Abstract
Some scholars are reluctant to write book reviews. Others do not hesitate, but actually welcome the opportunity. Few, however, have reviewed the number of books that theologian and philosopher Ernst Troeltsch did. His evaluations are not the typical brief “helpful” critiques, nor are they the usual “blood-sport” attacks. Instead, they are often lengthy pieces in which he not only carefully reviews the books but also uses the reviews to set out his own thoughts on the topic. Bienert’s volume examines almost 100 of Troeltsch’s reviews. B. concentrates on the reviews that cover topics Troeltsch found critically important.
One such topic is the question of the “religious apriori,” which B. notes is one of the most disputed concepts in all of Troeltsch’s works (77). She further notes that it recurs in a number of his reviews of books on Schleiermacher and, more appropriately, on Kant (79–90). A second topic is the relationship between theology and metaphysics. Troeltsch’s reviews include one on a book by Georg Wobbermin. Wobbermin is important for three reasons: he was Troeltsch’s successor at Heidelberg, he was regarded as the theological successor of Adolf von Harnack, and he attempted to formulate a conception of theology that was specifically metaphysical (50–61). Troeltsch claimed, however, that Wobbermin was in fact the theological descendant of Albrecht Ritschl and the philosophical offspring of Wilhelm Dilthey. For Troeltsch, Wobbermin erred in his overestimation of metaphysics and underestimation of epistemology, particularly the doctrine of knowledge and concept formation. These lead to a third theme: Troeltsch’s long-time concern with “neo-Kantianism.” This theme points to some of the serious problems with B.’s book.
These flaws include a number of omissions that fall into four categories: first, Troeltsch wrote numerous philosophical works that B. could have used to help clarify and expand upon the points Troeltsch raised in his reviews. Second, a number of critically important reviews are either totally ignored or treated marginally, such as those of Georg Simmel (Die Religion) and William James (The Varieties of Religious Experience). These first two types of omission may be matters of personal choice, but the second two types are not. B. chose to focus on many of Troeltsch’s reviews of books that are philosophical in nature, but she does not provide sufficient explanations of them. Unless readers have a thorough background in Kantian epistemology, they will be at a loss to understand why Kant’s work was so important to a theologian who was writing almost 100 years after Kant’s death. Unless readers have a good grasp of neo-Kantianism, the references to Troeltsch’s reviews will not make much sense. That is partially because “neo-Kantianism” is a broad term that applies to the “Marburg School” as well as to the “Southwest School.” B. simply mentions “Southwest neo-Kantianism” (35) without explaining that its major figures, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, sought to place the “human sciences” on an equal footing with the natural sciences by showing that the concepts employed were individual rather than abstract, and were valid for historical occurrences but not universally applicable. Furthermore, these efforts were coupled with the problem of values. If there are no universal standards, then how are values to be determined? These were all questions that interested Troeltsch. This very brief account is a great oversimplification, but B. did readers a disservice by failing to explain what neo-Kantianism was and why it was so important for Troeltsch. Lastly, B. never explains her title: While “Protestantische” can be easily understood as “Protestant,” “Selbstverortung” is rarely used to mean “self-orientation.” B. shows, however, that, however, Troeltsch was never in need of that.
There is one glaring error—perhas it is a typo: B. claims that Troeltsch wrote a total of “1300 book reviews” (1), yet the three volumes of the Kritische Gesamtausgabe devoted to Troeltsch’s reviews contain a combined total of (only!) 256.
These serious problems significantly detract from the book’s worth. B. has, however, proven two major points: first, Troeltsch’s reviews are important philosophical sources, not just for understanding his views on other scholars, but also because Troeltsch often used reviews as vehicles to explicate his own important theses. Second, no one can claim, after reading B.’s account, that Troeltsch “became” a philosopher only later in life. B. has also demonstrated another important point: Troeltsch is an inspiration for every scholar who strives to write clear, coherent, and objective book reviews.