Over the years, additional considerations and conditions have been added that have led to the delay and reduction of the early releases of prisoners, both in Israel and elsewhere (Caplan, 2007; Tzeng, 2014), as detailed below.

The Law of Conditional Release from Prison in Israel

The early release of prisoners was introduced in Palestine by the British even before the establishment of the state of Israel. The Prison Ordinance of 1946 allowed prisoners to be paroled automatically after serving two thirds of their sentence (Prison Ordinate No. 3, High Commissioner to Palestine, 1946). In 1954, the automatic release was abolished and replaced by parole boards whose task was to assess prisoners’ requests for early release. At that time, the boards had three representatives—a district court judge, a representative of the Israel Prison Services (hereinafter: IPS), and a physician or educator (The Penal Law Amendment [Methods of Punishment], section 38, 1954).

In 2001, a new law was enacted in Israel, which is valid to date, that regulated the early release from prison. This law provides that any prisoner sentenced to a period of more than 6 months, including a life sentence whose sentence has been imposed, and who has served at least two thirds of the sentence, is entitled to apply for an early release to the parole board. The parole board will then consider the early release request based, on criteria specified in the law, which includes the individual’s chances of rehabilitation and the lack of danger to public (The Israeli Parliament, Law of Conditional Release from Prison, 2001).

This law also specifies the members of the parole board, its functions, powers and considerations. That is, the parole board has four members, headed by a judge (usually retired), and two public representatives who are knowledgeable and experienced in applicable professional fields—criminology, social work, psychology, or education. The fourth member is a representative of the IPS, who is entitled to participate in the board’s discussions but does not have voting rights (The Israeli Parliament, Law of Conditional Release from Prison, 2001).

In Israel, the parole board is not subordinate to any governmental authority; its members are independent and make decisions to the best of their objective judgment. Also, there is no permanent composition of the parole board. Its members vary in each committee, and thus a deliberation that is postponed does not necessarily take place before the same panel that met in the first instance (Sharon, 2003). Committees of parole boards are held almost every day in one of the prisons throughout the country, each time in a different composition.

Two main objectives underpin the Law of Conditional Release from Prison: (1). Protecting public safety through controlled and supervised release of prisoners whose behavior in prison is positive and does not endanger public safety; and (2). Rehabilitation in the community of prisoners with actual rehabilitation potential (Dagan et al., 2013). Early release is consistent with the utilitarian goals of punishment; namely, individual deterrence, prevention, and rehabilitation, which are future-oriented, attempt to anticipate danger, and reduce societal harm by rehabilitation. Specifically, rehabilitation focuses on addressing inmate needs and problems in an effort to change perceptions and behavior and increase chances for successful community integration, thus reducing recidivism (Petersilia, 2003; Sapir, 2008).

Justifications for Granting Early Release to Prisoners

One of the main justifications for granting early release is minimizing the negative effects of incarceration. Many studies have found that staying in prison is a criminogenic factor, that is, reinforcing prisoners’ criminal mindsets and behaviors (Gendreau et al., 1996; Nagin et al., 2009; Tonry, 2011; Wood, 2007). Early release from prison allows the formerly incarcerated to begin to reintegrate into normative society at an earlier stage. So, from a criminogenic point of view, it is advisable to minimize the length of stay in prison.

Furthermore, providing early release is a motivational factor for prisoners to adopt positive behavior in order to gain such release. In effect, early release is used as a tool by the IPS to manage inmates’ behavior. The use of early release is first attributed to Alexander Maconochie, a naval officer, who between 1840 and 1844 commanded a penal camp for criminals who were exiled from England to Norfolk, Australia. Maconochie set a positive horizon for those sentenced to the camp that increased their cooperation in exchange for receiving benefits and gradual improvements towards early release (White, 1976). This positive motivation also influences the prisoner’s willingness to participate in rehabilitation programs in prison, assuming that this will increase their chances for gaining early release (Diamant, 2008).

Early release also allows for a continuum of treatment in the community that assists in reducing recidivism. One of the conditions for early release in Israel is proof of a community supervision and care program to ensure a gradual transition from prison to community life. In Israel, the Prisoner Rehabilitation Authority (hereinafter: PRA) is the official authoritative body responsible for creating supervised rehabilitation programs for parolees. During the supervisory period, the parolee must comply with all the conditions of the rehabilitation program set by the parole board. Any failure to comply with these conditions may result in their return to prison (Law of Conditional Release from Prison, 2001, articles 20, 21).

PRA treatment includes: assistance in finding a job, integrating into a community therapeutic program (e.g., hostel, therapeutic community, day care center, group therapy); attending weekly meetings with a PRA representative; and remaining at home during the night. Many studies show that stable employment along with continued community care are critical factors that assist in the rehabilitation and reintegration process and reduce recidivism (Drake et al., 2009; Elisha et al., 2017).

Research conducted in Israel examining the effectiveness of PRA treatment and supervision of parolees yielded positive findings regarding their functioning and reduction of recidivism (Amir et al., 2012; Bialer & Peled-Laskov, 2011; Shoham et al., 2014). Similarly, studies from various countries around the world report a reduction of 24% to 50% in recidivism rates among parolees who completed their treatment and supervision programs in the community compared to those who did not (e.g., Cullen & Gendreau, 2000; Duwe & Kerschner, 2008; Wilson et al., 2000). Recent investigations also highlight the crucial contribution of continuing care in the community for high-risk violent parolees, which assists them in community integration and rehabilitation, especially in the first year following their release from prison (Polascheck & Yesberg, 2018).

Early release of prisoners and their rehabilitation in the community also entails economic savings for the state, derived from the lack of unnecessary maintenance in prison of those eligible for early release. For example, in a study examining the economic feasibility of rehabilitating prisoners through the PRA, in contrast to the cost of incarceration in Israel, the average financial cost of rehabilitating a parolee within the PRA framework was NIS 7,354, while the average annual prison cost was NIS 81,409. Hence, the economic benefits resulting from PRA activities, in addition to their social values, far outweigh the costs involved in its operation (Shatner & Isser, 2008).

Another advantage lies in reducing prison overcrowding. In relation to this, it is important to note that recidivism rates among Israeli parolees supervised by the PRA were found to be as much as 15% lower than that of those released at the end of a full sentence (Ben Zvi & Walk, 2011). A recent PRA report indicates significant differences in recidivism rates of prisoners who were released early, usually under community care and supervision of PRA, compared to those who were released after completing their full sentence: 28.2% versus 47.1%, respectively, 5 years after their release from prison (Prisoner Rehabilitation Authority—Summary of 2017). The current general rate of recidivism among Israeli prisoners stands at 41% (Berman & Walk, 2015). Therefore, any further reductions through community-supervised treatment are welcome.

The Wide Range of Considerations Required by Parole Boards

In considering the granting of early release to the prisoner, the parole board is required to examine a great deal of complex data that includes: information about the offence of conviction; prior offences and convictions; and dangerousness assessments by professional experts regarding inmates convicted of domestic violence, sexual, and incest offences . Additionally, prison reports from the prison director, a social worker, a physician, a psychiatrist, and intelligence and security officials are reviewed for evaluations concerning mental state and behavior during imprisonment (Sharon, 2003). Finally, the parole board receives reports from the PRA regarding the prisoner's suitability for a community rehabilitation program under its supervision.

IPS data demonstrate that half of the deliberations on parole requests were postponed by the parole board, mostly due to administrative or technical reasons, such as missing documents or reports from the relevant authority. However, about half of the postponed requests were never examined or discussed again, since, in the interim, the prisoners had reached the end of their prison terms (IPS Research Department, 2014). Preventing an early release of inmates who are eligible for early release but rejected for technical reasons, violates the purpose of the early release law, does disservice to the intent of punishment, and forces the state to bear unnecessary imprisonment costs (Ben-Yehuda, 2017).

Early Releases from Prison—Numerical Data

According to the procedures for early prisoner release that currently exist in most developed countries, there are some legal provisions that are automatic for those convicted of offenses of lesser severity. For example, in England, such prisoners are entitled to automatic release after serving half of their prison term (Padfield & Maruna, 2006). However, over past decades, there have been radical changes in parole policy in many countries. For example in the U.S., changes in parole policy and law at the federal and state level resulted in a sharp decline in the number of prisoners released early between the 1980s to the 2000s., explaining the parallel steep increase in the number of those incarcerated for that time period—700% (Klingele, 2010).

Similarly, in Israel, there has been a decline in the past two decades in the number of parolees. Whereas in the 1990s, 63.4% of inmates who applied for early release were granted an early release, from the beginning of the current millennium to the present, this rate has shrunk to about 30% (Dorner Committee Report, 2015). In fact, a higher percentage of Israeli prisoners could have been paroled if the parole boards had functioned more efficiently. According to the IPS Research Department, some of the hearings on requests for early release continue over a long period of time, until the applicants reached the end of their sentences. In 2013, for example, 30.8% of all the inmates who requested early release were released, while the decisions regarding an additional 21.3% were repeatedly postponed until their arrival to the end of their sentence (IPS Research Department, 2014).

This reduction in the number of early releases in recent decades has social and economic implications. In light of the many advantages inherent in the practice, as opposed to the disadvantages of early release reductions, it is important to identify the factors that delay the granting of early releases to individuals who are eligible by law. Finding suitable answers might improve the current trend and may increase the number of parolees, to the benefit of those released, their families and society at large.

Method

The present study was based on the principles of qualitative research, applying a number of qualitative tools. Direct interviews with the relevant “actors,” along with observations and analyses of related protocols, provide comprehensive descriptive information and data that cannot be obtained through other means such as quantitative research (Graham, 2007). Central to the design is capturing the perceptions of parole committee members regarding the factors that impede early prisoner release, as well as suggestions for improvements.

Participants

Participants in the study were: eight retired judges who had chaired parole boards; ten parole board public representatives; and two relevant officials from each of the following entities: the IPS, the PRA, the State Attorney’s office, the police, and the inter-ministerial committees that submit inmate subject evaluation reports in subject to the parole boards.

Research Tools

Semi-structured interviews. In an open interview, the researchers asked a number of general questions aimed at exposing a variety of opinions, meanings, and implications related to the examined subject from the interviewee’s perspective. The interview guide built for the current study included the following questions: (1). How do the discussions in the parole committees actually take place? (2). Should the current procedures be changed and if so—how? (3). What are the key considerations in deciding the granting of an early release for an inmate? (4). What would you change about the current functioning of the relevant professional authorities that are supposed to assist in the decision-making process of the parole committees (IPS, police, inter-ministerial committees, etc.)?

Participatory observations were conducted in 24 parole board hearings that were held at three different prisons throughout Israel. As noted previously, on almost each day, parole committee hearings are held at any other prison, with the composition of the parole committee (judge and two public representatives—usually a criminologist and a social worker) also changing.

Protocols analysis—qualitative content analysis of hearings and judicial rulings were completed as follows: 20 Supreme Court rulings following appeal of prisoners whose application for early release was denied, either by the parole committee and/or the State Attorney’s Office; 47 District Court rulings acting as an appeal court for decisions of parole committees; and 300 quasi-judicial decisions of parole committees.

Method

Interviews with parole members—judges and public representatives—were held at intervals of hearings in the parole committees in various prisons throughout Israel. The interviews with the relevant officials were conducted in different locations according to coordination between the researchers and the participants. Each interview lasted about 30 minutes.

Data Encoding

The interviews’ analysis and encoding was based on qualitative content analysis aimed at identifying patterns and meanings and grouping them into general categories and themes. At the end of this process, an integrative and consistent picture emerged regarding the factors that delay the early release of prisoners, according to which appropriate themes categories were drawn. The quotes from the interviewees as well as from the legal rulings were incorporated into the main categories and themes that emerged from the interviews.

Findings

This study identified various factors that delay and sometimes even prevent the early release of prisoners who are eligible for early release by law. These factors are linked to the nature of the activity of the relevant authorities and inter-ministerial committees to which a parole board is obliged to relate in considering the granting of early release, as detailed below.

Objections of Attorney General’s Representatives

The Attorney General’s representatives, who appear before the parole boards, often express almost automatic resistance to early release. Moreover, when the parole board decides to release a prisoner, contrary to their opinion, they usually request a 7-day delay to consider whether or not to file an appeal with the administrative court against the board’s decision (delaying execution). One gets the impression that the State Attorney’s office has a perspective of the law that differs significantly from that of the parole board members, that is, that parole is a privilege for exceptional prisoners who have been completely rehabilitated during their incarceration and who thus pose virtually no danger to anyone. This kind of objection can be seen as an expression of a “reward” mindset that is incompatible with the rehabilitative mindset that underpins the Law of Conditional Release from Prison. As a result of this objection, the release of many inmates to whom the board has decided to grant parole is delayed, even if the State Attorney’s office ends up not filing an appeal at all.

Comments of judges at the District Court, following petitions filed by the State Attorney’s office against the decisions of the parole boards, indicate that they perceive this opposition as excessive. For example, in the hearing of an appeal submitted by the State Attorney’s office against a parole board’s decision (Prisoner Petition 15945-12-11) to parole a prisoner despite his alleged dangerous, the judge noted:

“The level of persuasion that the early release of a prisoner does not endanger public safety will not and cannot be of 100% certainty or even close to it . . .this is not about absolute certainty. . . rather at the level of danger that the parole board believes can be amended with a proper supervision of the parolee.”

It should be noted that the State Attorney’s directives mention the considerations according to which the legal advisor’s position on the parole board will be determined (State Attorney, 2016). Among other things, it mentions that:

“The rehabilitation of a prisoner or the steps he takes towards rehabilitation may be a consideration for his early release, A prisoner’s positive attitude towards the rehabilitation steps taken on his behalf, such as withdrawal from substance abuse . . . might also be taken into consideration, in the absence of any indication of his danger to the public if paroled”.

In light of this directive, which is consistent with the spirit of the Israeli Law of Conditional Release from Prison, one might expect a more balanced approach on the part of the State Attorney’s office regarding early release and fewer objections to it.

Police Objections

Like the State Attorney’s office, it seems that the attitude of the Israel Police often tends to be negative towards early release of prisoners. This attitude is mostly quite standard and fixed, depending on the type of crime in question. For example, regarding a prisoner convicted for property offences they often state:

“Property offences constitute a considerable portion of criminal activity and typically involve damage to the property and privacy of the citizen, and directly affect the quality of life of normative residents, and hence his level of danger [to the public]”.

Examination of this wording gives the impression that the attitude reflected in this opinion is mainly concerned with the type of offence and its dangers rather than with any characteristics of the individual and their chances of refraining from further criminal activity. This objection on the part of the police can be explained in light of the legal definitions of its role, which mainly emphasizes enforcing the law, in the name of protecting the general public safety. There is no reference in its role definition to any kind of rehabilitation, even though this rehabilitation will eventually contribute to a reduction in criminal activity (Petersilia, 2004).

Delays in Obtaining Reports of Inter-Ministerial Committees

It very often happens that the reports required by law as a part of the committee’s considerations as a precondition for granting early release are not brought before the parole board on time. For prisoners convicted for domestic violence and sex offences and for prisoners suffering from mental illness, the 2001 Law of Conditional Release from Prison states that a parole board should receive a report estimating the level of danger they pose. Thus, the parole boards are obliged to postpone the hearing and hope that the opinions will have been received by the new date set. The Public Defender’s office relates to this problem in its report for 2010 to 2011 as follows:

“One of the main reasons for the tough situation is the frequent delays, which have become routine, in the submission of the professional opinions of those entities which, according to the Law of Conditional Release from Prison, are supposed to provide them to the parole boards, including the committees on domestic violence and incest, the mental health department . . .” (Public Defenders’ Office Report, 2012).

In this context, the Palmor Report (2010) notes that a sample examination of the reasons for the postponement of parole board hearings revealed that 28% of all postponements occurred due to the lack of evaluation reports from the domestic violence/incest and mental health committees (15% and 13% respectively).

The District Court related to this issue in its decision in a petition filed by the Public Defender’s Office (Prisoner Petition 54210-05-10), in the case of a inmate whose release was denied by the parole board because it had not received evaluation reports from the domestic violence committee. In its decision, the court stated:

“The domestic violence committee is disrupting the work of the parole board, which is ordered by law to receive evaluation reports in cases such as that of the petitioner, in that it does not submit its opinion in time before the hearing of the parole board, as determined in the parole board work procedures”.

Lack of Rehabilitation Programs for Certain Groups of Prisoners

Section 9(8) of the Israeli Law of Conditional Release from Prison (2001), states that in its considerations, the parole board should relate to reports of the PRA regarding the prisoner’s suitability for a program of care in the community under its supervision, and to the existence of such a program. However, in many cases the PRA refrains from preparing any rehabilitation program for certain groups of prisoners, thereby causing delays in the granting of early release. One such group is prisoners with less than 6 months left to serve, because, supposedly, the period of time is too short to enable any meaningful rehabilitation, and thus their early release is often prevented (State Comptroller Report, 2014).

It is assumed that in order for prisoner rehabilitation programs to be effective, they must be extended over a long period of time to enable changes in patterns of perceptions and behavior (Amir et al., 2012). In some past studies, short rehabilitation programs were found to be less effective. Consequently, there was a tendency in certain countries, such as the U.K., not to include prisoners with short sentences in rehabilitation programs, either in prison or in the community (Graffam et al., 2004; Webster et al., 2001). However, later studies found that even short-term rehabilitation programs led to certain positive outcomes, whether carried out in prison or in the community, where the more successful programs were those that parolees continued to attend of their own free will, even after the official period of their supervision had ended (Clancy et al., 2006; Lewis et al., 2007).

Another group of prisoners for whom the PRA does not prepare supervised rehabilitation programs are those who living in settlements where there is no rehabilitation coordinator in the vicinity. The PRA attributes this policy to a lack of financial resources that prevents it from employing rehabilitation supervisors and coordinators to cater to the needs of ex-prisoners from these settlements. As a result, the chances that these individuals will be granted early releases are greatly diminished (Dorner Committee Report, 2015). While there are inmates with financial means who turn to private rehabilitators to prepare rehabilitation and supervision program for them in the community, they are a minority; and for many others, early release is withheld because of their place of residence (Amir et al., 2012).

Delays due to the Nature of IPS Activity a Partial or Out-of-Date Reporting on a Prisoner’s Behavior

Partial reporting or a lack of updated reports of a prisoner’s behavior may lead to a postponement of the hearing on the early release request until an updated report is receives, which, in turn, delays the early release. Research has shown that the inmate’s behavior while incarcerated has a greater impact on parole board decisions than other factors such as the severity of the offence and past criminal records (e.g., Caplan, 2007; Carroll & Burke, 1990). When an IPS report on a prisoner submitted to the parole board is insufficiently clear or lacking important details, it is difficult for the parole board to reach a properly based decision, and so it will tend to postpone the hearing. Several researchers have highlighted the importance of the organization of information in prisoners’ files. They claim that often what is missing from the file is more important than what it contains (Hannah-Moffat, 2004; Padfield, 2002); for instance, when an offence is attributed to a prisoner although it is unclear who actually committed it.

An example of this is a prisoner petition (21426-04-13) against the parole board’s decision not to grant an early release. This decision was due to a disciplinary report for garbage and dirt found under the window of his cell for which he was deprived of certain rights like purchasing in the canteen and watching television. The inmate claimed that he did not dispose of the garbage and that the punishment was collective, including all his cellmates because the guards did not know who was responsible. In their decision to accept the appeal and release the prisoner, the judges noted: “There is no dispute that there is nothing in the prisoner’s behavior in prison to deny his conditional early release, and since the parole board did not relate in their decision to other restrictions, we can only accept the appeal, and we order the petitioner’s early release".

Exclusion of Prisoners from Rehabilitation Programs in Prison for Reasons Unrelated to Them

One of the main considerations for granting an early release is the inmate’s participation in prison rehabilitation programs and the extent to which he has succeeded in such program. Not attending such a program might be interpreted by the parole board as a lack of motivation to be rehabilitated, thus constituting a continued danger to the public. This is based on the perception that one’s functional and behavioral problems have not been addressed. However, in practice, many inmates are not included in rehabilitation programs for a variety of reasons, such as having a short period term of sentence that precludes inclusion in a long-term program. Other reasons that prevent inmates from being placed in rehabilitative programming relate to intelligence reports and a lack of knowledge of the Hebrew language. As a result, an inmate’s chances of obtaining early release are reduced.

However, prisoners’ petitions filed following the postponement of early release due to failures to place them in prison rehabilitation programs related to a lack of knowledge of the Hebrew language were accepted by the District Court. The judges instructed the IPS to integrate these prisoners into rehabilitation programs, while finding proper solutions for their language deficit.

For example, in prisoner’s petition filed against the IPS (39706-05-10), the District Court judge noted:

“I accept the petition and instruct the IPS to integrate the petitioner within 30 days of this ruling in individual therapy for alcohol abuse, and then into individual therapy for sex offenders, whether by a Russian-speaking social worker or through an interpreter, if it is not possible to include him into treatment groups due to insufficient control in Hebrew”.

Exclusion of Detainees from Long-Term Rehabilitation Programs in Prison

Many detainees “until the end of legal proceedings” may spend over 6 months in prison. Because of their status as detainees, they are not integrated into prison rehabilitation programs. In addition, the periods of imprisonment following their conviction are usually short and therefore not conducive to placing them in a meaningful treatment program. As a result, such offenders will probably not gain early release from prison; they will only be released after completion of a full sentence, not addressing or treating their problems.

In some cases, entry into a treatment program is conditional upon giving up early discharge because of the length of the required treatment. In such cases, the inmate is in a “Catch 22” situation, since one’s natural and immediate desire is to be released from prison as early as possible (see, for example, Toch, 1992). Hence, such inmates will tend to relinquish the rehabilitation program prison in order to be released sooner. Yet, in the absence of a rehabilitation program, the inmate’s request for early release might be refused. For example, in the decision of the parole board of September 12, 2011, the members of the committee noted:

“According to the material presented to us . . . it emerges that the prisoner expressed a desire to be included in a rehabilitation program in prison. When he was offered to participate in a rehabilitation program in prison, while giving up of his early release due to the length of the program, he refused. I must note that I do not know of any prisoner who would be willing to give up his early release in order to undergo such treatment”.

Delays Due to Technical Factors

The numerous reports which the parole board is supposed to receive and the many considerations to be taken into account are an indication of the great effort its members must make and the burdensome workload they take on. This task is also mental, resulting from the many hours of discussion, the multiplicity of successive decisions, and the amount of information to be processed (Danziger et al., 2011). The challenge of this enormous undertaking causes fatigue that affects the release boards’ decision making. According to Weinshall-Margel and Shapard (2011), the order of prisoners’ appearance before the board can influence the quality of the decisions. In the first part of the day, the prisoners are accompanied by lawyers, while in the second part of the day, the board sees those who have no legal representation. The latter are given less discussion time, and fewer of them are granted parole—37% as opposed to 67% for those who do have a lawyer present (Weinshall-Margel & Shapard, 2011).

In 2010, the Ministry of Justice issued an investigation report on the conduct of hearings in the parole committees (Palmor Report, 2010). The report notes that close to 50% of all hearings on requests for early release end in a decision to postpone the discussion to another date, sometimes with delays that come into the period of the prisoners’ early release. These postponements have many implications, including economic ones due to the wasted resources for unnecessary days of incarceration, and those deriving from over-punishment and reduced efficacy of rehabilitation programs during the parole period.

As discussed, repeated postponements in requests for early release due to various reasons that are not dependent on the parole boards include the heavy caseload, the lack of evaluation reports from professional committees (domestic violence/incest and mental health), incomplete reports from the IPS, and the appearance of prisoners before the board without legal representation (Palmor Report, 2010). District Court judges harshly criticized this reality of the postponement of parole board hearing.

For example, in the hearing of prisoner petition 5500/09, in which the prisoner complained about the parole board’s delay to hear his case due to the committee’s workload burden, a delay that continued into the period of his early release, the judges noted:

“This petition brings to our attention a dismal picture of the handling of prisoners eligible by law to appear before the parole board, but this right is denied. . . This situation cannot be accepted according to which prisoners are not brought before parole boards on an effective date, since this is a very serious violation of one of the most basic rights of every prisoner, wherever he may be”.

Discussion

The purpose of the current study was to identify the factors that delay and thereby reduce the rate of prison early release of individuals who are eligible for early release according to the Israeli law (Conditional Release from Prison, 2001). As cited above, over the past two decades, there has been a decline in the number of Israeli prisoners being paroled, from 63% in the 1990s to about 30% in the 2000s (Dorner Committee Report, 2015).

The study has identified a number of key factors linked to the decline in the number of early-release prisoners as follows: (1) the many postponements in discussions due to delayed evaluation reports from relevant authorities and inter-ministerial committees that the parole board is obliged to address in making early release decisions (e.g., the IPS, the State Attorney, the police, the PRA, dangerousness assessments of committees for domestic violence, sexual offenses, mental health). These delays sometimes mean that the final third of a sentence is actually completed before the inmate is summoned to appear before the parole board; (2) the PRA’s failure to prepare rehabilitation programs for certain groups of prisoners—those with a short period time of sentence and those who live in settlements with no PRA representatives nearby; (3) the decision to not place certain prisoner groups in prison rehabilitation programs (those with a short time period of sentence and those who do not speak Hebrew), even though they seem to suitable for the programming. This action harms their chances of being granted parole, since one of the board’s considerations is inmate participation in a prison rehabilitation programs; (4) the delays that accrue due to technical reasons, for instance, parole boards’ heavy workloads, and a lack of legal representation for inmates requesting parole.

These findings have many negative ramifications which contradict the rehabilitative approach on which the law of Conditional Release from Prison based, as well as the principles of fairness and justice. In additions, they undermine the legitimacy of both the prison system and the parole boards in the perceptions of inmates which may harm rehabilitation efforts, as noted in previous studies (e.g., Franke et al., 2010; Sparks & Bottoms, 1995). Further, the results of our research have many negative implications:

Financial costs

First, not releasing those many individuals supposedly suitable for parole according to the law leads to great financial costs due to the unnecessary incarceration. The monthly cost of housing one prisoner in Israel is about ILS 10,000 per month. If this number is multiplied by the large numbers of inmates whose parole has been delayed, this sum is about half a million shekels per annum (Palmor Report, 2010). Furthermore, remaining in prison can reinforce criminogenic influences (Nagin et al., 2009; Tonry, 2011). Instead of taking advantage of this time period to participate in activities which support integration into the community, harmful prison influences decrease the chances of rehabilitation (e.g., Gendreau et al., 1999).

Impairment to the therapeutic continuity

Delaying the decision to grant early release is liable to significantly harm an individual’s chances of rehabilitation, as this delay interrupts the continuum of treatment begun in prison and continued in the community as a condition of his or her early release (Diamant, 2008). Delaying early release shortens the length of time the prisoner is released on parole, resulting in a timeframe that is sometimes too short for developing a meaningful rehabilitation plan. As a condition of parole, the release board is allowed to require inmates to continue their rehabilitation process under the supervision of the PRA in the community because of its positive effect on the reduction of recidivism (Ben Zvi & Walk, 2011). Hence, the constant rescheduling of parole board hearings harms one’s chances of being paroled on time and affects the continuum of treatment in the community.

Impairment of the prisoners’ motivation

The parole board’s constant rescheduling of hearing for reasons that have nothing to do with the prisoners, such as the failure of various relevant authorities and professionals to submit their reports on time, can cause negative reactions among these early release applicants. Cancelling inmates’ privileges, including parole, has been found to cause disciplinary problems (Memory et al., 1999). Similarly, such delays may impair the inmates’ motivation for rehabilitation. It is likely that one may feel cheated, as the adoption of positive behaviors and participation in prison rehabilitation programming does not lead to anticipated privileges, including the right for early release from prison (Dagan, 2015; Polinsky, 2013).

Impairment of principles of fairness and justice

The general aim of the Law of Conditional Release from Prison is to create a balance between clearly punitive and rehabilitative considerations. Thus, prisoners who meet the law’s requirements are suitable for parole. Delaying their release due to external causes unrelated to them harms the rehabilitative spirit of the law.

However, it is true that there has been some improvement in recent years due to the implementation of recommendations from the Dorner Committee Report (2015) which examined national punishment policy and the functioning of parole boards in Israel. One recommendation was to establish an entity to coordinate the various parole boards and the relevant authorities in order to prevent delays and postponements. Indeed, in 2015, the management of parole boards was transferred from the IPS to the Courts Administration, and since then, some improvements in the boards’ functioning have been reported. For example, data of the Courts Administration for the years 2014-2016 showed an increase in the number of days of parole board hearings as well as a decrease in hearings postponements. Yet, these changes did not lead to a real increase in the number of prisoners who gained an early release (Ben-Yehuda, 2017).

In recent years, the trend in many Western countries, including Israel, has been to increase the early release of prisoners. This is in light of prison overcrowding and the many costs associated with imprisonment when compared to the many social and economic benefits of community rehabilitation. This procedural change expresses itself through adoption of a judicial policy which allows the shortening of prison terms not solely through parole boards (Klingele, 2010). For instance, the Israeli Ministerial Legislative Committee recently ratified a temporary order that doubles the time period of administrative release as a quick solution for the problem of overcrowded Israeli prisons. This is a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling requiring the government to give each prisoner at least 3m² of living space (Appeal to Supreme Court 1892/14). Consequently, approximately 1,000 prisoners were paroled in December, 2018, up to 4 months before the end of their sentences.

However, despite these changes, to date, there has not been any significant increase in the number of prisoners being paroled in Israel. In our opinion, this situation must be remedied.

Recommendations

As noted in this article, Israel’s parole boards have many positive goals and justifications—economic, rehabilitative, utilitarian, and humane. As derived from this study’s findings, a number of concrete recommendations are offered to improve the implementation of the Law of Conditional Release from Prison and streamline the work of parole boards.

The IPS

The IPS should develop specific prison rehabilitation programs for groups that currently do not receive treatment. We are referring to detainees and inmates sentenced to short prison terms, as well as those who don’t speak Hebrew.

The State Attorney’s Office

The State Attorney should greatly limit the delay in the execution of parole board decisions—only issuing a delay in extreme cases where it is obvious that the parole board has made a radical and unreasonable mistake. It should only submit appeals under these circumstances.

The Police

When the police relay their opinion on parole, they should give more consideration to the rehabilitation needs of inmates who are eligible for parole and promote their integration into society as law-abiding citizens.

The Inter-Ministerial Committees for Domestic Violence, Sexual Offences, Incest and Mental Health

Each committee should appoint a coordinating representative on its behalf whose job it will be to ensure that the requisite professional opinions are sent to the court management’s office in time for parole hearings.

The PRA

The PRA should develop and run short-term supervision and rehabilitation programs within the community, such as those found to work in other countries, as well as allow licensed inmates to continue receiving treatment after their supervision period ends. Similarly, the PRA should appoint a sufficient number of program coordinators across the country to allow supervision in all communities.

The Parole Boards

Parole board members should update their expertise by attending conferences and seminars focusing on prison and community rehabilitation programs that are effective. The intent is to make better-informed decisions in the parole process, ones that promote and enhance the chances of a returning citizen’s successful rehabilitation.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Statutes cited

Appeal to Supreme Court 1892/14.

Law of Conditional Release from Prison, 2001.

Parole Board Decision, September 12, 2011.

Penal Law Amendment [Methods of Punishment], section 38. 1954.

Prisoner Petition 5500/09

Prisoner Petition 54210-05-10.

Prisoner’s Petition 39706-05-10

Prisoner Petition 15945-12-11.

Prisoner Petition 21426-04-13.

Authors Biographies

Uri Timor, PhD, is senior lecturer, department of criminology at Ashkelon Academic College and Bar Ilan University, Israel. He served as the public representative on Parole Committees, Court Administration, Israel, from 2010 to 2020). His research Interests include prisons, offenders’ rehabilitation, restorative justice, and juvenile delinquency.

Ety Elisha, PhD, is senior lecturer, department of criminology, the Yezreel Valley College, Israel. She serves as a public representative on Parole Committees, Court Administration, Israel from 2016 to present. Her research focuses on offenders' rehabilitation, domestic violence, violent crimes, juvenile delinquency, and positive criminology.

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