Abstract
Emerging from a Barthian perspective on the necessary impossibility of preaching, this paper articulates an erotic phenomenology for preaching as a means of knowing and speaking about God in contemporary ecclesial contexts. It draws upon the philosophies of Jean-Luc Marion, Luce Irigaray, and Emmanuel Levinas to sketch the contours of a method for sermon development that respects the alterity of the Word as revealed in and through Scripture.
Christian preaching flirts with the impossible. As Barth puts it, “Our difficulty lies in the content of our task … As ministers we ought to speak of God. We are human, however, and so cannot speak of God. We ought therefore to recognize both our obligation and our inability and by that very recognition give God the glory.” 1 But is mere recognition of preaching’s impossibility all we can say homiletically? Those who have heard God’s call to gospel proclamation need more than a holy shrug from homiletics. They deserve more. Preachers look to homiletics to articulate some method, some way to quell the uncertainty arising out of preaching’s impossibility. This methodological call prompts questions of how homileticians might conceptualize the task of preaching between society, self, Scripture, and sermon. This paper engages Barth’s impossibility–necessity homiletic, seeking a path around (or perhaps through) the aporia of preaching. 2
Homiletics has paid scant attention to epistemology, even less to such a yearning described by Anselm, one that seeks after God in love. 3 Love is often presupposed in homiletics. It is a given, something that should appear so obvious to the contemporary preacher that one may pass over it without comment. When love emerges as a topic in homiletical texts it is to name the posture of the preacher before her congregation—as a buffer of sorts for preaching the “hard word in love.” 4 I contend that the preacher who passes lightly over love does so at her own peril. Homiletics’ gravest ill is that we preachers have become so preoccupied with the noetic dimension of preaching that we have neglected alternative ways of knowing and speaking of God. Preaching’s communicative problems emerge from its epistemological problems. 5
This article retrieves an Augustinian/Anselmian/Pseudo-Dionysian notion of love: one in which love is regarded as neither a topic for homiletical reflection (i.e., sermons about love), nor as a bulwark for the prophetic word, but as a mode of theologico-phenomenological inquiry. It tethers preacher’s efforts to know about God to a yearning after God. 6 In other words, what drives this paper is a homiletical appropriation of an erotic phenomenology as a means of knowing and speaking about God in contemporary ecclesial contexts. As the Apostle Paul put it so simply and yet profoundly, “Knowledge puffs up while love builds up. Those who think they know something do not yet know as they ought to know. But whoever loves God is known by God” (1 Cor. 8:1–3). Or, as Jean-Luc Marion puts it, “Only love can claim to know Love.” 7
The Phenomenology of Eros: An Overview
Epistemologically speaking, love yearns to know beyond domination or totalization. Such yearning begins with wonder. 8 Wonder hearkens the would-be knower to the “face” of the other, which is simultaneously familiar and foreign; this “concrete emblem” of the other’s otherness is both visible and invisible in the face, as Merleau-Ponty once put it. 9 The loved one (l’aimée) must arrive within the horizon of perception before his phenomenality may give itself to the lover (l’amant). 10 In phenomenology, sight is the privileged mode of perception, wherein the phenomenon gives itself in as much as and to the degree that it shows itself. 11 Thus, the phenomenology of eros transpires at the site where the “essentially hidden throws itself toward the light, without becoming signification.” 12 Said differently, phenomena become visible to the would-be knower while simultaneously circumventing the a priori structures of knowability tethered to visibility. The phenomenal other approached in love by a “subject” presents himself (perhaps) in giving himself starting from himself without becoming an “object” of experience. 13
The “Object” that Gives Itself
Jean-Luc Marion offers an approach to knowledge that resists the Cartesian drive toward objectivization and totalization. According to Marion’s phenomenological schema, objects appear before consciousness to the degree that they give themselves to a perceiving subject. 14 Phenomena are given to the knower at the “fold” of givenness, which makes the knower’s knowability dependent upon the other to show her/him/itself. Similarly, Luce Irigaray notes that this is the site in which, “what is most interior and what is most exterior become mutually fecund.” 15 Givenness names a spatio-temporal event in which the alterity of the other that resists phenomenalization, and hence objectivity, nevertheless becomes visible. This first contact with the other, toward whom the gaze of love is projected, signals a kind of swelling, an expansive anticipation that frustrates the fulfillment of that anticipation in the intentional gaze of the would-be knower. In this instant of appearing, the one doing the seeing receives more than can be seen, much less known or discussed. The gaze constitutes more than sight; the gaze transcends sight. 16
Phenomenology outlines a path to knowledge by means of the “phenomenological reduction.” In brief, this initiates a process by which a would-be knower safeguards the objectivity of objects of experience through bracketing his judgment about the natural world. Such a suspension of judgement comes in the form of an epoché (from the Greek, ἐποχή, “suspension”). 17 The erotic reduction takes this procedure a step further. An erotic phenomenology charts the movement from that initial shock before the appearance of the “object” that gives itself beyond objectivity, a jolt that transcends the visible and is far beyond a mere passion of the soul. 18 The appearance of the “object,” the other, on the scene does two things: (1) a closeness-in-distance is inaugurated, de-centering and destabilizing the subject’s subjectivity; (2) the “object” resisting objectification quickens the perceiver to search, to forage for the alterity of the other that remains cloaked beyond all phenomenality. Even as the knower’s intentionality is sated via perception, the knower’s gaze constitutes an unremitting increase of hunger such that the closer the subject/knower draws to the “object” that gives itself, the more distant she feels. As Levinas describes it, “The desire that animates it [viz., the intentionality of the gaze] is reborn in its satisfaction, fed somehow by what is not yet.” 19 For every possible visibility, what is essential is “the beautiful appearing,” the giving of the invisible within the visible that the would-be knower must “seek, await, touch, but which is not comprehensible.” 20
This is what an erotic epistemology does: the would-be knower’s gaze is drawn into a proximity that constantly withdraws from experience as such, rending the subject with its absence—as “a trace in the trace of an abandon, where the equivocation is never dissipated.” 21 Under the erotic reduction the subject’s sovereignty, her assumed capacity to know with certitude, is deconstructed by an otherness that presents itself as unpresentable and unknowable.
The De-centered Subject
The effect of the erotic gaze is to de-center and de-stabilize the lover while simultaneously giving to the beloved the intentionality operating behind the gaze itself. This gaze no longer takes. It gives. Such a gaze is antithetical to the prototypical “male gaze,” which objectifies in order to consume. The erotic gaze, by contrast, brackets the very possibility of objectification.
22
Before the erotic gaze both parties are transformed, but it is the subject/knower who experiences this most strikingly. The subject enters a state of flux in which the epistemological borders between self and other, inside and outside, subject and object, are blurred. As Levinas notes, The ego stripped … of its scornful and imperialist subjectivity, is reduced to the “here I am,” in transparency without opaqueness, without heavy zones propitious for evasion. “Here I am” as a witness of the Infinite, but a witness that does not thematize what it bears witness of, and whose truth is not the truth of representation, is not evidence.
23
Descartes’s notion of the ego, as that which guarantees the subject’s existence by making the subject transcendent to objects of knowledge, can only certify what it presupposes: objects. Certainty places the knowable upon the ego, such that, in the knowledge of the object it is the ego more than this object that is certified (EP, 12). The lover’s approach to the other before the erotic gaze eludes certainty because it resists objectification by bracketing the ego cogito. The other cannot be reduced to an object of experience, and therefore the self/subject cannot be certain of anything pertaining to the other. Thus, the subject’s very position as subject, as ego, is called into question. 26 This de-centering of subjectivity before the other who escapes all certainty produces a recognition that the other before the erotic gaze is also an I who holds the would-be knower in her gaze. 27 This phenomenological situation can help us describe a homiletical approach to the Word given for proclamation. The erotic reduction aims the intentionality of the preacher away from biblical objectification or appropriation. It does not render the preacher passive or submissive, as some commentators fear; rather, it bolsters a mode of agency seeking a manifestation of the Word in and yet beyond the words presented in Scripture.
Preaching’s Erogenous Zones
Having traced the phenomenology of eros from its origin in wonder to its saturated intuition in a moment of givenness, we are now in a position to consider this phenomenological movement homiletically. According to Barth, the Word remains other, transcendent. 28 Accordingly, insofar as we may speak of preachers as receiving the Word, we must find a way to talk about that which is received beyond reduction. For Marion, the Word would constitute a “saturated phenomenon,” since whatever might be received overwhelms the intuitive capacities of the preacher. 29 That which is given to the preacher as Word exceeds her capacities to know, much less speak. And yet, somehow, miraculously, the preacher is gifted with words in and by the Word. How is this impossibility possible? How may we describe this event of givenness phenomenologically to offer a method for sermon development? To do so requires fresh concepts and conceptualities.
An Advance beyond Seduction
In The Erotic Phenomenon, Marion traces the formation of ipseity, a notion of subjecthood more radical than Descartes’s ego cogitans. Rather than beginning with a doubt that questions all phenomena save that of the doubting/thinking ego, Marion puts Cartesian certainty itself into doubt by showing the aporias created by the Cartesian quest to establish selfhood at the other’s expense. 30 Marion thus offers an alternative path to knowledge via the erotic reduction.
Homiletically, the erotic reduction works like this. The preacher begins the sermon development process not by seeking to know God in some objective sense. He advances toward the Word erotically by supplanting the question “What can I know” with the question “Can I love first?” In this advance, the preacher realizes that he is always already too late to constitute a proper advance because God has already advanced on us. God can only be known as love, as the One with us and for us in the person of Jesus Christ. This means that preachers receive the Word from beyond their subjectivity, beyond their initiative and desire to know.
This theological a priori ought not obviate a homiletical advance, however. The preacher is active in her desire to know. But when love precedes knowledge, what is given to be known is of a different kind than that objective knowledge. “I love first, without any other reason than this one whom I risk loving, without awaiting her response, without presuming reciprocity, without even knowing her” (EP, 82–83). 31 The advance of the preacher before the Word needs to be radical, striving, as far as possible, to love first even while she bears the assurance of God’s originary love for her as well as God’s promise to manifest Godself to those who earnestly seek after God.
This advance toward the haecceitas of the Word—before this Word and no other—precludes seduction. 32 Seduction is a genuine threat to erotic preaching because it is self-serving. We cannot lure, coerce, or trap the Word. Indeed, we must not. The preacher is sent from her congregation to bring back a word. It is an ever-present temptation to seduce the Word out of the biblical text, to love the text just long enough for the Word to appear, only to seize it and trap it, forcing it into submission. When this happens, life falters. Only loving can foster an encounter.
The kind of advance I am suggesting here—one beyond seduction—occurs as a kind of kenotic act. 33 The preacher humbles herself before God as if she could love first, as if the Word did not want to reveal Godself, as if God had not already promised to speak to and through the preacher (Lk 10:16). Such an advance draws close to Paul Ricoeur’s posture of dépouillement, or divestment, in which the interpreter (in this case the preacher) humbles himself to allow the magnanimous Word to become the subject, the addressor, who “appears of itself.” 34 It achieves an act of conjecture—neither knowledge nor understanding—of which, by the conditions of its very possibility, strip down (dépouille) any hope of objectifying the experience.
I Love (to) You
An erotic advance beyond seduction requires the preacher to safeguard the alterity of the Word. In so doing, the preacher secures a certain distance between the words of Scripture and the Word given. Irigaray is most helpful here. She explains that the seemingly innocent declaration, “I love you,” threatens to reinscribe the other as an object of one’s experience and thus subject the other to the hegemony of the ego. Irigaray offers a more faithful path. She explains, “I love you risks reducing the other to the object of my love. This way of speaking should be used with caution. It would be better to say: I love to you, or in you I love that which both is and becomes, that which is foreign to me.” 35 I love to you signals a mode of recognition beyond the Hegelian mode of recognition, which constitutes the basis for subjectivity in Hegel’s philosophy. Declaring, “I recognize you,” means that I cannot know you entirely. The “power of a negative prevails between us,” asserts Irigaray. “I recognize you goes hand in hand with: you are irreducible to me, just as I am to you.” 36 A special kind of recognition that regards the alterity of the other is imperative for an erotic approach before (that is, in front of) the other. The preacher ought to love with a love to the Word, that respects the Word as subject and therefore submits in advance, laying down its intentionality as one lays down a sword.
Irigaray’s dative erotic approach does something else. Homiletics has tended to force preachers into an interpretive double-bind between a hermeneutic of generosity and a hermeneutic of suspicion; one reads with or against the text. It is beyond dispute that words of Scripture were written in contexts where human and nonhuman animals were subjected to marginalization and domination by others. Equally true and equally horrid is the fact that Scripture has been wielded by those in power to subjugate certain kinds of people to bolster racist, sexist, heterosexist, and capitalistic regimes of power/knowledge. By construing the erotic reduction datively, the preacher not only avoids constraining the Word’s becoming according to the words of Scripture, such a relation enables the preacher to engage Scripture beyond the false choice between generosity or suspicion. Another way to say this is that the loving dative approach generates a space for becoming that is impossible when the Word is reduced to being.
The Word in/as Flesh
When the preacher initiates an advance according to the erotic reduction she initiates the first move before the Word. By respecting the radical alterity of the Word via the dative relation, the preacher establishes the conditions for the possibility whereby they might receive the Word beyond totalization or objectification. The third component of the eroticization of preaching attends to the locus of encounter in one’s flesh. This is the site of the saturated phenomenon.
In phenomenology, flesh is a tricky concept. Flesh is irreducible to one’s body or one’s spirit. Maurice Merleau-Ponty employs this word to mark a site of encounter beyond matter, mind, or substance. “What we are calling flesh, this interiorly worked-over mass, has no name in any philosophy. As the formative medium of the object and the subject, it is not the atom of being.” We must not think the flesh “starting from substances, from body and spirit—for then it would be the union of contradictories—but we must think it, as we said, as an element, as the concrete emblem of a general manner of being.” 37 Homiletically speaking, the preacher’s flesh does not exist in time or space, not even in the mind of the preacher. Rather, what the erotic approach initiates is a site of becoming in the preacher that redefines being and knowing.
Flesh is an important concept for Marion. “By entering into the flesh of the other, I exit the world and I become flesh in her flesh, flesh of her flesh” (EP, 119). By this Marion names a point of encounter between the would-be knower and the other, which bears the name “Word” in Reformed theology. Through a kind of homiletical divestment, the preacher-knower allows the Word to give a fleshly experience. Such an experience, as Marion frequently reminds us, is not about bodies and certainly not about sex. He struggles, however, to describe where this fleshly abode is to be found, which is unsurprising given what Merleau-Ponty says about it.
Irigaray provides some much-needed support here. She, too, speaks of the fleshly encounter, but in a way that is at once “horizontal and vertical, terrestrial and heavenly.” 38 This has huge theological implications, for it calls into question the easy opposition between transcendence and immanence. On one hand, preachers are less encumbered by the problems of fleshly encounter as it grounds our theology. The becoming flesh of the Word constitutes the threshold of revealed theology alongside phenomenology. 39 On the other hand, if the preacher’s flesh is not quite mental or spiritual or physical, but is given to her as a spatio-temporal locus of encounter in and through the erotic approach, this non-conceptual concept of the flesh puts serious pressure on “dialectical” theologies of the Word because whatever can be known of God in/as the flesh of the preacher cannot be thought according to spatio-temporal binaries.
The Jouissance of the Word
The final aspect of erotic preaching emerges (perhaps) in/as flesh, which does not exist in the preacher but can only be given by the other/Word. To name this experience that transcends dualities of activity–passivity and subject–object, French phenomenologists employ a word borrowed from Lacanian psychoanalytic philosophy and (Roland) Barthesian poststructural semiotics. The word is jouissance (from jouir, “to enjoy”). The French word is slippery, connoting more than the English translation, “enjoyment.” 40 Marion employs the term to name the moment of fleshly climax wherein the other is enjoyed by the reconstituted subject beyond use or objectification. This moment of jouissance is always too much and never enough; it is the target of desire even as it remains beyond consumption or total consummation.
What does this jouissance, this playful encounter, look like in homiletical practice? The preacher, through prayer and meditation, reads the biblical text on behalf of her congregation. As she reads, she encounters a certain resistance. The text pushes back on the preacher, shocking her with its foreignness, its otherness, its dissonance—preventing an easy epistemic assimilation or thematic subsumption. She reads and rereads, praying and playing without ceasing, yearning for an encounter with the Word in love. In view of jouissance the preacher approaches, not knowing with certainty whether or not she will receive anything. In lieu of certainty, she receives faith. In loving she gives her flesh to God in hope that the Word might again become flesh in and through her. 41 It is here that textual resistance softens; she may perceive a kind of give in the text.
The always possible and never certifiable arrival of the Word is otherwise than a noetic encroachment by the preacher. It is otherwise than exegesis (ἐξήγησις); the preacher leads (ήγέοται) nothing out of (ἐξ) the text, for such a seduction abandons the erotic advance. Insofar as the preacher does not divest himself, does not humble himself, does not approach the Word tenderly in prayer, there can be no jouissance. If the preacher aims to seize the Word, to force it, to constrain it to yield a meaning otherwise than its “unpredictable landing” in the eroticization of flesh, nothing is given. In Marion’s words, “love does not pretend to comprehend, since it does not mean at all to take.” 42 Love only gives.
To transpose this into Barthian terminology, the veiling of the Word in the text is the unveiling. The always possible enfleshment of the Word opened to the preacher as a moment of jouissance through the erotic approach reveals a sort of thin space, where the veil of alterity becomes less opaque. Marion writes, “There where I feel that something puts up no resistance to me, and that, far from turning me back into myself and thus reducing me, this something withdraws, effaces itself and makes room for me, in short that this something opens itself.” 43 The jouissance of the Word is the uncanny enjoyment always possibly available to the preacher through the erotic approach. Note well, that this openness and givenness does not permit the objectification or totalization of the Word. Just as the alterity of the other person remains forever beyond any “immediately visible spectacle,” so too does the Word retain its alterity in and beyond the text (EP, 105). Or, as Marion writes elsewhere, in a more theologically oriented discourse, “God crosses out our thought because [God] saturates it.” 44 God’s superabundant love welcomes the preacher to experience the jouissance of this love as a site and moment of encounter with God’s Word in the Bible.
Here I am providing phenomenological vocabulary to capture with greater precision what other’s alternatively label the “Aha!” of the text, or “encounter” with the text, or an “experience of the assurance of grace.” 45 Such terms designate that moment following prayerful, playful engagement with Scripture for sermon development when, all of a sudden, the Word discloses itself according to what Marion terms an “unpredictable landing.” This surprise inaugurates a climax in the preacher through the Word that overcomes time itself; it is an in-breaking of God into time (kairos) that enraptures and enthralls the preacher. In other words, this encounter endows the preacher with knowledge and pleasure. 46
Jouissance increases as long as the preacher can bear it, until the point of spiritual-epistemological climax. There the jouissance of the Word reaches its end because it has accomplished itself in the flesh of the preacher: “the accomplishment lasts only as long as it remains unaccomplished; desire lasts for as long as it does not cease to increase” (EP, 132). 47 Transposing this into homiletical parlance, the preacher basks in the afterglow of her jouissance, and accordingly, she is enabled and empowered to offer a Word from God for her congregation. The preacher’s task—always necessary, always impossible—is to render in words the radical immanence of her jouissance of the Word without encroaching on its alterity. 48 This encounter with the Word’s transcendent immanence constitutes the homiletical erogenous zone par excellence and is thus the terminus ad quem of scriptural engagement for sermon development.
Conclusion
I have offered a theologico-phenomenological description of the preacher’s engagement with the Word in the act of sermon development. Beginning from a sense of wonder that gives itself (perhaps) and thereby de-centers the preacher’s position as an autonomous subject, the gaze of the Word saturates the preacher’s hermeneutical/homiletical intentionality. From a certain perspective, according to a certain advance toward the Word in love, the preacher resists the temptation to seduce God into giving up the Word, for such groping is antithetical to the erotic approach. The dative relation (I love to you) preserves the difference and distance between the preacher and the Word at the site of fleshly encounter. The preacher maintains this approach as long as he can bear it, in jouissance beyond consumption or consummation. Marion summarizes the erotic approach (to God) thusly: Thus love gives itself only in abandoning itself, ceaselessly transgressing the limits of its own gift, so as to be transplanted outside of itself. The consequence is that this transference of love outside of itself, without end or limit, at once prohibits fixation on a response, a representation, an idol. It belongs to the essence of love—diffusium sui—to submerge, like a ground swell the wall of a jetty, every demarcation, representational or existential, of its flux: love excludes the idol or, better, includes it by subverting it.
49
The erotic epistemology that I have sketched above presents preachers with a new signification that prompts a new oath, viz., Thy shall not kill (totalize, objectify) the other. Before the Word, erotic preachers also receive a new signification, one that does not merely reinscribe Descartes epistemology. The preacher’s existence is not contingent on his thinking or knowing (qua ego cogito); rather, he discovers himself in and through the Word, which signifies a reality that precedes and supersedes his intuition: “I love you first.” In God’s decision—in God’s radical freedom and alterity—to be with us and for us in Jesus Christ and in the preaching event, the preacher experiences a saturated signification. It is to such an experience, such an encounter, such jouissance, that the preacher bears witness; it is only on account of such an experience that the preacher is able to bear witness. It is this unpredictable and unplottable movement of God in and through the Word that is worthy of the name preaching.
Footnotes
1
Karl Barth, “The Word of God and the Task of the Ministry,” in The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978), 186. Concluding this essay, Barth writes, “The word of God is at once the necessary and the impossible task of the minster. This is my ultimate conclusion. Further than this I have nothing to say” (213).
2
Labeling this “dialectical” is a misnomer, if by dialectical one has Platonic or Hegelian method in mind, wherein the resolution is achieved through the dialectic itself as a subsumption (Aufhebung) of theses in tension. Tillich is right to assert that Barth’s theology is not so much dialectical as it is paradoxical. He explains, “A dialectic theology is one in which ‘yes’ and ‘no’ belong inseparably together. In the so-called ‘dialectic’ theology they are irreconcilably separated, and this is why this theology is not dialectic. Rather, it is paradoxical, and therein lies its strength; and it is supernatural, which constitutes its weakness.” Paul Tillich, “What is Wrong with ‘Dialectic’ Theology?,” The Journal of Religion 15:2 (1935), 127.
3
“Come now, O Lord my God. Teach my heart where and how to seek you, where and how to find you … Let me seek you in desiring you; let me desire you in seeking you. Let me find you in loving you; let me love you in finding you.” Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 99.
4
See J. Philip Wogaman, Speaking the Truth in Love (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1998) and Leonora Tubbs Tisdale, Prophetic Preaching: A Pastoral Approach (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2010), 41.
5
This goes back to Augustine, whose epistemology bolsters his theories of language, biblical interpretation, and preaching. Augustine, On Christian Teaching, trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999).
6
N.B. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, intro/notes by Paul Rorem, trans. Colm Luibhéid, Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1987), 81: “So let us not fear this title of ‘yearning’ nor be upset by what anyone has to say about these two names, for, in my opinion, the sacred writers regard ‘yearning’ and ‘love’ as having one and the same meaning.” See also Wendy Farley, The Wounding and Healing of Desire: Weaving Heaven and Earth (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 101: “Eros is the power of love in the form of desire.”
7
Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (New York: Fordham, 2001), 145.
8
See the brilliant engagement of Socrates’ treatment of wonder by Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe (New York: Columbia, 2008). She advances a notion of wonder as that which remains open “to the raging elements, or it shuts itself down, shielding itself against all uncertainty within the comfortable confines of the certain, the familiar, the possible” (5).
9
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern, 1968), 147.
10
The words aimée and amante, as Irigaray employs them, are both feminine nouns. The translator of “The Fecundity of the Caress,” Carolyn Burke, offers the helpful reminder that “full engagement with the masculine amant cannot be rendered grammatically in English due to a lack of gender.”
11
Hence the cry, “To the things themselves!” Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht & London: Kluwer Academic, 1998), §19, p. 35. See also Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), 59: “[L]et that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.”
12
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne, 1980), 256.
13
Philosophers debate whether this structure of knowability constitutes the extreme limit of phenomenology or surpasses it. See the illuminating conversation between Marion and Derrida on the “horizon” of phenomenology in John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, eds., God, The Gift, and Postmodernism (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University, 1999), 66.
14
He writes, “The operation of phenomenalization for what gives itself should stage a given that accomplishes itself on the basis of its irreducible self … insofar as it is received by the gifted.” Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University, 2002), 309–10.
15
Luce Irigaray, “The Fecundity of the Caress: A Reading of Levinas, Totality and Infinity Section IV, B, ‘The Phenomenology of Eros’,” in Face to Face with Levinas, ed. Richard A. Cohen, trans. Carolyn Burke (Albany: SUNY, 1986), 234.
16
See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 257–58, who employs the term caress to designate the intensifying hunger that transcends sense perception, “seizing upon nothing” and “feasting on itself.” Though not a literal caress, this notion overcomes the idea of sight that gets idealized in the Western philosophical tradition in which the detached, autonomous ego sees without affection, where everything is kept at a safe distance and touching can be reserved for manipulating objects. After all, what do we feel with our eyes? See Irigaray’s critique in Luce Irigaray, “Question to Emmanuel Levinas,” in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley, trans. Margaret Whitford (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1991), 109–18.
17
Husserl, Ideas, §32.
18
Descartes views love as a passion of the soul rather than a condition of selfhood. He draws a distinction between desire, love, and will. See René Descartes, “The Passions of the Soul,” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothof, and Dugald Murdoch, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985), 356. Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, trans. Stephen D. Lewis (Chicago & London: University of Chicago, 2008), 76 and 82ff. (hereafter cited parenthetically as EP).
19
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 258. NB, Levinas’s concept of metaphysical desire as “desires beyond every-thing that can simply complete it” (34). It does not aim at appropriation or consumption, nor even consummation. Unlike Marion, Levinas separates desire from eros. In seeking satisfaction, he argues, eros returns only to itself.
20
Marion, Being Given, 46.
21
Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 94.
22
Audrey Lorde contrasts the erotic gaze with its opposite: the pornographic. Audrey Lorde, “Uses of the Erotic,” in Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Berkeley, CA: Crossing, 2007), 54.
23
Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 146–47. Feminist theologians have rightly challenged Levinas for regarding the other (qua beloved) as feminine and for importing his androcentric metaphysics that conjoins the feminine with frailty, passivity, and vulnerability. See, for instance, Mayra Rivera, “Ethical Desires: Toward a Theology of Relational Transcendence,” in Toward a Theology of Eros: Transfiguring Passion at the Limits of Discipline, ed. Virginia Burrus and Catherine Keller (New York: Fordham, 2006), 255–70.
24
Irigaray, “The Fecundity of the Caress,” 234.
25
Luce Irigaray, I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity Within History, trans. Alison Martin (New York & London: Routledge, 1996), 105.
26
In his Discourse on Method, Descartes writes, “I noticed, in the course of trying to think that everything was false, that it was necessary that I, who was thinking this, was something. And observing that this truth, I am thinking, therefore I exist, was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.” René Descartes, “Discourse on Method,” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 127. The encounter with the other throws this already formed ego and its quest for certainty into doubt.
27
According to Levinas, the encounter with the face of the other confronts the subject with a signification: “Here I am.” This signification confronts the subject prior to intuition; further, its unpredictable arrival signifies according to its own intention. This is imperative for ethics according to Levinas (Otherwise than Being, 88–89).
28
As Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 6th ed., trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford University, 1933), 44, writes, “We suppose that we know what we are saying when we say ‘God.’ We assign to [God] the highest place in our world: and in so doing place [God] fundamentally on one line with ourselves and with things … This is the ungodliness of our relation to God. And our relation to God is unrighteous. Secretly we are ourselves the masters in this relationship.” Note the important reminder by Steven G. Smith, The Argument to the Other: Reason Beyond Reason in the Thought of Karl Barth and Emmanuel Levinas, American Academy of Religion Academy Series, no. 42 (Chico, CA: Scholars, 1983), 46: “Barth’s argument is not that God is the Wholly Other … Barth’s point is that we must speak of God as the Wholly Other because of the actual position in which we find ourselves, in the light of revelation.”
29
Marion, Being Given, 367, fn. 90.
30
Descartes leaves us with two mutually untenable conclusions: either one can know oneself with certainty and thereby reduce oneself to an object in the world; or, one can recognize that such a yearning for certainty creates an epistemological aporia. The ego’s assurance of its I-ness can only come to a subject from outside oneself. The ego can’t be taken; it can only be given.
31
Scholars are right to challenge Marion’s heteronormative assumptions, which work against Marion’s proper declaration that the erotic reduction cannot constrain the other in advance and remain erotic. See J. Leavitt Pearl, “Jean-Luc Marion: The Reinscription of Heteronormativity into Postmodern Theology,” Theology and Sexuality 23:1–2 (2017), 144–63.
32
Marion notes that “seduction betrays the erotic reduction, not because it seduces, but because it seduces neither enough nor long enough; because it ends up reestablishing reciprocity according to the natural attitude; and because it mimics the lover’s love in order finally to invert it” (EP, 83).
33
Marion puts it like this: “Seduction wants to make itself loved without, in the end, loving—I only go about the advance with the firm resolution of losing it as soon as possible; I only lose myself in the advance so that someone comes to me and I thus find myself again; or rather so that I find her without her ever finding me again” (EP, 83). Kenosis is troubled by feminist scholarship, for reinforcing subordination and passivity of marginalized persons. At the same time, however, scholars like Anna Mercedes, Power For: Feminism and Christ’s Self-Giving (London: T & T Clark, 2011), draw our attention to the power arising from such acts as a power “that leans toward others and offers itself to them” (7). Such “power for” the other can actually lead to human flourishing rather than further subjugating and silencing already marginalized bodies/voices.
34
Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Testimony,” in Essays on Biblical Interpretation, ed. Lewis S. Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 120.
35
Irigaray, I Love to You, 138. Je t’aime (I love you) is a transitive construction in French as in English. Irigaray, wanting to protect the other as subject, thus offers the construction J’aime à toi (I love to you). This suggests a movement toward the other subject rather than a constitution of the latter by the action of the I.
36
She continues, “Recognizing you means or implies respecting you as other, accepting that I draw myself to a halt before you as something insurmountable, a mystery, a freedom that will never be mine, a subjectivity that will never be mine, a mine that will never be mine” (104). This is a very different notion of recognition that that proffered by Hegel. See also Kelly Oliver, “Beyond Recognition: Witnessing Ethics,” Philosophy Today 44:1 (2000), 3243.
37
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 147.
38
Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference (New York: Cornell, 1993), 17.
39
Marion writes of a remainder that transcends phenomenology. “In effect, givenness accomplishes its primacy in that it lets the given vibrate with an essential remainder that it neither can nor should ever erase, since it belongs to it intrinsically in the role of showing itself, of giving itself” (see Marion, Being Given, 139).
40
Lacan situates jouissance as the aim of desire, which cannot be guaranteed because it is a “fantasmatic target.” Jacques Lacan, Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. A. R. Price (Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity, 2014), 163.
41
“The essential property of my flesh has to do with its suffering, its passivity, and its receptivity, which are not of the world, but without which nothing of the world would appear. To become flesh does not only consist in perceiving—when I stretch out my hand toward a thing to touch it, I do not stretch out there a physical thing, which would then be enriched with a supplementary ownership … feeling that one feels at the same time that one feels oneself felt.” Jean-Luc Marion, “Flesh or the Givenness of the Self,” in In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham, 2002), 87–88.
42
Marion, God Without Being, 48. On “unpredictable landing” see Marion, Being Given, 131–34.
43
See also Jean-Luc Marion, “What Love Knows,” in Prolegomena to Charity, trans. Stephen D. Lewis (New York: Fordham, 2002), 160–3.
44
Later in God Without Being, Marion clarifies the nature of this saturation: “Love loves without condition, simply because it loves; he thus loves without limit or restriction” (47).
45
See Eugene L. Lowry, The Homiletical Plot: The Sermon as Narrative Art Form, expanded edition (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 53–73; Anna Carter Florence, Preaching as Testimony (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007), 131–34; Frank A. Thomas, They Like to Never Quit Praisin’ God: The Role of Celebration in Preaching, rev. ed. (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2013), 18.
46
Marion writes, “By pleasure, we understand my reception of the other’s flesh, such that it gives me my own flesh; this pleasure augments as I receive further my flesh from the flesh of the other and as my flesh is augmented by this nonresistance; reciprocally, passivity grows according to the augmentation; or, what amounts to the same thing, passivity grows in proportion as the augmentation fills it” (EP, 119).
47
Nothing ought to remain apart from jouissance itself since both Marion and Levinas are only borrowing the language of sexual climax to name a phenomenological event. Yet they each assert that a child is the “proper” manifestation of jouissance. Viewed one way, this is problematic, for it posits a (hetero)normative ethic onto phenomenology. Viewed homiletically, however, this is less problematic for three reasons. First, some homileticians already speak of sermon develop in terms of “birthing” a sermon, e.g., Jana Childers, ed., Birthing the Sermon: Women Preachers on the Creative Process (St. Louis: Chalice, 2001). Second, I am much more comfortable thinking about a sermon in objective terms than a child, who, as a person, remains beyond objectification (even if parents tend to forget this). Third, there is an unavoidable economy at work in preaching. The telos of sermon development is a sermon. And that’s okay.
48
Marion avers, “The difficulty of the phenomenon of the other thus lies not in its supposed distancing, poverty, or transcendence; it lies on the contrary in its absolute immanence; the other appears in the very measure in which she gives me my own flesh, which opens out like the screen upon which hers is projected; her own phenomenalization is played out in her taking flesh; reciprocally, my taking flesh renders manifest her emplacement in glory.” Marion, Being Given, 121.
49
Marion, God Without Being, 48.
50
See Mary Catherine Hilkert, Naming Grace: Preaching and the Sacramental Imagination (London & New York: Continuum, 2006), whose very approach provides a testimony to the division between Word in Text versus Word in the World in homiletics through her separate treatments of what she labels the dialectical, analogical, and sacramental imaginations. A marked exception to this trend is found in African American homiletics, which have a much greater sense of the permeability of the Word between Text, congregational context and world. See, for instance, Cleophus J. LaRue, The Heart of Black Preaching (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1999).
