Abstract
The book brings together eight essays in dialogues and mutual conversations between Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai—on a range of issues such as nature of experience; relationship between experience and social theorising; ethical issues in theorising and epistemology; and the nature of social theorising in India. The opening essay by Guru discusses the issue of egalitarianism in the social sciences in India. Guru argues that while the Brahmins in Indian social sciences do theoretical work, the Shudras have been left with the ‘earthen pot full of empirical details’ (p. 22). Guru also argues how Dalits need theory as a social necessity. But while Guru seems to be uncritically offering here a conspirational theory, he does not critically reflect upon the multi-dimensional challenge of responsibility on the part of the Dalits themselves to be engaged in an act of critical and creative theorising. Guru coming from a Dalit background is engaged in creative theoretical work as evidenced in his many fine essays in this volume as well as his larger ouvre. Has Guru been prevented from theorising by the so-called theoretical Brahmins in Indian social science?
The book begins with a very important statement by both Guru and Sarukkai, ‘the emergence of a politics of identity is a grim reminder of […] deficiency in theorizing social reality’ (p. 1). But Guru seems to be locked in an identarian closure in his insightful and complex argument in this book. This comes out in his multifaceted and nuanced engagement with Gandhi and Ambedkar. For Guru, as for Sarukkai, both Gandhi and Ambedkar gave primacy to experience. But in his simultaneous engagement with Gandhi and Ambedkar, Guru reads Gandhi primarily through the lens of Ambedkar. Is such a one-way reading ethical on the part of Guru himself? Also, what of the issue of fairness to one’s partner of dialogue, in this case Gandhi? In some places, it is no surprise then that Guru makes rather a simplistic contrast between Gandhi and Ambedkar in terms of self-rule and self-respect: ‘[…] In Gandhi it is the category of self-rule (both morally and politically) that becomes a sovereign viewpoint and in Ambedkar, it is the category of self-respect and social justice that acquires central importance. Ambedkar’s conceptualisation also indicates the limits of Gandhian imagination’ (p. 88). What about the limits of Ambedkar’s politics and vision? Since the book is concerned about ethics of social theorising, does not ethics demand a simultaneous exploration of limits of all the concerned partners of dialogue rather than a premeditated and accepted valourisation of one at the expense of the other? Guru argues that while the high-caste was preoccupied with freedom from colonial rule, Ambedkar and Dalits wanted emancipation from local configuration of power. But many Dalits, tribals and the marginalised from what Amedkar called Bahiskrit Bharat took part in India’s anti-colonial freedom struggle. But why did not Ambedkar take part in this? How different would his vision of and politics of social justice have been if he had also taken part in India’s freedom struggle by not just taking part in the round table conference but by also fighting against the colonisers and courting arrest?
Guru looks at Gandhi through the lens of morality and Ambedkar through the lens of politics. This is unfortunately a case of dualism of politics and morality, which is a limitation of modern political theory of justice from Rawls to Habermas. But in their own ways, both Gandhi and Ambedkar interrogate and strive to transcend such dualisms. Amdedkar’s later work, Buddha and his Dhamma, does suggest an overcoming of this dualism and suggestion of an ideal society that can be compared with Gandhi’s ideal of Ram Rajya, which is not just mythical as Guru opines. Gandhi sought to realise Ram Rajya through the historical processes of both Swadeshi and Swaraj. Gandhi’s experiments were animated by a deep desire for participation and were not an exercise in objectification as Guru attributes to Gandhi: ‘…the experience of Ambedkar and his community becomes an object of Gandhi’s experiment’ (p. 75). But Gandhi’s experiment was an experiment in non-dual participation. Gandhi’s position on the caste question changed over time and we must not forget that towards the 1940s, Gandhi advocated inter-caste marriage as a way of transforming the caste system. He had officiated the inter-caste marriage between Gora and his wife who came from a Dalit background at Sevagram.
Both Guru and Sarukkai offer deeply nuanced arguments about the nature of experience and the process of subsequent theorisation. While Guru argues that one cannot have a Dalit experience unless one is a Dalit, Sarukkai suggests a connected but wider possibility of experience and realisation. At the same time, Sarukkai’s comparison of Guru and Habermas, though interesting, calls for critical probing. Habermas’s critical reflection on Nazi experience also emerges from his own lived experience of growing up under the Nazi dictatorship and his quest for democratic transformation in post-Nazi Germany and the world. Both Guru and Sarukkai agree that theorisation needs to be based upon experience, especially on the part of the victimised and the marginalised. They, especially Sarukkai, look into the limits of experience per se and the need for further reflection to make sense of the experience. Guru himself rightly argues in his essay on ‘Experience and the Ethics of Theory’, ‘The recipient of experience carries a special responsibility to reflect upon experience for larger theorization’ (p. 113). But does not this connected and larger project of theorisation call for realising limits of one’s own experience and for transcendence of one’s own experience? Does not our own experience, many a time, create structures of closure? Does not it call for experiential co-realisations that also includes disjunction and contestations across boundaries, including boundaries of caste? The issue of experience also raises the question of depth and shallowness, a question recently raised by philosopher Hilary Putnam which both Guru and Sarukkai, building upon their insightful work here, can explore and cultivate further.
Both Guru and Sarukkai draw our attention to the complex ethics of theorising. It is insightful that Sarukkai brings both experience and meditation together. But ethics of theorising, as the larger project of an ethics of touch, as suggested in the book, can be accompanied by a related project of aesthetics and spiritual transformation. Here both Gandhi and Ambedkar can be our co-travellers as both of them in their own ways brought ethics, aesthetics and spiritual transformation together. While in case of Gandhi, it is evident throughout his life and ouvre, in case of Ambedkar this comes out particularly in his Buddha and his Dhamma.
The book has insightful essays on phenomenology and archaeology of untouchability by Sarukkai and Guru respectively. Both of them challenge us to realise the many aspects of ethics and politics of touch to which, once again, we need to integrate the aesthetic and spiritual dimension. As Sarukkai rightly argues, ‘Touching is an act of exploration, it is a reaching out to feel and to know. Untouchability is an obstacle to this movement’ (p. 186). The book also has a deeply insightful essay by Guru on ‘Experience, Space and Justice’.
Both Guru and Sarukkai agree that ‘neglect of concepts derived from Indian contexts’ (p. 151) raises several ethical issues. Sarukkai raises the issue poignantly: ‘In a place like India, with its multiplicity of languages, isn’t it the ethical imperative of the community to develop and integrate writers in languages other than English?’ (p. 154). This raises the question why is there not much serious social science writings in the mother languages of India? For Sarukkai, excessive dependence on the West is the main reason here. He terms it the problem of excess. But is not the problem of excess linked to that of access? For creative theorisation, we need to access deeper resources in our philosophical and linguistic traditions including Sanskrit, which calls for a creative memory work. It also challenges us to go beyond a politically correct condemnation of Sanskrit as a repository of Brahminical knowledge only.
In the conclusion, among other things, both Guru and Sarukkai write that ‘the neglect of Indian theoreticians by the accomplished West continues the political agenda of all theorizing’ (p. 224). This can unfortunately perpetuate a tradition of blame without critically reflecting upon how we in and from India are complicit in this. Are not Indian theoreticians ignoring themselves and is the West to be blamed for this? Post-independent Indian scholarship in humanities and social sciences has produced some outstanding scholars but how many of us have cared to engage with them seriously and critically reflect upon their works? Both Guru and Sarukkai have been in the academies for a long time, but have they challenged their own research scholars and colleagues to write critical theses on these thinkers from India and engage in a creative comparative reflection on critical thinkers from Europe and other parts of the world? This situation is slightly better for philosophers in India compared to what exists for scholars in social sciences. Indian Council of Philosophical Research has brought out critical debates with some contemporary Indian philosophers such as J.N. Mohanty, Daya Krishna and others. However, the fellow seekers from social sciences have been bereft of such critical and creative engagement, initiated by the Indian Council of Social Science Research, any other independent collaborative initiative or as part of a wider project. The gift of insights we receive from the present book has been made possible because Sarukkai chose to take Guru’s work seriously and gave himself to an inspiring engagement of critique and appreciation. Guru also responded with generosity and depth continuing this journey of dialogue. Such an engagement in love, learning, mutual exploration and dialogue is a unique event in Indian scholarship, which should challenge all of us concerned to transcend our intellectual habits and habitus of closure and indifference, and take responsibility for dialogue, creation of knowledge and social transformations transcending many of our entrenched, including experiential, boundaries of ego, identity politics and disciplinary prisons.