Learning from the Past for Present Counterinsurgency Conflicts

Changing Positions in Writings about COIN

The complexity of the COIN phenomenon encountered by the United States and its allies, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, necessitates understanding the nature and characteristics of this type of conflict. The American field manual dealing with COIN (FM 3–24) asserts that only a learning organization will be capable of coping efficiently with the COIN phenomenon. ⁹ One of the ways to develop such knowledge is to learn from past wars. This method of activity was not strange to the American army. Already in the Vietnam War a number of studies were written at the request of the American army that dealt with the British experience in Malaya. From the American viewpoint, Britain had succeeded in crushing Communist insurgency in Malaya. ¹⁰ . The clearest evidence for this was the appointment of Sir Robert Thompson as senior adviser to the American Army in Vietnam (1960–1965) in order to activate the pacification programs that had proved their efficacy in Malaya. ¹¹

The Americans also learnt the causes for the failure of the French in Vietnam and Algeria. Here there was the aim to understand the French mistakes, especially in Vietnam, in an attempt to avoid repeating them. ¹² At the same time, translations were made of French literature dealing with the lessons they learnt from the conflicts in Vietnam and Algeria, ¹³ such as the book by Roger Trinquier, a French officer who had garnered a great deal of experience in COIN during his period of service in Indochina and Algeria. ¹⁴ Even today, this book is considered as one of the most important theoretical works in the COIN field. Besides these writings on theoretical and practical issues related to COIN, we can find a wide range of research literature dealing with the phenomenon of insurgency itself with emphasis on the military thinking of Mao and analysis of the insurgency in Southeast Asia. We can also find many articles that were published in the professional journals of the American army such as the Military Review. ¹⁵

A book by David Galula, published in 1964, contained the first systematic discussion of the methods that should be adopted in order to defeat the insurgents. ¹⁶ Through an analysis of a number of test cases and relying on his personal experience acquired as an adviser in China and an officer in Algeria, Galula outlines the strategy and tactics for a successful conduct of COIN. The essential claim he made was the need to make a total attack on the political strength of the revolutionary organization and to obtain the support of the civilian population or at least to prevent them from supporting the insurgents. ¹⁷ Another important book is the one by Robert Thompson who sums up his experiences in Malaya and Vietnam but makes a distinction between the two conflicts. Thompson also defined the political activity that the government should undertake in order to eliminate the insurgency. ¹⁸

The first principle according to Thompson was to construct a political, economic, and social system that would counteract Communist ideology. It should be remembered that Communism in East Asia developed in countries where there had been political and economic crises, and that Communism had offered an ideological alternative that would bring economic and social improvement as well as freedom from the burden of Western colonialism. Therefore a political system should be presented that would eventually lead to the construction of a democratic state with political and economic stability. The second principle is the mechanism for achieving the first principle. The state should carry out a process of democratization within the framework of state laws and try to avoid exerting brutal force toward the civilian population. Thompson adds that even the war against guerrilla fighters should be conducted within a legal framework.

The important books of Galula and Thompson can be defined as military philosophy based on experience. These books are part of a series of studies dealing with the phenomenon of insurgency and the ways to fight against it. ¹⁹ Although the studies mentioned above are not the only ones that provide insights into the efficient conduct of COIN, they are examples through which, by historical analysis, a theoretical basis can be found for what is taking place today. ²⁰ The fact that FM 3–24 counterinsurgency quotes the studies of Galula and Thompson proves the importance and relevance of theories that were written during the 1960s. It also strengthens the claim made by this article that through historical discussion one can derive lessons for contemporary conflicts.

After the Vietnam War and during the course of the 1980s several studies were written about Vietnam, the main aim of which was, among other things, to understand the causes for the political and military failure of the United States in this war but not with a wide perspective that deals with the phenomenon of insurgency and the war against it. These studies were mainly intended for research purposes and not necessarily linked with the lessons that the American army should learn. ²¹ David Fromkin and James Chace claim that: “… the desire to forget Vietnam seems to have given way to a … desire to learn … how to avoid getting involved in such disastrous misadventures again.” ²²

Moreover, although the American army was involved in military conflicts of limited range, after Vietnam the army focused on building and rehabilitating its forces to face a future war against the forces of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. ²³ American military thinking in this period focused mostly upon the development of AirLand Battle (ALB), and during the 1990s a wide range of military philosophy was written in connection with the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA). ²⁴ The Marines also focused in this period on preparing their forces for high-intensive warfare in the European theater (the Norwegian arena as the northern flank of NATO) and integration with the approach of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). ²⁵

These developments undergone by the American army are closely connected with the declaration by President Nixon that would remain as the basis of American foreign policy until the beginning of the 1980s—the Guam Doctrine, better known as the Nixon Doctrine (1969). In this doctrine, the United States stated that it would send out its army only if the conflict involved a state that possessed nuclear weapons, the reference being to the Soviet Union. ²⁶ This neoisolationist policy simplified the task of the army in one sense: the lack of probability that the United States would enter another war except in case of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Therefore the army could focus itself on a possible confrontation with the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe.

During the 1980s, the concept of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) began to enter into use, and it may be claimed that military thinking in the COIN sphere, and now the LIC, did not disappear but was adapted to the roles that the United States had taken upon itself in this decade. ²⁷ The main aim was to help governments (mainly in Latin America) in their war against insurgents. Moreover, military thinking with regard to LIC was marginal as compared with the preparations of most of the military forces of the United States toward all out confrontation in the framework of NATO or as part of the RDF approach. This thinking continued even after Desert Storm in the framework of global politics following the end of the Cold War. The American army incorporated the RMA approach and the ALB doctrine deriving from it, and had created the concepts of Transformation and the Joint Operations approach. ²⁸

During the 1990s, the United States armed forces had been involved in a series of peacekeeping expeditions that did not necessitate utilization of the army in military operations as it had been in Vietnam. A new concept was now adopted: Stability and Support Operations (SASO). ²⁹ Mark Moyar asserts at the beginning of his book that: “In 1999, Americans view counterinsurgency as passé, as interests only to antiquarians ….” ³⁰

Significant change began only after the conventional stages in Afghanistan and Iraq were ended, that is to say during 2003. At present there is a renaissance in writings about COIN in military journals, as well as in writing about military doctrines. For example, the journal Military Review edited two special issues (2006 and 2008) in which many articles were collected on a variety of subjects (historical and contemporary) associated with COIN that had been published in the journal since 2004. ³¹

Clear evidence for this is the FM 3–24 that bore the heading counterinsurgency. This was issued in view of the neglect of this concept in the years following the Vietnam War and the adoption of a series of other concepts (although of a similar nature) such as LIC, the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and SASO. We can therefore explain the study published by the Center of Military History of the American Army that examined the American experience in COIN in its wider definition during the years from the end of World War II until after the Vietnam War. ³² This is further evidence of American determination that learning about the past was vital for understanding and creating the methods of action for present needs. The Center of Military History research is one more in the series of theoretical and historical studies carried out by the RAND Corporation for the Department of Defense. These studies deal with various aspects of COIN and with the lessons that can be derived from the different COIN campaigns, including that of Vietnam. ³³ Moreover, it is necessary to reread the works written during the 1950s and 1960s and to consider them as military theory so as to find out how they can be adapted to present-day realities.

The Chieu Hoi Program: Operational Contribution of the Defectors

After a suspension of about two months in the Chieu Hoi centers, the Hoi Chanh had two options. The first was to return to his village and his family. The second was to join the fighting forces in their various frameworks, either the army of South Vietnam, or of the United States (as trackers in the Kit Carson Scout Program), or in the various militia units. 20% of the defectors (about 30,000) found ways to join military or paramilitary bodies. Sir Robert Thompson claimed that this was the best service that the government could derive from those who had defected from the Communist ranks and rejoined the government forces. ³⁴ General Westmoreland and his officers, who were searching for the turning point at which the rate of Viet Cong losses would exceed the number of recruits, also took into account the number of defectors. This was because defection was damaging to the manpower strength of the Viet Cong. The guiding line in using former Viet Cong fighters was their knowledge of the field and the techniques of action of the Viet Cong units. The Chieu Hoi program director, Eugene Bable, wrote in August 1970 that:

The priority for exploitation of Hoi Chanh is intelligence and tactical, psychological operations, and public information. ³⁵

How Was This Directive Carried Out in Practice?

Until 1968 the Intelligence Department (J-2) of MACV focused on intelligence gathering on the large Viet Cong units and on those of the North Vietnamese army. ³⁶ In the course of 1965, the estimate was that the war in Vietnam would soon turn into a conventional one. Therefore the various intelligence units acted according to the principles of the “field guide” for military intelligence (FM 30–5 Combat Intelligence). This guide was meant for gathering intelligence in High Intensity Conflict, which means in a future war against the Soviet Union in a European arena and with the experience amassed in the Korean War. No efforts were expended at all in obtaining information at the low tactical level, that is, the village level. ³⁷ The importance of this information was made clear after Tet. One of the most severe problems that faced the units fighting against the Viet Cong was obtaining information in “real time” regarding the immediate intentions of the various Viet Cong units and the hiding places of these units. The character of the war in Vietnam as a guerrilla war prevented the massive and efficient use of electronic means of information. There was not much value in aerial photography or monitoring radio broadcasts, even though these techniques were used. The type of action by the American army, the tactics of “search and destroy” required precise and pinpointed information about the location of the Viet Cong units with the aim of avoiding ambush, and as far as possible, to set successful ambushes.

Besides the information regarding the location of the enemy, there was also the need to know his strength, abilities, and vulnerable points. ³⁸ Such information could be obtained mainly by the use of human intelligence sources (HUMINT). ³⁹ On this issue as well one can see the power struggle between MACV and CORDS. While the army tried to estimate the overall number of Communist fighters in the south, CORDS claimed that information should be obtained about the location of every unit at the platoon and squad level and not at the brigade and battalion level. But until after Tet there was no agreement in the American command regarding the right and efficient use of information that the Hoi Chanh could provide. Until after Tet, defectors were not required to provide intelligence information. Everything was dependent upon the good will of the defectors, and they received additional bonuses for the intelligence information they supplied. ⁴⁰

The institutional use of the Hoi Chanh as an intelligence source can be seen in a document prepared in MACV in April 1969, the contents of which dealt with human sources as a source for military intelligence. ⁴¹ The document claimed what was self-understood, that a human source was an important one for obtaining information because of its access to knowledge regarding the enemy, knowledge of the area, the hiding places of the guerrilla fighter, and their methods of action. ⁴² This document indicated the methods that should be adopted in order to obtain intelligence information from human sources. It also prescribed that interrogation should be carried out immediately after a defection so as to gain intelligence. The commander should then act in two parallels ways, firstly by taking immediate advantage of the information for the benefit of attack by his unit, and at the same time to send all the information to the higher command levels.

The order that emerged from the American assistance headquarters in Vietnam was not the first one on the issue of obtaining information from defectors. Already in January 1969, the headquarters of the I Field Force in MR-2 issued a similar order. ⁴³ The area of responsibility and control of I Field Force was the central highlands region. ⁴⁴ This region was of strategic importance for the forces of the North Vietnamese army. North Vietnam strategy regarded the central highlands region as a springboard for the conquest of all South Vietnam. The plan of the North Vietnamese was to act from bases in Cambodia and to move eastwards in the direction of the South China Sea so as to cut South Vietnam into two parts. ⁴⁵ I Field Force was in fact a secondary command in MR-2, which was responsible for thwarting the Communist plan through carrying out battle actions against the supply units and convoys passing along the Ho Chi Minh route. These actions demanded reliable intelligence sources as well as people who knew the territory and the lines of the supply route. With the escalation of the war, especially after the Tet offensive, new patterns of action were required. But in fact the new instructions only institutionalized the local initiatives of the various units throughout South Vietnam. ⁴⁶

An excellent example for local initiative can be found in the memorandum sent by the intelligence officer of one of the Special Forces units to CHD in Saigon. ⁴⁷ The memorandum reviews the actions of the unit in the period between February 21 and March 20, 1969. ⁴⁸ During the interrogation of the defectors, one of them noted the conjectured location of a prison camp. ⁴⁹ Within three days the unit organized a foray against that target with the defector serving as guide. The memorandum notes that the site was empty, but a battle ensued during which 13 Viet Cong fighters were killed and various kinds of weaponry were seized. According to the intelligence officer, the information supplied by the defector was exact, and the fact that the prison camp was empty did not prove that this was an attempt to draw the unit into an ambush. ⁵⁰ Moreover, a successful attempt was made to evacuate the family of the defector to safety, and according to the office, another action was planned in which the defector would serve as a guide.

Intelligence

Major General Joseph McChristian, the intelligence officer of MACV (July 1965–June 1967), noted the great importance of obtaining human information. ⁵¹ Although the forces of the United States and of South Vietnam derived their intelligence information from prisoners of war but the sources of information from defectors were more important. A prisoner of war was usually a Communist activist of the lower ranks, whose knowledge about the Viet Cong was limited to the village level only. In the framework of the Chieu Hoi Program (CHP) there were often defectors who were political cadres of higher command levels in the Viet Cong with considerable knowledge about the chain of command and methods of action.

To complete the picture about the importance of intelligence information for the actions of American army units, two additional examples can be brought. In January 1967, the Intelligence Department of MACV published a document summarizing the tactics used by the Viet Cong for setting ambushes. The document, in reviewing the sources of information that helped to compose this guide, mentioned the human sources, that is, the defectors. ⁵² The preferred tactics of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese units was to besiege an isolated unit (in many cases a Special Forces base) and to lay ambushes on the access roads to that isolated base. This technique worked well against the French (1954–1946) and against South Vietnamese army units until 1965. As part of their understanding of Communist methods of action by the forces of the United States, the activities of airborne units by helicopter were developed and improved. ⁵³

Another important use of intelligence information was in locating the secret underground tunnels of the Viet Cong. These underground tunnels were mainly situated in the region called the Iron Triangle, about thirty kilometers northeast of Saigon, in MR-3. These were in fact a labyrinthine maze of underground bases from which the Viet Cong emerged for their guerrilla activities. ⁵⁴ In this area some of the largest operations in the Vietnam War were conducted with the engagement of many forces. From the moment that a Viet Cong force encountered a superior American force, the guerrilla fighters disappeared into the underground tunnels. They frequently appeared behind the American force to surprise them. Artillery fire and even the use of B-52 bombers were often useless since these tunnels were very deep and could absorb the shock waves. The American units were sometimes forced to send soldiers into the tunnels in order to clear out the “tunnel rats.” ⁵⁵ The problem of the United States forces was to locate these hidden tunnels, to find their way in the maze of tunnels, and avoid surprise traps. Therefore enormous value was placed upon any intelligence information that would lead to the location of the entrances to these tunnels. Two large operations were conducted at the beginning of 1967 to clear the “iron triangle.” ⁵⁶ In these two operations, extensive use was made of the defectors from the Viet Cong who were recruited into the United States Army in the KCSP framework.

One may define the intelligence and the tactical use of the defectors as a military derivation of CHP. But from the more precise implications of the documents that note the various military possibilities of the Hoi Chanh, one may infer an additional conclusion. Throughout the Vietnam War CORDS fought for its image and its existential purpose. The copious correspondence conducted between CORDS and MACV extols the military importance of the defectors. The struggle was against the military ranks of MACV and the policymakers in Washington who demanded increased warfare against the Viet Cong, often at the expense of civilian activities. This was a demand for immediate successes that could be quantified such as a high number of those killed or captured, defectors, and seized weaponry. The quantification of the war was in order to show results and positive developments of the war, and that the United States was the winner. CORDS, in noting the military value that could be derived from the defectors, directly pointed to the importance of CHP for the war effort of the United States in Vietnam, and that this program offered a critical contribution to the success of the military efforts. There can be no doubt that at least some of the CORDS members understood that if there were no military aspect that could indicate immediate success on the battlefield, the fate of the civilian programs was doomed.

We therefore find many documents in the CHD files that are in fact fortnightly, monthly, quarterly, and annual reports that sum up the number of defectors in comparison with parallel periods in previous years. CORDS thus created a system that tried to examine the progress of the program by statistical measurements with the aim of suiting itself to the perception of Westmoreland. As said earlier, this perception was that the war of attrition would reach the stage in which the losses of the Communists would outnumber the fighters they were able to recruit. CORDS therefore integrated, within the statistics of defection, the calculations for achieving a “turning point” in the war.

Evaluation of the Program and the Viet Cong Attitude towards It

The attempts to evaluate the efficiency or success of the program are problematic for two reasons. Firstly, there is the problem that derives from the fact that the plan was never officially ended. During the course of 1971, the United States transferred the program to the responsibility of South Vietnam as part of their Vietnamization policy. The American documents ceased enumerating the monthly rate of deserters from October 1971. After this, no further documents were found dealing with the program. The second reason derives from the change in the character of the Vietnam War after the Tet Offensive. This offensive fatally affected the strength of the Viet Cong, and from the summer of 1968 it was possible to discern reinforced military intervention by the North Vietnamese army. Thus, despite the fact that one can speak about the official beginning of the program, one cannot say when it ended. In my opinion, the right way to examine and evaluate the general efficiency of the program is from the viewpoint of its aim, that is, the Viet Cong.

From a reading of the American documents, especially those that came from CORDS, it appears that the program was efficient and achieved its aims. But was the enemy, the Viet Cong, in agreement with this estimate? In other words, did the Viet Cong regard the program as a strategic threat by its very existence? Two studies were published in May 1966 and September 1967 that dealt with the estimation of CHP as seen by the Viet Cong. ⁵⁷ These two studies based their conclusions on interviews conducted with defectors and prisoners of war, and to a lesser extent—on Communist documents that were seized during military operations.

The interviews with defectors provided a wealth of information about the thinking processes of the ordinary Viet Cong fighter, and also described the measures taken by the commanders of the organization to prevent defection. This was generally done through intimidation—the defectors would suffer a bitter fate, they would be thrown into prison, undergo torture, and finally be executed. It could therefore be claimed that the Viet Cong command identified the great danger posed by the CHP and devoted much effort in tightening their control over their soldiers and on their sources of information. The political cadres learnt that the Chieu Hoi program was an attractive program for the fighters of the lower ranks, since it provided for all their needs such as shelter, food, medical care, clothing, and also saved them from the threat of the US army, particularly from the giant B-52 bombers. This weapon was the most threatening one both because one could not anticipate or hear the arrival of the bomber and because of the intensity of the bombing (“carpet bombing”), which did not allow one to find anywhere to hide, since bunkers and tunnels did not always offer sufficient protection. ⁵⁸

Contrary to its attractiveness to the lower ranks of the Viet Cong, CHP was not attractive to the higher command levels of the organization. To this must be added the fact that the government of South Vietnam found it difficult to integrate the political cadres who defected from the Viet Cong into the political system of the south. Nevertheless, defection from the Viet Cong caused serious morale and operational damage to the organizations, which eventually also had an influence on the higher ranks. This was the main reason why Communist counter-propaganda focused upon the intimidation of potential defectors. ⁵⁹

Three documents of the Viet Cong, which were captured by American intelligence and concerned the ways that the political cadres of the organization could cope with the problem of defections, are worth a detailed review. The first document divided those who defected in the CHP program into three groups. ⁶⁰ In the first group were defectors who transmitted intelligence information to the enemy. These defectors were considered as traitors, and as such should be eliminated. The second group consisted of those who had made short-range contact with the enemy. Since it was not clear what was the degree of damage they had caused, it was determined that their movements should be followed to prevent them from causing further harm. In the third group, there were those who had not made any contact with the enemy but should be followed in order to see if their behavior showed signs that tended toward defection. From this document, it may be understood that defection was considered as an existential threat to the Viet Cong. Since every fighter was exposed to the propaganda material of the program and there was a danger at one stage or another that he would defect, strict supervision was necessary, which led to mistrust between the commander and the fighters. The document speaks explicitly of the elimination of the fighter who defects and joins the enemy forces. It also determines the standard for distinguishing between the first and second groups–the period of time that the defector remained among the security forces of the South Vietnamese army. The longer this period was, the greater the danger it reflected.

The other two documents that testify to the danger the Viet Cong saw in the defection program are presented as appendices to the studies by the RAND corporation researchers, Carrier and Thompson. ⁶¹ The first document is from November 1965 and the second one from January 1966. The first document states firmly that the system of psychological warfare and CHP were a serious threat to the Viet Cong and “These psychological warfare (Chieu Hoi) activities of the enemy have affected the morale of the people and our armed forces (especially the guerrillas).” ⁶²

Two main subjects appear in this document. The first describes American psychological warfare. According to this description, after intensive military activity in a certain area, the propaganda agents of the enemy began their work, mainly among the villagers in that area, and their propaganda was based on lies. Their main method of action was to gather the families of the Viet Cong fighters and describe the CHP and its victories. According to the document, the transmission of information was carried out by force and the aim was to induce the family members to tell their sons serving in the Viet Cong about the program and thereby cause them to defect. ⁶³ The second subject in this document was a description of the ways to defend themselves against enemy propaganda and the pressure exerted on the families of the Viet Cong fighters.

The document details four methods of defense: ⁶⁴ First studying the enemy’s methods of action and instructing the fighters on how to cope with them. Second, tightened supervision and monitoring by the political and military cadres so that any decrease in morale and motivation can be quickly detected and be treated by team and division dialogues. The third method was supervision and protection of the families of fighters and cadres, and the fourth was development of programs by the political level against South Vietnamese and American propaganda.

As mentioned above, the programs that were developed were based on intimidation and not on an attempt to increase the ideological motivation of the fighters. The second document is more detailed and includes the following subjects. ⁶⁵

The first subject was the danger that defection causes to the Viet Cong organizational, political, and military system, to its operational ability, and to the transfer of intelligence information to the enemy that will harm the Viet Cong. The second subject was the enemy method of operation, with stress upon the physical and mental difficulties of the fighter. The third subject was defensive measures such as the establishment of defense committees, the identification of situations and trends that will lead to defection, and reports on suspicious events to the defense committee and the command staff.

The document states as a basic assumption that it was necessary to explain to the fighter that the difficulties they faced, which were so much emphasized in the propaganda leaflets, were only temporary, and would end with the final victory over enemy forces. The defense committees were also instructed that the main aim was to prevent defection and to try and minimize the damage caused by previous defections. In this document as well it was said explicitly that those who came into contact with the enemy should be supervised, and especially those who returned from leaves to their villages or had fallen captive to the enemy and managed to escape. It was also said that any soldier who had stayed for some time among the enemy and returned to his unit should be watched. This last point needs clarification.

The harshest criticism made by critics of the defection program on the American side was that the Viet Cong made use of the program centers as rest centers. This means that the fighter or group of fighters “defected” in order to receive the grants due to them and thus provide economic assistance to their families. They were able to get rest, better food, and medical care, and after recovery they returned to their units. ⁶⁶ Contrary to what was said in this criticism, the conclusion that can be made from the three Viet Cong documents reviewed above was that the Viet Cong command was afraid of any contact between its fighters and the South Vietnamese authorities. The instructions to supervise those who came into contact with the south, or fell captive, imply that the Viet Cong did not encourage “recreation” for their soldiers in CHP centers. Another proof that the CHP centers did not serve as “holiday camps” was the fact that they were one of the preferred objectives for attack by the Viet Cong. It is therefore clear from these documents as well as from the studies based on interviews with defectors that CHP constituted a threat to the Viet Cong, and that in spite of the considerable criticism against the program, the defection of many fighters damaged the operational ability of the organization.

Conclusion

This article examined one of the main pacification programs that the United States activated during the Vietnam War. In spite of the importance of the program, it is mentioned only in passing by the various studies written about the war and American involvement in it. The program aimed at persuading Viet Cong fighters to defect, and therefore it may be said that the program had two closely connected functions: a civilian and a military one. These two functions were meant to serve the overall aim of eliminating the Communist guerrillas through damaging the popular infrastructure of the Viet Cong. The civilian aspect of the program was to break off the contact between the rural population and the guerrilla fighters. This was done by providing security for the population against the terror imposed by the Viet Cong and also to improve their living standards, which would motivate the villagers to support the government of South Vietnam and not the Communist shadow government. The military aspect of the program was clear: to crush the military infrastructure of the Viet Cong in the village areas. The “philosophy” behind CHP was that in order to induce the guerrilla fighter to defect, it was first necessary to gain access to him. Contact was created through direct means, such as Armed Propaganda Teams (APT), and indirectly, mainly by propaganda leaflets that were scattered in their millions over South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. During the course of the Vietnam War, 798 different types of leaflets were used, of which 367 (46 percent of all the leaflets) presented the CHP. ⁶⁷

The Chieu Hoi program offered an active mechanism that damaged the ability of the Viet Cong to carry out their campaign from the aspect of motivation and of fighter morale. The program was directed against the fighters of the organization, and was not intended for the senior military and political ranks. This was where the secret power of the program lay and the ability to activate it in other places. The lower ranks of the fighters would not necessarily be subject to ideological influence as were the higher ranks. Anthropological and sociological studies carried out during the 1960s found that many farmers enlisted in the Viet Cong in order to improve their socioeconomic situation. ⁶⁸ A review of the economic data of Iraq and Afghanistan will show that the promise of pardon in lieu of desertion would lead to monetary grants and economic aid and improve the standard of living for the deserter.

In order to do this more efficiently, it was firstly necessary to understand what the factors were that caused this citizen, whether rural or urban, to enlist in the various organizations. Today, American intelligence is capable of identifying the main insurgency groups, defining their characteristics, and finding out the resemblances and differences among them. For example, one can distinguish six main groups active today in Afghanistan. ⁶⁹ The first was a regrouping of the Taliban forces mainly in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. The Hezbi Islami and the Haqqani network organizations are two extremist Islamic groups linked in some degree or other with the Taliban and active in the northern and central regions of Afghanistan. The fourth group is a merging of foreign fighters (of Arab and Central Asian origin) who arrived as individuals or groups to join local Islamic forces, with Al Qaeda as the main group. ⁷⁰ The fifth group is composed of tribes, mainly the Pashtun living on both sides of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These tribes provide assistance to insurgents such as the Taliban. ⁷¹ Thomas Hammes claims that any political solution in Afghanistan requires an understanding of the tribal–political structure of Afghan society, and that no agreement is possible without the tribal groups as partners. According to him, the main problem that the Soviets ignored in the 1980s was the fact that they tried to impose a Communist regime without understanding the complexity of Afghan society and the patriarchal political tendencies of the various ethnic groups. ⁷² There is no doubt that the key to achieving political stability in Afghanistan lies in an understanding of the tribal structure and the political tendencies of each and every ethnic-tribal group. The sixth group is comprised of criminal organizations engaged in the opium trade and smuggling it to the West in cooperation with the Taliban who use the profits to finance their activities. ⁷³ The distribution of the drugs in itself also constituted, in the view of the Muslim extremists, as a weapon against corrupt and decadent Western societies.

This basic division requires a more detailed subdivision, especially with regard to the socioethnic network of the tribes. ⁷⁴ Only after it is understood that Afghan society is not homogeneous and that each group has its own unique socioeconomic and political characteristics can it be possible to create a pacification system relevant to every group. ⁷⁵ It may be that for the Pashtun tribes it will be necessary to activate more civilian programs, and to emphasize the military option against the groups of foreign fighters since these are not part of the indigent Afghan society.

The army and civilian agencies operating within a military framework must act together in order to construct an efficient COIN campaign. Such cooperation can present the advantages that each body brings to supplement the other. COIN theories refer to the unity of efforts, which means integration between warfare and political and civilian activity. ⁷⁶ The army must therefore continue to provide protection by aggressive initiatives against the armed insurgents. After relative security is obtained within a certain area of activity, sometimes even in parallel with military activity, the civilian agencies can begin to act. This operational pattern was the basis for the Moshtarak campaign which deployed ISAF forces in mid-February 2010. The aim of this campaign was to purge the Marjah urban region (Helmand District, Southern Afghanistan) of the presence of Taliban forces (the military aspect) and afterwards to establish the forces of the Afghan government in the area (the political–civilian aspect).

This article presented a program that was the responsibility of a civilian agency (CORDS) but which was under military command (MACV). In effect, the desertion program, whether local or general, presented a combination of military and civilian efforts for a unified COIN program. The article also pointed out the fact that a program of this kind was a direct contribution to military efforts. ⁷⁷

Of course, the program that was activated in Vietnam should not be directly imposed upon the unique political and military realities found in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, this article proposes to review and learn the lessons that military history presents before us in general and those of the COIN campaigns and the Vietnam War in particular. The study of military history together with an understanding of the environment of military activities can created a methodological system that will allow us to distill the lessons that will be relevant to the COIN realities now facing the United States and its allies.

The main claim made by the writer of these lines is that the CHP may be regarded as a microcosm of the Vietnam War. The program was part of a whole complex of pacification programs in which elements of psychological warfare were integrated, and the operational aspects of which made an important contribution to the tactical success of the search-and-destroy actions derived from the attrition strategy of General Westmoreland. Proof of the success of the program can be found in the statements of the Viet Cong that the program was a strategic threat to their organization both politically and operationally. The program also constituted the essence of the dispute between those who promoted the “civilian” line in CORDS and those who promoted the “military” line in MACV. Throughout the course of the war, the civilian agencies, with CORDS as their overall framework, were in a defensive position vis-à-vis the focus on military efforts by the United States in Vietnam. From a reading of the documents of CORDS and its subsidiary departments, mainly CHD, it appears that there was an attempt, sometimes even desperate ones, to justify the existence of CORDS. This fact is especially obvious in the desire of CORDS to “speak” in the language of MACV. Did the number of defectors, which were measured at weekly and sometimes even daily rates, depend on military activity in this or that region, or was defection a reaction to the pacification programs? Or was it a combination of the two … an iron fist in a velvet glove?