Abstract
The Self-Organizing Social Mind by John Bolender attempts to outline a largely speculative theory for the cognitive origins of social organization, based upon the social theory of Alan Fiske. The Social Pattern Generator (SPG), which Bolender calls the finite part of the brain that can create an infinite amount of social patterns, is largely based on the linguistic theory of Noam Chomsky, who has a similar notion with language. More specifically, the concept of the SPG is based upon symmetry—or more directly, symmetry breaking—and is not necessarily adaptive, but has arisen out of physics. The brain is also a physical object, and has organized itself using rules of physics. The SPG is thought by Bolender to be the result of this physical organization rather than an adaptive phenomenon. His grand hypothesis is that these types of social organization are the result of symmetrical firing patterns in the brain, and that these firing patterns are exclusive to one neural network (a finite portion of the brain).
Bolender begins his argument by pointing out the almost universal symmetry found in nearly all of nature, from the small (quantum) to the large (galactic). The only way to see this symmetry is to watch it break down. In galaxies, for instance, the symmetry breaks down into subdivisions such as arms that have their own symmetries and the arms can then be divided into smaller units, and so on.
Bolender argues that physics can also be used to inform discussions of social behavior and language. For instance, fireflies, after swarming together for some time, will begin to pulsate light in unison. This is a phenomenon called “entrainment.” Another example is the locomotion patterns in animals, from snakes to quadrupeds. However, perhaps the most important example to sociologists is language. Language has both a rhythmic pattern and symmetries in structure. Secondary phrases can be embedded in primary phrases—a linguistic tool called “merge.” There can be infinite phrases in a sentence, all of which are embedded within a primary phrase, or vice versa. According to Chomsky, infinite and symmetrical combinations of phrases are possible by using a finite portion of the brain. The origin of a language generator is assumed to be adaptive, but not necessarily. The brain is a physical object subject to the rules of physics, and the presence of a generator could just as likely have been a part of physical necessity rather than adaptive biology.
Bolender connects Alan Fiske’s anthropological categorization of social organization with Chomsky’s interpretation of symmetrical language. Fiske categorizes social organization into four types—communal sharing (otherwise known as in-grouping), authority ranking (hierarchical ranking), equality matching (balanced relations), and market pricing (free market, eye for an eye)—all of which correspond with a level of measurement (nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio). Bolender adds a fifth type that he calls “asocial” or “null” relations, which covers situations in which the “other” is not human or not present. These different types of social organization can be combined infinitely, like phrases in sentences.
The author is clear that these types of social organization, and their combinations, are settled in brain cognition. It is innate in human beings, at the individual level of cognition. The SPG is the finite part of the brain that holds these social organization types and can arrange them in a descending and infinite sequence of subgroups. The brain measures when it is involved in social relations. The SPG, he admits, is not empirically verified or even hinted at; in fact, he is writing on pure speculation. His hypotheses need testing. One might ask how, exactly? The three components of the theory—symmetry breaking in physics, Chomsky’s linguistic essentialism, and Fiske’s theory of social organization—are components that already have empirical foundations and continued skepticism. The hypothesis that the SPG which exists in the brain is exclusive from the universality of Fiske’s social categorization types requires its own testing, which is probably not within the realm of sociology. In fact, Bolender’s argument hinges upon a preselected theory of social organization.
The argument is also dependent upon the ability of the four types of social organization to be measured by the brain. But what exactly is being measured? Is it material resources, or something more abstract, like power? Is it the distribution of value judgments on people? For a type of social organization to be measured, it requires something to be measured. In communal sharing, it seems to be the value judgment placed on people within and without a group; in authority ranking, it seems to be power; in equality matching, is seems to be resources; and in market pricing, it could either be resources, or moral judgments (like equal punishment for a crime). The unit of measurement that is thought to be symmetrical is not consistent across types of social organization.
To conclude, we think this book is most relevant for social philosophers and advanced graduate students in sociology. The problem, as we see it, is that the book is not very accessible for the sociologist who is not already familiar with physics. This does not mean that the book does not have merit for sociologists. For example, there has been some work trying to tie social relations to complexity theory. Some of the best examples of this include Chaos, Complexity and Sociology, edited by Raymond Eve, Sara Horsfall and Mary Lee (1997), Robert Axelrod’s The Complexity of Cooperation (1997), and, more recently, readers might want to look at Len Fisher’s The Perfect Swarm: The Science of Complexity in Everyday Life (2009). The readers of these books will also enjoy Bolender’s work and vice versa.