Abstract
Lawrence J. Vale, the Dean of public housing scholarship, has written his fourth book on this subject, taking on what may be the most controversial public housing development yet. HOPE VI was designed to replace what were considered the nation’s 260 most troubled public housing projects with mixed-income communities. Hailed by some, including Bill Clinton’s first HUD Secretary, Henry Cisneros, as the “new promise” of public housing, its critics saw this as the second coming of urban renewal, which would lead to the gentrification of many neighborhoods and displacement of their long-time residents, disproportionately people of color. In After the Projects: Public Housing Redevelopment and the Governance of the Poorest Americans, Vale finds a far more complicated story than its strongest supporters and opponents offer.
Vale focused on four specific projects in four very different cities: River Garden in New Orleans, Orchard Garden in Boston, Posada Sentinel in Tucson, and North Beach Place in San Francisco. From 200 interviews, site visits, review of archival material, and wide-ranging secondary sources, he attempted to decipher the evolution of these communities through the eyes of the various stakeholders (e.g., elected officials, private and non-profit developers, community organizations) and the range of innovative approaches taken in order to better understand urban governance.
Two key related messages emerge. First, HOPE VI was not so much a single program as it was a wide variety of initiatives that reflected divergent ideological perspectives. Second, this was not just a program for housing the poor, but an approach to the governance of the poor, generally, again, rooted in diverse ideological viewpoints. In each of the case studies, Vale examines the historical experiences that led to these four HOPE VI projects. He begins each story by laying out the evolution of the public housing projects that eventually were replaced by HOPE VI. He offers thick analyses of the key actors, including individuals, public agencies, and private organizations that were engaged in contentious debates throughout. And he identifies key political dynamics that accounted for the varying success of these four projects.
Vale develops the concept of a governing constellation—similar actors appeared in each community, but some stars have shown brighter in the different cities. One form is labelled the Big Developer, which characterized New Orleans because of the dominant role played by private developers. Publica Major refers to a strong governmental role, which he says Tucson typified. Nonprofitus is the label he attaches to San Francisco because of the strong role that non-profit developers and community organizations played. Finally, Boston is associated with the Plebs, given the influential role of low-income residents themselves.
It is these governing constellations that Vale claims account for the various goals, structures, and outcomes of these HOPE VI developments. So, for example, in New Orleans, the developers who dominated were more interested in razing than in redeveloping public housing. Boston relied the least on market-rate housing. And unlike most HOPE VI projects, all Tucson and San Francisco residents were offered an opportunity to return to their communities after the new homes were built. In general, Vale finds that New Orleans was the least favorable in terms of responsiveness to the needs of low-income families.
While these cities had very different histories, all experienced urban renewal, and this shaped their responses to HOPE VI. Vale finds that those cities that had more intense battles over urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s developed greater organizing capacity, which enabled them to be more effective in shaping HOPE VI to better serve the poor than would have otherwise been the case.
While Boston, San Francisco, and Tucson may have negotiated better deals for their public housing and for other low-income residents, Vale finds that in every city far fewer former public-housing residents returned to their communities when the HOPE VI homes became available than proponents expected. Given the reduction of affordable housing units in New Orleans, this was no great surprise. But the small number of returnees in the other cities was a surprise. He offers several possible explanations. Some simply found better housing elsewhere. Others did not want to subject themselves to the rules and surveillance of public housing authorities. Some no doubt mistrusted the public landlords, recalling their experience with urban renewal and other programs. Others may have been aware of the stereotypes that the new market-rate residents held in their minds about public-housing residents. Given the importance of one-for-one replacement promises on the part of many HOPE VI resisters and the fact that in at least three of these cities so many previous residents chose not to return despite the availability of housing units, this is an area that begs for additional research.
Housing low-income families and managing poverty, as well as helping people climb out of poverty, remain major challenges. As Vale reports, just one-quarter of very low-income American households (those whose income is less than 50 percent of the median in their communities) receive any housing subsidy. Almost one-third of those with very low incomes (below 30 percent of the median income of their communities) spend over half their income on rent and utilities. A central debate today in scholarly and policy venues is whether public policy and private practice should focus on helping vulnerable families move to “high-opportunity” neighborhoods or on reinvesting in troubled communities. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for, at least in the near future, is a conclusion with which Vale ends his book: Positive outcomes could therefore include not just the opportunity to return to a new apartment in a well-governed HOPE VI project on a desirable site but also the possibility of a well-utilized housing choice voucher (where the actuality of “choice” is as important as the housing or the voucher). Finally, an equitable outcome could even entail relocation to another property managed by the housing authority or its deputies if those properties are desirable. In the end, equitable outcomes are those that residents themselves deem to be equitable. (p. 410)