Abstract
Most scholars in sociology recognize an explosion of substantive and methodological uses of constructionism in recent decades. Scholars may also have noticed that reliance on constructionism is anything but consistent; indeed, it is frequently employed in ambiguous, contradictory and divergent ways. While Scott Harris is not the first scholar to grapple with the proliferating uses of constructionism, his book—What is Constructionism?: Navigating Its Use in Sociology—brings order to this relative chaos. In this short gem of a book, Harris concisely reviews the relevant theoretical literature, insightfully argues that scholars’ employment of constructionism should be differentially analyzed as either objectivist or interpretivist, and deftly applies these insights to studies that are in his areas of expertise.
The initial chapter describes and exposes the proliferation of sociological studies that rely on the theory of constructionism. Harris distinguishes objectivism and interpretivism as two types of constructionism having similar concerns—such as opposing essentialism, challenging reification, advancing notions of contingency, and addressing the “work” or “production” of various practices or realities; still, these two types also present distinctive arguments. For example, while objectivist constructionists treat “mind” as a internal reality that is shaped but not determined by social factors (p. 28), interpretivist constructionists would assert that “mind itself can be studied as something that actors define into being” (p. 36). In addition to the early chapter on “mind,” Harris examines both objectivist constructionism (OC) and interpretivist constructionism (IC) in four more substantive areas with which he is most familiar [especially family issues]: managing emotions, understanding family diversity, constructing equal marriages, and producing inequality more generally.
When he addresses scholars and studies on mind, emotions, or family diversity the contrast between OC and IC are distinct, illuminating, clear and notably comfortable. Most constructionist researchers do not want to impute meanings but aim to listen with phenomenological attunement and convey participants’ meanings, perceptions and understandings. The difference between OC and IC is that the latter assumes given conditions support that construction of meaning. Yet, as Harris recognizes, when he tackles marital equality or social inequality his argument becomes increasingly controversial and uncomfortable. Because “inequality” becomes, like mind, something “defined into being,” there is no room for assumptions about objective inequalities in society in this approach.
As with any new conceptual boundary, the reader is likely to question potential grey areas. For example, reviewing Arlie Hochschild’s (1983) work on emotions, Harris notes that her notion of emotional managements as an effort that works on some “thing” implies that emotions exist independently. His depiction of Hochschild’s approach as objectivist emotional management is persuasive; however, his suggestion that it is not also interpretivist is less convincing to this reader (p. 55). Hochschild also examines how students and workers make claims about and preserve notions of emotions in their constructions. Arguably, these two overlap for Hochschild—a double hermeneutic at work in her research. In sum, to establish his concepts he is prone to categorizing the studies he selects as either objectivist constructionism or interpretivist constructionism, rather than both/and. He freely admits in places that these uses can theoretically overlap, and even asserts by the last chapter that most studies contain both IC and OC. While he primarily aims for sociologists to recognize, examine, and critically assess the different implications of these approaches in order to perceive the dissimilarities—as well as the comparable goals like highlighting contingency—to some degree the idea that both IC and OC usually co-exist seems to undermine his argument.
Throughout the book, Harris’s partiality toward interpretivist rather than objectivist deployments of constructionism is evident if not always explicit. On the one hand, he observes that objectivist constructionist studies far outnumber interpretivist ones and so he advocates more interpretive studies. He also regularly states that objectivist approaches are legitimate, reasonable, and defensible (e.g., see p. 101). On the other hand, the reader senses that the author fundamentally feels that interpretivist constructivism is more thoroughly constructionist. Eventually, he notes that many protest “objectivist constructionism” is an oxymoron (p. 138). Harris admits he is sympathetic to the criticism, but does not fully embrace it because many scholars call their work constructionist when it relies on an objectivist frame; as such, it would be futile to appraise others’ work as not truly constructivist. Late in the book he finally states that his “personal preference is for analyses that are more interpretive rather than objective, and this bias has shaped this book” (p.139). One wishes he had addressed this bias earlier and explicitly in the book among other refutations that he reserves for his last chapter. Weaving responses to potential objections to his model throughout the book would have advanced an even stronger cumulative argument, and readers may want to peruse this last chapter after reading the first chapter.
Overall the organization is admirable, the writing is lucid, and the argument discerning and promising for a reconceptualized constructionism. Because this book is concise and accessible, it would be extremely valuable for teaching undergraduate students about constructionism as a theory or method. It would also be quite useful for courses in his area of expertise such as social psychology, marital relations, and family. These chapters can also be read independently and sustain clarity. For graduate students and other scholars in the constructionist tradition, it will help focus research questions and reveal the interpretivist gap in the literature. Of course an irony throughout the book does not escape notice: he posits realities of scholarship that are independent of his claims even as he discusses interpretivist constructionism.