Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey’s Position in the World System

Strategic depth: strategy is what states make of it

Despite the fact that the international political system has been in a state of structural change since the end of the Cold War, the direction of this change is still indeterminate. ⁵ In the words of Antonio Gramsci, ‘The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.’ ⁶ The ‘Arab Spring’ is only the most recent stage of the reconstruction of international space. Transitional periods in the world system create circumstances where dominant geopolitical discourses are contested. As Mamadouh and Dijkink argue, ⁷ ‘major changes in the geopolitical context generally bring the reformulation of geopolitical visions, a rearticulation of geographical representation that is necessary to acknowledge, justify foreign policy change’. ⁸ Indeed, the post-Cold War transformation of Eurasia into a ‘grand chessboard’ ⁹ brought about significant changes in the geographic imagination of policy-makers, as rigid Cold War representations of power lost their ability to depict international reality, and a new ‘geographical dynamics of power’ ¹⁰ and ‘culture of geopolitics’ ¹¹ have emerged. In describing Turkey’s position within this new environment, Aras and Fidan argue that ‘territorial limitations to involvement in the region have been eliminated in the minds of the policy-makers [and] domestic security has been tied to regional security’ as a result of changes in ‘the meaning of the nation’s geography’, and that this ‘has created a new framework for Turkish policy in neighboring regions and beyond’. ¹² Indeed, with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at the beginning of 2002, Turkey witnessed a substantial change in its foreign policy and geopolitical vision ¹³ that can best be described as an attempt to redefine state−society and economic relations in Turkey along neoliberal lines in the context of a reorganizing international capitalism. This new policy represents an ‘articulation between neoliberalism and Turkish Islamism’ ¹⁴ and, due to its Islamic ideology, is viewed as more cosmopolitan in outlook that the realist−nationalist Kemalist foreign policy adopted by the traditional civil−military bureaucracy. These ‘two ideal type traditions of’ Kemalists versus Islamists’ ¹⁵ represent the views of different social classes and hold conflicting images of Turkey’s geopolitical position. The traditionalist Kemalist style of foreign policy is seen as timid, defensive and too passive for a globalized world by those who argue that Turkey needs to take a more proactive role as a ‘soft power’ in the region.

The formation of this new thinking about Turkish foreign policy, referred to as ‘New Ottomanism’ ¹⁶ (although the AKP sometimes take issue with the term) may be said to date from the late 1980s and the presidency of Turgut Özal, but was not fully developed until the AKP regime. Whereas the traditional style of defensive foreign policy and secularism are said to have led to hostile relations with neighbours, Turkey’s new foreign policy involves a reinterpretation of its strategic position and is rooted in what, can be considered, when compared with many other states in the Middle East, to be its multicultural, democratic and plural structure. ¹⁷ Turkey’s new geopolitical vision can be defined as an attempt to redefine state−society and economic relations in Turkey along neoliberal lines in the context of a reorganizing international capitalism. With Turkey’s Muslim identity as a solution to both its own domestic identity and democratization problems, as well as the basis of good relations with its neighbours, identity-based politics began to replace the Cold War policies that had been grounded in Turkey’s geopolitical significance. This change has been interpreted in diverse ways, with references made to the ‘Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign policy’ ¹⁸ or to a ‘paradigm shift’ ¹⁹ to describe Turkey’s new place in this geographical reshuffling. Consequently, instead of the traditional image of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ between the East and the West, alternative conceptions of Turkey’s position in the world system have thus emerged, with terms such as ‘key state’, ‘pivotal state’, ²⁰ ‘regional power’, ²¹ ‘trans-regional actor’, ²² ‘middle-sized power’, ‘medium power’ ²³ or ‘middle power’ ²⁴ . Turkey’s role as a soft power ²⁵ in the Middle East has been underlined by others. For instance, Öniş and Yılmaz describe Turkey’s new ‘foreign policy activism’ with reference to ‘Turkey’s pivotal role as a benign regional power … based on the use of “soft power” resources’. ²⁶

Davutoğlu’s concept of ‘strategic depth’ can be rooted within this new transitional geopolitical dynamics. ²⁷ Strategic depth offers a new ‘geopolitical discourse’ about Turkey’s position in the world system that represents a secularized form of Islamic politics oriented towards increasing the power of Turkey in those regions with which it had close ties historically during the Ottoman Empire. His arguments revitalize a tradition of geopolitical thinking on international relations that has been associated with theoreticians such as Ratzel, Mahan, McKinder and Spykman ²⁸ and practitioners such as Kissinger and Brzezinski. Thus, Davutoğlu can be considered among those whom Tuathail and Agnew refer to as ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ – a group of ‘state bureaucrats, leaders, foreign-policy experts and advisors throughout the world who comment upon, influence and conduct the activities of statecraft’. ²⁹ What unites these politicians is the fact that each of them developed geopolitical visions that they later tried to apply from direct or indirect positions of political power, combining, in the words of Touthail, ‘formal geopolitics with practical geopolitics’. ³⁰

The concept of strategic depth is based on traditional realist geopolitical ideas of frontiers, territory, strategic belts, basins and conflict belts. Davutoğlu rejects the traditional image of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ between East and West. ³¹ He lists five basic principles upon which Turkish foreign policy should be based, namely: it has to strike a balance between ‘security’ and ‘freedom’ (and the delicacy of this balance is highlighted by the problem of PKK terrorism); it should involve ‘zero problems’ with Turkey’s neighbours (which implies ‘more institutionalized regional engagement’ and an ‘eagerness to play third-party roles in regional conflicts’); it must be ‘multidimensional’ and ‘multi-tracked’; its diplomatic discourse should be based on firm flexibility (i.e. firmness in terms of the principles of peace, security, welfare and stability, but exhibiting flexibility within this framework); and it has to pursue a ‘rhythmic diplomacy’ that is adaptable to different circumstances ³² . According to Davutoğlu, by following a foreign policy in line with its strategic position and cultural and historical past, Turkey will transform its position within the international system from that of a ‘wing country’ to a ‘pivotal state’ and, ultimately, to a ‘global actor’.

Davutoğlu argues that a country’s strategic depth is based on geocultural, geopolitic and geoeconomic parameters as well as on shared ‘time and space consciousness’. ³³ Whereas colonialism has, historically, destroyed geographical continuity between states and their hinterlands, Turkey, unlike colonized countries, is in a situation of geographical continuity with its region; however, it has forgotten what this strategic depth implies for its foreign policy. Theoretically, Davutoğlu is torn between his commitment to a realist, state-centric framework and his vision of strategic depth, which depends on a constructivist understanding of Turkey’s role in the world system. ³⁴ Turkey, he claims, must reinterpret its geostrategic discourse, develop a proactive policy as a regional power in the region and create new spheres of influence.

In his use of the term ‘strategy’, Davutoğlu differentiates between ‘strategic consciousness’ and ‘strategic planning’. Strategic planning, in the sense that Robert Cox ³⁵ uses it, is a problem-solving concept, which, simply put, consists of planning and implementing short-term, medium-term and long-term goals. Davutoğlu argues that, unfortunately, Turkish foreign policy has not been based on long-term planning and has lacked a permanency that is expected of its strategic position. In contrast to strategic planning, which, according to Davutoğlu, ‘depends on today’s realities’, ³⁶ ‘strategic consciousness depends on history’ and is related to the interpretation of a country’s ‘fixed sources’. ³⁷ Thus according to Davutoğlu, strategy is what states make of it. In the case of Turkey, Davutoğlu argues, while the country’s historical and cultural ties are viewed as an obstacle to its further development, others, including him, see in them a potential for an alternative Turkish foreign policy. Not only is strategic consciousness essential for such a (re)interpretation of Turkey’s power sources, the development of a ‘strategic theory’ is required to facilitate this essential strategic consciousness. ³⁸ Therefore, in line with his constructivist interpretation of Turkey’s geographical environment noted above, Davutoğlu argues that perceptions of Turkey’s geography, history and culture must be transformed to accommodate a foreign policy more suited to Turkey’s historical strategic depth.

Ontological depth: stratified layers of reality

The concept of strategic depth refers to a depth geography and ideology but it ignores the depth ontology of social relations. It is based on a realist, state-centric geopolitical conception of the international. As this paper argues, it is not possible to understand foreign policy unless state interaction is located in the dynamics of social relations in which they are grounded. Critical realism, by supporting and enabling a sociological understanding of foreign policy and therefore of geopolitics, relates a country’s strategic depth to other layers of reality through the concept of ontological depth. The concept of ontological depth implies a stratified reality that contrasts with the positivist restriction of the real to that which is only observable. According to positivist accounts of science, the social and natural worlds consist of observable phenomena and events (an official visit to Armenia, the development of nuclear capacity by Iran, Turkey’s help to Gaza, G8 negotiations, arms deals, trade agreements, etc.), and the aim of science is to find regularly occurring patterns in order to make predictions for the future.

With scientific explanation thus limited to the observation and description of that which can be empirically observed, foreign policy analysis cannot be expected to extend beyond simple narrative accounts of conjunctural developments. In contrast to the flat ontology of empirical realists, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, ³⁹ critical realists argue that the real is not identical with the empirical, i.e. only with what is experienced. Rather, reality consists of both observable phenomena and the unobservable structures, underlying relations and generative mechanisms that govern them. Critical realists further argue that reality is differentiated and stratified according to varying levels of causal power: the actual, the empirical and the real. The actual is the level of events, the empirical is what we experience, and the real consists of all that exists, including structures, powers and mechanisms that cause the levels of the actual and the empirical, i.e. events, to occur. Notably, the concept of ontological depth goes beyond the level of the empirical and the actual to the level of the real, i.e. unobservable social relations, thus making it possible to understand social relations in terms of different levels of causality. This implies that strategic depth should be seen as part of other social relations and its comprehension requires going beyond empirical reality and the adoption of a philosophical approach such as critical realism compatible with this ontology. As Bhaskar underlined, a compatibility exists between Marxism and critical realism especially by virtue of Marxism’s emphasis on a ‘relational conception of social science and a transformational model of social activities’. ⁴⁰ The main claim of Marxism has always been to understand social relations in their totality. Therefore, arguments of Marxist social theory are important with respect to the development of a social science approach compatible with the principles of critical realism. I see Gramsci’s arguments in this tradition and his arguments are additionally important due to this analysis which emphasizes, as discussed below, hegemony and passive revolution which are both important in analysing Turkish foreign policy.

Strategic calculations may not be successful unless they are rooted in social relations and structurally grounded potentialities and possibilities. This is summarised in Marx’s argument that, ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past’. ⁴¹ Marx tries to explain the underlying relations that generate the phenomenal forms of the capitalist mode of production and why these phenomena take the forms that they do – why, for instance, class domination takes the form of a state, or why certain relationships come to take legal forms. ⁴² He argues that the mechanisms of the capitalist mode of production, although real, may be obscured by phenomenal forms. This has important methodological implications. Thus, theories and models cannot be based on abstractions of apparent social relationships, for phenomenal forms may contain ideological elements that conceal social contradictions. When Marx argues that the concrete is ‘the concentration of many determinations hence unity of the diverse’, ⁴³ what he is referring to is ‘not something which is reducible to the empirical or to the “factual”’. ⁴⁴ In his discussion of commodity fetishism, Marx intended to show how ideology can conceal the underlying relationships between the surface appearance of phenomena. ‘All science’, Marx argued ‘would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things coincided.’ ⁴⁵ Given that the aim of science is to ‘reproduce in thought this real object (essence)’, ⁴⁶ Marx’s method of abstraction starts with the concrete, but analyses it in terms of the different social relations that play a role in its constitution. This implies that unless the multiple determinations of phenomena are revealed and interpreted in the context of a totality, abstract concepts – the state, for instance – are bound to offer only partial descriptions of social phenomena. In terms of its implications for IR theory and foreign policy analysis, this means that geopolitics must be studied in relation to the totality of social relations, ⁴⁷ rather than at the level of the state alone. As Roberts puts it, the ‘structural conjunctural’ should be thought of in terms of its interplay with the totality of capitalist social relations. ⁴⁸ In other words, in order to fully explain the multiple determinations of state behaviour, and for that matter foreign policy, state interactions need to be located in the dynamics of other social relations. Lacher further argues that ‘the relevant historical totality to the conceptualization of the [geopolitical] system of sovereign territorial states is capitalism’, ⁴⁹ which implies that the state system is above all a socio-historical category rooted in capitalist social relations of production. In this conceptualization, foreign policy analysis needs to include an analysis of the different forms of social and political structure related to the capitalist mode of production. Leaving aside the recent discussions on the relationship between capitalism and the state system, ⁵⁰ it is sufficient to state here that the crucial issue behind the analysis of capitalist totality is the separation of the political from the economic and the public from the private in the capitalist mode of production. The underlying link between economics and politics in capitalism is thus made invisible by their apparent separation. As Wood argues, this appearance of autonomy is part of the complex mechanism of the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. ⁵¹

Geopolitical competition itself is part of the ‘structures of production and reproduction’ of the capitalist relations of production. ⁵² What is crucial here is the analysis of the state form which is the dominant political form of the capitalist mode of production. Therefore an abstract analysis of the state as an actor cannot provide an adequate understanding of foreign policy without taking into consideration domestic and international structures in their totality. However, what is meant here is the necessity to theoretically ground the link between the domestic and the international rather than just assert their interdependence. The relation between the domestic and the international and within the domestic between politics and economics is best understood by a sociologically based IR theory that takes into account the specificity of capitalist relations of production.

Hegemonic depth: Turkey as a potential regional hegemon

Whereas strategic depth is a geopolitical concept rooted in realism, hegemonic depth is a socio-political concept rooted in historical materialism. These concepts refer to different ontologies, and thus to different epistemological positions. A schematic comparison of the theory of hegemonic depth and that of the realist geopolitical doctrine of strategic depth may be drawn as follows:

OPEN IN VIEWER

STRATEGIC DEPTH	HEGEMONIC DEPTH
State-centric	Social-relations-centric
Positivist/constructivist	Critical realist

The concept of hegemonic depth is important in that it facilitates the development of a theory of foreign policy that connects domestic social developments to the historical interaction between social orders and world orders. ⁵³ In realist terminology hegemony refers to dominance or leadership of a state based on its power capabilities or material resources. ⁵⁴ However as Cox argues, ‘dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of hegemony’. ⁵⁵ The concept of hegemony used here refers to Gramsci’s understanding, which defines hegemony not in terms of the hegemony of one state over another but in terms of different relations of classes within a society. Specifically, it refers to the political, cultural and intellectual leadership of the ruling classes oriented to create and maintain the consent of the ruled. Therefore, the state rules not only by coercion and domination but also by consent, and is accordingly defined by ‘hegemony protected by the armour of coercion’, ⁵⁶ underlining a conception of the state which includes its organic unity and interaction with civil society. This the meaning of Gramsci’s comment that ‘in actual reality civil society and the State are one and the same’. ⁵⁷

Critical realism provides us with an additional interpretation of Gramsci’s thoughts, especially his concept of the hegemony which from a critical realist perspective is both structural and agential. ‘Hegemony’, as Joseph stresses, ‘is more than just material capabilities’, like realism or ‘intersubjective agreement’ as seen in neo-Gramscian literature on international relations, ‘it is both intersubjective and structural’. ⁵⁸ In an interpretation that locates Gramsci’s concept within a transformational model of social reality, Joseph sees Gramsci as arguing ‘how the structural and agential aspects of hegemony fit together to look at the possibilities and limitations of hegemonic projects and their agents’. ⁵⁹ Through the concept of a historic bloc, Gramsci demonstrates how a temporary alliance between social classes is established around a set of hegemonic ideas, or ‘dominant ideology’. ⁶⁰ ‘Structures and superstructures’, he writes, unite to ‘form a historical bloc’: that is to say ‘the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production’. ⁶¹

Hegemonic depth explains the foreign policy of a country in terms of the interaction of domestic social forces with the dynamics of the world system as a whole (without giving a determinate role to either of these structural forces). This Gramscian approach transforms the geopolitically based realist conceptual apparatus of the strategic depth doctrine into a theory of hegemonic depth that includes economic, political and ideological relations on the local, regional and global levels. Furthermore, the concept of hegemonic depth emphasizes the unity of the structural and agential features of hegemony. It acknowledges Joseph’s understanding that hegemonic conditions must refer to both the structural (relations of production) and the conjunctural (strategic) as well as Cox’s idea that domestic hegemony (a hegemonic bloc) must be thought of in conjunction with the global hegemony (of the capitalist classes). ⁶² Whereas domestic hegemony refers to the hegemony of a dominant class, global hegemony refers to a global structure to which domestic hegemonic projects are linked. In order to understand the interaction between different hegemonic projects, it is necessary to understand their individual relationships to global forms of hegemony and associated forms of governmentality. The full integration and mutual structural overdetermination of domestic and global hegemonic projects far exceed in complexity mere mechanical descriptions such as ‘domestic sources’ or ‘structural conditions’ of foreign policy. Moreover, global hegemony should not be understood as ‘reducible to the dominance of any one state, either economically or militarily’, ⁶³ but as a structural feature of the world system as a whole. In the current situation, neoliberalism is the dominant form of governmentality, and each national hegemonic project is intrinsically connected to and inseparable from the realization of this global hegemonic project. ⁶⁴

For the AKP, foreign policy has played an especially important role in establishing the conditions for its domestic hegemony. In particular, Turkey’s relations with the European Union, at least in the initial stages of AKP rule starting in 2002, has been a very important support for the AKP to legitimize and entrench its domestic hegemony. AKP policies have indeed been closely integrated into global hegemonic structures. As Hendrick points out, AKP foreign policy has been ‘less a reactionary movement against “Western materialism”, than … a proactive effort to increase the Muslim share in Turkish capitalism’. ⁶⁵

The co-optation of the AKP’s hegemonic aspirations into the existing institutional structures of the Turkish state is accurately described by Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution, which ‘refers to transformative social change that occurs gradually, without the overthrow of an existing political order’. ⁶⁶ Through passive revolution, leading groups wage a ‘war of position’ in an attempt to reorganize the superstructure in line with developments in the structure so as to incorporate and co-opt potential challenges to their hegemonic rule. ⁶⁷ In the case of Turkey, the liberalization of the Turkish economy in the 1980s allowed a newly empowered Anatolian bourgeoisie to slowly penetrate and transform state institutions. ⁶⁸ However, what initially appeared to be counter-hegemonic policies aimed at the dominant secular Kemalist state structures and policies have gradually been transformed into a policy of compromise with those structures − a process defined as co-optation or transformismo by Gramsci. ⁶⁹ Cox defines co-optation as a ‘strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition’. ⁷⁰ This can be observed both in the way in which the ‘Islamic challenge’ has been incorporated into traditional state structures and in the way in which the AKP’s domestic hegemony has been linked to the global neoliberal project and the system of capital accumulation. The organic link between these two characteristics can be observed in the main discourses of AKP’s hegemonic strategy. While at the start of its rule in 2002 the AKP defined itself as ideologically ‘Islamist’, over the years, the party has tried to separate itself from this label, and the concepts of ‘Islamic state’ and ‘Islamic ideology’ have lost their significance within the party discourse. ⁷¹ By establishing itself as a ‘pro-Islamic party without any overt association to or discussion of Islam’, the AKP has adopted ‘a politics of Islam without Islam’. ⁷² Similarly, Neo-Ottomanism, the foreign policy equivalent of the AKP’s domestic strategy, was also initially thought of as an attempt to create an Islamic space, as a new identity politics envisioned the revival of influence and power to areas once dominated by the Ottoman Empire. However, as the AKP began to define its ideological position through ‘democracy, rule of law and market economy’, ⁷³ their hegemonic project was transformed into ‘a pro-State, Turkish nationalist, pro-Western, and capitalist’ policy ⁷⁴ that may be described as a form of ‘Green Kemalism’. As Tepe notes, because this policy

mirror[s] the premises of Kemalism by attributing a central role to the state and its redistributive policies, not only in the economic but also in the cultural sphere, it fail[s] to offer a novel political project that addresses the public role of Islam in a democratic polity. ⁷⁵

In other words, the hegemonic strategy of Turkish Islamism was ‘absorbed into Turkish secular hegemony’. ⁷⁶ As Tugal points out, ‘what is at stake in the AKP experience is not simply a marriage of Islam and secularism, of religion and democracy, of East and West, but the absorption of a radical challenge against the system’. ⁷⁷ The AKP ‘built its strategic importance not only on its geographical position, but on a foreign policy understanding based on the reconciliation of Islam with the system’. ⁷⁸ The apparent significance of this process was to democratize Turkey, redefine state−society relations, reduce the roles of the state and the traditional military-bureaucratic elite and increase the pace of Turkey’s integration with the West. ⁷⁹ However, on a more systemic and structural level, the process represented the neoliberal transformation of Turkey through ‘neoliberal populist’ ⁸⁰ strategies pursued by a new hegemonic bloc led by a united front of Islamicists and liberals ⁸¹ who attempted to construct a new ‘geopolitical social’, ⁸² i.e. a policy for consolidating the social basis for market-oriented, neoliberal hegemonic projects.

Politically, the AKP has defined its position as a conservative democracy in which ‘Islam is not a part of its political agenda, but a part of social cultural identity’. ⁸³ This position represents a form of pragmatic populism with the discursive aim of bringing together all social classes under AKP rule as it tries to create a ‘party for the whole nation’. ⁸⁴ By using the term ‘conservative democracy’ to explain their political philosophy the AKP distanced itself from political Islamists like the Milli Görüş (Nationalist View) whose views were based on Islamism, nationalism and anti-Westernism. As Sambur notes, ‘the ideological transformation of AKP represents the Westernization of political Islam, not the Islamization of politics’ and a synthesis of ‘conservative values such as morality, national identity, historical pride and so on, with democracy, free market economy, pluralism, the rule of law and human rights’. ⁸⁵ In fact, over the past 30 years, as Turkey has been fully integrated into the capitalist world economy, Turkey’s Islamists have been unable to develop any social and economic programmes that represent an alternative to Western neoliberal ideology that could potentially form the basis for engaging in an anti-hegemonic struggle at both the national and the international level. ⁸⁶

In summary, Turkey’s evolving position in the world system needs to be viewed in the light of the changing dynamics of the domestic struggles for hegemony that have occurred at the economic, political and ideological levels and their links to global forms of hegemony. As Arrighi argues, hegemonic transition periods are characterized by ‘the interstitial emergence of new configurations of power’, or what could be called ‘sub-hegemons’ or ‘transitional hegemons’, expressing the new ways in which social forces articulate with the world system. ⁸⁷ Given that the present world system is characterized by a transitional system of declining American hegemony, at least in the economic sense, this raises the question of what the current geopolitical situation implies for Turkey’s future. Depending on the extent to which it can impose its will independently of major power structures competing in the region, Turkey has the potential to take on the role of regional hegemon in the Middle East. At the level of the empirical or the actual, Turkey appears to be seeking greater independence and multilateralness in its foreign policy in a way that differs radically from its policy during the Cold War period. From a US perspective, Turkey’s new role as a predominantly Muslim country with a secular, democratic past is one of a sub-hegemon, transmitting Western values of liberal democracy to a region governed by different forms of non-democratic authoritarian regimes. This phenomenon was first observed with the Greater Middle East Project, subsequently known as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, which was, in essence, a policy of ‘putting a stop to the Radical Islam’ rising in the Middle East. ⁸⁸ Within this framework, Turkey was presented as a model based on ‘moderate Islam and a soft definition of secularism’ in order to allay fears that Islamic struggles against imperialism perforce result in ‘patriarchal, exclusionist, authoritarian’ societies closed to ‘democracy, diverse opinions and independent voices’. ⁸⁹

Recent policies towards Israel vis-à-vis Gaza and its ‘no’ vote in the Security Council regarding sanctions against Iran has made Turkey’s image as a model increasingly acceptable to Middle Eastern countries in place of its image as a ‘tool of Western imperialism’ in the region, which had arisen as a result of its participation in the Western Alliance and membership of NATO and the Council of Europe as well as its role in the Baghdad Pact and during the First Iraq War. As part of an effort to re-create its image in the Middle East, Turkey tried to rationalize its strategic shift in foreign policy in terms of its Muslim identity and ‘Islamic realism’. ⁹⁰

Even if one accepts the reality of ‘strategic depth’ at an emergent level, it is not yet obvious that the Middle Eastern, Balkan and Eurasian countries with which Turkey has had historical and cultural relationships will consent to Turkish hegemony − defined as agreeing to its ideological as well as political and economic supremacy. ⁹¹ The success of Turkey’s role as a regional hegemon will ultimately be determined by its ability to create such consent among Middle Eastern countries for Turkey’s role in the region – a process underlined by the Gramscian idea of hegemony. ⁹² The creation of this consent is likely to be beset by difficulties emanating from Turkey’s geopolitical situation. ⁹³ As Hale argues:

The fact that Turkey’s geographical position is one in which the interests of several great powers intersect has also given its foreign policy-makers a degree of flexibility not open to states which are likely to be dominated by a single great power … While this means that Turkey can extract some ‘strategic rent’ from a great-power ally, it also means that it cannot usually back out of great-power conflicts, especially if they are centred on south-eastern Europe or the Middle East. ⁹⁴

Similarly, other scholars have argued that the end of the Cold War and Turkey’s development as a ‘central power’ has increased its risk of becoming involved ‘in real and potential regional conflicts’. ⁹⁵ As Oğuzlu suggests, ‘the threat to Turkey’s national security might increase in the years to come, which would lead to a need to rely on hard power’ ⁹⁶ and reduce Turkey’s soft power. These different forms of strategic instances will articulate with structural forces to determine Turkey’s future position in the world system and its potential role as a regional hegemon.

Conclusion

This paper has argued, an alternative to the dominant realist, positivist and related constructivist analyses of Turkey’s position in the world system can be developed based on Gramsci’s views underlaboured by the insights of a critical philosophy of science. In focusing on the concept of strategic depth that currently dominates Turkish foreign policy analysis, I have tried to emphasize that the concept of strategic depth is not only a ‘discursive practice’ utilized by ‘intellectuals of statecraft’, but is deeply embedded in different relations of hegemonic power both within Turkey and in the international domain. Making sense of the overlapping dynamics of these different aspects of a global totality requires a ‘depth ontology of social relations’, based on an alternative concept of science that allows us to grasp social relations in terms of their different levels of stratification and causality. Whereas the concept of strategic depth is rooted in a realist understanding of geopolitics that aims to understand the empirical and the actual, the concept of hegemonic depth is rooted in a historical materialist understanding of international relations and aims to explain the effect of real structures on the empirical and the actual level of social reality. In other words, hegemonic depth combines the voluntarism of strategic depth with the structuralism of a historical materialist approach. By identifying the limits structures impose on the behaviour of agents − and, more specifically, on hegemonic projects − the concept of hegemonic depth makes it possible to understand strategic depth as part of a larger set of mutually overdetermined social relations and thus facilitates the replacement of a ‘realist’ foreign policy with a more realistic one.

This analysis has implications not only for Turkish foreign policy, but for foreign policy analysis in general. Any foreign policy analysis needs to come to grips with the structural dynamics of the world system and the ways in which they articulate with domestic class structures. Such an analysis can also provide the basis for a social theory of foreign policy as an alternative to positivist and constructivist approaches.