Conspiracy as a Defense: The Role of Defensive Styles in the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories

Functions of Conspiracy Theories

Conspiracy theories can satisfy three primary needs: existential, epistemic, and social (Douglas et al., 2017). Regarding the existential one, conspiracy theories help interpret a stressful situation and simplify its understanding (Hofstadter, 2012), providing a sense of security and control. For example, disempowered and anxious individuals are more likely to believe conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013); conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 are associated with a higher level of anxiety about the virus (Sallam et al., 2020). Considering the epistemic need, conspiracies logically explain events or phenomena that are difficult to understand. Notably, people with lower educational levels are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories (Douglas et al., 2017), and lower knowledge of COVID-19 is associated with conspiracy beliefs (Sallam et al., 2020). Finally, the social need regards maintaining a positive image of oneself or one’s group (Douglas et al., 2017). Indeed, people are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories when their sense of identity is threatened (Cichocka et al., 2016) or when they want to feel unique (Lantian et al., 2017). National narcissism (i.e., the belief that the ingroup is superior to the outgroup) is positively associated with conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 (Sternisko et al., 2023). Figure 1 shows how conspiracy theories address three primary psychological needs: existential, epistemic, and social. The overlaps highlight how these needs interact, with conspiracy theories often providing a unified solution to multiple needs simultaneously.

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Figure 1.

Existential, epistemic, and social needs are involved in conspiracy beliefs. The overlaps indicate cases in which more than one need is activated: for example, “explaining threat with conspiracies” (existential + epistemic), “anxiety-based ingroup beliefs” (existential + social), and “identity-congruent explanations” (epistemic + social)

Defense Mechanisms

Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been significant interest in studying individual resilience, with a focus on defense mechanisms and coping strategies (e.g., Elliott et al., 2021). Defense mechanisms have been developed in psychoanalytic theory and have been refined across different theoretical formulations. Originally, Sigmund Freud (1937) posited that defense mechanisms were unconscious Ego’s processes to protect itself from excessive drives, anxiety, stressors, and challenging thoughts. The ego can be described briefly as the instance of the psyche that mediates between the Id’s drives, the demands of reality, and the norms of the Superego, regulating behavior through the reality principle (Freud, 1937). Further, several psychoanalysts, including Anna Freud (1989), Melanie Klein (1930), and Otto Kernberg (1967), have studied defense mechanisms, expanding the list, classifying them, and relating them to psychotherapy research. Nowadays, one of the definitions that includes the evolution of the concept of defense is that of Phebe Cramer (1998), defining defense mechanisms as a mostly unconscious mental operation that has the function of protecting the individual from excessive anxiety caused by unacceptable thoughts, impulses, or desires, as well as protecting the Self, such as self-esteem or self-integration.

Although there are various ways to classify defense mechanisms, many authors agree that each person uses some defense mechanisms more frequently in certain situations than others, and that these modalities vary across people. These tendencies, or styles, can be classified as mature, immature, and neurotic (e.g., Bond et al., 1983), influencing psychological functioning, as the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (PDM) (Lingiardi & McWilliams, 2018) establishes. Specifically, the mature style relies on functional defense mechanisms such as altruism, humor, and sublimation, which enable individuals to address challenges constructively without distorting reality. Neurotic styles involve mechanisms like repression, rationalization, and intellectualization, which temporarily reduce anxiety but may partially distort reality. Immature styles, including mechanisms such as denial, projection, and passive aggression, often undermine individual and interpersonal functioning because they are dysfunctional in the long term and can significantly distort one’s perception of reality. In this paper, we adopt a dimensional perspective on defense mechanisms, moving beyond the rigid adaptive-versus-maladaptive dichotomy in favor of a continuum of maturity. Indeed, functioning is described in hierarchical and evolutionary terms, from the most primitive to the most mature, with the idea of stratification and developmental trajectories that do not imply rigid correspondences with chronological age (Gerö, 1951; Vaillant, 1977). Following the psychoanalytic tradition of Sigmund Freud (1937) and Anna Freud (1989), the functional value of a defense depends on context, flexibility, and reversibility, rather than on belonging to a dichotomous category: the early or prolonged use of defensive mechanisms can become problematic, but the same operations can be transiently useful under stress (e.g., grief, illness traumatic events). Although no mechanism is pathognomonic of a diagnosis, there are individual characteristics that can predict the use of, or not, mature defenses (e.g., Lingiardi & Madeddu, 2023). For example, attachment security correlates with higher levels of reflective functioning and more mature defense profiles, while insecurity is associated with immature defenses (Tanzilli et al., 2021). This relationship could be explained by difficulties in attachment relationships, which can interfere with the ability to mentalize and attribute mental states to self and others, leading reality distortions, epistemic mistrust, and impulsive responses (Luyten et al., 2020; Sharp & Fonagy, 2008; Yakeley, 2018).

Defense Mechanisms and Coping Styles

In the last three decades, defense mechanisms have been linked to coping strategies as a modality to hide or mitigate conflicts or stressful agents that cause anxiety (APA, 1994; Erickson et al., 1997) or threaten Self-Esteem (Cramer, 1998; Zeigler-Hill et al., 2008). Coping mechanisms are cognitive, attentional, or behavioral strategies aimed at addressing situational demands, with the primary objective of alleviating negative emotional states, such as anxiety and distress (Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2016; Zeigler-Hill et al., 2008). Although the two concepts of coping and defense mechanisms have been distinguished for many years, Silverman and Aafjes-van Doorn (2023) reported a significant relationship between them in a systematic review of 30 studies. These findings blur the distinctions between defense mechanisms and coping strategies, steering towards an integrative approach to the concepts rather than a theoretical separation. However, Cramer (1991) highlights similarities and differences between the two. Indeed, coping and defenses are different mechanisms activated by the ego to promote adaptation in situations of psychological imbalance and aim to reduce negative affect. While coping acts directly on the external stressful situation, involving intentional problem-solving strategies, defenses focus more on changing internal states by regulating and protecting psychic structures, operating outside of awareness. Furthermore, coping strategies, being conscious, appear to be more state-based mechanisms as they can change rapidly during psychotherapy; whereas defensive patterns, being more automatic, tend to evolve more slowly, confirming their more trait-based nature (Kramer et al., 2010). In line with recent models, we treat defense style as a relatively stable tendency in this paper, except for transient activations induced by context, as in the case of traumatic events (e.g., illness diagnosis, trauma, grief).

The Role of Defense Mechanisms in Conspiracy Theories and the COVID-19 Pandemic

Conspiracy theories might represent an outcome of defense mechanisms that enable individuals to cope with their environment, confront stressors, and fulfill specific needs. Indeed, defense mechanisms are relevant to conspiracy theories because such beliefs may help people cope with uncertainty, fear, or feelings of powerlessness, thereby exerting control over situations (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013). This connection between defense mechanisms and conspiracist ideation highlights the psychological utility of conspiracy theories in addressing existential, epistemic, and social needs (Douglas et al., 2017). By understanding the defensive styles associated with conspiratorial thinking, researchers might better identify why some individuals are more predisposed to these beliefs, especially during heightened stress or uncertainty.

The relationship between defense mechanisms and conspiracy theories has only recently become a focus of empirical investigation, particularly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic was an event that can be defined as traumatic, as an unknown disease endangered the lives of many people, created fear of contagion, claimed victims, and forced the adoption of restrictive measures. From a trauma-informed perspective, defenses can mediate or moderate the relationship between trauma and symptoms (Di Giuseppe et al., 2020; Horowitz, 1986). For instance, Gori et al. (2021) established a mediator role for the defense and coping styles between anxiety caused by COVID-19 and perceived stress. Mature defense mechanisms were associated with positive coping strategies (e.g., problem-solving), thereby reducing perceived stress. Conversely, immature defense mechanisms were associated with avoidant or ineffective coping strategies, amplifying perceived stress.

Notably, only two studies have specifically examined the association between defense styles and conspiracy theories. The first, by Celia et al. (2022), identified distinct groups based on beliefs about COVID-19 conspiracy theories. For instance, “believers” exhibited stronger conspiracy beliefs, were more likely to rely on immature defense mechanisms, and demonstrated poor emotional regulation. In contrast, “non-believers” who scored the lowest on the conspiracy belief scale tended to use mature defense mechanisms, adopt active coping strategies, and display practical emotional regulation skills. Similarly, Gioia et al. (2023) found that high levels of mature defense mechanisms were associated with reduced adherence to COVID-19-related and general conspiracy theories, while immature defense mechanisms were linked to greater adherence. Neurotic defense styles, however, showed no significant relationship with conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, from a sociological perspective, some behaviors could be interpreted as products of defense mechanisms. For instance, during the first months of the pandemic there were widely reported reactions including acting out (e.g., assaults on supermarkets, mass departures by train), projection (e.g., conspiratorial attributions that locate blame solely in others while ignoring one’s own responsibility), affiliation, sublimation, humor (e.g., communal balcony singing) and altruism (e.g., covering shifts for sick colleagues) (Granier et al., 2020; Walker & McCabe, 2021).

This growing body of research underscores the importance of examining defense mechanisms as a psychological factor in understanding why individuals adhere to conspiracy theories. One limitation that emerges from these studies is that they primarily measured COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs, overlooking a central theoretical construct: conspiracist ideation or the general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. An exception is the study by Gioia et al. (2023), which assessed conspiracist ideation using the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ) (Bruder et al., 2014). However, this scale consists of only five items and does not measure the dimensions of conspiracist ideation.

Hypotheses Development

This study aimed to investigate whether there was an association between defense style and conspiracist ideation. It also aimed to extend this association to the most strictly current and debated conspiracy theories, such as those about COVID-19, vaccines, and skepticism. Lastly, we investigated if the socio-demographic characteristics of the population were associated with conspiracist ideation.

Although immature and neurotic styles cope temporarily with stressors and satisfy psychological needs, they may foster a reality distortion that increases the likelihood of believing in conspiracy theories (Celia et al., 2022; Gioia et al., 2023; Taylor et al., 2020). For instance, in conspiracist ideation, immature defenses, such as projection or denial, may reinforce conspiratorial beliefs by attributing external blame (e.g., “there are some bad people who caused this event”) or rejecting factual evidence (e.g., “Covid does not exist, there is no real pandemic”). Neurotic defenses, such as intellectualization, might allow individuals to frame conspiratorial thinking as logical or evidence-based, even when it lacks empirical support. On the other hand, mature defenses, such as humor, altruism, or affiliation, may mitigate the tendency to adopt conspiracy theories by easing stress and tension through a joke, helping others, or seeking support. In line with this literature and our expectations, the hypothesis can be finalized as follows:

Hypothesis 1

(H1). Conspiracist ideation is associated with an immature and neurotic style but not with a mature style.

Moreover, believing in specific conspiracy theories increases the likelihood of believing in others, even when they appear unrelated. For example, Williams et al. (2022) showed that several different conspiracies were associated, including the existence of a world order, the intentional spread of COVID-19 and AIDS, the fake moon landing, and the danger of 5G antennas. This pattern suggests that conspiracist ideation functions as a unified cognitive framework, shaping how individuals interpret and make sense of the external world. It implies the existence of a nomological system underlying this particular way of thinking (Goertzel, 1994). Research by Wood et al. (2012) further supports this view, showing that individuals can endorse mutually contradictory conspiracy theories—such as the belief that Princess Diana was both murdered and faked her own death—highlighting how coherence is less important than the conspiracist mindset itself. Consequently, believing in some conspiracies increases the likelihood of believing in others, even when they contradict each other (Miller, 2020). Following this literature, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2

(H2). Conspiracist ideation is associated with contemporary conspiracist beliefs.

Conspiracy beliefs are shaped not only by cognitive and psychological tendencies but also by broader social and demographic factors. Beyond individual cognitive tendencies, demographic characteristics also play a crucial role in shaping belief in conspiracy theories (Calvillo et al., 2020; Cassese et al., 2020; Sallam et al., 2020; Wood et al., 2012). These associations can be explained through different psychological and social mechanisms. For example, gender influences levels of critical thinking and the sense of learned helplessness, both key factors in the belief in conspiracy theories (Zhao et al., 2024). Moreover, Women perform better than men in critical thinking, which is a protective factor against conspiracy beliefs (Zhao et al., 2024). They also show less learned helplessness than men, a risk factor for conspiracy beliefs (Cassese et al., 2020).

Age is another sociodemographic characteristic that affects conspiracist ideation. Literature shows that age is negatively associated with conspiracist ideation, likely due to lower self-esteem, emotional stability, and greater political disaffection (Bordeleau & Stockemer, 2025).

Education contributes to the development of analytical thinking and cognitive complexity, which protect against simplistic explanations offered by conspiracy theories. Following that, education is negatively associated with conspiracist ideation (e.g., van Prooijen et al., 2015). Having a higher level of education could imply higher analytical thinking and cognitive complexity, higher perceived life control and self-esteem, and reduced feelings of helplessness —a risk factor for conspiracy beliefs. Additionally, since educated people occupy higher hierarchical roles, they are more likely to have greater social and economic status.

Socioeconomic level influences a sense of belonging and trust in institutions, which, in turn, modulates perceptions of injustice and social exclusion (Salvador Casara et al., 2022; van Prooijen et al., 2015). Lower social classes are more susceptible to conspiracy theories, with perceived control mediating this association (Mao et al., 2020). Moreover, various studies stress that socioeconomic status (i.e., household income and housing situation) is negatively associated with conspiracist ideation (e.g., Uscinski & Parent, 2014). People with low socioeconomic status are often marginalized and may feel a sense of injustice and distrust of institutions, attributing responsibility for their conditions to others. Indeed, economic inequality impacts conspiracy engagement (Salvador Casara et al., 2022). A low income and an unowned house might cause a feeling of lack of control, increasing the likelihood of engaging in conspiracy theories (Mao et al., 2020)

Finally, political orientation, especially when extreme, can increase the predisposition to believe in conspiracies through cognitive mechanisms such as dichotomous thinking and ideological polarization (Imhoff et al., 2022). Belief in polarized ideas is supported by dichotomous thinking, a typical immature defense mechanism (e.g., splitting, idealization, or devaluation). Moreover, extremism is often associated with membership in extremist groups that foster conspiracies against outsiders or perceived enemies (Sternisko et al., 2023).

Considering the several sociodemographic characteristics following the literature, we hypothesized:

Hypothesis 3

(H3). Conspiracist ideation is associated with sociodemographic characteristics.

Participant Characteristics

Five hundred sixteen subjects were recruited to complete an online questionnaire via convenience sampling (N = 516; 197 men, 314 women, 5 “other”; M_age = 32.69, SD_age = 14.11). In this sample, 98.6% were Italian, while the remaining 1.4% were from other countries. Most of the sample was celibate (71.5%), lived with their parents (53.1%), had a total family income lower than 36,151.98 euros (55.4%), had homeownership (77.1%), had a high school degree (45.3%), and was a student (40.5%). Political orientation was predominantly left (30.4%) or Centre-left (32.9%). Appendix A shows a summary of socio-demographic characteristics.

Instruments

Procedure

The university’s ethics committee approved the study, in accordance with ethical standards (prot. n. 0173384). Researchers built an online questionnaire using Google Forms and shared its link on social networks (such as Facebook or LinkedIn). Participants could complete the questionnaire by clicking link and filling out the form. There were no agreements or payments to participate. The questionnaire was anonymous to avoid social desirability bias.

Data Analysis

We used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, version 25) for descriptive statistics and R for the other analyses, relying on the following packages: haven, dplyr, tidyr, broom, car, lmtest, sandwich, multcomp, emmeans, Gifi, and stats.

Pearson correlations have been calculated to test whether the immature, neurotic, and mature styles were associated with conspiracist ideation and whether conspiracist ideation was associated with CCBs. Benjamini–Hochberg FDR control (q = .05) and a split-half cross-validation (random 50/50 split, n = 258 for both samples, seed = 20250113) were employed to mitigate Type I error. An effect was considered as replicated only if it had the same sign and p < .05 in both halves. Then, a preliminary forward stepwise multiple regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) was run to investigate the prediction of defense styles and single defenses for conspiracist ideation, cross-validated using the same procedure.

Additionally, we tested the moderation of the relationship between defensive styles (immature, neurotic, mature) and conspiracy ideation by political orientation and education, treating the moderators as ordinal factors (these analyses were exploratory and not hypothesis-driven, as requested by peer reviewers). We used robust standard errors (HC3), Type III tests for interaction terms, and the R statistic for explained variance; in cases of significant interactions, we examined simple slopes, interpreting b as the unstandardized slope of GCBS for a 1-SD increase in style at the specific level of the moderator. The sample was not split to save power.

Categorial regression tested if socio-demographic variables were associated with conspiracist ideation. Predictors were treated as nominal (e.g., housing situation) or ordinal with monotone scaling (e.g., political orientation, educational level). The Squared Multiple Correlation (SMC) of categorical regression is the analogue of the standard regression R², indicating the proportion of variance explained. To mitigate Type I error, we repeated the analysis in a split-half design (with the same seed and replication rule as above). One-way independent-measures ANOVA and Dunnett T post hoc tests were used to test for differences in conspiracist ideation across levels of socio-demographic multinomial variables (e.g., gender identity, political orientation, housing situation); p-values for the family of contrasts were adjusted using FDR. We report ω² as the effect size for omnibus tests. Finally, correlation coefficients were used to assess the association between household income (Spearman) and age (Pearson) and conspiracist ideation, applying BH-FDR and cross-validating (with the same seed and replication rule as above).

Discussion

This study investigated the relationship between defense style and conspiracy ideation across all dimensions, extending the analysis to CCBs such as those about COVID-19 and vaccines. It also examines whether socio-demographic factors influence conspiracy ideation. Overall, this study investigated three main hypotheses and an exploratory one (i.e., a moderation).

The first hypothesis of this study (H1) was “Conspiracist ideation is associated with immature and neurotic style but not with mature style.” Our findings revealed that conspiracist ideation and CCBs were positively associated with immature style. Since the neurotic style was associated only in one sample with conspiracist ideation, the association cannot be considered replicated. No statistically significant association was found with the mature style. Therefore, H1 is partially confirmed, aligning with previous studies’ findings of a relationship between an immature style, a conspiracist mentality, and engagement in COVID-19 conspiracies, or an association between “non-believers” and mature mechanisms (Celia et al., 2022; Gioia et al., 2023). It can be hypothesized that individuals who primarily rely on immature defense mechanisms are more likely to engage in conspiracist thinking, potentially due to cognitive distortions that simplify complex events and reinforce rigid, emotionally driven interpretations of reality.

Moreover, the only mechanism that has been replicated as a predictor of conspiracist ideation was splitting. Since this result has never been found, we cannot compare it with the literature. Nonetheless, it can be hypothesized that splitting might foster a dichotomous view of the world, dividing everyone into good and evil. Conspiracist believers whom relying on splitting, could identify themselves with the good part threatened by the evil part. For instance, they may consider a minority group or a culturally very far apart group as the evil part that threatens or acts maliciously toward the ingroup (e.g., jews spreading a virus). From this perspective, new beliefs would explain the conspiracists againts the “good” group, accomplishing epistemic, existential, and social needs (Douglas et al., 2017). Splitting is a defense mechanism that characterizes paranoid thinking, often attributing the cause of personal distress or problems to others. Similarly, conspiracist believers tend to explain their difficult situation by attributing the guilt to others (e.g., companies, states, famous individuals), so there could be a parallel between paranoia and conspiracy (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2018).

Therefore, these findings also raise the possibility that conspiracist ideation may, at least in part, represent a defensive product: by attributing threatening, ambiguous, or uncontrollable events to the intentional action of a clearly identifiable (and malevolent) agent, individuals can reduce uncertainty, preserve a positive and cohesive sense of self/ingroup, and manage feelings of vulnerability or anxiety that would otherwise be harder to tolerate. Defense mechanisms might function as psychological scaffolding for conspiracist ideation, offering protection from anxiety and uncertainty at the cost of accuracy and integration with consensual reality (e.g., Prooijen & Lange, 2014). However, further studies are needed to confirm these speculative explanations.

Additionally, education was found to be a significant moderator: the association between immature/neurotic styles and conspiracist ideation was strongest at low to medium levels of education and weakened (to the point of reversing for the neurotic doctorate) at higher levels. Conspiracy thinking might be driven more by underlying cognitive processes (that education could influence) than by ideological alignment (as the vote is). Consistent with prior research, highly educated individuals tend to show lower susceptibility to conspiratorial thinking, as education fosters analytical reasoning and reduces reliance on simplistic explanations for complex and emotionally challenging events (Hofstadter, 2012; van Prooijen, 2017). Education could also moderate the relationship between defense mechanisms and conspiracy beliefs by shaping cognitive and socio-cognitive development. As individuals become more educated, they tend to develop greater cognitive complexity and analytical capacity, supporting the use of more mature defense mechanisms such as intellectualization and sublimation (Dehli et al., 2014). With stronger cognitive and emotional regulation skills, people could be less likely to rely on primitive defense mechanisms and less susceptible to simplified or conspiratorial narratives. Nevertheless, education × defense style interactions accounted for only a small additional amount of variance and were identified in the context of multiple uncorrected moderator tests. Additionally, since this analysis was requested by the reviewers and not planned by the researchers, the sample could not be split for statistical power reasons. Therefore, the purpose of these analyses was purely exploratory; the findings should be interpreted with caution and replicated in independent samples before firm conclusions are drawn.

The second hypothesis (H2) of this study was that “Conspiracist ideation is associated with contemporary conspiracist beliefs.” Our findings confirmed this hypothesis, as a strong positive correlation was observed between the two scales in both the discovery and validation samples, indicating that individuals with a higher tendency toward conspiracist ideation were also more likely to endorse CCBs. This result is in line with the monological system theory of conspiracy theories: belief in one predicts belief in others (Goertzel, 1994), as a network of beliefs that explain the world in a conspiracist way, even when these beliefs are contradictory (Wood et al., 2012). Conspiracy theorists believe more in conspiracy theories (Swami, 2012), and conspiracy beliefs tend to reinforce one another (Franks et al., 2017; Goertzel, 1994). Moreover, Miller (2020) found that COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs could be considered a monological system. It could be hypothesized that believing in classic conspiracy beliefs might explain CCBs about COVID-19 or vaccines. For instance, the assumption that scientists manipulate data could explain why subjects believe that vaccines’ side effects are hidden from the public (Carrieri et al., 2023; Littrell et al., 2025).

Lastly, the study’s final hypothesis (H3) stated that conspiracist ideation is associated with sociodemographic characteristics. This hypothesis was partially confirmed. Specifically, not every sociodemographic factor was associated with conspiracist ideation. For instance, gender identity did not have a significant effect. When comparing these results with the literature, Cassese et al. (2020) found that women believed in conspiracy theories about COVID-19 less than men, whereas in this study, no gender difference was observed. This discrepancy might be explained by the type of conspiracy theories assessed, as gender differences may vary depending on the content and context of the conspiracy (Sallam et al., 2020). Furthermore, conspiracist ideation was not statistically correlated with age. This result is not in line with the literature. For instance, age is negatively associated with conspiracy beliefs (Swami, 2012), as adolescents aged 10 to 14 are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories (Jolley et al., 2021). The association between age and conspiracy theories is also confirmed by Bordeleau and Stockemer's (2024) meta-analysis (191 studies published between 2014 and 2024; N = 374,224), which found that older age is associated with higher emotional stability, political engagement, and self-esteem, all of which act as protective factors. Nevertheless, this study’s sample included only adults, so the authors’ choice could “cut” the effect of age.

Regarding socioeconomic status, while housing situation was a replicated predictor of conspiracist ideation, total household income was not. However, FDR-corrected Dunnett’s test revealed no statistical differences among housing conditions. Our results are in contrast with the literature. Considering income, lower levels are associated with a higher probability of believing conspiracy theories (Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Indeed, social class (i.e., income, educational level, and occupation) predicts beliefs in conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994; Kraus et al., 2012; Mao et al., 2020). Similarly, Salvador Casara et al. (2022) also stressed that perceived social exclusion and economic injustice are key mediators between low socioeconomic status and conspiracy beliefs. Feeling economically marginalized may increase institutional distrust and a sense of powerlessness, both of which foster conspiracist ideation.

Political orientation could not be considered a replicated predictor since it predicted conspiracist ideation in both the discovery and validation samples, but in opposite directions. Nevertheless, participants who were far-left, left, or center-left had lower levels of conspiracist ideation than those who were center, while center-right, right, or far-right individuals did not differ from center. Therefore, from our results it seems that being left-wing protects one from believing in conspiracy theories compared to being center- or right-wing. This result is partially aligned with the literature and cannot be confirmed. Specifically, while McHoskey (1995) did not find a significant association, van Prooijen et al. (2015) found that political extremes (both left and right) are associated with conspiracy beliefs. More specifically, the far-right is associated with pro-establishment (i.e., minority groups planning to reverse the social order) but not with anti-establishment conspiracy theories (i.e., governments abuse power) (Wood & Gray, 2019). Conservatism, considered the Italian right-wing, was associated with a stronger endorsement of the view that the virus’s spread was a conspiracy (Calvillo et al., 2020). Imhoff et al. (2022), in an extensive cross-national study (N = 104,253), confirmed both a linear association between right-wing ideology and conspiracy mentality and a quadratic relationship, suggesting that individuals at both political extremes are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories. Furthermore, Sternisko et al. (2020) noted that political extremism often correlates with belonging to tight-knit ideological groups that reinforce conspiratorial narratives about perceived outgroups or enemies.

Finally, educational level was a significant predictor of conspiracist ideation, replicated in both samples: the higher the level of education, the fewer subjects believed in conspiracy theories. This result aligns with other studies (Douglas et al., 2017; van Prooijen, 2017; van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). A possible explanation is that lower educational levels predict lower use of analytic thinking, leading to a greater reliance on simple solutions to complex problems and thereby increasing the likelihood of engaging with conspiracy beliefs (van Prooijen, 2017). Furthermore, education is also linked to higher perceived life control and self-esteem (van Prooijen, 2016), both of which reduce feelings of helplessness—a risk factor for conspiracist ideation. Higher education is associated with better social status and greater institutional trust, decreasing susceptibility to conspiratorial beliefs (van Prooijen, 2016).