Local Energy Transition and Multilevel Climate Governance: The Contrasted Experiences of Two Pioneer Cities (Hanover,Germany,and Växjö,Sweden)

Introduction

Exiting fossil fuels has become a new horizon for local climate plans, as a prolongation of policies put in place by certain European cities in the 1990s, such as Stockholm and Freiburg-im-Brisgau. On the one hand, local authorities play an increasing role in post-carbon transitions. Most of them have been involved in environmentalist transnational municipal networks (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003) in order to legitimise and empower their local climate action. On the other hand, climate policies have been developed by different levels, national and European. In this article, we will analyse the role played by environmentalist associations and municipal networks in the impetus of local post-carbon transitions, and highlight the political and multilevel dimension of these transitions. Despite a common objective (CO₂ reduction), energy transitions can be quite different from one city to another. Focusing on two pilot case studies in Germany and Sweden will enable us to compare local paths towards exiting fossil fuels and to address the reasons of such divergences.

The first part will show how transnational municipal networks are contributing to the construction of legitimacy for local climate and energy action; how they provide a reassurance for local actors in the face of the opposition and the obstacles they meet. We will study the emergence of a new mode of political action, consisting of an alliance between European institutions trying to reach the Kyoto engagements, cities’ networks working to an activation of local policies and municipal environment departments in search for support. This alliance is part of the Europeanisation of local authorities (John, 2000). It is a preliminary step on the way towards multilevel climate governance, cities using municipal networks to lobby for a reorientation of national and European policies, in order to create conditions more favourable to local action.

The second part presents the different trajectories for exiting fossil fuel followed by two ‘pilot’ cities (Hanover, Germany, and Växjö, Sweden), analysing their conditions of success and their limits. The city of Växjö was chosen because it was the first in Europe to have adopted a ‘fossil-fuel-free city’ strategy, as early as 1996. The city of Hanover also engaged itself with a very early climate policy, participating in the ICLEI programme for urban CO₂ reduction plans launched in 1991, and succeeding to exit nuclear energy during the 1990s. Both cities are particularly active in municipal transnational networks dedicated to climate issues.

Subsequently, a comparative analysis of the local energy transitions is conducted, highlighting a number of lessons drawn from the two case studies. The paths towards energy transition in these cities are divergent. We address the question of whether these paths can be combined (Guy et al., 2001), or if they represent divergent political choices. A second interrogation bears on the impact of national or federal support for local climate action, which until a few years ago greatly differed between Germany and Sweden. What effect do political actions performed at different levels have on local post-carbon transitions? In response to the call of Andrew Jordan, this paper is an attempt to link, in a exploratory manner, two components usually studied apart

governance interventions and outcomes ‘on the ground’ … to know what forms of governing lead to what sort of outcomes (Jordan, 2008, p. 29).

Since the work of James Rosenau, “the term governance allows non-state actors such as business and nongovernmental organisation to be brought into any analysis of societal steering” (Jordan, 2008, p. 21). Climate governance can be defined as the upsurge of a multiplicity of actors and spheres of authority for governing climate, beyond the international arena (Bulkeley and Newell, 2010). Transnational municipal networks and cities are constructing themselves as one of these new spheres (Bulkeley, 2005; Andonova et al., 2009). Multilevel climate governance would be the interplay and co-ordination of climate action at all scales and across scales, in a non-hierarchical way.

Such multilevel governance is in a very preliminary phase and, moreover, varies depending on national contexts. Some national governments relied on local authorities in order to reach their Kyoto engagement; others did not. Multilevel climate policies, in democratic and decentralised contexts, suppose some degree of multilevel governance. Our hypothesis is that the multilevel character of post-carbon transitions, in which states and federation of states are still key actors, is an essential part of their efficacy. A second hypothesis is that the lack of national or federal support for local energy and climate policies gave birth in certain contexts to transnational municipal networks.

The article is grounded in empirical field work conducted during three research projects on sustainable and local climate policies, from 2002 to 2009. The identification of the pilot case studies was the result of participation, from 1994, in all the conferences of the European Campaign of Sustainable Cities and Towns. The Växjö climate policy was studied during a research project on local Agendas 21 and sustainable mobility in Europe (Emelianoff, 2006). In 2008, an updated enquiry was conducted in Växjö. The Hanover case study was also conducted in two phases: in 2002, as part of a research project on urban sustainable development, and in 2009 in a research project on urban energy transitions in Europe (Emelianoff et al., 2010). The author undertook 17 in-depth and non-directional interviews in Hanover and Växjö with civil servants heading municipal climate, urban design and planning policy, transport policy and with politicians and leaders of environmentalist associations.

The Construction of Legitimacy for Local Climate Action

Since the beginning of the 1990s, urban policies to limit greenhouse gases have constituted some of the first ways in which the issues of sustainable development were taken on board at the local level in the European context, mainly in Germanic countries. In 1990, after the publication of the first International Panel on Climate Change report, the founding of three transnational and environmentalist associations of local authorities, ICLEI ¹ (Toronto), Climate Alliance (Frankfurt) and Energy Cities (Besançon), was to put the question of climate on the local political agenda. Energy Cities was initially oriented towards energy savings, as a means of opposition to the French nuclear policy, while Climate Alliance was focused on Amazonian deforestation, but they quickly joined the climate ‘battle’. ICLEI Europe was founded in 1992 in the city of Freiburg-im-Breisgau, the winner of the competition for hosting the European Secretariat of ICLEI. Urban action was seen to be relevant in the eyes of both international institutions such as UNEP, which furnished support to the ICLEI, and those rare environmentalists who were familiar with urban policies. ² From their point of view, cities provided a window of opportunity for political action in a period when strong economic lobbies were blocking national and international climate policies. More broadly, the rescaling of climate policies participates in a tendency towards reterritorialisation within overall globalisation (Brenner, 1999).

The Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign, launched by ICLEI in 1993, sought to increase cities’ involvement in climate policies and to define common terms of reference for local climate action, whether in terms of calculating greenhouse gas emissions, adopting tools and strategies, or evaluating the results. However, the cities’ campaign vacillated prior to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia, in 2005 (Emelianoff, 2007). In terms of CO₂ reduction results, its impact was very modest. The main support provided by the CCP is political, reinforcing or creating legitimacy for local climate action. Risk-taking in urban CO₂ emissions reduction calls for alliances which can reassure environmental vice-mayors and civil servants in the face of the opposition they meet from the economic actors and/or local politicians. Transnational municipal networks are the bearers of visions, knowledge and operating methods (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). They draw cities into experimental policies and partially finance risk-taking through partnership with the European Commission.

After the Protocol came into force in 2005, the World Mayors’ Council on Climate Change, founded by the Mayor of Kyoto and administered by ICLEI, relaunched urban mobilisation, encouraging the cities to join the world CCP. The CCP counted 800 local authorities in 2006 (150 in 1996), 160 of them in Europe (67 in 1996). The post-Kyoto calendar was also marked by the arrival on the scene of networks of international metropolises, such as the C40, a climate summit of world metropolises. However, these big metropolises have not been shining examples, in Europe, for their action towards climate protection, with the exception of Stockholm and London. Their marginal results and modest role in transnational municipal networks such as the European campaign of sustainable cities or the CCP, due to marketing-driven policies and bureaucratic inertia, is in contrast to their claim to be a model for other cities. In these cities, secure energy provision and international mobility are stronger motivations than CO₂ reduction (Hodson and Marvin, 2009).

An Alliance between Local and European Authorities

The efficacy of transnational municipal networks would, however, be rather limited in the absence of alliances with funding institutions. These institutions also provide legitimacy for the networks’ actions in the eyes of the cities. In the early 1990s, the European Commission became a central partner of ICLEI, Climate Alliance and Energy Cities, as it was elaborating its energy and climate policy during that decade. For the European Commission, working at the level of cities coincided with several of its interests: speeding up the political construction of Europe by means of decentralised co-operation, sharing the effort to reduce greenhouse gases, preparing the liberalisation of the energy market, involving the largest possible number of actors and partners in the energy transition and making the cities and economies of Europe more competitive through technological innovation (Emelianoff et al., 2010).

The alliance constructed during the 1990s between interested local authorities and the European Commission is a ‘win-win’ strategy: cities assume a part of responsibility for global environmental problems, opening a door for green politics, while other political levels recognise their power to act, and thus they could obtain further decentralisation reforms and financial means. This alliance bore fruit in the Covenant of Mayors established in 2009, gathering around 5000 local authorities in August 2013. For the mayors, local climate policies are an opportunity for international recognition, leadership and the vehicle for political demands in favour of an increase in urban powers. For the transnational municipal networks, cities are a new lever for implementing global environmental regulation, following the failure of states to act. While for local municipal environmentalists, local climate policies open new paths of development.

A New Form of Political Action

As for urban sustainability, local climate policies are the fruit of alliances and coalitions between environmentalists and politicians on the one hand, and institutions coming to grips with new questions requiring renewed forms of action, on the other. The process cannot be described as bottom–up or top–down: we have observed that a number of actors move from place to place and from one scale to another; some wear different hats on different levels; others are working simultaneously at different scales from their principal position. Thus, as noted by Bulkeley and Betsill (2003), the boundaries between local, national and international actors sometimes become unclear and lose their pertinence, even if this mode of functioning is probably not new. In what can truly be called an interscale process of political action (Emelianoff, 2008), the interplay of actors follows the interplay of scales. So it is not directives or injunctions that explain the territorial anchoring of climate action, nor ‘the coming to ground of carbon control’, as in the UK (While et al., 2010); rather, it is the coalitions of environmentalist actors from varying levels, thus reinforcing one another and constructing a new type of legitimacy for local action.

Transnational municipal networks help to construct these coalitions. Their mode of functioning probably has its roots in ‘civic environmentalism’ which developed particularly in the US in the 1980s and which has much influenced ICLEI’s work methods. Following the infiltration by industry of the Environmental Protection Agency in the 1970s and, under Reagan, the dearth of federal funding, citizen participation programmes developed and the state governments and local authorities drew closer to NGOs and citizen groups. The major environmental NGOs meanwhile acting at the federal level through lobbying and opposition, implicated themselves in local civic partnerships. So, the development of a capacity for collaboration between the levels of public policy, and interagency—for example, the upsurge of multilevel environmental governance—was catalysed by the civil-sector actors (Sirianni and Friedland, 2001).

We can consider that environmentalist associations which spring up in support of local initiatives are building a new mode of political action, piloted by activists who obtain support from public powers and programmes but remain independent from those powers (Blanc and Emelianoff, 2008). Networking of often experimental local initiatives creates dynamics of value-adding and drawing-in: such experiences become attractive to other local authorities and communities, risk-taking is reduced by the collective framework and that makes it possible to extend the ‘movement’: movements for watershed preservation, for ecological restoration, for healthy communities, sustainable communities, climate protection, etc. This form of collaborative action between activists, support networks and public programmes is pushing professionals and public-sector managers to relay those dynamics, once they recognise that it is innovative.

Environmentalist associations which activate local initiatives, put them into networks and diffuse models or possibilities of action, seem to be a lever for transforming public action, on the procedural as much as on substantial levels (bringing the global environmental problematic into local politics). The former name of ICLEI, International Council on Local Environmental Initiatives, reveals this form of political action. However, results are not immediately obtained and can be uncertain, as the local authorities do not have climate or, quite often, energy competence and do face numerous obstacles.

The ‘pioneer’ cities, involved in the creation of these networks, come to be seen as pioneers through the leadership role they have, their ability to deal with conflicts and path dependencies, leading to the opening of new paths, subsequently calling for the alignment of national and international policy along these orientations. They aim to transform the context of public action in order to give themselves wider margins for manoeuvre. In the field of climate, the local reduction of CO₂ emissions is rapidly reaching a threshold in the absence of support and structural transformations at other levels. Clearer signals, in particular, need to be sent to economic leaders.

So, the upsurge of local climate policies and local post-carbon transitions in Europe can be explained by a new context of political action, of which we have analysed three components: the construction or reinforcing of legitimacy for local climate action by transnational municipal networks; the Europeanisation of local authorities; and a form of political action linking public and civic actors at different scales. Cities become involved in these networks in order to obtain both influence and changes at other levels, and to gain impetus for their local climate policies. The experiences of Hanover and Växjö both illustrate this process, in different ways.

Hanover Policy: From Nuclear Independence to Fossil Fuel Independence

Hanover, capital of Lower Saxony with 521,000 inhabitants and more than 1 million in the urban region, is a market/fair city open to international influences. The city played a particular role in the European dynamic of sustainable development, being a founding member of ICLEI in 1990, of the Climate Alliance, and one of the three co-ordinating members of the European campaign for sustainable cities, in 1994, together with Aalborg and the province of Barcelona. It was also an initiator of a German climate protection programme involving around 20 cities. This role as a motor for various municipal networks was not its only contribution to rescaling climate public policies. Hanover managed to create, in 2001, an urban region directly elected by universal suffrage. The following year, a regional climate protection agency was opened, which allowed action at the level of the urban region.

As in many German cities, anti-nuclear activism has shaped an active civil society, from which the protagonists of environmental policies in associations and the municipality have issued. The energy policy began following Chernobyl, in order to attempt to depend no longer on nuclear energy, which was attained in 1999. The greenhouse gas reduction objective only came to the fore when Hanover became a pilot city for the ICLEI international programme on urban CO₂ reduction plans, launched in 1991 with 12 other cities around the world. This programme was a preparatory step for the Cities for Climate Protection campaign, which brought about a change of scale in the mobilisation of local authorities.

The city could not find support from federal or state governments for its climate policy, because the reunification of Germany delayed the elaboration of federal policies in favour of the climate, in spite of a lively sensitivity to the issue (Huber, 1997). So the strategy of the environmental department was to develop a strong implication in transnational municipal networks, in order to gain legitimacy and power to act at the local level. The Green party is influential in Hanover, having joined, in 1989, the social democrats governing alliance. The two political forces learned to work well together, although not without difficulties. Several years were necessary and the investment of Hanover in various ‘pilot’ municipal networks brought confidence

The fact of being in contact with these networks puts you in contact with all of Europe, you are aware that you belong to a European movement, which is a source of pride for the municipal councillors. It isn’t a legitimation, but it helps, it helps a lot. ³

Within the local administration, Greens are playing an important role, such as the Head of the Environment Department. ⁴ This influential personality took over the direction of economic and environmental affairs in 2005, having proved that protecting the environment can go hand-in-hand with financial savings and the creation of jobs. It was the first time in Europe that the municipal departments for the environment and economic development merged. Affected by a high rate of unemployment in the 1990s, Hanover oriented itself towards ecological innovation. In 2000, the city hosted a universal exhibition, devoted to sustainable development.

The urban CO₂ reduction plan was adopted as early as 1995. With an exit from nuclear power as an objective, the plan placed the priority on energy efficiency. Developed in partnership with the municipal energy company, the energy saving programme reached more than 50,000 customers. ⁵ From 1998, a fund for climate protection, representing 5.1 million euros per year with 80 per cent provided by the energy company, provides on average 1500 subsidies per year to public and private actors who commit to improving energy efficiency. In parallel, combined heat and power stations, district heating extension and energy rehabilitation in social housing are developed.

From 1990 to 2005, through economies in heating (−19 per cent) and efforts by industry (−12 per cent), CO₂ emissions were reduced by 7.5 per cent, despite a population growth of 15,000. ⁶ The increasing electricity consumption in the residential sector reduced the overall result. In 2005, each inhabitant was responsible for 11.79 CO₂-equivalent tonnes, air transport included. ⁷ Almost half of the emissions came from electricity consumption, 34 per cent from heating and 17 per cent from transport. Coal power stations continue to provide a significant share of the electricity supply, as the municipal company no longer buys nuclear power. The major challenge is thus to reduce consumption of electricity and to decarbonise electricity. Hanover is attempting to do so through energy decentralisation, with the shortening of the distribution network reducing energy loss: 149 combined heat and power microstations have been installed, 240 wind generators in the surrounding region, small hydro-electric stations and solar energy and biomass installations. In 2007, combined heat and power plants produced 29 per cent of the electricity consumed in Hanover, compared with 12 per cent in Germany as a whole.

This energy transition is also based on the reduction of energy needs in housing and transport. The urban planning is structured by the principles of the ‘short-distance city’ and the polycentric city at the level of the urban region. The city has an excellent network of public transport with integrated pricing, put into place starting in the 1970s. Urban densification is undertaken along this network, through a binding plan negotiated between the urban region and the municipalities, a situation which is uncommon in Germany (Laigle, 2009). At the level of individual buildings, the energy standard of 55 kWh per square metre per year in the sustainable district of Kronsberg, was about half the usual standard at the end of 1990s, and has been extended to new buildings constructed on municipal land. Since 2007, municipal lots are preferentially sold to developers who propose passive buildings, which is accompanied by a vigorous land policy. Each year, 10 million euros are reserved for the acquisition of land, while 15 million euros are expected to be obtained from the sale of land (Emelianoff and Stegassy, 2010).

Despite uncommon voluntarism, the head of the Environmental and Economic Affairs department stresses the impossibility of achieving a large decrease in CO₂ emissions without strong measures at the international and national levels. It is extremely difficult to reduce CO₂ emissions by 25 per cent in 10 years, the initial objective of the climate plan, while energy consumption, particularly of electricity, is increasing: homes are getting bigger; people are living separately; everyone has more electrical equipment, inhabitants are more mobile and travel more kilometres, etc. Those cities which have managed it are often in countries where a large part of electricity is provided from renewable sources, such as Sweden. The decision to give up nuclear energy has not made it easier to get results. However, the Hanover 2020 Climate Alliance, created in 2008 with 80 public and private partners, has set the objective of reducing emissions by 40 per cent by 2020, corresponding to the federal objective established in 2007. The new strategy excludes the transport sector, due to the weight of the car industry in Hanover and the open conflicts engendered with the all-powerful Automobile Club when the municipality sought to reduce the place of the car in the city. The two means to approach the 40 per cent reduction are thus, on the one hand, the development of combined heat and power plants and renewable energies (bio-energy and wind) and, on the other, the continuation of the thermic rehabilitation of housing: an ambitious and probably very difficult target. ⁸

A Transition towards Bio-energy: The Hope of Växjö

Växjö, a medium-sized Swedish city (79,000 inhabitants), has sought to go a step further, committing itself to become a ‘fossil-fuel-free city’ by 2050. This idea came to light in the early 1980s in Övertornea, a little northern Swedish town (population 6000) hit by economic recession, which set up a local ecological development project, based on endogenous energy resources (James and Lahti, 2004). Starting in 1996, the city of Växjö transformed this idea into a political programme, without having the same objective of energy autonomy.

First, we need to emphasise that Swedish cities have real power for initiative-taking in the field of energy policy. At the national level, the rejection of large hydroelectricity schemes in the 1960s led to an ambitious nuclear programme, the second-largest after France. The subsequent opposition to nuclear power contributed to the fall of the social democrats in 1976 (Kitschelt, 2009). Following the Three Mile Island accident (1979) and a national referendum, the exit from nuclear power was programmed. With this constraint added to that of the oil shocks, the priority has been placed on energy savings in order to secure energy supply: the country has adopted the most restrictive thermal regulations of the OECD countries (Löfstedt, 1997). From 1977 all municipalities were requested to elaborate energy plans. However, local energy utilities often prioritised energy production and export rather than energy savings (Palm, 2006). Currently, nuclear energy supplies 40 per cent of the electricity consumption in a country which has reduced its CO₂ emissions by 40 per cent between 1970 and 1990, and wishes to do the same again by 2020. Lately, the climate challenge has restored a future for nuclear power.

In 1991, the carbon tax put in place by the government was a strong incentive for energy utilities to convert district heating to the use of biomass or waste. ⁹ The central government relies on the local authorities in order to attain its ambitious objectives on greenhouse gas reduction, notably through support programmes for local Agendas 21 (LIP) and climate protection (KLIMP). Conversion to biomass of local heating networks and their extension allowed a reduction of CO₂ emissions corresponding to 20 per cent of actual national emissions, according to the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (2009).

Växjö, encircled by forest in the region of Småland in southern Sweden, and spread out between several lakes, has been a pioneer in the transition to bio-energy. The origin of their awareness on environmental problems dates back to the 1960s, when the strong eutrophication of the lakes by sewers and the textile industry set off environmental mobilisation and depollution works. The water quality was restored, as well as fishing and swimming in the lakes, raising confidence in the efficiency of environmental action (Emelianoff, 2006).

A second and more central factor was the development in the early 1980s of bio-energy by the municipal energy company (VEAB) for its thermal power stations. In response to the oil crisis, the company was the first in Sweden to take a chance on biomass. This pioneering role enabled the company to get numerous subsidies. It encouraged politicians to play the card of independence from fossil-fuel-based energy, and leadership on bio-energy

It’s cheaper than oil, much cheaper, it gives the forest value, so it’s produced locally, and argument number three, it’s good for the environment. ¹⁰

Creating jobs in connection with the forest is an issue in Sweden because unemployment hits forest regions, where the population is sparse, particularly hard.

Local pressure from a few politicians and the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation has made it possible to go a step further, after numerous debates: the project of a ‘fossil-fuel-free city’ was adopted unanimously by the city council in 1996. Widespread environmental awareness and economic opportunity are not, however, sufficient to explain this decision. A third key is the local political context. When the Social Democrats came to power in coalition with the Greens in 1994, a proactive sustainable development programme was launched. As in Hanover, the Greens are quite powerful locally. Yet more than that, the leader of the Conservative party in Växjö is a convinced environmentalist, an anti-conformist figure within the party, who became Mayor in 2006. In opposition, as town councillor since 1973 and vice-mayor in charge of environment since 1999, he was one of the promoters of the project to end fossil-fuel usage, which thus was a subject of political consensus. Since coming to power, he has maintained this ambition despite obvious difficulties.

In this singular political context, the idea of exiting fossil fuels, born of the forum of the Agenda 21 animated by an activist from the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC), received a sympathetic reception; whereas in a number of Swedish cities, local Agendas 21 did not successfully realign energy choices, due to the lack of political support (Palm, 2006). This powerful naturalists’ association played a national role in getting the first local Agendas 21 off the ground, training actors on the issues of sustainable development, particularly biodiversity and climate issues (Eckerberg, 2001). In Växjö, training given to a quarter of the 6000 municipal employees, politicians and interested members of the public was a determining factor in confronting controversial decisions. The activist from the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation in charge of the Växjö Agenda 21 was recruited by the city in 1999 and became co-ordinator of the ‘Växjö fossil-fuel-free city 2050’ project. The local Agenda 21, too, made it possible to get national structural subsidies from the support programmes LIP and KLIMP, approximately €15 million in aid (20–25 per cent of the overall cost of the initiatives).

The ‘fossil-fuel-free city’ strategy, at the forefront of municipal action, had the goal of reducing CO₂ emissions by half by 2010. Electricity was already carbon-free, so the main lever was the conversion to biomass of the district heating network. The Sandvik II combined heat and power station (110 MW) came on-stream in 1997, financed by national and European programmes and fuelled by wood detritus collected in the region. The municipal energy company has also constructed four small wood-powered stations, which serve surrounding districts. With the help of subsidies for connection to district heating by individuals and the municipal housing company, which owns most of the rented housing stock, 76 per cent of houses were connected in 2007 (City of Växjö, 2007). CO₂ emissions due to heating have been cut four-fold and total emissions diminished by a third between 1993, when the first inventory of emissions was taken, and 2007. The municipality estimates that the emissions per inhabitant were 3.12 tonnes in 2007, ¹¹ a very low figure for Europe. More than three-quarters of emissions were due to transport. The city’s policy had to be redirected.

The city suffers from two handicaps for reducing automobile traffic, which is used for 61 per cent of all movements: its size, which makes the extension of the bus service difficult from an economic perspective, and its morphology which, as it is built around lakes, increases distances. Växjö is also home to a large Volvo factory (700 jobs). The attachment to the car is lively. The mobility policy adopted in 2005 aims to reduce CO₂ emissions for the transport of people by 40 per cent between 2005 and 2025. Other than an excellent bicycle policy, the plan relies on the use of first- and second-generation biofuels.

Local subsidies were supplied initially to individuals to convert cars to biofuels, but it was too expensive. Then, buying biofuel cars was encouraged through measures such as free or facilitated parking. ‘Clean’ vehicles rapidly came to represent the majority of new car sales. ¹² The main hope of Växjö is successfully to produce second-generation biofuels, extracted from wood by-products. This would open up a strong dynamic for economic diversification. Through the university’s Bio-energy Research Centre, set up in partnership with local industry, the city supports research on dimethyl-ether (DME), a gas obtained from wood, intended to be a diesel substitute. Experimental DME production started with aid from the government and from the 6th European Framework Programme. The city has received much interest from abroad concerning this programme, but without decisive results yet. With a certain number of firms already working in the domain of depollution techniques and eco-technology, Växjö seeks to play the eco-business card in order to redefine its attractiveness. The city dreams to be the ‘green capital’ of Europe.

However, a fossil-fuel-free strategy does not make sense if only pursued locally. Once more following the initiative of the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, a network of five cities was created in 1998 (in which we find the small town of Övertornea) with the aim to reduce fossil-fuel dependence, on the basis of a partnership between local branches of the SSNC and each municipality. This network was enlarged in 2001 after receiving the support of the European Union’s Campaign for Take-off of Renewable Energy and joined the Climate Alliance. The Climate Municipalities network (24 cities) enables local politicians to be heard at the national level and to lobby ministers to support policies. ¹³ Växjö is also actively involved in transnational municipal networks such as Energy Cities, the Union of Baltic Cities, ICLEI and various networks promoting biofuel usage (Gustavsson et al., 2009). In 2006, the Swedish Prime Minister embraced a cause that had become national: putting an end to the use of fossil fuels. The Swedish policy on climate change mitigation was ambitious, but the goal of ending dependence on fossil fuels sprang up from the local level.

Confirming previous works on local climate policies (Collier and Löfstedt, 1997; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003), these case studies allow us to underline some important factors for local post-carbon transition and for breaking the usual path dependencies of local infrastructures, organisations and habits: combative personalities, either in the local administration or on the political side, or both, able to build a political consensus and to convince local economic actors despite remaining conflicts; reciprocal influence with transnational municipal networks; political control of energy utilities; local partnerships of NGOs, private and public actors; and, most certainly, funding of local action. However, issues such as transport of persons and goods remain a Gordian knot and impose a substantial limit to such a transition (Emelianoff, 2007; Gustavsson et al., 2009). A second problem is that the municipal urban CO₂ account does not include indirect energy consumption (40–60 per cent of total energy consumption), limiting by a factor of two the scope and results of local climate policies.

Discussion

The examples analysed here give rise to three principal lessons: first, it is the cities, in the context studied, which provide the impetus for an energy transition for exiting fossil fuel, confirming the analyses of Harriet Bulkeley and Michele Betsill (2003); however, the efficacy of this transition depends on putting in place multilevel policies; lastly, the paths towards a post-carbon city can be very contrasted and even contradictory.

In the two case studies, the local energy transitions are a manifestation of the engagement of the cities in climate governance. The environmental NGOs, by managing to establish alliances with the municipal teams, were at the origin of the policies for exiting fossil fuels. In Växjö, the very audacious idea of a ‘fossil-fuel-free city’, pushed by the SSCN, found a context which was receptive both in political and economical terms, the energy utility being a pioneer in the utilisation of biomass. Synergies grew between the industrial and university milieux for the development of second-generation biofuels, which would be a second step towards a transition to biomass. In Hanover, ICLEI found a powerful ally in the person of the head of the environment department, who engaged the municipal services in an ambitious policy of climate protection by projecting the city as a pilot case, as much within the CCP as within the European campaign of sustainable cities and towns.

These cases of initiative were not independent from decentralised national contexts, open to local experimentation. Swedish and German cities have a capacity to guide the development of infrastructure and energy production through the energy utilities that they control (Collier and Löfstedt, 1997), which is becoming more difficult in the context of the liberalisation of the energy market. However, this is still a determinant factor in the capability of local authorities to push an urban energy transition.

Beyond these common features, the integration of climate policies between different scales is very different in the two countries. Sweden is the European country which has most solicited its local authorities in order to attain CO₂ emission reduction objectives, by making available to them important tools and financial incentives (Lundgvist and Biel, 2007). In Germany, due to the delayed elaboration of federal policies for climate protection, the cities have worked in a much more isolated way. It was not until the 2000 law on renewable energy then that of 2002 on combined heat and power, that a strong signal was given by the federal government.

We think that the absence of federal policies creates a favourable terrain for the development of transnational municipal networks in decentralised countries such as the US and Germany. The German cities are the leaders of the two main European networks that work to put in place a multilevel climate governance: ICLEI Europe, based in Freiburg-im-Breisgau, and Climate Alliance, in Frankfurt. The third municipal transnational network focused on energy was born in France: in this centralised and nuclearised country, some local authorities wanted to contest national energy choices and be able to choose their ‘energy future’. For Energy Cities, the climate issues only came to the fore later. In contrast, the Swedish cities were not a central player in the early construction of these transnational municipal networks because they did not have a vital need for their support to develop their climate policies. They use these networks in a different way. They reclaim a form of leadership for reason of the degree of advancement of their policies. They notably seek to export their savoir-faire, in which they are supported by their government, in a spirit of ecological leadership which is more and more forced to serve objectives of economic competitiveness. The engagement of German cities in the climate battle has been of a more political and conflictive nature. The size and the political structure of these two states (Kitschelt, 2009) largely explain the differences in the conflicting positioning of their cities.

The core of our argument in this discussion is that the efficacy of local strategies for exiting fossil fuels, beside the first impetus and results, depends—to a degree that needs further research—on other political levels and particularly, for the moment, on state and federal policies which the cities seek to influence: because the initial situation is more or less distant from the desired objective, the German cities being in this circumstance really disadvantaged, and as a function of the means that the local authorities can obtain in order to effect this transition. The multilevel character of the energy transition, and the influence between political actions performed at different levels, appear to broaden the scope of urban energy transitions. If we confront CO₂ reduction emissions in Växjö and Hanover (32 per cent versus 7.5 per cent), or in other European cities, such as Stockholm (825,000 inhabitants) and Freiburg-im-Breisgau (220,000 inhabitants) (26 per cent versus 13.5 per cent), we can see that the size and industrial character of a city, although determinants, are not the only factors determining potential for urban CO₂ reduction (Emelianoff et al., 2010).

Biomass is certainly a powerful means to reduce CO₂ emissions when electricity is already largely decarbonised, above all in the presence of municipal heating networks. Yet still, the development of this form of energy required a high carbon tax, green certificates, financing of combined heat and power plants, national programmes such as LIP and KLIMP and funding of research, as well as a strong local political will. Swedish climate policy has helped local energy transitions a lot. The conversion of district heating networks to biomass, or the development of biofuels for vehicles, are national orientations, for which Växjö received funding, opening the path to this energy transition. Hanover, on the other hand, had to supply significant funds from its own revenue.

A third lesson drawn from the comparative analyses of the two case studies is that there are contrasting paths for exiting from fossil fuels. The divergences firstly reflect national situations: the choice of nuclear and biomass power in Sweden; the rejection of nuclear and a strong dependence on coal in Germany. These choices and refusals are themselves to be placed in a wider geohistorical context: the European dorsal, with its dense patterning of agglomerations, versus the wide spaces in Scandinavia, where green gold glitters. The availability of this forest resource led Sweden to adopt a carbon tax in 1991, more so as petrol came from Norway. In Germany, the strength of anti-nuclear mobilisation led to the development of renewable energies, but without the hydropower and biomass potential of Sweden.

National frameworks are responsible for the contrasting carbon footprints in each country, both in overall terms and with respect to principal emissions by sector, which leads to very different local strategies for the reduction of CO₂ emissions at the least cost. Whether a country exits or not from nuclear power modifies the global level of emissions as well as the weight of emissions due to electricity, attaining almost a half of total direct emissions in Hanover. To undertake the exit from both nuclear and fossil fuel energy requires a strong reduction of electricity usage. Energy decentralisation, in terms of production, is part of the solution. Compact urban tissues and low-carbon buildings, with respect to energy consumption, constitutes a second priority, as Hanover does not have an extensive district heating network, not fitting well economically with passive buildings. In contrast, in Växjö, given that electricity was carbon-free and the district heating network was already established, it was sufficient that a decision be taken—the conversion of the heating network to biomass—for the CO₂ emissions to be significantly reduced. Whereas, in the absence of a specific potential (wood or hydroelectricity), the development of renewable energies involves a diversity of actors and competing interests.

Apart from the dominance of national frameworks, there exist local political factors for divergence between the paths towards fossil energy independence. Hanover, like other pioneer German cities in climate protection, is governed by a red–green coalition (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). In contrast, the mayor of Växjö comes from a conservative liberal party. He is as convinced as the head of the Hanover Department of the Economy and Environment of the necessity, in order to break the dependence on fossil energy, of a transition towards an ecological economy, but for different reasons: strong public regulation, notably via eco-fiscality, conditions innovation and economic competitiveness, yielding an advantage for Swedish enterprises in the world market, ¹⁴ whereas for the elected administrator in Hanover, it is the responsibility of political ecology to work profound transformations on the nature of economic activities in the direction of energy restraint. These divergent political orientations, greening of capitalism versus eco-political economy, explain the different positioning of the two cities as regards nuclear power (i.e. the global energy of which a society disposes), or the use of biofuel for automobiles.

Conclusion

This analysis allows us to repoliticise the choices which direct the urban energy transitions in the case studies: on the one hand, they are driven by environmentalist associations, which demonstrates the growing weight of actors from civil society in the renewal of political action; on the other hand, these choices cannot be maintained over time in the absence of an uncommon political will; finally, as a consequence of the local and national political landscape, the choices made do not give rise to the same orientations in the post-carbon transition.

The strength of political motivations is often underestimated in studies of local energy transitions such as in Guy et al. (2001) and Hodson and Marvin (2009). Cities will certainly draw the economic benefits of their choices, without which they are untenable, as much as the ecological benefits, which make the cities more attractive, but the principal benefit is probably political: to gain a new political autonomy in the context of the globalisation of political choices. The local authorities act in order to increase their own power and to transform the world, reinforcing their role on the international scene. The two motivations are not exclusive, rather complementary. The cities can represent a window of opportunity for political action, for deviance from dominant political regimes (Rohracher and Späth, forthcoming), which could not be imagined at the national level due to organisational inertia and the weight of economic lobbies on national or federal policies (Newell, 2000).

The two examples demonstrate how the multilevel climate governance borne by the environmentalist associations (SSNC and ICLEI) takes root in local climate governance and partnerships which opens new paths (here, paths to energy transition). These paths subsequently receive publicity from the transnational municipal networks. The alliance between environmentalist associations and local authorities allows pressure to be put on national and international policy for alignment to the new orientations (through the Covenant of Mayors, for example). By playing the card of networked innovations and local initiatives, environmental activists gain political weight. For the cities, working to establish multilevel climate governance allows them to position themselves as innovative and to extend their power for action. The invention of a climate competence at the local level acts not only through a rescaling of public action, but also through a multilevel reorientation of public policies.

We have shown that, by this double movement—reinforcement of the local and the creation of continuity between levels in order to transform the context of urban action—the cities, in specific contexts, have imposed themselves as a global political force, as windows of opportunity for change.