Abstract
I write this editorial five days after events occurred in Washington, D.C., that shook the foundations of American democracy. After a pro-Trump rally, thousands stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, showing an unprecedented contempt for democratic institutions that many have attributed to incitement by the president’s speech (cf. Chaggaris 2021; Savage 2021). At least five people lost their lives as the mob descended on the Capitol, broke into the Senate Chamber, ransacked offices, and occupied the U.S. seat of power for several hours. This followed weeks of false allegations by the president and his aides that the election had been stolen. Naturally, what is at stake concerns the United States’ internal democratic character, institutional functioning, and socioeconomic, political, and racial divisions. It also concerns the country’s strength and international standing as a bastion of democracy, as well as its future ability to use that standing to further its own national interest and the promotion of democratic rights globally.
The riot inspired disbelief and condemnation around the world from state leaders and spokespersons of democracies and nondemocracies alike. 1 Some have predictably seized the opportunity to leverage their own interests in the face of U.S. instability and perceived weakness—trouncing the lack of genuine moral global leadership that the rhetoric and conduct surrounding the 2020 U.S. election has exposed. Others have, equally predictably, condemned such contempt for democratic institutions and the politics of hatred and falsehood. But they have done so while also bolstering their commitment to the common goods of democracy—and their belief that the U.S. system is strong enough to overcome the last dark months with its democracy intact. In the aftermath of the riot, there is much to reflect on concerning the critical issues it has raised regarding democratic values, impeachment, trust and mistrust in democratic institutions, moral authority and global leadership, American exceptionalism, and the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy, among many others. Over the coming months, I especially invite your submissions in these areas and the questions for democracy they entreat.
In light of the recent and troubling events in the United States, our first article this spring is as pertinent as it is sobering. Anthony R. Brunello’s piece, “The Tragic Fall of Better Angels: Nationalism, Neoliberalism, and the Failure of Responsibility in American Conservativism,” was submitted to World Affairs’ peer-review system months before the January 6 riots in Washington, D.C. However, our readers will immediately see that his warnings take on even more significance at the start of 2021.
Brunello traces how American conservatism, once thought to be more responsible than progressivism or liberalism, has in the Trump era contributed to the political irresponsibility of eschewing the common good to win elections. This may be for reasons of expediency, self-interest, self-serving or careless folly, or due to acting and speaking as one pleases without regard for the consequences to others—as politicians and as citizens. “Good faith and norms can be lost when the means to taking power becomes the dominant motive over the ends of governing,” he writes. Throughout the article, his points need little underlining in light of the storming of the Capitol. And, while they may be difficult to achieve, his eight tasks for us to consider along the path toward reinstating political responsibility in the United States are worth sustained reflection, careful debate, and concerted action in the near future—both within and outside America.
Our next two articles redirect attention toward the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. Emilian Kavalski continues the discussion on COVID-19 and international cooperation begun in the 2020 volume of World Affairs (see Klimkin and Umland 2020; Ross Smith and Fallon 2020). In “Quo Vadis Cooperation between Central and East European (CEE) Countries and China in an Era of COVID-19?,” Kavalski questions if cooperation between China and the CEE countries has become a victim of the pandemic. His answer is a resounding no. While the coronavirus has sped up social distancing between China and the CEE region, the former’s “unrequited romance” with these countries was already showing strain, particularly in 2019 after the protests in Hong Kong against the proposed extradition bill. The author argues that the bifurcation has been less a consequence of what China has actually done, globally or in each CEE state, and more to do with the contextual localization of China in domestic political debates in the region—reflecting a general trend toward Europe’s pushback against China. For Kavalski, the trend does not bode well for the future of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Abel Kinyondo and Riccardo Pelizzo examine empirically “How COVID-19 has Affected Africa’s Development,” adding to the burgeoning discussions in World Affairs on governance and development in Africa as well as the pandemic (see Asongu 2017; Baris and Pelizzo 2020; Pelizzo, Kinyondo, and Nwokora 2018). They find that the pandemic has slowed down sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies to varying degrees which will bring to an end the “strong sustained growth experience” they had enjoyed at the beginning of the millennium. Yet the evidence shows that the slowdown has been moderate compared with how high-income countries have been hit. The authors conclude that the economic consequences of COVID-19 in the region could be somewhat mitigated if SSA countries can capitalize on skyrocketing prices in the sectors of natural resources and agriculture.
Remaining with SSA, Segun Oshewolo and coauthors focus on the setbacks and dividends involved in Nigeria’s quest for regional leadership in Africa. Their article, “‘Instrumentalizing’ The United Nations” (UN), broadens an earlier perspective in this journal offered by Lagon and Lou (2018) on the drawbacks and advantages that different countries experience when attempting to use international organizations to leverage their regional and global interests. The authors show how Nigeria has used the UN to strategically project itself as a leading African power—and that this hegemonic quest has been a fundamental driver of its diplomacy within Africa and beyond it. They also note recommendations that focus on ameliorating the setbacks the country has faced. These include enhancing foreign perceptions of the country by providing more deliberate leadership in the region; employing diplomatically savvy personnel in the UN; and avoiding the bullying tactics it has become known for to force smaller states into accepting its positions.
Henrique Estides Delgado contributes the final piece in this issue entitled, “Governance of and Through Central Banks: A Comparative Analysis at the Close of a Dismal Decade.” Delgado reviews three scholarly articles that illuminate the scope, mandate, power, and independence of central banks and their evolution since the 2008 financial crisis. The author emphasizes the changing character of central banks since the devastations of 2008 and argues that, as a result, central banks were far better equipped to provide necessary economic policy interventions as the economic recession of 2020 hit. Delgado concludes by highlighting a real need for more studies on how central banks will use their powers to institutionalize trust in their highly indebted countries. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic’s effects on economies everywhere, it is a call for further research that should not be ignored.
As always, I encourage responses, critiques, or commentaries on these and other issues of importance to contemporary world affairs to add to the array of alternative perspectives and stimulate provocative debate on policy and current affairs. I invite you to submit your scholarly articles, critical and topical commentaries, and book reviews to World Affairs at https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/waf. Please keep safe and well!
