Abstract
Imperial orders have dominated this planet for over five thousand years. In conventional historiographical narratives, nation-states have gradually but inevitably replaced empires as the world's dominant form of territorial organization. In this standard interpretation, from the late eighteenth century onward, political revolutions, wars, industrialization, capitalism, and the spread of nationalist movements undermined the legitimacy of imperial orders. These structural changes created the conditions for the development of a new, non-imperial, international order based on the principles of popular sovereignty and national self-determination. In this understanding, the waves of decolonization in the second half of the twentieth century marked the final death knell of empires.
This general interpretation is rarely contested. When challenges do come, they mostly focus on the endurance of imperial legacies in the contemporary world. Therefore, some scholars point to the informal imperial relations that persist in the world of nation-states. They identify neo-colonial and neo-imperial forms of domination or describe existing global economic or political inequalities in quasi-imperial terms. Recently, proponents of the decolonial paradigm have focused on deconstructing the epistemological hegemony of imperial legacies in the colonial universalism of "western knowledge."
However, none of these well-established critiques of empires and imperialism have challenged the idea that nation-states have taken the place of empires in the contemporary world. In other words, even the most radical views do not question the point of view that the formal empire as a socio-political order belongs to the past. In his Nations, States and Empires, John A. Hall decisively challenges the prevailing view that empire belongs in the dustbin of history. He is equally critical of conventional historiography that posits nation-states as the only form of polity in our time as he is of radical viewpoints that focus primarily on the legacy of imperialism. Instead, Hall argues that empires and nation-states are not necessarily mutually exclusive forms of state organization. Rather than one form of polity simply replacing another, empires and nation-states often continue to coexist in late modernity.
Hall challenges traditional accounts that see empires experiencing an inevitable downfall from the nineteenth century onward. Instead, as he points out: "the two world wars were imperial wars, rather than wars between nation-states. Even after the rapid decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, empires persisted in the USA and the USSR, though both denied that they had that status. Furthermore, empires are not finished: Russia and China have joined the USA in showing imperial dispositions, and even the European Union thinks of itself occasionally in these terms—while both India and Turkey now exhibit imperial features, both internally and externally" (p. 2).
None of this is to deny that our world is different from that of our eighteenth- or nineteenth-century predecessors. While in previous centuries the empire was perceived as a beacon of progress and economic and cultural superiority, today the word "empire" has a pejorative meaning. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the nation-state is the only legitimate form of territorial organization. Nevertheless, Hall aims to show that rather than completely replacing imperial orders, some powerful nation-states retained many imperial prerogatives such as launching military interventions without UN consent, imposing unfavorable trade regimes on smaller nation-states, or benefiting from the global reach of their ideological creeds. In Hall's view, the same logic applies to nationalism and imperialism: rather than being incompatible ideological projects, they often overlap. So, just as empires and nation-states can coexist in the same space and time, so can nationalism and imperialism. As Hall shows, the historical record is full of political orders that might best be described as "nationalist empires" or "imperial nationalisms."
The book zooms in on different historical periods to show the variability and complexity of this relationship between empires and nation-states. The first chapter offers a comparative historical analysis of various imperial social structures ranging from the capstone empires of ancient China and Rome to European imperial projects in the early modern period. Hall emphasizes that the imperial world was created by violent conquests and that geopolitical imperial competition played a crucial role in the development of multipolar Europe. He questions conventional explanations that link the rise and spread of imperial power to capitalism. Instead, he shows that capitalism preceded industrialization in the Netherlands and Britain, while colonial adventures were often initiated by individuals who did not represent their governments. Initially, imperialism was less linked to the economic aims of the state or even the capitalist class as such and had much more to do with geopolitical dominance and great power politics.
In the book's second chapter, Hall explores the transformation of the imperial world and the rise of nation-states during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The focus here is on the structural shift from the elite politics that dominated the premodern world of monarchical rule to a popular politics built around class and nationhood. Hall convincingly shows that nationalism was not the cause of wars or revolution in the nineteenth century, nor did it cause the First World War, as is often misunderstood. Rather, nationalism was mainly a consequence of these violent events and processes. In this context of geopolitical uncertainty and change, governments have been forced to accommodate some of the demands of the common people. Therefore, they often encouraged the development of industrialization and nationalism to save imperial projects. As Hall points out, the expansion of nationalism was a consequence of "the entry of the people, as classes and nations," into politics. By nationalizing empires, rulers could increase power through greater social cohesion. Hall also shows how the marriage of nationalism and imperialism generated disaster after disaster, including not only two world wars, but also the violence of settler colonialism, institutionalized racism, and in some cases outright genocide. However, Hall argues that, despite profiting from the empire, British rulers, just as other imperialists, were not driven so much by their capitalist ambitions. Instead, the principal cause for imperial expansion was geoeconomics—"the belief of leaders of states that profits and security might come in the future, with possession fundamentally being a hedge against rival states" (p. 111).
Hall's third chapter looks at the world in the second half of the twentieth century. While conventional accounts emphasize the stability, prosperity, and relative peace of the Cold War era, Hall zooms in on the proxy wars and millions of human casualties generated within the U.S. and USSR imperial domains. Despite the nominal hegemony of the nation-state model of governance in the world, Hall shows that the geopolitical architecture of this period was shaped by the imperial politics of the two great powers. Cold War tensions also forced U.S. business leaders to adapt to organized labor, thus making American society more prosperous as well as more equal than before. At the same time, the Soviet empire was also under constant external pressure to liberalize and deal less coercively with internal dissent. Eventually, the Soviet imperial project imploded, and the institutional vacuum was filled with nationalist separatism. As Hall puts it, "nationalism occupied space that had been created by state weakness; it was more a reaction to, than a vital cause of, collapse" (p. 152).
The final chapter and conclusion explore current developments and future trends. Contrary to many analysts who predict the decline or fall of the American empire, Hall insists that U.S. power is likely to continue its dominance in the military, political, and economic spheres. Similarly, he challenges views that focus on the decline of nationalism. Hall argues that waves of nationalism will continue around the world. While the West is experiencing anti-immigrant "nationalism of the rich" along with a populist backlash, "large parts of the world have barely begun the transition towards nation-state status" and are likely to experience much more nationalism in the near future (p. 158). None of this means that imperial orders would lose their significance. On the contrary, for Hall, imperial politics is likely to shape social and political relations for the foreseeable future.
Nations, States and Empires is an excellent book that clearly shows how the tools of historical sociology can be used successfully to understand long-term patterns of social change. Moreover, Hall nicely demonstrates how insights from classical social theory and contemporary sociological research can help us make sense of world history. His concise but very wide-ranging and erudite historical analysis effectively challenges some well-established views about empires and nation-states. The book engages in dialogue with a range of diverse thinkers, from Max Weber, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Karl Polanyi to Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, and offers a novel interpretation of the relationships between empires, nationhood, and modern states.
Although it is recognized that the nation-state is the only form of government that is considered legitimate in the modern world, this does not mean that all such entities have equal or reciprocal relations. Thus large and powerful nation-states such as the United States, China, India, and Russia retain many imperial prerogatives that Luxembourg, Montenegro, or Moldova could never possess. However, this is not only a question of size, as the imperial principle is also at work in some much smaller states—from Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom to Israel. Yet, as Hall convincingly demonstrates, these imperial powers are not vestiges of the ancien régime. Rather, they are often new developments arising from ever-changing geopolitical arrangements. Human societies do not evolve according to some grand teleological plan in which nation-states replace empires for good. Instead, imperial rule remains part and parcel of geopolitical life in the present and future.
Hall is right that one of the key features of the multipolar world order is its quasi-Darwinian character. Since empires are entities oriented toward conquest and domination, they function well in such a hostile environment. Political and military elites are focused on expanding their political power and economic benefits and will seek to establish or retain elements of imperial dominance wherever possible. However, this line of argument overemphasizes the instrumental rationality of rulers and does not tell us much about the role of organizational power, ideology, or the internal social dynamics in decision-making processes.
For one thing, imperial powers throughout history operated through multi-layered and uneven systems of governance. In this context, the imperial reach was determined not only by the will of the emperors, but even more by complex organizational dynamics. As Hall (1985) noted in his early work, the rulers of capstone empires were often unable to enforce their will on the vast territories nominally under their control. They lacked the coercive-organizational capacity to penetrate the world beyond the capital cities and towns or the central provinces. Despite their extraordinary despotic powers, neither the Roman nor the ancient Chinese emperors were able to shape their world without working through the organizational complexities of their empires. Obviously, modern states possess much greater coercive-organizational powers, and their rulers have at their disposal more centralized decision-making mechanisms. However, at the same time, they must operate in a world in which the coercive-organizational capacity of non-state organizations has also been significantly expanded. Thus, changing internal organizational dynamics constantly influences decision-making processes for those in power where rationality is inevitably restricted (Malešević 2017).
For another thing, decisions about imperial expansion, warfare, and political control are not only based on rational calculation, but rulers themselves can be strongly influenced by specific ideological beliefs. Despite their obvious geopolitical interests, Stalin and Mao were equally driven by their communist beliefs. Similarly, the mission civilisatrice was not only a fig leaf hiding the territorial ambitions of nineteenth-century European imperialists; many were driven by this ideological project. All social organizations, including states, legitimize their existence by referring to ideological principles, and all major decisions, such as conquering another social organization, must be justified within the existing normative framework of that organization. Although premodern rulers had much more freedom in this regard and usually only required the tacit support of fellow aristocrats and high clergy, they too could not overextend themselves beyond their ideological principles. In modernity, this is even more the case because fundamental political decisions imply a considerable degree of justification.
Hall is right that in contemporary conditions nationalism usually plays a central role in legitimizing decisions about war, peace, or territorial control. The rise of nationalist ideology as a cross-class social glue allowed rulers to rationalize and validate their major geopolitical decisions to their populations. However, nationalist rhetoric and practice are a double-edged sword that can be used equally by opponents of the government. Thus, nationalism and other secular and religious ideological creeds can be used to delegitimize state power. This is especially the case with imperial ambitions because they have no legitimacy in a modern world that only recognizes nation-states. Thus, rulers' decisions about imperial outreach are never made solely based on instrumental rationality. Ideology regularly looms large whenever matters of life and death are decided.
Finally, although geopolitics and geoeconomics are of great importance to the development and transformation of empires and nation-states, it is equally important to look at the social structure of the individual societies that make up these states. In other words, Hall's analysis is mainly focused on interstate relations and does not tell us enough about internal social dynamics. The possibility of imperial power is not only determined by the territorial vastness of a particular polity, its enormous population, or the possession of a formidable army. Internal social order is also crucial. Hall emphasizes the role of nationalism in bringing about a degree of internal social cohesion. Nevertheless, nationalism may not always be sufficient to maintain the modern social order. A good example here is the United States. Hall is right that in many respects this is the most powerful polity that has ever existed on this planet. The military, political, economic, and even ideological power of this imperial state is unprecedented compared to even its closest competitors today. However, this geopolitical dominance also rests in large part on internal dynamics that could unravel at some point in the near future. So, I would be more skeptical of Hall's assessment that U.S. power will continue to dominate. Despite its unparalleled geopolitical, economic, and especially military supremacy, the American state rests on a much weaker and more unstable society than it had just a few decades ago.
Deep political polarization, huge socioeconomic inequalities, uneven development among states, the decimation of social welfare, the collapse of infrastructure and public services, the decline of social solidarity, and the breakdown of civility are some of the factors that make American society much more fragile today. As Richard Lachmann (2020) shows in his recent book, U.S. imperial power in some respects resembles the political and economic decline experienced by the British and Dutch imperial projects. The collapse of the elite consensus has led to a situation of "paralysis and plunder" where financial and oligarchic capitalism cannibalizes the economy and undermines the internal social order.
These brief critical reflections are not intended to take anything away from this gem of a book. Hall has written an outstanding contribution that not only raises some key questions about the relationships between nations, states, and empires, but also provides compelling answers to those big questions. His insightful answers will stimulate further discussion about the role of state power in history and how states are transformed in the modern world. His analysis will also make us all ponder whether we still live in a world of empires.