Grass through concrete: Authoritarian governance and the urban politics of minimal change

Theoretical background: Authoritarian urban governance

Cities have traditionally been seen as a threat to authoritarianism because urban life fosters coordinated public action, increases the likelihood of uprisings, and cultivates populations inclined towards democratisation and stronger civic institutions (Glaeser and Steinberg, 2017). Notably, large cities outside the Global North often become opposition hubs (Lambright, 2014), forcing authoritarian elites to tailor policies specifically for cities. In China, for instance, threats to regime stability from urban areas have resulted in enhanced control measures coupled with urban-centric benefits and subsidies (Wallace, 2014). In this context, it becomes particularly intriguing to understand the strategies and forms that ruling elites deploy in urban settings to limit potential dissension and unrest (Goodfellow and Jackman, 2020).

Political survival is the key goal of any authoritarian regime, prompting the use of an extensive array of tools to address ever-changing threats to their rule (Frantz, 2024). In contemporary contexts, however, the fine-tuning of this toolkit faces an additional challenge: authoritarian regimes must simulate democratic procedures to cultivate an image of competence and gain both domestic and international reputational benefits (Brancati, 2014; Guriev and Treisman, 2023). They have to demonstrate technocratic competence and a commitment to modernisation, while ensuring that these appearances do not translate into genuine democratic accountability.

To address evolving threats to their survival, authoritarian regimes increasingly engage in policy transfer – drawing lessons from both democratic and non-democratic settings (Hall, 2023; Hall and Ambrosio, 2017). However, unlike democratic learning aimed at reform, authoritarian policy transfer tends to reinforce the status quo. In urban contexts, this often means managing populations perceived as potentially destabilising while simultaneously rewarding supportive elites. On the one hand, regimes may pursue strategies to improve perceived quality of life by redistributing benefits and fostering a sense of improved comfort (Wallace, 2013). On the other hand, cities also serve as crucial sites of elite enrichment: urban land and planning regulations are central to the financialisation of real estate and the fusion of state and business interests (Can and Fanton Ribeiro da Silva, 2024; Ergenc and Yuksekkaya, 2024; Lees, 2024). Substantive shifts in planning policy thus carry risk – not only because they might trigger public contestation, but also because they could disrupt entrenched networks of power and privilege.

While international best practices in urban development often emphasise municipal autonomy, participatory planning, and measurable social outcomes (Moore, 2013; Stead, 2012), these features conflict with the core logic of authoritarian rule. Capacity-building at the local level, for instance, is frequently resisted due to the perception that even minor decentralisation could threaten regime control (Bollens, 2008; Owen, 2020). As Glasius (2018) argues, authoritarian practices are fundamentally oriented towards accountability sabotage – the systematic undermining of institutional mechanisms that might expose, contest, or constrain elite power. Planning tools that introduce new stakeholders require public deliberation or empower local actors and are therefore viewed with suspicion. In this context, authoritarian elites prefer instruments that are technical, non-binding, and ambiguous – tools that appear modern and apolitical, but that can be tightly controlled from the top.

This is why policies developed in other authoritarian contexts – already tested for their compatibility with elite interests and top-down control – often hold particular appeal for authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian governance operates through practices that transcend borders, often facilitated by geographic proximity, shared institutional legacies and cultural affinities (Koch, 2022). These dynamics are especially visible in the post-Soviet region, where scholars have identified Russia as a ‘black knight’ or authoritarian gravity centre – actively promoting illiberal norms and governance models (Ambrosio, 2020; Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2021; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Kazakhstan may also be emerging as a secondary node in this regional constellation (del Sordi and Libman, 2020). In such contexts, policy transfers are not neutral administrative exchanges; they are part of a broader repertoire of authoritarian legitimation, used to stabilise regimes while avoiding the risks posed by more participatory or accountable planning models.

Existing literature often portrays policy transfer in authoritarian contexts as an elite-initiated process, led by ministers, governors, state corporation executives or security officials (Hall, 2023). This aligns with the logic of authoritarian practices, where growing centralisation makes decision-making appear rigid and impenetrable (Glasius, 2018). However, the case examined in this article highlights a different dynamic: the process was initiated by grassroots policy entrepreneurs, understood as actors willing to invest resources such as time, money, reputation or energy in the hope of future private financial returns after policy adoption (Petridou and Mintrom, 2021). The adaptation of the Standard demonstrates why policy entrepreneurs can sometimes succeed in advancing grassroots initiatives within authoritarian systems, contrasting with more democratic contexts where such initiatives are more extensively studied (Frisch Aviram et al., 2020).

Approach, data and methods

This study examines how planning tools originating in one authoritarian context are taken up and politically mobilised in another. Rather than treating policy transfer as a neutral process of institutional borrowing, the analysis focuses on how technocratic instruments cross borders and become embedded in authoritarian governance – supporting elite stability, signalling modernisation, and avoiding accountability. Research in authoritarian ‘closed contexts’ (Koch, 2013) often encounters incomplete or skewed data, as many decisions are verbal or delegated (Hall, 2023). Researchers also note that actors frequently decline direct communication, especially when sensitive political content is involved.

The methodological approach in this paper is grounded in process-tracing, which involves tracking decisions back to their origins. The first task of the research was to establish that the case at hand – Kazakhstan’s adoption of the Russian Standard – indeed constitutes learning from abroad, rather than from internal processes or general global trends. To make this case, the study draws on three indicators commonly used to identify cross-border learning: (1) linguistic and legal similarities, including shared terminology, bureaucratic formulations, and even paragraph structures (Waller, 2023); (2) sequencing, where similar policies are introduced in different contexts with a recognisable time lag (Hall, 2023); and (3) explicit references to prior models by officials, in press releases, speeches or interviews. As will be shown in the analysis, the Standard case meets all three of these criteria.

The second task was to understand how the adaptation process worked in practice – what motivated the actors involved, how the tool was interpreted locally, and how it functioned within Kazakhstan’s urban governance system. Because relying solely on legal texts in authoritarian contexts risks missing informal or hidden practices, the primary source of empirical data is in-depth interviews. Between December 2021 and September 2023, 14 semi-structured interviews were conducted (in Russian) with 15 professionals working in urban planning and related fields (see Appendix). While most participants were based in Kazakhstan, several were international experts with direct experience there. With consent, all but one interview were recorded and transcribed. Additional information on the Standard’s adaptation was provided via email by DOM.RF, the Russian agency responsible for its original development. Interview transcripts and correspondence were first coded deductively using two broad themes – (1) the Standard and (2) urban planning in Kazakhstan – then refined into 15 second-order categories to balance theoretical framing and data-driven insight.

The non-democratic environment of the study shaped the research design in several important ways (see Janenova, 2019; Mohmand and Anderson, 2023). First, to protect participants – some of whom expressed criticism of government policy – extensive identifying information has been withheld. Anonymised ID codes and the singular gender-neutral pronoun ‘they’ are used throughout. Second, snowball sampling was employed, with interviewees recommending relevant experts and helping arrange meetings. Third, the sample skews towards the non-governmental sector, as current public officials declined to participate. To strengthen validity, findings were triangulated against a wide range of sources, including the adopted Standard and its explanatory notes, national strategic documents, planning frameworks, press releases, media reports and speeches from professional forums and conferences.

Urban policy and planning in Kazakhstan

The longstanding tradition of centralised policy-making in Kazakhstan goes back to the socialist era, when much of the country’s urbanisation process took place. The Soviet spatial project was largely based on the creation of new cities or the development of new territories to serve industrial and military objectives of the state (Junussova and Beimisheva, 2021). To speed up the achievement of these goals, Soviet authorities employed a standardised hierarchical system of spatial planning (Crawford, 2022; Shaw, 1983). Cities in Kazakhstan were planned according to rules and norms developed in the Soviet capital – Moscow – by specialised state institutes, which prepared general plans for cities across the republic (Dyker, 2014; Shaw, 1983). For decades, Kazakhstani city governments functioned primarily as policy implementers, remaining weak and subordinate to Moscow’s central administration (Junussova, 2020). This system contributed to a high degree of physical uniformity across Kazakhstan’s cities (Sarzhanov and Schurch, 2023)

Urban policy and planning in Kazakhstan has experienced significant transformations since the fall of the Soviet regime in December 1991. In the last three decades, both Kazakhstan and Russia have followed a path of ‘the introduction of market-based principles while maintaining the strong presence of centralised power over economic and political affairs’ (Hirt and Stanilov, 2009: 4). While urban planning also gradually reoriented towards the market and adapted to new actors and conditions (Golubchikov, 2004), much of the practice was still inherited from the Soviet past (Junussova, 2020). In both countries, urban planning systems today reflect a hybrid formation: a mixture of inherited bureaucratic structures and strategically adapted foreign models, filtered through domestic political logic.

Despite recent efforts (Zhumashov, 2023), Kazakhstan remains a centralised country with an influential national level (Junussova, 2020). It is a unitary state with top-down manner intergovernmental relations. Legally, an äkim, a head of a subnational unit and its executive body (äkimdik) of a province or a city (equivalent to a governor or a mayor), is a local representative of the President and the Government, not the local community. The majority of äkims are appointed by a higher level of government. Junussova (2020) highlights that even though private actors are involved in spatial planning, this process is strictly regulated through one-size-fits-all nationally installed guidelines and standards. She stresses that local urban planners still often rely on outdated planning theory and practice and, ‘like Soviet planners, approach the planning process as engineers’ (Junussova, 2020: 25).

Urban turn in policy and discourse

City management poses a challenge for policymakers in Kazakhstan. Although urbanisation in Kazakhstan is progressing more slowly than anticipated in the country’s national ‘2050’ development strategy (Seitz, 2021), urban areas and the urban population continue to grow. The housing and construction boom observed in the country often proceeds in an unstructured and uneven manner, failing to systematically address the quality of the urban environment, the renewal of utilities, transportation, and the creation of sufficient social infrastructure (Junussova, 2020; Sanghera and Satybaldieva, 2021; UN.ESCAP (Center for Economic research (CER) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)), 2013). Experts have repeatedly pointed out the need to update or establish policies, guidelines, and decision-making processes for urban development to make them more adequate for contemporary needs (see, e.g. Urban Forum Kazakhstan, 2018). In this context, urban policy offers not only a technocratic response to systemic urban dysfunction, but also a political opportunity: it allows the state to demonstrate responsiveness and modernisation without undergoing deeper reform.

In the late 2010s, urban development emerged as a prominent policy agenda in Russia and, from the early 2020s onwards, in Kazakhstan. In both contexts, urban strategy has come to serve a broader political function: to rebrand major cities as comfortable and modern, and in doing so, to bolster regime legitimacy (Abilov et al., 2023; Gunko et al., 2022; Kinossian, 2017). During this period, state-supported educational programmes on urbanism began to appear – starting in 2011 in Russia and starting in 2020 in Kazakhstan – aimed at training specialists with technical skills and a modernised planning vocabulary. Rather than introducing a new political vision for cities, these programmes helped construct a depoliticised urbanist expert community aligned with central government priorities. In Russia, new consulting bureaus focussed on urban planning have also emerged since the late 2010s, providing design and development services in close coordination with state agencies (Volkova, 2021).

In recent years, urban development has become central to state discourse in both Russia and Kazakhstan, with a strong emphasis on comfort, modernisation, and quality of life. Russian President Vladimir Putin described Moscow as ‘a trendsetter in terms of the quality and comfort of urban environments’ and outlined a national agenda to create a ‘comfortable environment’ for residents across the country (Putin, 2018). Similarly, Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev emphasised the strategic importance of urban management, identifying the ‘quality of life of residents’ and the creation of ‘comfortable urban environments’ as key goals for Kazakhstan’s cities (Tokaev, 2023). These narratives are not simply technocratic but serve an important political function: they present urban development as a visible, tangible sign of regime competence. The convergence in discourse and direction across the two regimes reflects not only shared legacies and elite ties, but also a common use of urban policy as a tool of authoritarian legitimation (Hall and Ambrosio, 2017; Waller, 2023).

Broader context for urban development

Kazakhstan and Russia not only share the longest continuous international border in the world, but also have deep historical, economic and political ties. While researchers note that the two countries have followed increasingly divergent trajectories in recent years (Busygina et al., 2018), close elite networks and investment cooperation remain in place (del Sordi and Libman, 2020; Hess, 2020). Both operate under variations of authoritarian state capitalism, combining market openness with strong central oversight. Strategic sectors in both economies remain under state or quasi-state control, despite integration into the global market since the 1990s (Hirt and Stanilov, 2009; Kinossian and Morgan, 2022; Spechler et al., 2017). Politically, both countries ‘initiated democratisation in the 1990s but got stuck in a hybrid status and then experienced backsliding towards an authoritarian status quo ante’ (Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2021: 4).

Although these regimes share institutional similarities, their state-city dynamics differ. Russia adopted a federal system, while Kazakhstan has remained a unitary state. Both countries built hierarchical ‘power verticals’ in the 2000s, concentrating authority at the top (Gel’man and Ryzhenkov, 2011; Peyrouse, 2016). In Russia, this has led to a severe erosion of municipal autonomy. In contrast, Kazakhstan has pursued a more pragmatic approach: despite strong political centralisation, it has enacted administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms aimed at improving efficiency and international competitiveness (Busygina et al., 2018; Junussova, 2020). This uneven configuration – centralised political control alongside technocratic decentralisation – shapes the institutional context in which tools like the Standard become attractive: they enable the performance of modernisation without redistributing power.

New urban development standard

Since the Standard plays a central role in this study, it is important to outline the context of its initial development. Designed between 2016 and 2019 under the mandate of the Russian government, the document was produced by the Strelka consultancy at the request of DOM.RF, a state financial institution for housing development. The goal was to replace Soviet-era planning norms with a ‘contemporary development model for Russian cities’ (DOM.RF, 2020). The Standard included six volumes and four catalogues, offering project management guidelines, architectural and planning solutions, and recommendations for both new developments and urban renewal. It promoted planning principles such as compactness, mixed-use development, street-level retail, multimodal transport and microclimatic comfort.

While initially intended for regulatory incorporation by 2021, the Standard remained a non-binding advisory document. Its technical framing deliberately avoided issues such as citizen participation, financing mechanisms or property rights, thereby sidestepping politically sensitive topics. By 2024, its practical impact in Russia was minimal: aside from a few pilot projects, it was rarely used by developers or local authorities. Despite its ambitious branding, the Standard has functioned more as an educational or illustrative reference than a regulatory tool [Interviews with IP-A, IP-B]. Its limited use and lack of binding status undermine its role as a transferable best practice. Nonetheless, the Standard was formally adapted in Kazakhstan (Figure 1), where its technocratic and apolitical character made it an appealing instrument for urban governance– a topic explored in the following section.

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Figure 1.

Excerpts from Book 1: The principles of comprehensive urban development of the standard (q88edu.kz, 2022).

From architect to President: A new urban policy

The adaptation of the Standard in Kazakhstan was a complex, non-linear process, driven by a variety of actions, interests, and motivations from both public and private actors. It was initiated by a young local architect, who described themselves as ‘a samurai with no goal, only a path’ [IP-E]. Their interest in urban development emerged after a trip to Europe, where they observed the shortcomings of Kazakhstani planning practices and the built environment. Like many other interviewees, they highlighted widespread issues in Kazakhstani cities, including corruption, fragmented governance and a lack of accountability [IP-D, IP-H, IP-I, IP-J, IP-F]. Searching for models and solutions, IP-E turned to Russian-language urbanist content from think tanks and prominent bloggers – where they first encountered the Standard. Framing their initiative as a patriotic contribution to urban improvement, they began advocating for the Standard’s adoption in Kazakhstan.

The choice to focus on the Russian Standard, rather than models from other countries, was pragmatic for this architect. First, cities in Kazakhstan and Russia were believed to have similar physical characteristics rooted in the Soviet legacy, suggesting their issues could be addressed with the same tools [IP-E, IP-I]. Second, Russia was perceived as relatively advanced in urban policy-making: ‘We have not yet learned how to develop documents of such high level, simply because we lack individuals capable to work specifically on the preparation of major documents with engagement of a wide pool of experts’ [IP-K]. Finally, Western models were viewed as aspirational but unattainable, whereas the Russian Standard appeared more feasible – an intermediate step between local practices and European approaches. ‘Between the [Western] level of understanding the city and ours, there’s no connecting ladder. The [Western] level is the rooftop, and our level is [gestures to the ground]’ [IP-E].

To localise the Russian Standard in Kazakhstan, IP-E sought to build a coalition and find an organisation willing to support the idea. Initial attempts to convince three city officials in Astana failed. As IP-E explained:

They had no time. Why? Because all of them are busy making money from their jobs. Meanwhile, in this situation, it is necessary to invest some funds to integrate [the Standard]. It is not so simple to make a couple of actions and get paid. It is a long process.

Their efforts eventually found support through an influential figure at Q88, a newly established urbanist association. ‘I thought “If anyone can understand it, it is him”’ [IP-E].

Q88 became an organisation that was able to push adaptation of the Standard from an idea of a motivated individual to the President’s Address. Founded in 2021 by urbanists, architects, and policy experts, this non-governmental association defined its mission as the ‘concentration of knowledge and promotion and implementation of best practices in urbanism in Kazakhstan’ (Aukenov, 2021). Within just two years, Q88 had taken on a prominent role in shaping urban discourse. It published master plans for cities and territories, developed road safety strategies based on Vision Zero, and organised a wide range of public events. Rather than contesting the official urban policy agenda, Q88 actively sought to shape it – positioning itself as a central actor in both policy development and project implementation.

The merits of Q88, though acknowledged, often leave professionals questioning the association’s exact objectives and beneficiaries, which seem to align primarily with some business interests [IP-D, IP-G]. While the association’s financial sources are undisclosed, it is believed to lean on ‘private personal funds’ with an eye on future returns [IP-E, IP-G]. Q88’s ambition, as expressed by one of its early members, was to create a Kazakh counterpart to Russia’s prominent urban consultancy, Strelka KB [IP-I], which has been one of the major private contractors in tenders of the Moscow government, Russian regions, and federal development agencies, often receiving unprecedented remuneration for its work (Lähteenmäki and Murawski, 2023; Volkova, 2021). Yet, Q88’s inspiration from Strelka KB was primarily about adapting its business model and working methods, not about direct collaboration or importing expertise. Unlike the activist-driven motivation of the initial proponent, Q88’s involvement appears more reputation-oriented, with a focus on visibility, future contracts, and proximity to public authorities

Official backing for the Standard’s adaptation came from the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructural Development, described as ‘monstrous’ and a ‘mega ministry’ [IP-K]. Covering areas from transport to construction and regulatory drafting, the Ministry coordinated with two key partners: the Kazakhstan Housing Company (KZIK) and the Eurasian Group (ERG). KZIK, the sole operator of state housing policy since 2020, works closely with developers – the Standard’s main prospective users (KZIK, 2020). ERG, a mining conglomerate with ties to local elites, financed the adaptation as part of its corporate social responsibility agenda (ERG, 2022). Additional partners included universities, NGOs, local authorities, and KazPost, which distributed printed copies nationwide.

Demonstrating success in modernisation to both domestic and international audiences is a key priority for public authorities and officials in Kazakhstan. Modernisation has been central to the country’s policy since president Nazarbayev’s 2010s strategies, which aimed to position Kazakhstan as a global financial hub attractive to multinational corporations (Busygina et al., 2018). Unlike Russia, where policy ‘reform’ often carries negative connotations (Gel’man, 2022), Kazakhstan consistently pursues reforms within an authoritarian modernisation framework, prioritising economic growth while sidelining broader political change (Gel’man, 2016). Adapting foreign expertise has been vital to this agenda (Shelekpayev, 2020). For example, during the planning and construction of Astana, officials relied heavily on international practices, doubting that domestic architects alone could deliver ‘cutting-edge’ urban solutions (Bissenova, 2013).

Within this agenda, the Standard offered a convenient tool: a lengthy, technical document that signalled reform without requiring structural change. The adaptation of the Standard, a document spanning thousands of pages with calculations and illustrations, involved minimal adjustments. Some parts were rewritten to align with local legal contexts and include Kazakh examples [IP-E, IP-K], after which the Standard was translated into Kazakh. Subsequently, 17,000 printed copies were distributed to äkimdiks (local executive bodies), universities, libraries, and urban planning centres to ‘enlighten people there’ [IP-I]. The campaign was accompanied by numerous roundtables, public presentations, and extensive media coverage, ensuring that the Standard received significant visibility.

To present the adaptation as a modernisation success, authorities needed to demonstrate visible demand. As a result, the instruction to develop the Standard was included in the President’s 2021 Address and completed by July 2022 – without visible public discussion or expert consultations. By the time the opportunity arose to incorporate the new urban policy into the presidential address, it had become a widely accepted idea, facing no resistance from any coalition members. In just three years, the idea of adapting the Standard transformed from a patriotic, social media-inspired activist initiative to a policy endorsed by the President, approved by the Ministry, and disseminated nationwide.

Following this high-level process tracing, the analysis now returns to examining how this case fits into broader patterns of policy adaptation and learning in authoritarian urban contexts and what insights it can provide.

Learning from the policy adaptation

The adaptation of the Standard shows how a policy initiative can gain traction in an authoritarian context – and move from idea to institutionalisation within an exceptionally short timeframe – when it aligns with state priorities and does not challenge the political status quo. In this case, the initiator worked with a coalition of actors, including a policy entrepreneur and semi-official organisations, to navigate the system. Their success can be interpreted through four strategic challenges identified by Hammond (2013). First, they responded to a clear public sentiment for improved urban environments (‘social acuity’). Second, they framed the problem in practical, technical terms: the absence of guidelines for city development. Third, they assembled a network of supporters, including public agencies and state-related business. Finally, they demonstrated sustained commitment and reliability as partners for the state. In a short time, policy entrepreneurs shaped the terms of policy debates and used their networking in policy circles to communicate their ideas (Li et al., 2022). As a result, they were able to successfully find a policy niche and figure out how to fill it.

The Standard case suggests that authoritarian systems may accommodate policy initiatives from outside the core bureaucracy –particularly in technically framed areas like urban planning. Literature on policy experimentation in an authoritarian context tends to see the bureaucratic state as the primary actor, overlooking the role of other actors, such as individuals, private businesses and civil society organisations – or a coalition of those (Hasmath et al., 2019). The diffusion of practices is typically portrayed as top-down, especially in post-Soviet urban settings, where innovation is expected to flow from the capital to regional cities (Zupan et al., 2021). Yet, this case shows that under the right conditions – strategic framing, elite buy-in, and institutional compatibility – external actors can introduce ideas that are absorbed and formalised within authoritarian policy systems.

The policy adaptation proposed by the policy entrepreneurs proved highly suited to the specifics of the contemporary authoritarian context described in the Theoretical Background: showcasing the government as committed to social development and modernisation, while ensuring that new practices did not threaten the status quo by enabling genuine democratic change. Adopting the Standard fit this logic as both a ‘quick win’ and a ‘free win’: the ministry and officials gained political acclaim for modernisation, Q88 unlocked new business opportunities, and even the activist-initiator found satisfaction in their altruistic efforts. Meanwhile, the non-binding nature of the document ensured that no further obligations were automatically associated with the policy – an embodiment of the ‘accountability sabotage’ characteristic of authoritarian practices (Glasius, 2018). The framing of the initiative as expert-driven and technocratic also helped simulate a form of collective rationality, lending the appearance of transparency and consensus while preserving the highly centralised character of political decision-making. As one interviewee put it: ‘Someone approached the minister and suggested publishing a book [the Standard]. It’s great; you’ve done nothing, attended a few presentations, and now have a good track record’ [IP-K].

Moreover, the authoritarian context, weak institutions, and vertical nature of decision-making in this case accelerated and boosted the process of Standard adaptation. Decision-making in Kazakhstan is largely based on personal motives and preferences rather than rational factors [IP-E, IP-F, IP-H, IP-I, IP-K, IP-M]. On the one hand, this arrangement ‘personifies’ policy promotion and makes it relatively vulnerable to administrative reshuffles or private conditions. On the other hand, this sporadic governance approach opens the doors for highly motivated citizens to promote policy innovations such as the Standard. As a result, in the scarcity of democratic control, institutionalised public debate and more distributed power, such initiatives by policy entrepreneurs can sometimes be implemented much more quickly than in a democratic context. However, the authoritarian context also affects the real outcomes of adapting new policies: the new Standard did not become part of the regulatory system and remained a recommendation. As interviewee IP-J argues: ‘The [authorities] took the things that “did not hurt”’.

One notable issue is why the Russian Standard – despite its limited impact in its original context – was still considered more suitable than internationally recognised guidelines or widely cited best practices. In authoritarian contexts, ‘best practice’ does not necessarily mean most effective, but most compatible. In this case, suitability meant achieving reputational results rapidly, at low cost, and without triggering institutional disruption. The Russian Standard offered all three: it was developed in a comparable political environment, already tested in a similar governance setting, and did not require citizen participation or new accountability mechanisms. As one interviewee explained, ‘The [Russian] Standard fit[s] for a typical Soviet city … and the cities of Kazakhstan are just typical Soviet cities’ [IP-I]. From a practical standpoint, Russia was seen as ‘not developmentally far from Kazakhstan’ [IP-E], making the Standard relatively easy to adapt – it needed only translation and minor legal revisions. Crucially, while international guidelines often promote inclusive processes and citizen engagement, the Standard enabled the performance of technocratic competence without threatening the political status quo.

In this case, Russia performed the function of a regional intermediary, offering policy models that appear modern while remaining politically safe. Russian urban planning initiatives – often derived from Western European ideas – are recirculated in neighbouring states through shared media spaces and linguistic proximity. As one interviewee summarised: ‘By orienting towards Russia [in urban projects], we are still oriented towards Europe, because Russia itself is oriented towards Europe’. These models, while borrowing from the West, are viewed as a lower-risk, politically safer option for authoritarian regimes, as they offer global engagement without the demands of genuine democratic participation.