Abstract
This essay argues that hunger functions as one of the primary passions driving political association in Thomas Hobbes’s materialist political philosophy. Despite the extensive scholarly focus on fear and the social contract, the pivotal role of bodily needs—particularly hunger—in shaping Hobbes’s entire political framework remains underexamined. By attending closely to hunger within Hobbes’s political thought, we can understand how his metaphysical materialism directly informed his political ideas, providing unique insights into the bodily basis of political legitimacy and prefiguring later materialist philosophies. The analysis critically engages with Samantha Frost’s materialist interpretation of Hobbes whilst also incorporating insights from Gregory Kavka and contemporary phenomenological approaches to embodied vulnerability. Through an examination of seventeenth-century English economic conditions, and drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological work, the essay demonstrates that, according to Hobbes, political legitimacy fundamentally depends on the sovereign’s ability to ensure not just survival, but also the material conditions that enable a “delightful living.” This bodily political theory reveals hunger to be more than just a mechanical need; it is also an experiential disruption to the perceptual and social foundations necessary for political community.
Introduction
This essay offers an alternative interpretation of Hobbes’s political philosophy, identifying hunger, alongside fear, as a key motivator for political association. It distinguishes itself from conventional interpretations by emphasising Hobbes’s metaphysical materialism, particularly his idea that bodily needs generate political prescriptions. Whilst scholars such as Morris, Suzuki, and Seaman have examined aspects of Hobbes’s welfare provisions and material concerns, they have overlooked the role of hunger as a fundamental organising principle within his theoretical framework. This essay demonstrates that, within Hobbes’s materialist metaphysics, hunger operates simultaneously as a mechanical bodily process—a phenomenological disruption of social coherence, to use Merleau-Ponty’s words—and as a criterion for political legitimacy that reconfigures our understanding of sovereignty from formal authorisation to continuous material performance.
Hobbes’s political philosophy rests upon a thoroughly materialist foundation that scholars have yet to fully explore. Whilst his theory of the social contract and his conception of humans as passionate beings have received considerable attention, the pivotal role of bodily needs—particularly hunger—in shaping his entire political framework remains underexamined. This essay argues that Hobbes’s materialism—his commitment to explaining all phenomena through matter in motion—provides the essential link between basic bodily needs and political association.
The main argument advanced here suggests that Hobbes’s political philosophy is grounded in a materialist understanding of human nature, according to which human beings are essentially bodily creatures driven by passions and an overwhelming desire for self-preservation. This anthropological premise provides the foundation for his social contract theory, which asserts that individuals’ primary motivation in establishing civil government and instituting sovereign authority is the preservation of their bodies and lives: “The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves in which we see them live in commonwealths is the foresight of their own preservation” (Hobbes 1994, XVII,1).
By focusing on hunger, this essay challenges the conventional view that fear is the primary passion driving political association in Hobbes’s thought. Whilst the fear of violent death is undoubtedly a powerful motivator for entering into the social contract, we argue that hunger is a more decisive and enduring force in shaping human relations. As a universal human experience, hunger offers a distinctive perspective through which we can discern that political association is not merely an artificial construct but also a response to shared bodily vulnerability. Crucially, the phenomenological dimensions of hunger reveal aspects of human experience that are overlooked by purely mechanical or political analyses: Material deprivation does not merely operate through resource scarcity but also through the breakdown of the perceptual and social coherence that makes meaningful political participation possible. This interpretation opens new theoretical avenues, enabling a phenomenological approach to human needs as the foundation from which political and social categories emerge. By acknowledging hunger as the material motivation behind political association, the essay provides a more robust account of its origins. Rather than treating fear as an independent psychological phenomenon, we demonstrate how it largely arises from the body’s fundamental need for sustenance.
The first section emphasises the distinctive features of Hobbes’s materialist approach and reviews the literature that has previously engaged with this issue. The second section adopts a phenomenological perspective on hunger in Hobbes’s political philosophy, highlighting the limitations of existing analyses and arguing that hunger is a stronger motivator than fear in prompting entry into the social contract. The third section examines the critical conditions of famine, subsistence riots, and civil war that shaped Hobbes’s ideas about hunger. The fourth section situates these ideas at the core of Hobbes’s social contract theory. Sections five and six analyse Hobbes’s thought, demonstrating that bodily welfare is the primary criterion for political legitimacy and that managing material welfare is essential for preserving political peace and the continuity of the commonwealth. Finally, the seventh section illustrates how Hobbes’s materialist perspective underpins his theory of authorisation.
Body and Matter in Hobbes’s Political Thought
The significance of the materialist approach adopted in this essay becomes apparent when we consider Hobbes’s conception of materialism. Unlike metaphysical materialism, which asserts that everything is matter in motion, Hobbes’s political materialism grounds sovereignty in the management of bodily needs. This view is neither a precursor to Marx’s historical materialism, which focused on modes of production, nor a simple form of biological reductionism. Rather, it is a sophisticated attempt to derive political principles from the observable reality of embodied human existence. “The world, (I mean not the earth only, that denominates the lovers of it worldly men, but the universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are), is corporeal (that is to say, body),” Hobbes (1994) stated in Leviathan (p. XLVI.16). This metaphysical commitment translates directly into a political theory in which legitimacy depends on the sovereign’s ability to ensure the material conditions necessary for bodily preservation.
The connection between Hobbes’s focus on hunger and Marx’s subsequent materialist philosophy becomes apparent when we examine the latter’s analysis of English materialism in The Holy Family. Marx explicitly traces a genealogy from Bacon through Hobbes to the French materialists, ultimately connecting this tradition to socialism and communism. According to Marx (1975, 158–59), “materialism is the natural-born son of Great Britain,” and Hobbes is “the man who systematises Baconian materialism,” the man who “as Bacon’s continuator, argues thus: if all human knowledge is furnished by the senses, then . . . only material things [that are] perceptible [are] knowable to us.” Marx (1975, 161–2) also explains how French materialism, building on English foundations, established the connection between material conditions and social organisation: “If man draws all his knowledge, sensation, etc., from the world of the senses and the experience gained in it, then what has to be done is to arrange the empirical world in such a way that man experiences and becomes accustomed to what is truly human in it.” The argument that material circumstances shape human nature and must therefore be reorganised to enable human flourishing is clearly and systematically expressed in Hobbes’s insistence that the sovereign must ensure not mere survival but “delightful living.”
By focusing on hunger, Hobbes highlighted an issue that Marx (1975, 161) later recognised as a key insight of materialism—namely that “the sensory qualities and self-love, enjoyment, and correctly understood personal interest are the basis of all morality.” Although Marx attributed this insight to Helvétius, it was already implicit in Hobbes’s framework, which grounded political responsibility in the satisfaction of bodily needs. The difference lies not in fundamental principles, but in their application: whilst Hobbes saw absolute sovereignty as the solution to material scarcity, subsequent materialists proposed a more radical reorganisation of society.
This materialist genealogy extends into contemporary scholarship, where Hobbes’s metaphysical commitments continue to provide fresh interpretative insights. Frost’s (2008) influential work, Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics and Politics, offers one of the most sophisticated contemporary analyses of how Hobbes’s metaphysical materialism shapes his conception of embodied existence and political life. Frost demonstrates that Hobbes’s commitment to material causation requires us to reconsider traditional concepts of agency, responsibility, and political authority. However, her analysis does not take hunger into consideration. This is a notable omission, given that hunger is the most immediate and involuntary manifestation of material need—a bodily imperative that Hobbes himself identifies as fundamental to understanding human behaviour. In De Homine, Hobbes emphasises human vulnerability through the temporal dimension of hunger, observing that only men are “famished even by future hunger” (Hobbes 1991, 40). This characterisation of hunger as both present deprivation and anticipatory anxiety precisely encapsulates how material need generates the forward-looking calculations that Frost identifies as central to Hobbesian ethics—calculations that she grounds in the unavoidable reality of bodily maintenance.
Hobbes makes the mechanical necessity of hunger explicit when he asks: “Do we desire food and the other necessities of nature because we will? Are hunger, thirst, and desires voluntary?” The answer is unequivocal: “When desiring, one can, in truth, be free to act; one cannot, however, be free to desire” (Hobbes 1991, 46). The involuntary nature of hunger suggests that the ethical and political frameworks described by Frost must accommodate the inexorable demands of embodied existence. The material conditions that enable future agency, which constitute Frost’s main concern, are none other than the conditions that ensure continued bodily sustenance. Our approach extends rather than contradicts Frost’s insights, showing how Hobbes’s commitment to material causation operates across multiple registers, ranging from abstract vulnerability to specific biological imperatives.
Having established how hunger operates within Hobbes’s framework as both an abstract materialist principle and a concrete bodily imperative, we can now examine the implications for his conception of political legitimacy and the limitations on sovereign authority. The bodily basis of the social contract has significant consequences for our understanding of rights within Hobbes’s framework. According to Hobbes, in the state of nature, rights equal the absolute freedom to do whatever is necessary for self-preservation, including securing resources for sustenance. This freedom constitutes an inalienable natural right precisely because it stems from material necessity rather than voluntary choice.
This distinction is crucial for understanding sovereign authority and locating its limits. According to Hobbes (1994, XXI.12), certain inalienable liberties pertaining to self-preservation are retained, even after authorising a sovereign: “If the sovereign command a man (though justly condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those who assault him, or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing without which he cannot live, yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.”
The critical point is that subjects retain these liberties not because they have claim-rights against the sovereign, but because certain self-preservation actions are physically and logically nontransferable. The sovereign cannot command subjects to stop seeking sustenance any more than it can command them to stop breathing. These are not moral limitations on a sovereign’s power, but mechanical impossibilities inherent in the material nature of human existence.
This analysis explains why it would be conceptually confusing to speak of the sovereign having “obligations” or “duties” to subjects in the strict Hohfeldian sense (Hohfeld 1919). Recent scholarship, particularly the work of Olsthoorn (2013), has questioned the suitability of rigid Hohfeldian categories for Hobbes’s premodern legal framework. Olsthoorn argues that Hobbes recognises genuine legal duties of the sovereign that exist without correlative claim-rights in subjects—duties that derive from natural laws that become legally binding upon the establishment of sovereignty. Yet, even this more nuanced interpretation must acknowledge that subjects cannot make claims on the sovereign in the same way that holders of claim-rights can make them on duty-bearers.
The aforementioned passage (Hobbes 1994, XXI.12) emphasises the importance of physical well-being as a fundamental aspect of the social contract, setting out clear conditions for the exercise of sovereign power. It is not amongst the sovereign’s prerogatives to issue commands that endanger the life or health of a subject, since such commands would contradict the reason for which sovereign power was established in the first place. Rather than creating obligations for the sovereign, these conditions reflect the logical and physical impossibility of transferring certain liberties. Hobbes (1994, XXI.21) reiterates this point a few paragraphs later: “The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them.”
The sovereign’s role in promoting bodily welfare does not stem from duties owed to subjects; rather, it stems from the internal logic of sovereign power itself. Hobbes’s conception of the sovereign’s role extends well beyond mere protection from violence, embracing comprehensive material welfare. He sets out an expansive notion of the welfare that effective sovereignty must ensure. In a pivotal passage, Hobbes (1994, XXX.1) posits that the sovereign’s function extends beyond mere life preservation to include “all other contentments of life, which every man by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself.” This expansive understanding of security reflects not a duty owed to subjects, but the recognition that political stability requires attention to the material conditions that drive human behaviour.
This focus on material welfare is not a moral responsibility in the sense of duties owed to subjects; rather, it is a functional requirement for effective governance. According to Hobbes, such policies serve the interests of the sovereign by ensuring the obedience and loyalty of subjects, thereby prolonging the lifespan of the commonwealth: “For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved, because preservation of life being the end for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him” (Hobbes 1994, XX.5). The sovereign’s interest in the material welfare of subjects does not stem from their claim-rights but from the mechanical relationship between bodily satisfaction and political stability.
A population that is content with its material circumstances and personal autonomy is less likely to engage in insurrectionary activities. Conversely, extreme poverty and an inability to meet basic needs can lead to civil unrest and threaten state stability. According to Hobbes (1991, 251), neglecting the basic needs of the population—such as the critical need for food—only exacerbates the ever-present tension between the poor and the government: “Yet all the poor commonly lay the blame on the evil government, excusing their own sloth and luxury, as if their private goods forsooth were wasted by public exactions.”
Hunger as Passion in Hobbes’s Anthropological Conceptions
Williams (2021) is one of the few commentators to have addressed the significance of hunger and poverty in Hobbes’s political thought. Williams argues that Hobbes was well aware of the destabilising effect of economic inequality on political stability and considered both poverty and excessive wealth to be causes of social and political unrest: The former has the potential to foster discontent, envy, and sedition, whilst the latter can lead to arrogance, the presumption of impunity, and factionalism, ultimately challenging sovereign authority. Williams demonstrates that Hobbes believed the sovereign should redistribute property as necessary to achieve a fair balance of wealth that is consistent with the principles of peace, justice, and the common good. To Hobbes, managing economic inequality was not merely a matter of superficial preference, but vital for the existence of the state. However, Williams’s analysis focuses on the effects of hunger and poverty after people enter into the social contract and does not seem to consider them as issues in the state of nature.
Kavka’s Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory has explored the relationship between hunger and sufficiency in Hobbes’s thought, particularly in relation to welfare rights and the responsibilities of the sovereign (Kavka 1986, 210–14). This study suggests that Hobbes endorses a “sufficiency” standard for material welfare, arguing that the sovereign must ensure that subjects have enough to survive and enjoy some basic comforts. However, Kavka’s analysis underestimates the role of hunger in establishing this standard by treating sufficiency merely as one political goal amongst many. Consequently, it fails to acknowledge that hunger—as the paradigmatic bodily need—establishes the very criterion by which political legitimacy must be measured.
When viewed in this light, the debate between Kavka’s sufficiency interpretation and Williams’s focus on inequality could be resolved by acknowledging that both issues stem from the need to manage hunger and its social consequences. Suzuki’s (1998, 50) analysis of taxation is particularly illustrative in this regard, as he emphasises that Hobbes (1994, XXX.17) explicitly argued that sovereign power extends to progressive taxation, maintaining that “the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not only for their own persons, but for many more.” According to Suzuki (1998), this idea legitimises redistribution precisely to prevent the material deprivation that threatens political stability. This changes our understanding of Hobbes’s political economy: The goal shifts from minimal protection to actively managing material welfare in order to preserve the conditions necessary for comfortable living and, ultimately, political peace.
The phenomenological dimensions of hunger reveal aspects of the human experience that are overlooked by purely mechanical or political analyses. According to Murphy (2018), hunger alters one’s basic experience of space and time, as well as one’s sense of social belonging. This insight is crucial for understanding how Hobbes’s materialism operates through the lived experience of physical vulnerability rather than merely through abstract bodily needs. When hunger disrupts the “phenomenological unity of the body,” as defined by Merleau-Ponty, it exposes the vulnerability of the material basis of political order.
Murphy’s analysis of Hamsun’s autobiographical novel Hunger provides a compelling counterpoint to overly rationalist interpretations of bodily needs. Whilst Sartre defined hunger as a “distinct and clear desire” that can be held at a distance, Hamsun’s phenomenological account reveals that chronic hunger produces “radical and pervasive distortions in the perception and understanding of both self and other” (Murphy 2018, 4). Therefore, a person experiencing chronic hunger does not simply seek out food with a clear desire; their perception of the world is profoundly altered, affecting their sense of self and their social belonging.
This phenomenological understanding illuminates why Hobbes places such emphasis on the sovereign’s responsibility not just to ensure survival, but also to promote prosperity. Hunger is not merely a mechanical bodily need; it is also a fundamental disruption to what Merleau-Ponty called “perceptual faith”: the fundamental belief that the world of perception is real and meaningfully shared with others (Murphy 2018, 9). When people lose this perceptual faith because their basic needs are chronically unmet, the existence of the political community itself is endangered. Therefore, the sovereign must address hunger as a public affair, not only because it leads to competition for resources, but also because its phenomenological effects endanger the shared perceptual world that renders collective life possible.
Furthermore, a phenomenological analysis reveals how hunger can lead to what Murphy (2018, 5) describes as a “distinctly social devastation.” This extends beyond individual suffering to encompass the breakdown of intersubjective recognition and the shared meaning that facilitates political association. The hungry individual becomes increasingly unable to read social cues and loses their grip on the “interworld”—the intersubjectively constituted lifeworld shared with others. This phenomenological dimension helps to explain why Hobbes believed that effective sovereignty requires creating conditions that enable “delightful living” rather than mere subsistence. Therefore, political legitimacy hinges not only on preventing starvation but also on maintaining the phenomenological conditions that allow people to participate meaningfully in shared social life.
In Hobbes’s meticulously crafted theory of the passions, hunger occupies a unique position as one of the few innate drives. Unlike acquired passions, which develop through experience and social interaction, hunger stems from a fundamental human physiological need. Hobbes (1994, III.5) explicitly acknowledged this at the beginning of Leviathan: “Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger.” This classification places hunger amongst the innate passions that precede social organisation and persist regardless of political arrangements.
The materialist significance of this categorisation cannot be overstated. According to Hobbes (1994, VI.2), endeavour—the initial movements within the body—manifests as appetite when directed toward objects: “This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called
This materialist interpretation implies that our approach to Hobbes’s political theory must be radically changed. If humans are essentially material beings governed by mechanical processes, then political organisation must primarily respond to material needs. The sovereign cannot rule through ideology or abstract principles alone; it must address the concrete bodily needs of its subjects. This explains why sustenance, prosperity, and physical well-being are recurring themes in Hobbes’s political works.
Commentators have long emphasised the fear of violent death as the primary motivation for leaving the state of nature. However, this interpretation overlooks the generative role of hunger. The temporal and causal priorities must be considered: Hunger is a constant physiological demand, whereas fear typically arises in response to specific threats. Furthermore, as Hobbes (1994, XXVII.26) emphasises, competition for food resources can lead to conflicts that engender fear: “When a man is destitute of food or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himself any other way but by some fact against the law . . . he is totally excused.”
This passage reveals the absolute priority that Hobbes places on satisfying hunger. Even the sovereign’s laws yield to the imperative of sustenance. This would be inexplicable if fear were truly the primary motivating passion for entering into the social contract, since the fear of punishment should outweigh hunger if both operated at the same level. Hobbes clearly understood that hunger operates according to inexorable physical laws that cannot be overridden by any political arrangement.
The philosophical sophistication of Hobbes’s treatment of hunger as a fundamental political problem is particularly evident when examined through competing interpretations of minimal state theory. Whilst Levin (1982, 345) argues that the Hobbesian bargain addresses only those needs that depend on mutual perception and social interaction—claiming that “the need to fight is, so to speak, in the eye of the beholder, and in the eye of the beholder of the beholder”—this interpretation fails to account for Hobbes’s extensive consideration of material welfare. As Morris (1988, 661) demonstrates, hunger is a distinct category of human need—one that persists regardless of social arrangements or mutual perceptions. Unlike the need for security against attack, which could in theory be eliminated by collectively surrendering weapons to a sovereign, hunger is a physiological imperative that cannot be abolished by any political covenant. This distinction illuminates why Hobbes’s emphasis on hunger and material welfare as determinants of political stability extends beyond the minimal protective functions of the state. As Lloyd (1992, 90) points out, our narrowly prudential interests encompass not merely “the interest in self-preservation and thus in the security of our persons,” but also “the interest in ‘commodious living’—in the means to live a contented life, in such a way as ‘not to be weary of it.’”
Hunger in Hobbes’s Historical Context
The devastating impact of food insecurity in early modern England has been extensively documented in parish records, price histories, and contemporary accounts. The history of famine in Britain provides empirical evidence in support of Hobbes’s view that hunger is a fundamental human passion that profoundly influences human affairs. Until at least the mid-seventeenth century, the recurring threat of famine in England caused immense suffering and social upheaval (Healey 2011; Hoyle 2017). Crop failures, plagues, and economic crises resulted in large sections of the population becoming impoverished and despairing (Hindle 2008).
Allen (2001) notes a marked decline in real wages in England during the sixteenth century. Furthermore, Brenner (1962) and Boulton (2000) demonstrated that the prices of basic necessities rose steadily between 1600 and 1650, highlighting the fact that wages failed to keep pace with inflation. By the early seventeenth century, wages could purchase “no more than half the quantity of foodstuffs their earnings bought in the late fifteenth century” (Brenner 1962, 282). This decline in purchasing power had dire consequences for food security, particularly in urban areas, meaning ordinary workers had to spend an ever-increasing portion of their income—often exceeding 30%—merely on bread. The volatility of food prices created constant anxiety about subsistence, turning hunger from an abstract possibility into a recurring threat that shaped daily existence. These material conditions corroborate Hobbes’s assertion that hunger is a pre-political passion with the power to dissolve social bonds and return society to a state of war. Indeed, the frequency of food riots and social unrest during times of scarcity supports Hobbes’s view that hunger can drive people to take desperate measures: “There is nothing more afflicts the mind of man than poverty, or the want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of life and honour” (Hobbes 1991, 251).
Lloyd’s (1992, 334–35) analysis of Hobbes’s treatment of necessity reveals the depth of his concern with material deprivation. Hobbes (1994, XXVII.25) explicitly excuses those driven by hunger from violating property laws: “No law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation.” This recognition reflects Lloyd’s (1992, 52) observation that, in cases of extreme need, the narrowly prudential interest in physical survival becomes so pressing that it dissolves all other obligations, thus making sovereign provision not merely advisable but essential to maintaining political order.
When people cannot meet their basic needs, they are unable to engage in activities that could generate wealth and promote progress. Poverty restricts human potential and hinders economic and social development: “But men must consider, that they who have no patrimony, must not only labour that they may live, but fight too that they may labour” (Hobbes 1991, 251). This statement suggests that poverty is not just an economic situation, but a constant struggle to survive with dignity. Those in poverty face additional challenges in improving their situation, as a lack of resources impedes their ability to find employment and advance socially. This perpetuates a cycle of poverty across generations. Moreover, Hobbes acknowledges that poverty and hunger hinder individuals’ capacity to contribute productively to society and achieve prosperity: “Lastly, out of it [the state], there is a dominion of passions, war, fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in it, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence” (Hobbes 1991, 222).
Martha Taylor, an eighteen-year-old Englishwoman who began rejecting solid food in 1667 following a variety of psychological and physical symptoms, is a historical example that highlights the significant place of hunger in Hobbes’s framework. She did not consume solid food for between twelve and thirteen months. This attracted the attention of various individuals, including members of the clergy, nobles, and doctors—amongst them, Hobbes himself. After a visit from his patron, the Earl of Devonshire, Hobbes wrote a detailed account of Martha’s condition (Gee 1907). Despite her physical weakness, Hobbes observed that her mental faculties remained intact: He regarded her as someone exercising her liberty despite her illness.
The case of Martha Taylor provides fascinating insight into Hobbes’s views on the importance of hunger. This young woman’s apparent ability to survive without food for over a year challenged his materialist assumptions about bodily needs. His detailed account reveals his scepticism, as well as his acknowledgement that such cases required an explanation, given that they appeared to contradict the fundamental laws of human nature. The fact that Hobbes himself visited Martha, wrote extensively about her condition, and expressed his reservations about the veracity of her affliction demonstrates the theoretical importance he attached to understanding the limits and necessities of human sustenance. Martha’s case is considered one of the earliest comprehensive descriptions of anorexia nervosa, predating the first “official” medical description by Richard Morton in 1689 (Silverman 1986).
Hunger and Self-preservation
In Hobbes’s framework, the connection between hunger and self-preservation is explained by his materialist metaphysics. If all phenomena can be reduced to matter in motion, then the desire to survive simply represents the tendency of organised matter to maintain its motion and resist dissolution. From this perspective, hunger is the mechanical process by which the human body signals the need for replenishment to maintain its characteristic motions.
Hobbes emphasised this connection by suggesting that self-preservation is not only about avoiding death, but also about ensuring continued existence: “He that foreseeth the whole way to his preservation (which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at) must also call it good, and the contrary evil” (Hobbes 1969, XVII.14). Therefore, the pursuit of food is not just one activity amongst many, but rather the primary manifestation of the drive to survive.
This materialist approach to political association sets Hobbes’s political thought apart from later liberal theories, which treat self-preservation as an abstract right. In Hobbes’s view, “preservation” refers to a physical process subject to invariable natural laws: “Every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evill, . . . and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward” (Hobbes 1991, 115). Just as gravity compels an apple to fall, physiological necessity compels the pursuit of sustenance.
The implications for political theory are profound. Once hunger is recognised as a natural need beyond the realm of choice, it becomes clear that political institutions must adapt to this reality; otherwise, they will fail. Just as the sovereign cannot command apples to fall upwards, it cannot command its subjects to ignore their hunger. By acknowledging this, Hobbes (1994, XXI,12) places strict limits on sovereign power: “If the sovereign command a man (though justly condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those that assault him, or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing without which he cannot live, yet that man has liberty to disobey.”
The materialist conception of hunger as an involuntary need shapes Hobbes’s view of human nature as fundamentally embodied and vulnerable. Humans are complex material systems, and their interactions with their environment are essential to their continued existence. Hunger is the most basic and unavoidable of these interactions. This view of human nature, based on material dependence, provides the theoretical foundation for Hobbes’s political prescriptions: If humans are materially vulnerable creatures who depend on regular access to sustenance for survival, then political institutions must be designed to secure that access.
The hypothesis of the state of nature clearly emphasises the fundamental role of hunger in motivating political association. Although commentators often emphasise the war of all against all arising from glory, diffidence, and competition, they often overlook the fact that competition primarily stems from the scarcity of resources needed for bodily preservation. Without established property rights or cooperative agriculture, the state of nature ensures that there will never be enough food for everyone. It is this material scarcity, rather than abstract psychological tendencies, that drives the conflicts described by Hobbes.
Recognising hunger as foundational to Hobbesian political theory redefines the relationship between hunger and fear in his account of political motivation. Rather than presenting fear as the primary passion that hunger merely accompanies or reinforces, Hobbes’s materialist approach suggests that hunger constitutes one of the principal material conditions from which fear arises through a causal sequence based on bodily necessity. The fear of violent death stems from the more fundamental understanding that the body needs constant replenishment. In the state of nature, where access to sustenance cannot be guaranteed, the anticipation of future hunger creates an existential vulnerability that manifests as fear. This temporal dimension of material need transforms immediate bodily requirements into the pervasive anxiety that characterises natural conditions. Understood materialistically, fear arises largely as an emotional response to the material vulnerability that hunger renders unavoidable when projected forward in time: The dread of violent death is deeply intertwined with the dread of starvation, both stemming from the material imperative to maintain bodily existence. By grounding fear in hunger’s material necessity, Hobbes provides a mechanistic account of how physical needs generate the passions that drive political association, demonstrating that emotional responses to danger originate from the fundamental requirements of embodied life, rather than from abstract psychological dispositions. Thus, Hobbes offers a more robust explanation of the origins of political association, one that is grounded in the body’s fundamental material needs.
It is important to clarify the precise nature of the causal relationship between hunger and fear being advanced here. The argument is not that hunger constitutes the sole and exclusive source of fear in Hobbes’s framework; other sources—such as the threat of violent death at the hands of adversaries, the unpredictability of the state of nature, and the ambitions and diffidence of others—clearly operate independently within his account of political motivation. Hunger, however, functions as one of the principal and most persistent causal antecedents of fear, providing the material foundation upon which it takes root and acquires its existential urgency. Because the body’s need for sustenance is continuous and inescapable, the apprehension of future deprivation generates a pervasive anxiety that intensifies and exacerbates all other forms of fear in the state of nature. According to this interpretation, hunger is not a substitute for fear but the material condition that renders it politically irresistible and gives the drive toward political association its most immediate and unavoidable impetus.
Moreover, the transition from the state of nature to the civil state cannot be understood as being driven solely by fear. Hobbes (1994, XIII.9) explicitly states that, in the state of nature, “there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth.” The absence of agriculture—and therefore of reliable food production—defines the misery of the natural condition as much as the threat of violence. Indeed, violence often aims to secure sustenance, with hunger being the underlying cause of fear. In De Homine, Hobbes reinforces this point when discussing the conditions for political engagement, noting that individuals “use not to contend for public places, before they have gotten the victory over hunger and cold” (Hobbes 1991, 169). This observation reveals that political participation presupposes the prior satisfaction of material needs and suggests that civil society is founded on the need to secure sustenance. Therefore, the violence characteristic of the state of nature does not originate from inherent human aggression but from desperate competition for the resources required for survival.
It should be clear by now that hunger occupies a very special place in Hobbes’s political thought: It acts as a key motivator for establishing a civil order, operating alongside fear whilst providing a material foundation and reinforcement for it. When the dread of violent death is understood as part of the body’s inescapable need for sustenance, hunger becomes the conceptual link that transforms abstract anxiety into a concrete necessity. The resulting civil order manages competition for resources and enables collective living precisely because it addresses the dual imperative of securing both physical survival and the conditions that prevent the fear arising from material scarcity. Consequently, the state is responsible for providing the basic material conditions necessary for maintaining its population, including food. Hunger can be seen as a tangible manifestation of the principle of self-preservation, which plays a pivotal role in Hobbesian thought.
Whilst the management of hunger and basic sustenance is fundamental to civil order, Hobbes’s political framework extends beyond mere survival to encompass a broader vision of human flourishing. The sovereign’s foundational mandate is not only to prevent starvation, but also to create conditions conducive to “delightful living,” as Hobbes termed it. This broader conception of public safety—which is inextricably linked to economic prosperity and peaceful commerce—constitutes a sophisticated elaboration of how the commonwealth must actively enrich life, rather than merely preserve it. This expanded understanding of public safety is indeed a cornerstone of Hobbesian civil science, where peace is not merely the absence of conflict but a positive state that enables productive work and commercial trade.
Public Safety and Economic Prosperity
The concept of public safety is pivotal to Hobbes’s civil science and is closely related to the concept of peace, which he defined as a time when there is no willingness for violent contention between individuals living in the same place. Hobbes’s conception of public safety encompasses not only physical security, but also comprehensive material welfare. This broader understanding necessarily stems from his materialist premises: If humans are bodily beings driven by physical needs, then political success requires addressing those needs in all their complexity. The sovereign who ensures mere survival while ignoring prosperity fails to understand the mechanical principles that govern human behaviour.
In a crucial passage that deserves to be quoted in full, Hobbes (1991, 259) explicitly rejects minimal definitions of safety: But by safety must be understood, not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever, but in order to its happiness. For to this end did men freely assemble themselves and institute a government, that they might, as much as their human condition would afford, live delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kind of government, would sin against the law of nature (because against their trust, who had committed that power unto them), if they should not study, as much as by good laws could be effected, to furnish their subjects abundantly, not only with the good things belonging to life, but also with those which advance to delectation.
This passage significantly expands the responsibilities of the sovereign. References to “delightful living” and “delectation” suggest that Hobbes conceives of human flourishing in material terms that extend beyond mere subsistence. This interpretation is consistent with his materialist psychology, which posits that pleasure and pain are fundamental bodily sensations that motivate all behaviour.
The economic dimensions of sovereignty are clearly evident in Hobbes’s enumeration of the benefits of civil government to its subjects: “1. That they be defended against foreign enemies. 2. That peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be enriched, as much as may consist with public security. 4. That they enjoy a harmless liberty” (Hobbes 1991, 260). Including enrichment as a core sovereign function, alongside defence and civil peace, demonstrates that economic prosperity is an essential feature of political legitimacy rather than an optional benefit. Indeed, Seaman’s (1990, 111) analysis reveals that Hobbes presented his welfare policies not as optional additions, but as integral components of the sovereign’s duty to preserve civil peace, thus establishing a direct connection between material deprivation and political dissolution.
This economic imperative shaped Hobbes’s entire approach to governance. In his view, effective sovereignty meant enabling subjects to sustain themselves through legitimate employment. This involved establishing and enforcing legislation that allowed individuals to pursue various endeavours through ingenuity and effort, as well as encouraging productive activities such as navigation, agriculture, fishing, and manufacturing. He also advocated a minimum form of public assistance, arguing that the state should support those incapable of self-sufficiency rather than “left to the charity of private persons” (Hobbes 1994, XXX.18). In making this suggestion, Hobbes acknowledges that the sovereign’s charity is intended to prevent the specific risk of civil unrest (Suzuki 1998, 47). This prescription follows logically from his materialism: If political stability depends on managing bodily needs, then providing for these needs becomes a requirement of sovereignty itself.
Morris (1988, 665) further elucidates how redistribution to prevent hunger may constitute what he terms “cooperative redistribution”: a coercive alteration of resources that benefits all parties by forestalling the return to a Hobbesian state of nature. This analysis directly challenges Levin’s minimalist interpretation. Whilst Levin (1982, 344) argues that “giving Jones our plows will have no like effect” as surrendering weapons because “the need to gather food—the need which up to now we have severally used our plows to meet—will persist unchanged after the surrender,” Morris (1988, 662) points out that this metaphor is misleading. Agricultural production and food distribution generate spillover effects whose relief constitutes public goods requiring state coordination beyond minimal functions.
The international dimensions of economic prosperity in Hobbes’s thought deserve special attention. Recognising that no commonwealth can produce all necessities internally, Hobbes (1994, XIV.4) puts forward a sophisticated defence of trade as being essential to public safety: “Because there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth, (except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needful for the maintenance, and motion of the whole body . . ., the superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad.”
This passage reveals how deeply material needs are embedded in Hobbes’s framework, even shaping international relations. The term “commodities” refers to various products and materials that can either be found naturally in a given area or brought in from elsewhere: This matter, commonly called commodities, is partly native and partly foreign: native, that which is to be had within the territory of the commonwealth; foreign, that which is imported from without. And because there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth (except it be of very vast extent) that produceth all things needful for the maintenance, and motion of the whole body, and few that produce not something more than necessary, the superfluous commodities to be had within become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by just war, or by labour. (Hobbes 1994, XXIV.4)
According to Hobbes, states depend on foreign goods. Consequently, the sovereign’s duty to guarantee public safety and prosperity extends beyond domestic legislation and defensive strategies against foreign powers. Indeed, ensuring prosperity involves managing foreign trade, maintaining peaceful relations to promote commerce, and securing access to essential resources. Whilst Hobbes clearly favoured peaceful exchange, he believed that war could be justified to acquire goods essential for the well-being of the body politic.
Given that prosperity is a prerequisite for peace, it is necessary to apply economic concepts in order to clarify the responsibilities of the sovereign. Scholarship has proven that impoverished people are unable to provide the financial resources necessary for public protection, whilst economic theory has also clarified the connection between international conflict and the struggle of all against all. In the state of nature, there is no incentive to work due to uncertainty over the outcome of one’s efforts. The responsibility for facilitating industrialisation lies solely with a sovereign power.
In a Hobbesian state, the sovereign establishes a standard of sufficiency within the economic sphere. Furthermore, citizens are entitled to the fruits of their labour, except for taxes levied by the state for consumption and maintaining peace. According to Hobbes’s austere conception of a comfortable life, this was considered sufficient as long as it provided the bare necessities for survival.
Bodily Welfare
The criterion of bodily welfare radically changes our understanding of political legitimacy within Hobbes’s framework. Rather than deriving from consent, natural law, or divine right, a sovereign power is considered legitimate if it improves people’s material circumstances. This bodily standard of legitimacy is a direct consequence of Hobbes’s materialist principles and his view of human nature as fundamentally bodily based.
Liberty, one of the key concepts in Hobbes’s political thought, is defined by resorting to bodily imagery: “
The implications of this bodily focus are significant and far-reaching. Hobbes develops a form of political theory centred on the body, in which political legitimacy and social stability are rooted in the sovereign’s care for its subjects as bodily beings (Odzuck 2016). By situating political philosophy within the context of human bodily nature and needs, Hobbes establishes a governance framework that prioritises material welfare as the basis of social order (Odzuck 2016). This approach sets Hobbes’s theory apart from the purely rights-based or procedural theories of political legitimacy that emerged in subsequent liberal thought.
Seaman (1990, 113–14) explains Hobbes’s welfare policies through two distinct yet complementary liberal arguments. The first is the inalienable right to the means of life, which extends beyond mere survival to encompass living well. The second is a compensatory principle whereby those who consent to unequal distributions must receive sufficient benefits to justify their departure from natural equality. This interpretation is consistent with Suzuki’s (1998, 49) observation that Hobbes’s conception of “the safety of the people” encompasses not only “bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man by lawfull industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himselfe” (Hobbes 1994, XXX.1).
Preventing idleness is also crucial to Hobbes’s welfare framework. As Suzuki (1998, 52) demonstrates, Hobbes recognised that “passions like fear of death, desire of things necessary to commodious life and hope by men’s industry to obtain them incline people to peace,” thus making productive employment essential for maintaining civil order. Seaman (1990, 110) notes that when Hobbes suggests that failing to address unemployment will inevitably lead to war (Hobbes 1994, XXX.19), he is essentially conceding that systemic unemployment is tantamount to an excuse for civil war.
Seaman’s (1990, 123) reinterpretation of Hobbes’s work—viewing it not only as a means of escaping the state of nature, but also as a way of avoiding a return to it—radically changes our perception of his welfare provisions. The baseline for adequate living standards is not the primitive conditions of the state of nature, but the current standard of living in civil society. This insight clarifies why Hobbes’s specific welfare policies cannot be understood as fixed prescriptions, but must evolve alongside social development.
Thus, in Hobbes’s political framework, the sovereign’s “politics of the body” serves a variety of functions. It provides the motivational basis for the social contract, imposes limits on sovereign power, establishes criteria for legitimacy, and offers practical guidance for effective governance. By ensuring the physical well-being of its subjects, the sovereign can simultaneously preserve its own power and the collective welfare of the body politic. This body-centred political philosophy reflects Hobbes’s broader materialist worldview. By situating politics within the physical human condition and fundamental needs, Hobbes sought to establish a scientific approach to governance based on observable facts rather than abstract ideals or theological doctrines.
It is important to note that Hobbes did not envisage a comprehensive social security system similar to the modern welfare state. Instead, he proposed that poor relief should be reserved for those who are genuinely unable to provide for themselves and are experiencing extreme poverty. His main aim was to create a system that would enable people to achieve well-being through lawful, productive activities. This reflects his belief that people are driven by passion and self-interest, and that cooperation can only be achieved by appealing to bodily desires and needs rather than to altruism or to abstract notions of the common good.
Hobbes’s bodily approach to politics also influenced his views on political representation and authority. He developed the theory that the sovereign is an artificial person representing the body of the commonwealth. This representation is based on the bodies of the subjects, who empower the sovereign to act on their behalf: “A person is he whose words or actions are considered either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction” (Hobbes 1994, XVI.1). This theory of authorisation is closely intertwined with Hobbes’s conception of human beings as bodily entities driven by self-interest, since authorising the sovereign is based not on abstract reason or moral duty, but on the bodily imperative of self-preservation.
The rationale behind subjects authorising the sovereign to act on their behalf is based on the conviction that it is the most effective means of ensuring their physical safety and well-being: “The end of obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in another’s sword, nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it” (Hobbes 1994, XXI.21). The implications of this bodily theory of authorisation are significant. It suggests that the legitimacy of the sovereign depends on its ability to provide tangible benefits to the bodies of its subjects. If the sovereign fails in this responsibility, its subjects are entitled to seek protection from an alternative source.
Hobbes’s work presents a vision of sovereignty that is inextricably linked to the care and preservation of the people’s bodies under the rule of the sovereign. The legitimacy of the sovereign and the stability of the state depend on the fulfilment of this duty of care toward its subjects’ bodies. This “politics of the body” involves protecting people from violence, providing them with the necessities of life, promoting prosperity, and safeguarding bodily freedoms. By meeting these material needs, the sovereign maintains the loyalty of its subjects and preserves the life of the body politic.
Body Politic
The metaphor of the body politic takes on new significance when viewed through the lens of Hobbes’s materialism. Rather than operating as a mere analogy, the comparison between the commonwealth and the human body reflects the deep structural similarities in the way organised matter maintains itself against dissolution. Just as the organic body requires constant nourishment to sustain its characteristic motions, so the artificial body of the commonwealth requires material inputs—food, security, prosperity—to maintain its coherence.
By identifying hunger as the only natural and pre-political passion, Hobbes acknowledges its universality and influence on social dynamics. Experienced by everyone, hunger creates a common bond between people and influences social and economic behaviour: the pursuit of food is therefore a fundamental human drive in the formation of political communities and the accumulation of wealth. Consequently, Hobbes (1969, XVII.2) acknowledges that relinquishing certain liberties upon exiting the state of nature does not imply the relinquishment of all that is required for the sustenance of life: As it was necessary that a man should not retain his right to everything, so also was it, that he should retain his right to some things: to his own body (for example) the right of defending, whereof he could not transfer; to the use of fire, water, free air, and place to live in, and to all things necessary for life.
Hobbes’s theory of authorisation is thus grounded in bodily imperatives: subjects authorise the sovereign not through rational deliberation about justice or rights, but out of an urgent need to secure their survival.
From this perspective, the social contract is not so much a moral agreement as a mechanical response to material pressures, which means that legitimacy ultimately stems from performance rather than origin. A sovereign may have formal authorisation, but if it fails to ensure the bodily welfare of its subjects, its legitimacy disappears. The early seventeenth-century history of England, with its recurring famines, subsistence riots, and civil wars, provided Hobbes with ample evidence to substantiate his theoretical claims. Such crises revealed the fragility of political order when its material foundations were eroded. Local authorities proved themselves unable to enforce the law when confronted with starving populations, thus validating Hobbes’s assertion that hunger excuses the violation of positive law. The Crown’s attempts to tackle these crises through Books of Orders and poor relief legislation demonstrate an acknowledgement that political stability requires the active management of subjects’ bodily needs.
Conclusion
Hobbes’s political thought emphasises the interconnectedness of the biological, social, and political aspects of human existence. It demonstrates that prosperity does not depend solely on material wealth, but also on the satisfaction of fundamental bodily needs. This focus on the body offers a distinctive perspective on the nature of political legitimacy and the role of government. By grounding political theory in the physical realities of human existence, Hobbes’s framework holds the state accountable for the material welfare of its subjects. This approach continues to shape contemporary debates concerning the responsibilities of the state and the nature of political responsibility.
Within Hobbes’s materialist framework, hunger is central to his entire political philosophy. Far from being a private issue, it constitutes a public concern with direct social and political consequences. Hobbes’s commitment to explaining all phenomena through matter in motion led him to recognise that bodily needs generate the necessity for political organisation and define the standards for its success. Accordingly, satisfying these basic needs is essential for societal prosperity and constitutes the primary aim of political association.
The reconceptualisation of power that Frost derives from Hobbesian materialism gains particular significance when hunger is foregrounded as the paradigmatic material need. Frost argues that, rather than treating power as an autonomous capacity for domination, Hobbes understood it as the social and material conditions that enable future action. Ethical power, therefore, consists in creating conditions that facilitate universal agency rather than in accumulating resources for dominance. Hunger exemplifies this insight: the sovereign’s power is legitimate only if it secures the material conditions—most fundamentally, access to sustenance—that enable subjects to act. This shifts sovereignty from a formal legal status to a practical obligation to maintain the material infrastructure of bodily existence. From this perspective, the social contract is an ongoing process in which subjects grant obedience in exchange for the sovereign providing the conditions necessary for life, and hunger constitutes the most fundamental measure of whether this exchange is being fulfilled.
This essay contributes to the field by engaging with competing interpretations and revealing analytical connections that have hitherto gone unexplored. Whilst contemporary materialist readings of Hobbes have examined issues of vulnerability, embodiment, and distributed agency, they have not considered hunger as a distinct motivating force within his political framework. By foregrounding hunger, our analysis shows how Hobbes’s abstract materialist principles operate through concrete bodily imperatives, thereby deepening our understanding of how his metaphysical commitments shape his political prescriptions. Ultimately, the essay demonstrates that, despite anticipating concerns later associated with posthumanist thought, Hobbes’s materialism remains fundamentally anthropocentric and grounded in human biological needs.
The implications of this essay extend beyond historical interpretation. Hobbes’s focus on the physical prompts reflection on the bodily dimensions of contemporary political issues. His attention to bodily vulnerability resonates with feminist theory and phenomenological approaches to politics. A phenomenological analysis of hunger reveals that material deprivation operates not only through resource scarcity but also through the disruption of the perceptual and social coherence necessary for meaningful political participation. Recovering Hobbes’s materialism in all its complexity provides a framework for understanding the persistent tension between political order and bodily needs, offering insights that extend beyond historical analysis.
From discussions about healthcare and food policy to debates on environmental protection and urban planning, the Hobbesian perspective emphasises the importance of policies that safeguard bodily welfare. His political theory of the body further illuminates contemporary discussions of legitimacy, welfare, and the role of government. In the context of global challenges—such as food insecurity, public health crises, and economic inequality—Hobbes’s vision of a political order centred on the bodily welfare of its subjects offers valuable guidance.
In an increasingly interconnected world, where the actions of a single state can profoundly affect global food security and health, Hobbes’s insights into the interplay between domestic and international affairs remain highly relevant. His emphasis on peaceful trade and international cooperation as a means of securing prosperity for all aligns closely with contemporary efforts to address global challenges through coordinated governance.
The Hobbesian insight that formal legitimacy cannot substitute for meeting citizens’ material needs challenges both liberal proceduralism and authoritarian ideologies that prioritise goals other than welfare. Hobbes’s materialism remains as relevant today as it was in seventeenth-century England: Political philosophy cannot ignore the body. Any theory that neglects hunger, disease, or material deprivation is inadequate for the realities of political life. By recognising this truth and grounding his system in it, Hobbes makes an enduringly valuable contribution to political thought: Before humans can be citizens, they must first be fed. He thus reminds us that the legitimacy of a political regime depends not only on its capacity to guarantee security but also on its ability to ensure the material conditions—sustenance, health, and bodily welfare—that enable all subjects to thrive.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to the reviewers, whose comments did much to improve the article. I also wish to thank Diego Rossello for encouraging me to organise a panel at the 2024 MPSA Annual Conference, where the central arguments of this article were first presented, as well as my fellow panellists for their engagement. My gratitude goes, too, to Patrizia Anwandter for her work in the review of the literature underpinning this article. Finally, and most especially, I am grateful to Professor Pablo Escalante for his suggestions on style and structure and for the ideas that helped me sharpen the argument.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by FONDECYT Regular Grant 1230993 (ANID, Chile), whose backing I gratefully acknowledge.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.