Popper's Theory of the Closed Society Conflicts with His Theory of Research

This has been noticed by John Hall (1997), who suggests that part of Popper's thesis of the general attraction of the closed society can be saved by viewing it as a characteristic of some—above all Western societies. We may then proceed to institutional analyses of the causes of the creation of closed societies. I agree with the latter suggestion, though less so with the former. I suggest elsewhere that when there is a call for closed societies, there is a feeling that problem-solving ability is being lost due to breakdown of institutional frameworks that allow individuals to solve problems (Wettersten 2006a). It is thus often a fear of the loss of rationality as a rejection of rationality (see also Wettersten 2006b). Fred Eidlin (1997) points to a blind spot of a liberal when he notes that Popper gives no room for the wish of humans to live in communities. He reminds us that this is a traditional complaint against liberal views. (It is now very strongly put forth by Michael J. Sandel [1966]). All desire for community then cannot be a mere desire to return to a closed society.

For a beginning in this direction, see Wettersten (2006b).

All translations are my own and do not necessarily conform to others. For a discussion of the inductivism of the latter essay, see ter Hark (2002).

Malachi Hacohen discusses it but in another context with other interests (Hacohen 2000, 127; see also Wettersten 2005b).

“Wir verstehen unter `Heimat' einen Relationsbegriff, dessen Gegenstand ein Komplex von Dingen, Personen und geistigen Inhalten ist, wobei die lokale (geographische) Bestimmung der `dinglichen' Komponente gewöhnlich stark hervortritt” (Popper 1927b, 904).

“For the educator it is important, that for the most part the child does not possess a conscious appreciation of the beauty of nature, yet his tie to his home, as we have seen, has an aesthetic nature. This is the core out of which the awareness of the beauty of nature can develop.” “Für den Erzieher ist wichtig, daß das Kind meist eine bewußte Schätzung der Naturschönheit nicht kennt; doch enthält seine Gebundenheit an die Heimat, die, wie wir gesehen haben, ästhetischer Nature ist, den Keim, aus dem sich der Sinn für die Schönheit der Nature entwicklen kann” (p. 905).

“The relationship of home art to child art contains a hint of the psychogenetic law of `psycho-historical parallelism'; then home art is early art.” “Die Verwandschaft von Heimatkunst und Kinderkunst enthält einen Hinweis auf das psychogenetische Grundgesetzt der `psychohistorischen Parallelität'; denn Heimatkunst ist frühe Kunst” (p. 905).

“The meaning of this path for ethical education: Begin with `home' virtue. Accordingly Witasek emphasizes ... parallel to Lipp's point of view in aesthetics, that the ethical feelings are genetically derivable from feelings of sympathy; `foreign' and `wicked' are synonyms for the small child.” “Die Bedeutung dieses Weges für die ethische Erziehung: Ausgehen von `heimatlicher' Sitte. Demententsprechend betont Witasek (`Psychologisches und ethischen Erziehung') parallel zu dem Standpunkte Lipps zu Ästheitik, daß die ethischen Gefühle genetisch aus den Sympathiegefühlen ableitbar sind; `fremd' und `boß' sind für das Kleinkind Synonyma (vgl. Ch. Bühler, “Das Seelenleben des Jugendlichen,” Seite 179) (p. 906ff).

This view found its way into The Open Society and Its Enemies as Popper (1945) based his appeal to defend the open society on feelings of sympathy for others.

“When action out of love of home does not conflict with any duty it should be (aesthetically) positively judged; but if it conflicts with an ethical imperative, for example, that of internationalism, then it is immoral.” “Wo das Handeln aus Heimatliebe keiner Pflicht überschreitet, ist es daher (ästhetisch) positiv zu beurteilen; widerstreitet es jedoch einem ethischen Imperativ, z.B. dem des Internationalismus (sieh oben), so ist es unsittlich” (p. 906).

“Each individual can have an overview of life which is close to the way he lives only over a limited geographical and social area. If his feeling of right should be heard, he has to stand in a living relationship to it: this fact points to the general theistic-political meaning of the organization of right, that is, to the necessary limitation of the democratic responsibilities of citizens to those areas with which he is acquainted and accustomed, i.e. his home area. This idea is decisive for the educator. Out of it follows the task of the school community to provide the child with a comprehensible, homelike system of rules: education must flow from the responsibility to awake the feeling of right. The task of the educator is to ensure that the child will learn to understand the other homelike rights and wrongs of our society. That is the true education for citizenship and thereby also the true socializing education.” “Jeder Einzelne kann diese lebensnahe Übersicht nur über ein beschränktes geographsiches und soziologisches Gebiet haben, zu dem er in einer lebendigen Beziehung stehen muß, wenn sein Rechtsgefühl sprechen soll: dies weist auf die allgemeine theistische-politisches Bedeutung der Heimat als Rechtsverband hin, das heißt der notwendigen Beschränkung der demokratischen Verantwortlichkeit des Staatsbürgers auf die Ordnung eines ihm „bekannten“, „vertrauten“, also „heimatliche“ Gebietes. Für den Erzieher ist dieser Gedanke entscheidend; aus ihm folgt die Aufgabe der Schulgemeinde als einer für das Kind übersichtlichen, „heimatlichen“ Rechtsordung: Erziehung durch Verantwortlichkeit zur Aktivität des Rechtsgefühls; aber auch die Aufgabe, daß das Kind die sonstigen ihm lebensnahen, „heimatlichen“ Gerechtigkeiten und Ungerechtigkeiten unserer Gesellschaftsordnung begreifen lernen soll. Das ist wahrhaft staatsbürgerliche, das ist daher auch soziale Erziehung” (p. 907).

“These considerations throw a light on the question, why the ethical fight for justice— socialism—which should be encouraged by everyone is the job of the proletariat: the direct, homelike relationship to justice and injustice that the suffering under injustice creates keeps the feeling of justice alive in the proletariat.” “Diese Überlegungen werfen auch ein Licht darauf, warum der ethisch von jedermann zu fordernde Kampf für die Gerechtigkeit, der Sozialismus, die Sache des Proletariaats ist: die unmittelbare, „heimatliche“ Beziehung zu Recht und Unrecht, die das Leiden unter Ungerechtigkeiten schafft, hält das Rechtsgefühl des Proletariers wach” (p. 907).

“Insofar however that the theory of knowledge does not concern itself with the validity (truth) of our knowledge, but rather with the conditions under which knowledge arises, is the concept of home, as we have formulated it, significant for the theory of knowledge: The child's experiences new situations in that it expands his home, i.e. the borders of that which is known.” “Soweit sich jedoch die Erkenntnislehre nicht mit der Gülltigkeit („Wahrheit“) unserer Erkenntnise beschäftigt, sondern mit ihren Entstehungsbedingungen, ist der Heimatbegriff, wie wir ihn gefaßt haben, für sie von Bedeutung: Das Kind macht seine Erfahrungen, indem es seine „Heimat“ den Umkreis des Bekannten, erweitert” (p. 907).

“In the history of natural philosophy the national character plays, of course, a role which is quite similar to the role it plays in the history of the theory of knowledge. One needs only to compare the contemporary mathematicians-cum-philosophers Leibniz and Newton. The grotesque fantasy of Leibniz's Monodologie could only arise on German soil, on the ground of speculation, of mystic. Obviously natural philosophy has for some time laid aside this national character, in order to do better justice to its task as science.” “In der Geschichte der Naturphilosophie spielt der Nationalcharacter natürlich eine ganz ähnliche Rolle, wie in der Geschichte der Erkenntnislehre. Mann vergleiche nur die beiden Zeitgenossen und Mathematiker-Philosophen Leibniz und Newton; die Monodologie Leibniz' konnte in ihrer grotresken Phantastik nur auf deutschen Boden entstehen, auf dem Boden der Spekulation, der Mystik. Selbstverständlich hat die Naturphilosophie dies „Nationalcharakter“ längst abgestreift, ihrer Aufgabe als Wissenschaft gerechter werdend” (p. 908).

“When we further take into consideration, that the child works through his experiences in his home and through his home, we are able to say: Home is the naturally given, primitive cultural organization, that creates the fundamental psycho-genetic structure for all further cultural organization.” “Wenn wir überdies bedenken, daß das Kind sich seine Erfahrungen in der Heimat und durch die Heimat erarbeitet, so können wir sagen: Die Heimat ist der „naturgegebene“ primitive Kulturbverband, der psychogenetisch das Grundschema der Struktur für jeden weiteren Kulterverband schafft. Alle kulturelle Entwicklung wurzelt also letzten Endes wenigstens zum Teil in Grundlagen, die aus der Beziehung zur „Heimat“ stammen” (p. 908).

I have discussed the role of this article in Popper's development in Wettersten (2005b).

In 1973 or 1974 I met with Popper and discussed with him the relations between psychology, methodology, and logic. I was then working with William Berkson on our book on Popper and psychology (Berkson and Wettersten 1984). I told him we could not find a copy of the essay, which was listed in his bibliography published in the volume of essays dedicated to his philosophy edited by Schilpp. I asked him if he could help us. His wife was present and began to say she could bring us a copy of the essay, but Popper interrupted her before her sentence was finished. He said it was lost. I presume he was reluctant to let others see that he was an inductivist for a while in Vienna. The fact that he did not throw the essay away is puzzling but reveals his ambivalence. Hansen included the table of contents of the essay in Popper's bibliography in The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper, edited by Schilp, but there was neither any description of the content nor discussion of it until after Popper's death (Schilp 1974, 1202).

William Berkson and I discussed the relations of Popper's psychology to Selz's, emphasizing the difference between them: Selz thought we learned by filling gaps and Popper by discovering contradictions (Berkson and Wettersten 1984). In succeeding essays I have discussed Popper's development, emphasizing the closeness of the two views—Popper also needs gaps in problems and Selz learning from mistakes—as well as Popper's debt to the Würzburg school, including Selz (Wettersten 1985b, 1987,1988,1990,1992,1999, 2003, 2005a). ter Hark (1993, 2004) has taken up the subject as well. For a criticism of Hacohen's account of Popper's development, of ter Hark's account of the role of Selz in Popper's development, and of Gattei's discussion of Popper's early inductivism and his overcoming of it (see Wettersten 2005b).

Agassi, Joseph. 1977. Towards a rational philosophical anthropology. The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Bahle , Julius. 1930. Zur Psychologie des musikalischen Gestaltens. Eine Untersuchung über das Komponieren auf experimenteller und historischer Grundlage. Archive für die gesamte Psychologie 74:289-390.

Bahle , Julius. 1936. Der musikalische Schaffensprozess. Leipzig, Denmark: S. Hirzel.

Bahle , Julius. 1939. Eingebung und Tat im musikalischen Schaffen. Leipzig, Denmark: S. Hirzel.

Bartley, William Warren. 1962. The retreat to commitment. New York : Knopf.

Berkson, William and John Wettersten . 1984. Learning from error. LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing.

Douglas , Mary. 1987. How institutions think. London: Routledge & Kegen Paul.

Eidlin, Fred. 1997. Blindspot of a liberal. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27(1, March):5-23.

Hacohen, Malachi Haim. 2000. Popper: The formative years, 1902-1945. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, John A. 1997. Social foundations of openness. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27(1, March):24-38.

Kaufmann, Walter. 1973. Without guilt and justice. New York : Delta Publishing.

Popper, Karl. 1927a. Gewohnheit und gesetzerlebnis in der erziehung, hausarbeit vorgelegt an der pädagogisches hochschule der universität wien. Popper Archives 12:11.

Popper, Karl. 1927b. Zur Philosophie des Heimatgedankens. Die Quelle 77:899-908.

Popper, Karl. 1928. Zur Methodenfrage der Denkpsychologie. Dissertation vorgelegt an der Pädagogische Hochschule der Universität Wien.

Popper, Karl. 1931. Die Gedächtnispflege unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Selbsttätigkeit . Die Quelle 81:607-19.

Popper, Karl. 1935. Logik der Forschung. Vienna: Springer. References to 1994 Zehnte Auflage , Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Popper, Karl. 1944-45. “The poverty of historicism.” Economica 11-12:86-103, 119-37, 69-89. References to the 1957 book version. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul .

Popper, Karl. 1945. The open society and its enemies. London: George Routledge & Sons. References to the 4th edition of 1962, New York: Harper and Row.

Sandel, Michael J. 1966. Democracy's discontent: America in search of public philosophy . Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

Schilp, Paul Arthur , ed. 1974. The philosophy of Karl Popper, Book II. La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing.

Selz, Otto. 1913. Über die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufs. Eine experimentale Untersuchung Stuttgart, Denmark: Speeman.

Selz, Otto. 1922. Zur Psychologie des produktiven Denkens und des Irrtums . Bonn, Germany: Cohen.

Selz, Otto. 1924. Die Gesetze der produktiven und reproduktiven Geistestägkeit. Kurzgefasste Darstellung. Bonn, Germany: Cohen.

Selz, Otto. 1931. Der schöpferische Mensch. Zeitschrift für Pädagogische Psychologie 32:229-41.

Selz, Otto. 1935. Versuche zu Hebung des Intelligenzniveaus. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Intelligenz und ihrer erzieherischen Beeinflussung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie 134: 236-302.

ter Hark, Michel. 1993. Problems and psychologism: Popper as the heir to Otto Selz. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 24(4):585-610.

ter Hark, Michel. 2002. Between autobiography and reality: Popper's inductive years. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33A(1):79-103.

ter Hark, Michel. 2004. Popper, Otto Selz and the rise of evolutionary epistemology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wettersten, John. 1985a. New methods for the study of man, review of Towards a rational philosophical anthropology by Joseph Agassi. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie XVI(1):167-76.

Wettersten, John. 1985b. The road through Würzburg, Vienna and Gottingen, review of Die beiden grundprobleme der erkenntnistheorie by Karl Popper. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 15(4, December):487-506.

Wettersten, John. 1987. Selz, Popper, Agassi, on the unification of psychology, methodology and pedagogy. Interchange 18(4):1-13.

Wettersten, John. 1988. Külpe, Bühler, Popper. In Karl Bühler's theory of language, edited by Achim Eschbach (Hg.), 327-47. Amsterdam /Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co.

Wettersten, John. 1990. How can psychology and methodology be integrated? Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 21:293-308.

Wettersten, John. 1992. The roots of critical rationalism. Amsterdam/London: Rodopi.

Wettersten, John. 1999. The critical rationalists' quest for an effective liberal pedagogy. In Critical rationalism and educational discourse , edited by Gerhard Zecha , 93-115. Amsterdam / Atlanta, GA: Rodopi.

Wettersten, John. 2003. Eine offene Gesellschaft braucht ein offenes Schulsystem, Festschrift, 2. Mannheimer Alumni-tag, 2002. Römerberg , Germany: Chroma Druck und Verlag Gmbh.

Wettersten, John. 2005a. An open society needs an open school system. Learning for Democracy 1(1, February):21-40.

Wettersten, John. 2005b. New insights on Young Popper. Journal for the History of Ideas 66(4, October):603-31.

Wettersten, John. 2006a. How do institutions steer events? Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

Wettersten, John , 2006b. Towards a new theory of the closed society. In Karl Popper: A centenary assessment, Vol. 1: Life and times, and values in a world of facts, edited by Ian Jarvie , Karl Milford , and David Miller , 251-62. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.