The Making of UNASUR: Visions of Latin American Regionalism at the Height of the Progressive Cycle

Foreign Policy And Regionalism in Latin America

Contrary to their prominence on the regional agenda in the 1990s, trade integration projects lost momentum throughout the first decade of the 2000s, particularly in South America. After years of negotiations, the FTAA was ultimately rejected in 2005, as Latin American countries disagreed with the United States over its terms and conditions (Vigevani and Mariano, 2005; Reis da Silva and Silveira, 2012; Barros and Ramos, 2013). In the wake of its collapse, the decision by the Andean Community member states to maintain a pro-trade agreement orientation with the U.S. led to the fragmentation of the Andean coalition, as the Venezuelan government rejected this approach and withdrew from the bloc (Goldbaum and Luccas, 2012; Romero, 2010). Within MERCOSUR, the shift in the political orientation of the governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay gave greater breadth to the scope of the bloc’s agenda, which, despite making some advances in the trade agenda, came to focus on broader dimensions of regional integration without necessarily overcoming still-pending trade-related controversies within the bloc (Vázquez and Briceño-Ruiz, 2009; Saraiva, 2012; Nogara, 2025). Consequently, the old pattern of open regionalism became restricted to bilateral agreements, such as the FTAs negotiated by some South American countries with the U.S., and to the remnants of multilateral mechanisms inherited from previous periods.

However, the rise of the Pink Tide, marked by progressive left-wing and center-left governments across Latin America, advanced the paradigm of post-neoliberal regionalism. This new regionalism was characterized by the creation and strengthening of regional integration instruments that incorporated dimensions beyond the economic and commercial sphere, aiming for greater institutionalization, political coordination, and a focus on security, energy, social, and financial issues (Sanahuja, 2010). This included, for example, the establishment of CSN/UNASUR, ALBA, and CELAC, as well as parallel and complementary mechanisms such as the CDS, the Bank of the South, and efforts to consolidate infrastructure integration instruments. This new situation reshaped the trajectory of regional coalitions inherited from the previous cycle, such as MERCOSUR, which gradually adopted a new orientation—characterized by greater institutionalization, an expanded emphasis on social issues, and even territorial enlargement, as reflected in the initiation of Venezuela’s accession process.

In this context of the weakening of neoliberal alternatives and the growing convergence around a new type of regionalism—primarily involving the countries of the region and extending beyond strictly commercial dimensions—distinct approaches to integration emerged among the proponents of post-neoliberal regionalism. A key expression of this dynamic was the differentiated positioning of Brazil and Venezuela regarding the direction of multilateral cooperation in South America and, more broadly, in Latin America (Malamud, 2009), reflecting not an irreconcilable divide, but alternative paths toward expanding regional autonomy.

This post-liberal, post-neoliberal, or post-hegemonic regionalism can be interpreted as a return to the centrality of politics in the foreign relations and development strategies of the region’s countries, driven by a vision of defending national sovereignty and seeking greater autonomy from market and globalization trends (Sanahuja, 2016). In line with this view, Serbin (2013) indicated that this regionalism was marked by three “returns”: 1) the return to politics, as mentioned; 2) the return of the state, which once again played a significant role in social and development policies, as well as in defining a foreign policy agenda with strong nationalist and sovereigntist components; and 3) the return of the “development agenda,” which stood in opposition to the Washington Consensus and neoliberalism.

Evaluating fragmentation and overlapping integration in Latin America, Mariano and Ribeiro (2020) identified some fundamental points that relate to regionalism. As they pointed out, although almost all Latin American multilateral institutions are commonly referred to as integrationist, not all of them represent integration based on the deepening of supranational mechanisms. Thus, they often diverge from the classic functionalist and neo-functionalist definitions of regional integration (Haas, 2004), which presuppose aspects of supranationality for multilateral institutions.

In response to these dilemmas, Nolte and Comini (2016) observed that predominant approaches in academic studies often evaluate regional organizations based on their coherence and efficiency, comparing them with previous models of regional integration, specifically the European Union model. This explains the recurrent criticism of Latin American multilateral organizations, given that the overlapping of regional integration instruments contradicts the assumed ideal model. Contrary to these perspectives, the authors proposed that this overlap could create room for maneuver for member states to achieve their objectives and, therefore, should not be viewed as a problem but as an opportunity for political strategies using different institutions simultaneously, each with its advantages.

In this sense, the aforementioned definitions regarding the main features of post-neoliberal regionalism, on the one hand, and the structure of Latin American regionalism, on the other, underscore the centrality of the foreign policy objectives of member countries in shaping regional multilateral institutions. This study analyzes South American regionalism by examining the interactions between the strategic objectives of the foreign policies of some of its leading proponents.

Thus, the analysis is guided by the following assumptions.

With regard to the third point, however, it is important to emphasize that the differences in the foreign policy conceptions of Brazil and Venezuela concerning regional integration mechanisms were by no means marked by any form of geopolitical rivalry, nor by a supposed inevitable antagonism between distinct currents of the Latin American left. What occurred, rather, was that the period marked by the foundational debates surrounding CSN and UNASUR coincided precisely with the peak of the Latin American progressive cycle, alongside the collapse of the FTAA project and the weakening of regional cohesion among governments advocating the continuation of open regionalism formulas.

Within this window of opportunity, progressive governments across the region assumed a central role in shaping the regional agenda. Even more far-reaching integration proposals—particularly those advanced by the Venezuelan government, often carrying an explicitly anti-imperialist orientation—resonated significantly within broader debates on the construction of Latin American multilateralism.

As this article seeks to demonstrate, Brazilian proposals, characterized by a more moderate profile and advocating a minimalist approach to regional integration, did not constitute a rejection of Venezuelan initiatives. Rather, they represented the feasible arrangement within a broader correlation of forces that had not yet shifted sufficiently across the region to enable the full realization of the more ambitious proposals (Visentini, 2013; Barros and Ramos, 2013; Nogara, 2024; Nogara, 2026b). Even so, the institutional format ultimately assumed by UNASUR, as a product of its foundational debates, was undeniably shaped by this particular conjuncture.

This was a context in which the rise of left-wing governments—and even the emergence of growing divergences among them regarding the regional agenda—coexisted with a shared objective: the consolidation of a paradigm aimed at enhancing the decision-making autonomy of South American countries vis-à-vis extra-regional powers. Despite these differences, the successful establishment of UNASUR, and the key role it would later play in addressing regional crises often marked by typical forms of external interference, reflected this underlying convergence. This was evident in its responses to events such as the Bolivian Media Luna crisis (2008), its mediation of diplomatic disputes between Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela (2008–2010), its coordinated defense of democratic order during the attempted coup against Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2010), and its condemnation of the impeachment of President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2012).

Furthermore, the subsequent aggressiveness with which imperialist and conservative forces in the region acted against UNASUR during the later downturn of the progressive cycle reinforces the importance of these earlier debates. While the tensions surrounding the transition from CSN to UNASUR were highly relevant in shaping the organization’s characteristics, they do not diminish the fundamental role played by the eventual convergence among regional governments in establishing a mechanism that, even if only temporarily, expanded the margins of autonomy available to the countries of the region.

The Rise of Csn

Unlike Argentina, which viewed the strengthening and reformatting of MERCOSUR as a preliminary step towards expanding the scope and breadth of regional integration, the foreign policy of the Lula administration prioritized cooperation programs with a softer profile, capable of encompassing all South American countries (Bernal-Meza, 2008). To understand the steps that led to Brazil’s proposal for the CSN, it is essential to examine the process by which Brazil had been experimenting with initiatives since the 1990s.

In 1993, during Itamar Franco’s government, Chancellor Celso Amorim, who would later coordinate foreign relations under the Lula administration, proposed the launching of the Área de Livre-Comércio Sul-Americana (South American Free Trade Area, ALCSA) in the context of the rising hemispheric proposal to systematize debates on the FTAA. This move aligned with the Brazilian perspective on fostering greater integration among South American economies as a steppingstone towards advancing hemispheric proposals (Bandeira, 2010). More than simply opposing the FTAA project, ALCSA was envisioned as a tool to strengthen the bargaining power of Brazil and all South American countries in negotiations with other global players.

With a minimalist agenda focused solely on trade, this initiative did not propose the creation of supranational decision-making institutions, mechanisms for linking regional industrial development ambitions, or even the promotion of greater political convergence among South American countries (Briceño-Ruiz, 2010b). Although the initiative was not adopted, it symbolized Brazilian intentions, particularly Brazil’s insistence that MERCOSUR negotiate jointly and with a unified position vis-à-vis third countries and external actors.

In 2000, Brazil took the lead in organizing the First Meeting of South American Presidents at the Brasilia Summit, the first formal gathering of the presidents of all South American countries. The main resulting document, the Brasilia Communiqué, laid the foundation for the launching of the Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure, IIRSA) and paved the way for greater convergence between MERCOSUR and the Andean Community in negotiations to establish free trade agreements. In the same vein, the meeting encouraged Chile, Guyana, and Suriname to collaborate with the Andean Community and MERCOSUR countries towards the “shared goal of forming an expanded economic and trade area in South America,” based on the “progressive liberalization of the exchange of goods and services, the facilitation of investments, and the creation of the infrastructure necessary to achieve this goal” (Cúpula de Brasília, 2000: 32).

In September 2002, the Second Meeting of South American Presidents at the Guayaquil Summit reiterated the intention to promote coordination and cooperation in order to create a common South American space. The initiatives driven by Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s diplomacy laid the groundwork for what would become CSN in 2004. Under Lula, Brazil continued its efforts to structure cooperation tools encompassing all South American countries, and in December 2003, the long-awaited free trade agreement between the Andean Community and MERCOSUR was signed. In December 2004, a new meeting of South American presidents in Cusco finally established the creation of CSN, formalizing Brazil’s minimalist project for South American regional integration.

The integration model proposed by Brazil in CSN opened the possibility of free trade. The convergence of the Andean Community and MERCOSUR into a free trade area was one of its pillars. Despite this, there was a recognition that South America needed to address problems such as infrastructure deficits, which were considered an obstacle to increasing trade interdependence and strengthening ties among South American countries. Other issues, such as investments in science and technology as well as democratic governance, were also addressed within the CSN framework. (Briceño-Ruiz, 2010a: 217)

However, despite initially achieving its goal of establishing a regional cooperation mechanism in line with its plans, Brazil soon had to contend with its neighbors’ markedly different perceptions of its long-term direction. While Argentina insisted on deepening MERCOSUR integration as a prerequisite for other South American initiatives, countries such as Colombia and Peru placed greater emphasis on free trade agreements with the United States. Chile maintained a cautious and pragmatic approach, engaging in the initiative while prioritizing its broader trade strategy. Meanwhile, the rise of governments aligned with the Bolivarian paradigm introduced divergent views on the depth and direction of regional integration.

At the First Meeting of CSN Heads of State in Brasilia in September 2005, the principles, objectives, and institutional design of the organization were reaffirmed. It was established that the Pro-Tempore Secretariat of the Community would rotate among member countries for one year, with Brazil holding it until the Second Meeting of CSN Heads of State.

On the eve of the meeting in Cochabamba, the changes in the correlation of political forces in South America were already evident. The recent election of Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005 and Rafael Correa’s victory in Ecuador a few days before the meeting (although he took office in 2007) strengthened the Bolivarian coalition, given the similar orientations of these governments to that of Venezuela since the rise of Chávez (Klachko and Arkonada, 2017). Days before the meeting, Morales released an open letter criticizing aspects of South American integration, particularly IIRSA’s investments, which he argued were too focused on commercial issues rather than on the interests of the people and the promotion of buen vivir (Gudynas, 2011).

In this context, the document resulting from the meeting maintained the main direction of CSN but substantially broadened the scope and depth of its agenda. In short, the revisionist intent gained momentum, reshaping the fundamental pillars of CSN’s construction and questioning the hegemony of the minimalist proposals put forward by Brazil. The path was paved for the subsequent transformation of CSN into UNASUR.

As Cabarcas (2017) pointed out, at the First South American Energy Summit organized in Isla Margarita, Venezuela, in 2007, the challenge to the hegemony of Brazilian proposals became more explicit. Driven primarily by Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and Bolivia, participants questioned various dimensions of Brazil’s regional integration strategy, including the financial, energy, and institutional aspects (Malamud, 2007). In addition to paving the way for the transformation of CSN into UNASUR, the meeting confirmed the establishment of the organization’s new headquarters in Quito, rather than in Rio de Janeiro as Brazil had proposed.

Venezuelan proposals for establishing OPPEGASUR, the Bank of the South, and the Southern Gas Pipeline were also discussed, along with Chavista statements opposing the Brazil-U.S. cooperation program for biofuel production. While Argentina aligned itself with the Bolivarian bloc in questioning the CSN and advocating for its relaunch under the name UNASUR, this alignment did not extend to most of the other areas of disagreement between Venezuelan and Brazilian approaches (Malamud, 2007). The meeting in Isla Margarita demonstrated a surprising and short-lived polarization between the ideals of South American integration presented by Brazil and Venezuela, reflecting a dynamic that had been taking shape through the developments of recent years.

Even so, as a Brazilian journalist analyzing the summit’s developments pointed out, these attempts were not enough to secure more significant gains for Venezuelan interests in the regional landscape:

Lula prevailed in all confrontations with the Venezuelans. He succeeded in including a favorable reference to biofuel in the declaration by the South American countries, aligning with Brazil’s interests, while excluding references to an “OPEC for gas” (proposed by Chávez and Morales) and the Bank of the South (supported by both and by Argentina’s Kirchner). And what did Chávez achieve? The Brazilian response was ironic: he won a rhetorical victory by changing the name of the new South American group from CSN, as proposed by Brazil, to UNASUR. A victory? That remains debatable. (Castanhêde, 2007: 1)

Burges (2007) identified Chávez’s support for the nationalization of Petrobras’ assets on Bolivian soil by President Evo Morales in 2006 as a turning point in Brazil’s stance toward Chavista influence in South America. On the one hand, Chávez was mobilizing the governments more aligned with his political perspective, while also seeking to bring Argentina closer in support of his more autonomist proposals for regional integration. On the other hand, Brazil began to adopt a more cautious approach toward Venezuelan positions within the regional multilateral sphere, a tendency that would become particularly evident in the subsequent process of shaping the Bank of the South.

In addition to seeking to strengthen ties with its traditional regional partners, Brazil sought to position itself as a more moderate regional leader—both in its engagement with South American countries governed by more conservative or liberal, non-leftist administrations and in its management of relations with the United States; this posture became evident in the model adopted for the creation of the South American Defense Council within UNASUR, which was preceded by consultations with Washington, including talks between Defense Minister Nelson Jobim and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in March 2008 aimed at framing the initiative as compatible with hemispheric security objectives and at avoiding potential misunderstandings (Comini, 2015); in this same vein, a 2008 confidential U.S. Embassy cable later released by WikiLeaks records Jobim’s argument to Ambassador Clifford Sobel that Brazil sought to incorporate Venezuela into a regional framework to mitigate perceptions of threat, emphasizing that isolating it would likely intensify its confrontational stance (U.S. Embassy Brasília, 2008).

Even so, the outcome of these disputes did not result in an irreconcilable antagonism between the positions of Brazil and Venezuela, but rather in the construction of a workable consensus that made possible the creation and consolidation of an important mechanism for dialogue and cooperation among the countries of the region.

The Transition To Unasur And Its Regional Implications

In May 2008, the Third Summit of South American Heads of State, held in Brasília, endorsed the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR. Contrary to the interpretation advanced by journalist Eliane Castanhêde, cited earlier, the transformation of CSN into UNASUR was not merely a semantic change, but represented a significant expansion in the scope of regional integration. What had previously been a process centered on the convergence between the Andean Community and MERCOSUR, the promotion of regional infrastructure, and political coordination was now evolving into a more ambitious project with a broader range of objectives (Vázquez and Briceño-Ruiz, 2009). The preamble of the Constitutive Treaty stated that it was inspired by the previous declarations of Cusco (December 8, 2004), Brasilia (September 30, 2005), and Cochabamba (December 9, 2006), thus affirming the measures agreed upon during CSN’s existence. Broadening its scope and intentions, the Treaty established the goal to “build a South American identity and citizenship and develop an integrated regional space in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, energy, and infrastructure spheres, to contribute to strengthening the unity of Latin America and the Caribbean” (UNASUR, 2008: 6).

Article 2, which addresses the general objective of the organization, clearly symbolizes the expansion of UNASUR’s thematic lines of action.

The Union of South American Nations aims to build a space for integration and unity across cultural, social, economic, and political spheres among its peoples, through participatory and consensual approaches. It prioritizes political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing, and the environment, among other areas, with the goals of eliminating socioeconomic inequality, achieving social inclusion and citizen participation, strengthening democracy, and reducing asymmetries—all within the framework of enhancing the sovereignty and independence of states. (UNASUR, 2008: 8)

When comparing the specific objectives of CSN, as outlined in the Cusco Declaration, with those of UNASUR in its Constitutive Treaty, the distinctions in their strategic dimensions become evident. These changes influenced Brazil’s strategy of engagement with the regional multilateral framework, while preserving the core pillars of its approach. For Brazil, UNASUR became a space for consolidating political dialogue and cooperation in South America, particularly in the field of regional security, with emphasis on mechanisms for conflict resolution among member states. As highlighted by Briceño-Ruiz (2010a), this did not imply the abandonment of broader objectives such as infrastructure integration and trade convergence, which continued to advance through parallel or pre-existing mechanisms and were, in some cases, incorporated into UNASUR’s scope—as in the case of IIRSA through COSIPLAN—alongside the gradual convergence between the Andean Community and MERCOSUR following the signing of Economic Complementation Agreement No. 59.

Although the change in name and strategic objectives with the transition from CSN to UNASUR altered some of its underlying assumptions, it remained a central tool for dialogue and political cooperation among South American countries, continuing to operate through consensus-based mechanisms. As noted by Giacalone (2013), the evolution of CSN into UNASUR retained its intergovernmental character and low level of institutionalization, as advocated by Brazil, while the incorporation of a constitutive treaty with legal personality and a general secretariat reflected elements of the Venezuelan proposals. However, these changes did not establish a supranational character within UNASUR, nor did they lead to the adoption of frameworks that would enable an operative military force. Advances aligned with the Venezuelan proposals were mainly related to the reduced emphasis on trade dimensions previously proposed for CSN. Sanahuja (2012) observed that this reduction in focus on economic and commercial elements aligned with the need for greater consensus among countries on the direction of integration in these dimensions.

Celso Amorim’s reflections on Venezuela’s role in South American integration processes at the time make clear the Brazilian reading that its own proposals possessed a greater capacity to generate consensus and to advance—albeit within certain limits—the scope of regional integration initiatives feasible in that conjuncture:

As previously noted, Chávez was enthusiastic about South American integration, but his rhetorical bluster often complicated the process. He favored swift actions with strong media impact, yet overlooked the fundamental practical instruments necessary to achieve those goals. Chávez frequently opposed measures for regional free trade, seemingly forgetting (or ignoring) that historical integration processes, such as the European Union and even the formation of national states like 19th-century Germany, originated with the elimination of tariff barriers and the establishment of customs unions. The strongly statist approach of the Chavista integration model, combined with a significant degree of voluntarism, alarmed some leaders—even those of South American social democratic governments—whose economies were rooted in market-oriented principles. (Amorim, 2022: 8631)

Brazil’s core proposals for regional integration were systematized through the launch of the CSN, conceived and politically articulated by Brasília. As Giacalone (2013) argues, a central objective of this strategy was to prioritize a South American framework for regional integration while addressing structural constraints such as infrastructure deficits that hindered regional connectivity. However, it is debatable to what extent Mexico’s absence from these initiatives reflected a deliberate Brazilian strategy of exclusion, rather than the result of Mexico’s own political choices and its alignment with U.S.-led integration frameworks. Interpretations that attribute a strongly geopolitical character to these dynamics—often emphasizing supposed rivalries among key Latin American countries—have been recurrent in the literature, particularly in assessments of Venezuelan foreign policy. Such readings tend to overstate antagonisms and overlook the broader processes of convergence and accommodation that shaped regional integration during this period.

Illera (2005) observed that Brazil’s and Venezuela's strategic objectives in the regional context revealed significant differences in their approaches to integration. In her view, while the Brazilian project assumed that regional stability, predictability, and peace were necessary for expanding business and trade, building infrastructure, securing energy resources, and enhancing global projection based on regional security, the Venezuelan project was based on the inevitability of asymmetrical conflict with the U.S. and its allies. This worldview underpinned a regional approach that prioritized an anti-imperialist orientation, rejecting trade liberalization and traditional integrationist methods as pathways to development.

Giacalone (2013) noted that the official Venezuelan government document Marco Filosófico de la Nueva Integración del Sur (Venezuela, 2007: 39) distinguished the liberal representative democracy model of CSN, the Andean Community, and MERCOSUR from the model that had prevailed in Venezuela since the 1999 Constitution, which was based on a participatory democracy. The document emphasized the need to include Central America and the Caribbean in the integration process, which had hitherto been recognized as being developed “under the tutelage” of Brazil (through CSN) and restricted to South America. It further suggested that Venezuela should play a leading role in advancing the Latin American and Caribbean integration process, aiming to expand its mechanisms to the entire Latin American and Caribbean region (Venezuela, 2007: 72).

Academic discussions in international relations—such as those mentioned above—have often emphasized the supposedly “geopolitical” and even “ideological” nature of Venezuelan foreign policy interests in the regional arena. However, contrary to such interpretations, it is essential to underscore that the construction of regional integration and cooperation mechanisms as far-reaching as ALBA—and with advanced proposals concerning financial matters (such as the Bank of the South), security and defense (as reflected in Venezuelan proposals for the format of the emerging South American Defense Council), energy, and multilateral dialogue—was by no means directed against third parties or imposed upon any countries. Rather, these initiatives were developed through consensus among their proponents.

Chavista governments’ placement of anti-imperialist discourse at the center of their arguments concerning both international relations and domestic politics was by no means a form of theoretical posturing. Instead, it was a direct consequence of the persistent interference of U.S. foreign policy in efforts to undermine not only Hugo Chávez, but also the broader spectrum of progressive governments in the region, as well as multilateral cooperation initiatives such as those mentioned above (Borón, 2013; Calloni, 2020; Ellner, 2023).

It is important to note, however, that although the Kirchnerist governments in Argentina did not align with most of the regional integration model articulated by Caracas and the Bolivarian coalition—as evidenced by their decision not to join ALBA—the peak of the progressive cycle allowed for an eventual rapprochement with Venezuelan positions in the regional arena (Corigliano, 2011). This was evident not only in the process that led to the transformation of the CSN into UNASUR, but also in the expansion of MERCOSUR through the invitation extended to Venezuela, as well as in the launch of the Bank of the South.

In the absence of an integration project articulated directly from Buenos Aires—where priority continued to be placed on the expansion and transformation of MERCOSUR as the central axis of its regional strategy (Paikin, 2012)—it was in Argentina’s interest to counterbalance the asymmetrical influence exerted by Brazilian leadership in the formulation of the CSN, thereby increasing its leverage in negotiations over the future direction of regional integration. Thus, its occasional alignment with Venezuela and some of the Bolivarian countries aimed at influencing key aspects of the emerging institutional framework, including the organization’s name and headquarters, the appointment of Néstor Kirchner as secretary-general, and the inclusion of specific provisions in the Constitutive Treaty. These initiatives were not intended to oppose or antagonize Brazilian positions, but rather to shape them and to strengthen regional integration mechanisms through an approach that sought to reduce the predominance of formulations originating in Brasília.

However, when disagreements between Brazil and Venezuela concerned deeper issues of regional integration, Argentina tended to align with Brazil. In the case of MERCOSUR, Argentina’s support for Venezuela’s accession did not imply endorsement of Chávez’s critiques of the bloc’s integration model (Bernal-Meza, 2008). Likewise, although Argentina joined Venezuela in launching the Bank of the South, it did not exert significant pressure on Brazil regarding delays in making the institution operational (Alves and Biancareli, 2015). Nor did Argentine diplomacy support the Venezuelan approach to security and defense in the debates surrounding the creation of the CDS, where it demonstrated a high degree of alignment with Brazilian positions (Comini, 2015; Nogara, 2026a).

In conclusion, it should be noted that these differences did not imply a Venezuelan rejection of either the CSN or the emerging format of UNASUR, which retained a relatively minimalist structure when compared to the model envisioned by the Venezuelan government, despite the modifications introduced in relation to the CSN. In this sense, the consolidation of UNASUR satisfied the diverse and immediate interests of many countries in the region, thereby enabling the minimum consensus required for its establishment, despite the heterogeneity of positions among South American governments. As highlighted by Sanahuja (2012), UNASUR offered differentiated but complementary benefits to its member states: for countries such as Chile and Colombia, it provided a framework to manage regional tensions, diversify foreign policy, and address security and energy concerns; for Bolivia and Peru, it expanded opportunities for energy integration, market access, and infrastructure development; while for Venezuela, it functioned as a platform to advance its broader regional integration agenda. At the same time, smaller countries such as Uruguay and Paraguay could use the organization to mitigate asymmetries within existing arrangements. More broadly, UNASUR contributed to strengthening regional dialogue, political coordination, and democratic stability, while promoting a more comprehensive integration agenda beyond strictly economic dimensions.

Thus, the implementation of more maximalist and transformative regional integration instruments, such as those proposed by Venezuela, continued to face political obstacles rooted not in any form of geopolitical containment or structural rivalry with Brazilian positions, but rather in their limited capacity to generate consensus among a significant number of neighboring countries. While the progressive cycle altered the regional balance of forces, it did not definitively transform it, nor did it overcome the longstanding structural constraints to the construction of a more cohesive and autonomous regional pole.

In addition to countries with more conservative or moderate strategies, even allies of the Bolivarian coalition, such as Ecuador and Bolivia, expressed reservations about some of the Chavista proposals related to security and infrastructure integration (Briceño-Ruiz, 2015). As Villa and Bragatti (2015) argued, significant differences within ALBA regarding the military structures of countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, in comparison with Cuba and Venezuela, hindered convergence, particularly because the former faced more limited conditions for adopting the model of civil–military integration that prevailed in the latter. In this sense, the proposals that would later shape the creation of the South American Defense Council (CDS) within UNASUR once again reflected a process in which Brazil’s proposals proved more palatable to the diverse interests of the countries in the region, owing to its more flexible structure and greater capacity to generate consensus.

According to Sanahuja (2012), one of the critical factors contributing to UNASUR’s progress was its flexibility and limited demands concerning trade and development strategies, which allowed it to bring together governments of distinct ideological orientations and focus its sectoral cooperation agenda on areas other than trade. This largely explains the success of the integration model articulated by Brasília, which, despite occasional setbacks, managed to consolidate the minimalist and pragmatic framework initially advanced through the CSN, while incorporating an expanded set of modifications in the UNASUR project. By reconciling different currents of opinion within the continent, it secured the workable consensus that was possible in that conjuncture, which strengthened the institution by bringing together all South American countries. However, this model was not without its limitations, which became evident in the subsequent course of events.

Even with a relatively flexible and intergovernmental structure, the organization was capable of formulating firm and coordinated responses to critical situations in the region, as evidenced in the Bolivian crisis of 2008, the diplomatic tensions between Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela, the attempted coup against Rafael Correa, and the political crisis in Paraguay. This capacity was particularly visible in the Bolivian case, where, as later recalled by former Vice President Álvaro García Linera, “it was the presence of UNASUR, of Presidents Kirchner, Chávez, Correa, and Lula, that helped restore democratic order, to deny any form of legitimacy to those fascist groups, and to allow the national government to regain political initiative” (Linera, 2020: 196). More broadly, UNASUR created a space for regional dialogue and crisis management that operated independently of extra-regional powers, allowing South American governments to address their own political and security challenges without direct mediation from institutions historically influenced by the United States. At the same time, it enabled the convergence of distinct integration initiatives, incorporating infrastructure through mechanisms such as COSIPLAN, as well as security and defense through the creation of the South American Defense Council, thereby expanding the scope of regional cooperation beyond traditional economic dimensions.

On the other hand, this same minimalist and consensus-based structure that made UNASUR viable also imposed clear limitations on its operational capacity. The Paraguayan case illustrates these constraints: although the organization’s condemnation of the impeachment of President Fernando Lugo carried significant symbolic weight, it proved insufficient to reverse the process or to effectively contain external influences and institutional pressures. Furthermore, while Venezuelan proposals were often characterized—even by progressive governments such as Brazil—as overly “voluntarist,” it was the Venezuelan government that, despite sanctions, external pressure, and sustained attempts at destabilization, demonstrated greater resilience during the subsequent downturn of the progressive cycle.

The trajectory of this later period is itself revealing: the intense opposition of conservative sectors and external powers to UNASUR underscores the extent to which the organization had come to symbolize the rise of progressive governments in the region. In this sense, despite temporary and issue-specific divergences between Brazil and Venezuela, their combined efforts and eventual convergence were fundamental in consolidating UNASUR within the constraints of the time—anchored in a flexible and moderate institutional design, yet still shaped by the more ambitious and transformative proposals that emerged from Caracas and found resonance across the region.

Conclusion

In sum, the trajectory of UNASUR cannot be reduced to a dispute between competing national projects, but must be understood as the outcome of a specific historical conjuncture marked by the reconfiguration of political forces in the region. The rise of progressive governments, the erosion of open regionalism, and the collapse of the FTAA created the conditions for a redefinition of regional integration agendas. Within this context, the proposals advanced by Brazil and Venezuela did not represent mutually exclusive paths, but rather distinct responses to the same structural constraints. The institutional format ultimately assumed by UNASUR expressed this balance: a product of negotiation between projects with different levels of ambition, shaped by the limits imposed by the regional correlation of forces at the time.

At the same time, these limits were not merely circumstantial, but reflected deeper structural constraints on the consolidation of a more autonomous and cohesive regional pole. The flexible and intergovernmental design that made UNASUR possible also restricted its capacity to advance beyond a certain threshold, particularly in moments of heightened political confrontation. Even so, its creation represented a concrete attempt to expand the margins of maneuver for South American states within the international system. The subsequent dismantling of UNASUR during the downturn of the progressive cycle, driven by the rearticulation of conservative forces and their alignment with external interests, underscores both the fragility of these advances and the extent to which the organization had come to embody a moment—however temporary—of reconfiguration in the region’s patterns of dependence and autonomy.