Divine Command,Natural Law,and Redemption in Calvin’s Thought

Divine Will and Natural Moral Order as Moral Grounds

The fundamental reasons for action, according to some views of divine command ethics, are grounded solely on divine will in issuing moral commands. This occurs whether they seem reasonable or arbitrary. Thus, the nature of moral obligation is purely heteronomous in the sense that imposing moral obligation is not dependent on any human understanding or endorsement. Augustine famously said that when the divine commandment thundered, it was to be obeyed, not disputed. ¹ This view has been continually challenged by such writers as Patrick Nowell-Smith, Kai Nielsen, and Peter Singer as they allow no place to divine authority in human moral thinking. Basing one’s actions on divine will may seem “infantile” to some people, ² while those who do not acknowledge any theistic beliefs at all will certainly call this motivation nonsense, or worse. ³

There is another mode of moral thinking in which one’s reasons for action do not come from divine commands, but rather from human nature or practical reason. According to James Luther Adams, natural law ethics is a moral idea in which “ethical standards” are established and justified “in their relation to the essential nature of [human beings] and of things.” ⁴ In this line of ethical thinking, God, if not ruled out altogether, is a wise creator with perfect rationality who has structured creation in such a way that it pursues its own good naturally, rather than a God who continues to issue commands out of his sovereign will. In this view, as Aquinas wrote, “we do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own good.” ⁵ It is not difficult, however, to notice here a sign of doing ethics independently of religion or of valuing reasonableness over divine authority in ethical thinking.

In advocating his ethics of mutual-love, Edward Collins Vacek criticizes divine command ethics as “humanistically inadequate,” and natural law ethics as “religiously inadequate.” ⁶ Divine command ethics have a tendency not only toward theocentrism, but also legalism, as they hold that something is right simply because God commands it. Natural law ethics, on the other hand, have a tendency toward not only anthropocentricism, but also “practical agnosticism,” as they hold that something is right simply because human nature dictates it. ⁷

For John Calvin, however, Vacek’s criticism is not correct and must be modified as against some, and not all, divine command theories and some, and not all, natural law theories. Calvin formulates an ethical framework in which natural law ethics are so reconciled with divine command ethics that they can be both humanistically and religiously adequate. ⁸ His idea of natural law is interwoven with divine command ethics in a way that leads to a new awareness of the unique relationship between God’s authority and human autonomy with regards to morality.

Before we look at Calvin’s understanding of the grounds for human morality, it would be profitable to identify some extreme arguments in both divine command and natural law theories in order to see how Calvin’s understanding eliminates them and reconciles the two views by his more adequate understanding of moral grounding.

Extreme Views of Divine Command Ethics

Divine command ethics are rooted in theism, which is one reason why this moral view is unpopular among contemporary ethicists. The rationale of divine command ethics, according to Richard Mouw, can be stated as follows: “Since there is a God who has provided guidance for the living of human life, obedience to divine directives is essential for human flourishing.” ⁹ A defender of divine command ethics, according to Janie Idziak, is “one who maintains that the content of morality (i.e., what is right and wrong, good and evil, just and unjust, and the like) is directly and solely dependent upon the commands and prohibitions of God.” ¹⁰

Though divine commands, according to Mouw, are given not only in biblical commandments, ecclesiastical teachings, or private callings from God, but also through natural law and human conscience, ¹¹ one common criticism of the divine command theory is that it requires blind obedience to divine commands issued by the arbitrary will of God and thus makes human morality into heteronomy. If one holds the nature of moral obligation as purely heteronomous, then he or she will not need any human understanding or endorsement to make a moral judgment. The response of the human agent or the role of human practical reason in moral judgment is thus totally denied. Regarding this extreme form of divine command ethics, Vacek points out that in this view “we must do the required deed, but we are not required either to understand or to agree with what we are doing.” ¹²

Extreme Views of Natural Law Ethics

H. L. A. Hart’s succinct summary of the Thomist natural law theory states that “There are certain principles of true morality or justice, discoverable by human reason without the aid of revelation even though they have a divine origin.” ¹³ In some forms of natural law thinking, however, the “divine origin” seems to be ruled out as an unnecessary condition. David Braybrooke, for example, insists that one need not adopt a theistic perspective about God’s existence or his will for human moral living to subscribe to natural law theory. In this respect, he argues that even Thomas Aquinas recognizes “in principle that the content of natural law can be arrived at without invoking the existence of God.” ¹⁴

According to this view of natural law ethics, the fundamental reasons for action are grounded solely on intrinsic human goods, which can be comprehended by natural reason. Appealing to divine authority or revelation is therefore regarded as redundant for moral judgment. Natural law ethics, as Vacek observes, “can proceed under a rubric of ‘methodological atheism.’” ¹⁵ David Little sees this application of natural law thinking as problematic to Christians because it presupposes that there is “something prior to, and broader than, revelation” ¹⁶ on which morality is to be grounded. As natural law ethics eliminate the divine origin from a natural moral order, practical reason becomes the ultimate interpreter of universal morality without paying any legitimate attention to the noetic consequences of humanity’s fall.

To summarize, the fundamental reasons for action, according to some extreme views of divine command ethics, are grounded solely on divine will in issuing moral commands. This occurs whether they seem reasonable or arbitrary. Thus the nature of moral obligation is purely heteronomous in the sense that imposing moral obligation is not dependent on any human understanding or endorsement. According to some extreme arguments concerning natural law ethics, on the other hand, the fundamental reasons for action are grounded solely on intrinsic human goods, which can be comprehended by natural reason, to the extent that appealing to divine authority or revelation becomes unnecessary in making moral judgments.

Having seen some extreme arguments of both divine commands and natural law ethics regarding the grounds of morality, we turn now to Calvin’s understanding of divine authority in morality and the natural moral order of things. According to his understanding, those extreme views will be successfully ruled out and natural law ethics can thus be integrated into divine command ethics.

Calvin and the Moral Grounds

According to Calvin, biblical moral law is authoritative in human morality as it is “the true and eternal rule of righteousness” prescribed for humanity in every time and place. ¹⁷ It contains the “eternal and unchangeable will” of God for proper human living. ¹⁸ Though it has been issued by God who has absolute sovereignty over all humanity and in every area of their life, the biblical moral law is not imposed on humanity just as heteronomy, as some extreme forms of divine command ethics suggest. Unlike some extreme arguments of natural law ethics, on the other hand, Calvin does not understand natural law to be simply autonomous. Rather, the nature of human morality can be properly appreciated neither by simply appealing to God’s authority in biblical moral law at the cost of the role of natural reason in perceiving the natural moral order, nor by affirming the natural moral order as the sole grounds for human morality and subordinating God’s authority to it.

Though morality is grounded in God’s authority and not in the natural moral order, God’s authority in human morality does not require blind obedience to his commands from humanity. Rather, Calvin’s understanding of natural law shows that, even though blind submission to divine authority is the right response of humans in their moral living, the way in which divine will works in human morality does not preclude a response from human hearts. In other words, there is no such tension in Calvin between autonomy of natural law based on the natural moral order and heteronomy of biblical moral law based on divine authority. In this regard, Klempa rightly points out that for Calvin, unlike Aquinas, there are not two laws (such as natural law and revealed law), but they are one law in an ultimate sense. ¹⁹

According to Calvin, biblical moral law is identical with natural law in content. With regard to the relationship of the natural law given in human minds to the moral principles written in the Bible, Calvin contends that the written moral law of Scripture, that is, the Decalogue, is “nothing else than a testimony of natural law,” which God has inscribed upon the mind of humanity. ²⁰ For him, there is no difference in principle between the moral laws given through Moses and the natural law given to all humans in creation. Preaching from Deuteronomy 19:14–15 he puts it this way: “This law has been received by men although they had never heard it preached by Moses. Our Lord imprinted upon the hearts of men that which he gave to his people by writing.” ²¹

This understanding of Calvin makes it possible to reconcile God’s authority in morality and the natural moral order, and thus to recognize both of them as the grounds for morality. Natural law is not a self-contained moral order; it was instituted and is still maintained by God’s authority in morality. Divine authority in morality revealed in biblical moral law does not invalidate the natural moral order but affirms it as having same moral content and thus still reflecting God’s will for human moral living. Natural reason, therefore, not only perceives the natural moral order but it also plays a certain role in understanding revealed moral law in Scripture.

God’s Authority in Natural Law

Calvin asserts that natural law is not autonomous for two reasons: First, natural law has its origin in God’s creation and, second, it is confirmed by the moral principles revealed in Scripture.

Calvin’s first point about natural law is that a supreme moral order does not exist independently of any other authority but is instead part of God’s creation. Not only did God create heaven and earth and everything in them, but he also established the order of creation according to which all created things are to exist. Natural law is part of that creational order implanted in the minds of humanity as the right standard of human moral living. Prior to the fall, humans were perfectly able to distinguish good from evil and right from wrong by virtue of the light of reason, the proper interpreter of natural law in their minds. This excellent endowment was meant not only to guide their earthly life, but to lead them to eternal, blessed life with God. ²²

Natural law in Calvin, therefore, is not an absolute moral law grounded in the intrinsic nature of things as good or evil, according to which God issues moral commandments and prohibitions. An example of this is the line of argument in which God prohibits murder because it is morally wrong independent of God’s will, and not vice versa. ²³ Calvin’s understanding of natural law as established by God’s will in creation, however, reveals that God himself has the legitimate power to issue commands according to his own sovereign will and his specific design for human life, and that natural law which he has instituted in creation is “the rule of his righteousness.” ²⁴ Murder and stealing are wrong because God has decreed them to be morally wrong, and not vice versa.

Second, according to Calvin, natural law as we comprehend it should be verified by the revealed moral law of Scripture in order to see whether it correctly reflects God’s will. For Calvin, the human faculty of natural reason has been damaged due to the Fall and does not function soundly in every aspect that it was created for. Natural reason does not properly interpret the natural law that is written on the hearts of all; though humans still comprehend natural law in some measure, they frequently misunderstand it because of the noetic effect of sin. Calvin holds that natural reason should be examined and guided by divine revelation because it is not reliable with regard to a proper understanding of natural law. He says, “Accordingly (because it is necessary both for our dullness and for our arrogance), the Lord has provided us with a written law to give us a clearer witness of what was too obscure in the natural law, shake off our listlessness, and strike more vigorously our mind and memory.” ²⁵

According to Calvin, natural law is not independent of God but part of God’s creational ordinance as he commands everything to be in its proper way. Though human reason was created to understand the natural law, the noetic effect of sin necessitates scriptural revelation for humanity to regain its right understanding. Understood this way, it is impossible for Calvin to eliminate God’s authority in natural law thinking. Natural law ethics thus need not be formulated in a completely autonomous way. Biblical moral law, on the other hand, need not be regarded purely heteronomous; for Calvin, it is a written manifestation of the natural moral order and, because of this, natural reason plays a positive role in understanding biblical moral law.

Natural Reason in Understanding Revealed Law

When Jesus was giving moral teachings such as the Sermon on the Mount, he, according to Calvin, did not intend to give new moral law in place of the old law. He rather restored the true meanings of the law, which had been hidden or mistaken by its legalistic interpretations. When Old Testament law, like the Decalogue, was given, it was not given as a new law for the first time. It was given as a written restatement of natural law that was already in place. For Calvin, it is nothing but a reminder of natural law that has been inscribed in every human mind from creation but is only partly or incorrectly comprehended by natural reason due to the effect of sin on the human intellectual faculties.

If humans still have limited knowledge of natural law through their weakened but still working natural reason, and if biblical moral law is given to restore the vague memory of natural law in human minds, then natural reason certainly has a role to play in understanding biblical moral law. This in turn will make biblical moral law more than just heteronomous. Natural reason for Calvin functions in two ways in comprehending revealed moral law: through redemption in Christ for the regenerate and through common grace for the unregenerate.

Redemption of Reason

Several scholars like Emil Brunner, John T. McNeill, Edward Dowey, and more recently David VanDrunen have pointed out that natural law has a unique place in Calvin’s theology. But they did not pay adequate attention to the redemptive implication in Calvin’s use of natural law. They have explored Calvin’s use of natural law only in terms of God’s providence, that is, God’s general provision of universal moral law. David VanDrunen, for example, understands Calvin’s view of natural law in terms of the two kingdoms doctrine and argues that, for Calvin, natural law is for maintaining the order of peace and justice in the civil kingdom and has no positive role in the spiritual kingdom. ²⁶ According to VanDrunen, God’s redemptive activity takes place only in the spiritual kingdom of Christ. Consequently, he says, “Calvin believed that the civil kingdom was to remain the civil kingdom, and he was modest in his hopes of changing it.” ²⁷ In this approach, however, VanDrunen and others tend to ignore the unique relation in Calvin between natural law and redemption in Christ.

Though Calvin recognizes the existence of natural law and its universal knowledge in some measure among humanity, he does not attempt to lay the groundwork for common morality on its basis. Even though he affirms natural law as universal moral guidance, Calvin immediately draws attention to the need for renewal of natural reason through redemption in Christ, which will make the full comprehension of natural law possible among the regenerate. With regard to the understanding of natural law he clearly distinguishes the natural reason of fallen humanity from that of the redeemed. For him, in fact, there are three kinds of reason corresponding to the stages of creation, fall, and redemption. There is a reason originally created by God which “cannot be condemned without insult to God.” ²⁸ It exists in principle but not in reality, however, except in fallen or regained states. Natural reason has been vitiated by humanity’s fall and now produces only a partial or distorted knowledge of God. Redemption in Christ affects the whole creation, including the renewal of human reason; thus a third kind of reason is possible for the regenerate, a reason that “both the Spirit of God and Scripture sanction.” ²⁹ For Calvin, not only does the Holy Spirit restore the originally created faculty of reason in the hearts of the regenerate, but scriptural revelation also sheds light on the reason of the saved to make a genuine knowledge of natural law possible.

Calvin maintains that for Christians there is no duality of natural law and revealed law, for they are identical when comprehended by the reason that has been renewed through redemption in Christ. The regenerate, in this sense, do not claim that their natural reason is autonomous, nor do they take biblical moral law as heteronomous. According to Calvin’s understanding of natural law, the regenerate recognize that natural law comprehended by a fallen natural reason should be corrected and confirmed by revealed moral law in Scripture. At the same time, renewed natural reason of the regenerate does not resist biblical revelation as heteronomous divine commands that are based on arbitrary will of God, as critics of the divine command theory of ethics do. Instead, when biblical revelation and the works of the Holy Spirit illumine and reinstate their natural reason, the redeemed come to recognize the biblical moral law as being congruous with the natural law inscribed in their minds. By their redeemed reason, they recognize that both laws are grounded on God’s will for human moral living and thus have equal authority.

In this way, the supposedly autonomous natural law and the allegedly heteronomous biblical moral law are perfectly reconciled in Calvin through redeemed reason, which proclaims both natural law and biblical moral law to be, in Paul Tillich’s words, “theonomy,” the reintegration of autonomy and heteronomy. ³⁰ The regenerate acknowledge biblical moral law by virtue of their redeemed, theonomous reason. They find it to be a strong reminder of natural law, and thus have no conflict of reason and revelation in their moral understanding. How, then, does the natural reason of the unregenerate fit into their ethical thinking?

Common Grace

Calvin holds that natural reason was vitiated and remains as such in the unregenerate. Nevertheless, he affirms that humanity still has a certain degree of natural knowledge of morality through natural reason, even after the fall. Commenting on Romans 2:14, Calvin says that the unregenerate are “by no means wholly destitute of the knowledge of what is right and just; as they could not otherwise distinguish between vice and virtue.” ³¹

However, Calvin says we should not ascribe any of the natural gifts remaining in us to our soundness of mind or uprightness of heart, but only to the general grace of God, for “if he had not spared us, our fall would have entailed the destruction of our whole nature.” ³² Thus he sees the natural reason of the unredeemed in the light of God’s grace. Though humanity’s fall into sin should have entailed total annihilation of both supernatural and natural endowments, God has left some of his natural gifts in humanity. Knowledge of natural law, or of any kind of truth, no longer comes from the goodness of our nature but from the preserving grace of God. In this regard, Calvin says that the mind of humans, “though fallen and perverted from its wholeness, is nevertheless clothed and ornamented with God’s excellent gifts.” ³³

For the unregenerate, then, natural law is not totally unintelligible but rather partially intelligible to their natural reason, which has been preserved by God’s common grace from being totally inactive. Since the natural reason of the unregenerate is not totally ineffectual, it follows that the unregenerate can acknowledge biblical moral law to some degree. In this regard Calvin affirms that even people outside of saving grace can understand the second part of the Decalogue concerning right human interpersonal relationships, though only in its superficial sense. This is how Calvin reads Romans 2:14–16: though the unbelieving do not know biblical moral law, they turn out to have some knowledge of, and even obedience to, divine moral commands when they follow what their damaged but still functional natural reason dictates. Although the unbelieving do not subscribe to biblical revelation as the ultimate source of truth, nor are they willing to submit to divine authority in their moral understanding, they nevertheless acknowledge some biblical moral laws as genuine moral standards for human flourishing. It is a matter of biblical truth that the unregenerate live in rebellion against God’s will, but it is also biblical truth that their reason is still functioning and thus produces some natural knowledge of God’s will. ³⁴ For Calvin, this natural knowledge of God is attainable by virtue of God’s common and preserving grace and its existence cannot be denied without ignoring the Holy Spirit who is the ultimate source of all truths, wherever those truths appear. ³⁵

Having said this, the unregenerate should not be unwarrantably thought of as totally unable to acknowledge biblical moral law. They can accept some biblical moral principles to a certain extent as true moral standards for everyone. They perceive those principles not as an utter heteronomy imposed by an authority that they do not acknowledge, but as something that reminds them of what has been unclear in their minds. In this way, even for the unregenerate, natural reason does not conflict with biblical moral revelation entirely, especially when the explicit meanings of moral principles as related to social living are concerned. Because of this, the biblical moral principles should be presented to them as a viable option for universal moral standards. Otherwise, there will be no way to address today’s moral issues in a genuinely Christian way without first trying to convert people into Christian faith.

The natural reason of the unregenerate, however, should not be trusted as wholly reliable. Calvin’s strong emphasis on this often makes some entirely disregard his affirmation of still functioning natural reason. A proper appreciation of natural reason will recognize its limits as well as its possibilities. Therefore, while it is theologically legitimate to think that the unregenerate will not wholly understand Christian morals, it is also legitimate to make an appeal to their natural reason with regard to moral standards concerning human social living. These moral standards are part of genuine Christian morals that are revealed, as Calvin consistently holds, both in natural and revealed laws. Seeing that the unregenerate, by their natural reason, partly understand what biblical moral law requires, the biblical moral law cannot be labeled as sheer heteronomy requiring blind obedience. Nor can it be regarded as an unacceptable moral standard for humanity in general as rational beings. Rather, as far as it is recognized by unredeemed natural reason, the biblical moral law can be considered rational and thus consonant with natural law.

In summation, Calvin maintains that God’s creational order is the ultimate source of natural law and the natural moral order perceived by natural reason still provides true sources for human morality. He does not underestimate, however, the noetic effect of sin on natural reason. In fact, Calvin takes seriously the epistemological limitation of the created but fallen natural reason with regard to comprehending the true intention of creational moral order in its full scope and meaning. So, he argues that the scriptural revelation does not just complement natural morality, but it redeems it. Calvin’s view thus successfully rules out extreme views of both natural law and divine command moralities that render morality either utterly autonomous or rigidly heteronomous. By ruling out these extreme views, natural law ethics and divine command theory of ethics can be reconciled. Reconciling God’s authority in morality and the natural moral order, Calvin’s view presents human morality as theonomy (in Tillich’s terminology), in which the heteronomy of revealed laws and the autonomy of natural law are reintegrated by redeemed, or theonomous, reason. In this view, humans can acknowledge the God-commanded biblical moral law by their natural reason because the biblical moral law is a written manifestation of natural law. The regenerate can wholly acknowledge it through the renewal of their natural reason while the unregenerate can partly acknowledge it through common grace of God that preserves functionality of natural reason in fallen humanity to a certain degree.

In conclusion, Calvin formulates from his redemptive theological perspective an ethical framework in which natural law ethics are so reconciled with divine command ethics that divine moral will and human natural reason can be compatible in moral thinking.