Continued Influence Effect: A Three-Dimensional Framework Shaping Practical and Theoretical Perspectives

Mental Model Updating

A first hypothesis of the KReC (Kendeou et al., 2014) posits that individuals construct dynamic and coherent mental models of the situations they encounter, based on the information they receive. A second hypothesis suggests that when new information, such as a correction of FI, contradicts previously acquired knowledge, the mental model should be updated accordingly. According to the KReC, updating a mental model is guided by five key principles: encoding, passive activation, coactivation, integration, and activation competition. The first principle states that once information is encoded, it is stored in memory and cannot be entirely erased. The second principle explains that encoded information remains available for activation in memory, automatically and passively, when triggered by a related environmental stimulus. For example, upon receiving a correction, the FI is likely to be passively activated due to its conflictual relationship with the correction. This passive activation of the FI leads to the third principle, coactivation, wherein both the FI and the correction are simultaneously activated in memory. From this state of coactivation, individuals may proceed to update their mental model by integrating the correction (fourth principle). The final principle, activation competition, posits that even after a correction has been successfully integrated, the FI can still be reactivated when the mental model is later invoked. From these principles, two key moments emerge as particularly prone to the CIE. The first occurs when the correction is initially received, and the second arises when the mental model is subsequently invoked.

Failure in Mental Model Updating

The first critical moment prone to the occurrence of a CIE is when the correction is received. At this stage, a CIE may arise from a failure to update the mental model. This failure can result from two processes. The first is a failure to activate the FI, and the second is a failure to integrate the correction into the mental model.

Activation Competition

In addition to the moment of receiving the correction, a second critical moment for the CIE occurs during the activation competition phase (Kendeou, 2024; Kendeou et al., 2014), when the mental model is invoked and must be retrieved, such as when an inferential question is asked. At this moment, the principle of activation competition suggests that both the FI and the correction should be activated simultaneously. A CIE could then occur if the activation of the FI is stronger than that of the correction, or if the correction is not retrieved from memory at all (Ecker et al., 2010).

Several studies lend support to the hypothesis that activation competition between FI and its correction contributes to the CIE by manipulating the activation potential of the FI. For example, Ecker et al. (2011) observed a stronger CIE when the FI had been repeated within their CIE text, compared to when it was presented only once. Additionally, Ecker et al. (2015) presented participants with a scenario involving two complementary causes, one introduced at the beginning of the narrative and the other at the end. The order of presentation was counterbalanced, and one of the causes was subsequently retracted. The results revealed that the CIE was stronger when the cause presented at the end was retracted, compared to when the initial cause was retracted. Aligned with the activation competition hypothesis, this suggests that the final FI was more readily accessible in memory, making it more likely to be activated during recall.

Other studies have supported the activation competition hypothesis by demonstrating how manipulating the activation potential of the correction affects the CIE. For instance, Ecker et al. (2011) found that the persistence of FI diminished when the correction was repeated, compared to when it was presented only once. Another method for influencing the activation potential of the correction involves varying the delay between its encoding and retrieval. Longer delays are expected to make the correction less accessible in memory, thereby reducing its activation potential. Consistent with this expectation, studies have shown that delays of three days (Skurnik et al., 2005) or seven days (Ecker et al., 2020; Swire et al., 2017; Wahlheim et al., 2025) between encoding the correction and retrieving the mental model led to a stronger CIE compared to conditions with an immediate recall.

In summary, the cognitive dimension highlights three processes that can contribute to the occurrence of the CIE. The first two processes take place during the encoding of the correction: a failure to activate the FI or a failure to integrate the correction into the mental model. The third process occurs when the mental model is invoked, stemming from activation competition between the FI and the correction: if the correction is insufficiently activated to override the influence of the FI, the FI may continue to exert its effect despite the correction being provided.

Reluctance to Accept Incomplete Mental Models

Similar to the cognitive perspective, the motivational explanation for the CIE, based on reluctance to accept incomplete mental models, relies on the premise that individuals construct a coherent mental model when processing information about an event or object (Kendeou et al., 2014). A key element of this explanation is that the completeness of a mental model varies depending on the information available. For instance, a complete mental model would encompass both the causes and consequences of an event, whereas an incomplete model might describe the event itself without providing any causal context.

A complementary assumption is that individuals experience discomfort when faced with incomplete mental models. Supporting this idea, an experiment (Susmann & Wegener, 2021, study (2) evaluated participants’ discomfort upon reading the correction in the text used by Johnson and Seifert (1994). The text was modified to manipulate the level of incompleteness resulting from the correction. In one condition, the retracted information was central to the narrative (i.e., the cause of the fire). In another, it had only a peripheral importance (i.e., the identity of the person who raised the alarm). Consistent with the hypothesis that incompleteness affects discomfort, the findings revealed that the correction of central FI was rated as more uncomfortable compared to a peripheral FI.

Building on these assumptions, one potential explanation for the CIE is that corrections create a sense of incompleteness, which in turn generates discomfort. This discomfort may motivate individuals to reject the correction (Susmann & Wegener, 2021). Several studies support the idea that the CIE is influenced by the level of incompleteness left by the correction. For instance, research has shown that FI persists more strongly after correction when it plays a central role in the described scenario, compared to when it has only a peripheral role (Kan et al., 2021). Additionally, providing an alternative explanation alongside the correction significantly reduces the CIE compared to corrections without an alternative explanation (Amazeen & Krishna, 2024; Ecker et al., 2023; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Kan et al., 2021; Kendeou et al., 2014; MacFarlane et al., 2018). One interpretation of this finding is that alternative explanations fill the gap left in the mental model by the removal of the FI, thereby reducing the discomfort associated with incompleteness. Furthermore, Susmann and Wegener (2021) found that manipulating participants’ discomfort in response to events with incomplete justifications influenced the extent of the CIE. Collectively, these studies highlight that a reluctance to accept incomplete mental models - stemming from the discomfort they create - may play a key role in explaining the persistence of the CIE.

Motivated Reasoning

The motivational explanation of the CIE rooted in motivated reasoning is based on the premise that information processing varies depending on its alignment with an individual’s attitudes (Lord et al., 1979; McHoskey, 1995). For instance, numerous studies demonstrate that information damaging to a political candidate or party generates greater agreement among individuals whose ideology opposes the candidate or party, compared to those who support them (Weeks & Garrett, 2014; Winneg et al., 2005). Similarly, individuals with a conspiratorial worldview are more likely to reinterpret events through a conspiratorial perspective (Zwaan, 2022). This attitude-dependent processing of information can be partly explained by the desire to maintain coherence with one’s social identity (Van Bavel et al., 2024). Another explanation is that, when the subject matter of the information is personally significant, individuals are primarily motivated not by accuracy but by the desire to avoid being wrong (Kahan, 2013; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018).

Building on this assumption, a plausible explanation for the CIE is that individuals are motivated to reject corrections when they contradict information deemed important to them. Important information could be information that aligns closely with an individual’s attitudes or forms a core part of their social or personal identity. Several studies support this hypothesis by showing that adherence to a pro-conservative misinformation is less effectively reduced by a correction among conservatives compared to Democrats (Ecker & Ang, 2019; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Weeks & Garrett, 2014). More broadly, two meta-analyses have confirmed that misinformation is more resistant to correction when the correction is counter-attitudinal (Walter et al., 2019; Walter & Tukachinsky, 2020).

Several empirical findings seem to challenge the hypothesis that motivated reasoning contributes to the CIE. For instance, some studies have found that the counter-attitudinal nature of a correction had no discernible effect on the persistence of FI (Ecker & Ang, 2019; Ecker et al., 2014). However, these null results can likely be explained by the highly specific nature of the misinformation used in these studies, which may have been insufficiently broad or salient to engage participants’ attitudes or ideological frameworks (Ecker & Ang, 2019; Ecker et al., 2014). Consistent with this explanation, when subsequent experiments rephrased the misinformation to be more general and ideologically salient, the expected interaction effect aligning with motivated reasoning was observed (Ecker & Ang, 2019).

Moreover, some studies have found that corrections were unexpectedly more effective when they were counter-attitudinal (Amazeen et al., 2018; Hameleers et al., 2020; Young et al., 2018). One possible explanation for this seemingly contradictory finding is the presence of a floor effect when corrections align with individuals’ attitudes. In these cases, the misinformation itself is counter-attitudinal, meaning that individuals are less likely to fully endorse or strongly believe it in the first place (Lord et al., 1979). As a result, the potential impact of the correction is minimal, as there is little belief to overturn. In contrast, when corrections are counter-attitudinal, the misinformation is more likely to have been accepted and internalized by individuals. This greater initial adherence provides the correction with a larger margin for influence, allowing it to reduce belief in the misinformation more effectively (Amazeen et al., 2018; Hameleers et al., 2020; Young et al., 2018).

Thus, while certain empirical findings appear to contradict the hypothesis of a CIE driven by motivated reasoning, these inconsistencies can likely be attributed to methodological or statistical factors. According to meta-analyses (Walter et al., 2019; Walter & Tukachinsky, 2020), the prevailing consensus is that corrections are generally less effective when they contradict information deemed important by individuals, thus supporting the hypothesis of a CIE driven by motivated reasoning.

Practical Recommendations

The cognitive perspective offers several practical recommendations for reducing belief in FI. First, because the CIE may arise from a failure to activate the FI at the time of correction, explicitly mentioning the FI within the correction might be an effective strategy. Highlighting the FI alongside the correction could make the conflict between the two pieces of information more salient, thereby increasing the likelihood that the discrepancy is detected and thus resolved. Supporting this perspective, several studies have shown that the CIE is reduced when the FI is mentioned within the correction (Ecker et al., 2017; Kan et al., 2021; Xu et al., 2020). It is worth noting that this recommendation contrasts with earlier guidelines advising against mentioning the FI in corrections (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2012), due to concerns about a potential “boomerang effect”. This effect posits that increased familiarity with the FI, by mentioning it, might inadvertently strengthen belief in it (Skurnik et al., 2005). However, more recent evidence has consistently failed to replicate this phenomenon (Amazeen et al., 2018; Ecker et al., 2023; Wood & Porter, 2016). The only context where caution may still be warranted is when the FI is entirely unknown to the audience (Autry & Duarte, 2021). In such cases, the increase in familiarity introduced by mentioning the FI might be so significant that it outweighs the corrective effect. Therefore, in these situations, it may be prudent to avoid explicitly referencing the FI (Lewandowsky et al., 2020). However, further research is needed to confirm this potential exception.

Furthermore, since the CIE can arise from a failure to integrate corrections due to limited cognitive resources, a second recommendation is to ensure that individuals have sufficient mental capacity available when processing the correction. This recommendation is supported by studies demonstrating that the CIE is reduced when corrections are presented in the absence of additional cognitive load (Ecker et al., 2011; Sanderson et al., 2023). In practical terms, during social interactions, it is advisable for the source of the correction to deliver the correction when the recipient is mentally prepared and able to fully engage with the information. Similarly, on social media platforms, where FI proliferate (Vosoughi et al., 2018) and users often multitask (Jeong & Hwang, 2012), platforms could design corrections in ways that capture attention. This can be achieved by leveraging visual elements such as colour, font size, or layout to increase their prominence and visibility, thereby improving their likelihood of being noticed and processed.

A third recommendation grounded in the cognitive and rational perspective is to repeat the correction. Repetition increases the likelihood that individuals will recognize the conflict between the FI and the correction, integrate the correction into their mental model (Ecker et al., 2011), and perceive the correction as credible (Bowes & Fazio, 2026; Dechêne et al., 2010; Fazio et al., 2022). Empirical evidence supports this recommendation, with studies showing that repeated corrections significantly reduce the CIE compared to single exposures (Carnahan et al., 2021; Ecker et al., 2011; Sanderson et al., 2022). In practice, this means that in both social interactions and media contexts, reiterating the falsehood of misinformation can enhance the impact of corrections. Similarly, social media platforms seeking to combat the influence of FI could consider implementing algorithms to identify users exposed to misinformation and systematically provide repeated exposures to its correction. This strategy could help reinforce the correction and mitigate the persistence of FI over time.

Practical Recommendations

The motivational perspective provides several practical recommendations for stakeholders seeking to mitigate the influence of FI through corrections. One key strategy addresses the reluctance to accept corrections due to the incompleteness they introduce into mental models. It consists of providing an alternative explanation for the FI or to explain why the FI is false, which would reduce the incompleteness introduced by the correction, thereby reducing the likelihood of the correction being rejected. This recommendation is strongly supported by numerous studies showing that corrections accompanied by alternative explanations significantly reduce the CIE (Ecker et al., 2023; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Kan et al., 2021; Kendeou et al., 2014; MacFarlane et al., 2018). In both social interactions and media contexts, those delivering corrections should go beyond merely stating that the information is false. Instead, they should provide a clear explanation of why the FI is incorrect or offer accurate information to replace it. Similarly, social media platforms combating misinformation can improve the effectiveness of corrections by avoiding oversimplified corrections, such as only using a “false” label. Partnerships between social media platforms and fact-checking organizations could be optimized by providing these organizations with sufficient space to explain why specific FI is incorrect.

Another perspective inspired by the motivational dimension, particularly the concept of motivated reasoning, is to incorporate self-affirmation techniques. These techniques aim to reinforce an individual’s sense of personal integrity (Epton et al., 2015) by encouraging reflection on core personal traits or values, such as writing about an important personality trait or value they hold (G. L. Cohen et al., 2000). The motivational perspective grounded on motivation reasoning suggests that individuals may be driven to reject a correction that contradicts an important attitude, particularly one tied to their identity. Thus, inducing self-affirmation may help counteract the perceived threat to personal integrity posed by reconsidering a deeply held attitude or behaviour. For example, an experiment found that participants, whether supporters or opponents of the death penalty, were more willing to change their stance after being exposed to a counter-attitudinal scientific argument if they had undergone self-affirmation (G. L. Cohen et al., 2000). Similarly, a meta-analysis showed that self-affirmation increased intentions to change behaviour following health-related messages (Epton et al., 2015). In the context of the CIE, self-affirmation could mitigate the threat to personal integrity posed by an important counter-attitudinal correction (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Therefore, for practical application, in a social interaction, someone delivering a counter-attitudinal correction might preface it by affirming the recipient’s personal qualities or values to reduce resistance. On a broader scale, self-affirmation exercises could be integrated into interventions aimed at reducing belief in FI. However, it is important to note that while this perspective is theoretically grounded, its effectiveness in mitigating the CIE has yet to be directly tested. Further empirical research is needed to evaluate its potential in this specific context.

Perspectives for Research

Future research could explore whether self-affirmation techniques can effectively reduce the CIE in cases where the corrected information is both important and aligned with the individual’s attitudes. For instance, an experiment could examine whether a conservative activist is less influenced by the CIE after receiving a correction to pro-conservative FI, if they first engage in a self-affirmation task, such as writing about the values of the conservative group. Similarly, another study could investigate whether individuals strongly committed to false beliefs about climate change become more receptive to corrections after being reminded of their personal qualities or achievements. These investigations could provide valuable insights into the potential of self-affirmation to mitigate the resistance often encountered when corrections challenge deeply held or identity-relevant beliefs.

Regarding the CIE grounded on reluctance to accept incomplete mental models, research on the need for cognitive closure (NFCC), measurable with the Need For Cognitive closure Scale (NFCS, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), highlights significant individual differences in discomfort with ambiguity and preference for order and structure. Since corrections destabilize the structure of a mental model and introduce ambiguity, future research could explore the hypothesis that correcting FI generates greater discomfort among individuals with a high need for closure, making them more susceptible to the CIE. Indirect evidence supporting this hypothesis includes findings that the NFCS (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) positively correlates with dogmatism (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, study (2) and that individuals with a high NFCC are less likely to revise their initial impression of a person even when presented with new information (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, studies 4 and 6). These findings suggest a plausible link between high NFCC and vulnerability to the CIE, which future research could investigate.

Practical Recommendations

Research grounded in the rational perspective highlights the importance of the credibility of corrections in mitigating the CIE. Therefore, a strategy to reduce the CIE would involve enhancing the credibility of key sources of correction in society, such as the news media (Graves & Cherubini, 2016), and the scientific community. Enhancing the perceived credibility of these institutions might represent an indirect yet powerful strategy for mitigating the CIE. This perspective holds particular contemporary relevance, as multiple surveys reveal declining or low levels of trust in these corrective sources for several countries. For instance, in France, distrust in news media is reported by 32% (CSA, 2022; IPSOS, 2024) to as high as 72% (CEVIPOF, 2024) of the population. Trust in the scientific community, while relatively higher, has also been affected, with 20% of a representative French sample expressing distrust in 2024 (CEVIPOF, 2024), reflecting a seven-point rise since 2011 (Boy, 2014). In this context, a practical recommendation to reduce the CIE would involve efforts to bolster trust in the media and scientific institutions. This perspective also implies that in a social interaction, individuals delivering corrections should emphasize their expertise and reliability to optimize their effectiveness.

Research based on the rational perspective also highlights the role of the credibility attributed to FI in perpetuating the CIE. This suggests that individuals might be less prone to the CIE if they were better equipped to withhold credibility from FI. Strengthening individuals’ capacity to critically evaluate and discredit FI aligns with recommendations from scholars advocating for the development of critical thinking skills (Bronner et al., 2022; Swami et al., 2014). Critical thinking can be defined as “the ability to appropriately adjust one’s level of confidence based on the evaluation of the quality of supporting evidence and the reliability of sources” (Pasquinelli & Bronner, 2021, p. 15). The importance of promoting critical thinking is supported by evidence showing that exposure to educational interventions, such as videos teaching methods for identifying FI (e.g., verifying URL), improves people’s ability to recognize FI (Bor et al., 2023). Additionally, studies reveal that critical thinking is negatively correlated with belief in conspiracy theories (Lantian et al., 2021), and that engaging in information verification behaviours enhances the detection of false claims (Melki et al., 2021). Therefore, a promising strategy for reducing the CIE would involve initiatives aimed at fostering critical thinking skills, thereby reducing the unwarranted credibility attributed to FI.

Perspectives for Research

Perspectives to enhance critical thinking and build trust in information sources offer promising theoretical strategies for reducing the CIE, but their practical implementation remains undefined. Future research could explore effective methods for fostering trust in media and science, as well as the most impactful ways to cultivate critical thinking skills. For instance, Pasquinelli and Bronner (2021) proposed embedding critical thinking education into primary, secondary, and higher education curricula, integrating it across various subjects to promote lifelong analytical skills. Investigating such perspectives through future research could help identify scalable and sustainable strategies for reducing the CIE.

A broader perspective for advancing research on the CIE is to place greater emphasis on rational explanations for this phenomenon. As noted by Ecker and Antonio (2021), the rational perspective is rarely employed to explain this effect in the literature, despite several indications that the CIE can often be explained through rational factors. To our knowledge, only three studies (Guillory & Geraci, 2010, 2013; O’Rear & Radvansky, 2020) have directly asked participants whether they believed the correction of FI presented in a text. These studies revealed that a significant proportion of participants, ranging from one-third to half, either doubted or outright disbelieved the correction. Another argument supporting the importance of the rational dimension is the hypothesis that corrections inherently face a credibility handicap compared to FI (Ecker & Antonio, 2021). The hypothesis is that FI is not necessarily questioned when initially received. In contrast, a corrector faces a credibility handicap because, by definition, they are contradicting something that was likely perceived as true (Connor Desai et al., 2020). Supporting this hypothesis, an experiment asked participants to evaluate the credibility of each message within several CIE texts and found that corrections were generally rated as less credible than the FI (Ecker & Antonio, 2021). Thus, the credibility handicap hypothesis for corrections combined with research showing that corrections frequently lack credibility underscore the need for greater consideration of the rational dimension within CIE research. In this regard, future CIE protocols could benefit from explicitly asking participants whether they believe the correction. This practice would help clarify the extent to which the effect is attributable to cognitive, motivational, or merely rational factors.

Practical Recommendations

Several findings suggest that the three dimensions of the CIE are interdependent. Accordingly, optimizing correction strategies requires taking this interdependence into account. First, the interaction between the cognitive and rational dimensions suggests that source credibility primarily influences message credibility under conditions of superficial processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984, 1986). This implies that encouraging deeper cognitive processing may be particularly important when FI originates from a highly credible source, as such processing may reduce reliance on source cues.

Second, evidence shows that information is more likely to be perceived as less credible when it conflicts with pre-existing attitudes. This implies that highlighting inconsistencies between the FI and the recipient’s existing beliefs may, under certain conditions, prompt a re-evaluation of its credibility in light of worldview-consistent standards. For instance, among Democratic-leaning individuals exposed to FI criticizing a Democratic politician, a correction could emphasize how the claim conflicts with values central to their political identity.

More generally, the interaction among the three dimensions suggests that correction effectiveness may be enhanced by combining elements across dimensions. For example, repeating corrections, providing alternative explanations, strengthening source credibility cues, or using self-affirmation techniques may jointly improve correction outcomes, although further research is needed. Supporting this view, a multi-component intervention that combined these elements outperformed a standard correction approach (Paynter et al., 2019).

Perspectives for Research

Regarding the interaction between cognitive and motivational dimensions, further research is needed to clarify the conditions under which cognitive engagement reduces, enhances, or has no effect on susceptibility to corrections (e.g., Ross et al., 2021; Valli & Nai, 2023). One possible explanation is that cognitive resources may reduce correction effectiveness when they are recruited for counter-arguing, which is more likely when individuals are motivated to defend their prior attitudes. In contrast, when such defensive motivation is absent, analytic processing may instead be directed toward accuracy goals, thereby increasing resistance to FI.

Moreover, recommendations based on interactions between the different dimensions remain largely speculative and require further empirical validation. Future research could quantitatively test proposed hypotheses, such as whether the effect of FI credibility is reduced by deeper analytic reasoning or whether framing corrections in terms of worldview inconsistency reduces the perceived credibility of FI. Finally, following Paynter et al. (2019), future studies could evaluate the effectiveness of combining different correction techniques. Such paradigms could improve theoretical understanding of how these mechanisms interact, and whether they produce additive, synergistic, or potentially inhibitory effects.