Abstract
Armed Forces and Society recently published an article, “Intra-Military Division and Democratization in South Korea” by Insoo Kim. In the article, Kim argues that economic development and civil society explanations for South Korea’s democratization are not sufficient because conflict in the military undermined the ability of Chun’s government to suppress the democracy movement, which made the transition possible. We refute Kim’s argument because economic development clearly made significant contribution to South Korea’s democratization by enhancing education attainment and facilitating industrialization and urbanization. Moreover, there is no clear evidence of schism in the military or among political elites, and the authoritarian leader Chun Doo-hwan agreed to change the presidential election system based on his political calculation.
Armed Forces and Society recently published an article, “Intra-Military Division and Democratization in South Korea” by Insoo Kim. 1 According to the article, previous studies on South Korea’s democratization attribute the successful transition to democracy to two factors: (1) economic development and (2) the role of civil society. However, Kim argues the positive effects of economic development, the so-called modernization theory, alone cannot explain the South Korean case. The reason is modernization theory expects that a military coup would not succeed once the country passes a threshold level of economic development. For instance, Samuel Huntington wrote, “countries with per-capita GNP’s of $1,000 or more do not have successful coups; countries with per capita GNP’s of $3,000 or more do not have coup attempts.” 2 However, South Korea’s per capita gross national product (GNP) was almost $2,000 when Chun Doo-hwan came to power through a military coup in 1979. Thus, Kim contends that economic development alone cannot explain the transition to democracy in South Korea.
Kim also argues that civil society’s contribution to democratization is not sufficient to explain the successful transition in South Korea because a cohesive military can suppress democracy movements and stop civil societies regardless of their number and size. 3 Civil society was able to play a significant role in South Korea’s transition to democracy because there was serious intra-military conflict. The South Korean military during Chun Doo-hwan’s rule practiced unfair promotion policies, favoring a small group of Korea Military Academy (KMA) graduates called Hana faction. Faction members received preferential treatment in promotions and were highly sought after for military leadership positions. These discriminatory promotion policies damaged cohesion within the military and the non-Hana faction KMA graduates gradually became dissatisfied with the military leadership. As a result, they resisted their Hana faction superiors, and this schism in the military, according to Kim, undermined the authoritarian Chun Doo-hwan administration’s ability to stop the transition to democracy, which made democratization possible in South Korea.
Kim’s argument has four flaws. First, the transition to democracy in South Korea occurred in 1987 when authoritarian leader Chun Doo-hwan and his handpicked successor Roh Tae-woo accepted the public’s demand for changing the presidential election system from selecting the president through an electoral college to a direct popular election system. As a result, a popular presidential election was held in December 1987. To analyze whether economic development played a significant role in South Korea’s democratization, one should study pre-1987 socioeconomic conditions and its effects on the democratization process. Yet, Kim cites Chun Doo-hwan’s successful military coup in 1979 as a reason to dismiss modernization theory on the grounds that South Korea was enjoying higher economic prosperity than Huntington’s threshold level of economic development for coup failure.
Furthermore, Kim makes the mistake of assuming Huntington’s argument as an iron law. Huntington simply meant that countries enjoying per capita GNP of $1,000 or more are unlikely to experience a successful military coup because that stage of economic development is often coupled with the level of education and industrialization high enough to make it difficult for a military coup to succeed. In addition, modernization theory does not claim that economic development is the necessary and sufficient condition for a transition to democracy in every country. Instead, modernization theory posits that economic prosperity tends to facilitate the transition to democracy in most countries through various channels for different theoretical reasons. In general, social science theories have exceptions and the South Korean case is one of them for Huntington’s claim.
Second, Kim’s argument implies that if non-Hana faction military officers had supported the military leadership, the Chun administration could have suppressed the democracy movement to prevent the transition to democracy. However, public demand for democracy at that time was extremely high because of the death of college student protester Park Jong-chul. He was arrested and killed while tortured during police interrogation. His death led tens of thousands of people taking to the streets in massive demonstrations all over the country. Chun Doo-hwan witnessed the consequences when President Park Chung-hee tried to quell nationwide protests for democracy in the late 1970s. 4 In addition, there was heavy US pressure on the Chun administration not to use military force to suppress the protest due to what Chun Doo-hwan had done during the Kwangju massacre. 5 It is likely that Chun Doo-hwan was hesitant to continue to oppress the demand for democracy regardless of military cohesion. 6
Third, Kim does not provide an explanation on how non-Hana faction military officers resisted their Hana faction superiors and why this was a problem to the Chun administration in terms of stopping protests for democracy. According to Yun, Chun maintained strong control of the military throughout his tenure even when the country was unstable due to the nationwide protests for democracy in 1987. Moreover, there was no visible challenge to President Chun or known conflict within the military or the ruling bloc while Chun Doo-hwan was in office. 7 Since the main thesis of the article is that the cleavage in the military undermined the Chun government’s ability to stop democratization, it is necessary to provide convincing evidence of intra-military division and the explanation on how this division prevented the Chun administration from stopping the transition to democracy.
Fourth, the critical juncture in South Korea’s transition to democracy was the announcement by President Chun Doo-hwan’s designated successor Roh Tae-woo on June 29, 1987, that a popular election would be held for the next presidency. This was a critical change because, while an electoral college system would almost guarantee Roh’s victory, a popular election would likely mean Roh’s defeat. Despite the possibility of losing in the presidential election, Roh Tae-woo agreed to change the presidential election system. Why? The reason might be because Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo assumed that dissident leaders Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung would fail to unify and both would run for the presidency. In that case, the opposition vote will split and Roh would have a good chance to win the election. In other words, authoritarian leader Chun Doo-hwan and his handpicked successor Roh Tae-woo willingly accepted the transition to democracy based on their political scheming. 8
For these reasons, Kim’s argument that intra-military division handicapped the authoritarian Chun administration, which made the transition to democracy possible, does not seem to be convincing. The purpose of this article is to provide another view on the effects of economic development and the role of the military in South Korea’s democratization along with whether factional divisions in the military prevented the authoritarian Chun government from obstructing the transition to democracy. To this end, we describe how economic development helped democratization in South Korea followed by discussions on the democratization process to argue that there were no significant divisions in the military or other challenges to the Chun administration, and changing the presidential election system was based on the political calculations of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo.
Economic Development and Democratization
Theoretically, economic development can help the transition to democracy through enhancement of education, growth in the middle class, and the spread of information and communication. 9 Economic development allows citizens to invest more in education, which enhances the quality of human capital by raising literacy rates and education levels. Educated people better comprehend their political rights and national governance. Thus, they demand democracy because a democratic government system provides the best political environment for their rights. 10 In other words, economic development facilitates political and social modernization through education enhancement. 11
In South Korea, economic development had a clearly positive effect on education attainment due to the Korean culture that has high respect for education. Economic resources generated from development were reinvested in education. Improved education laid the foundation for democratic principles and institutions, prompting changes in political behavior and attitudes. 12 For instance, in 1970, South Korea’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was about $279 and only 20.3 percent of the high school age population was enrolled in school. But, as South Korea’s per capita GDP rose to $6,153 in 1990, the proportion rose to 79.4. Those who received tertiary education also increased significantly from a mere 5.4 percent to 23.6 percent in the same time period. 13 Considering the role of college students and middle-class citizens’ participation in South Korea’s protests for democracy, heightened education attainment enabled by economic development made a significant contribution to South Korea’s democratization.
Economic development also leads to industrialization. As a society industrializes, the number of workers increases, urbanization occurs, and the size of the middle class becomes larger. Industrialization also allows people to have better access to information on other nations than before. The information may include democratic political systems and human rights practice which will undermine the legitimacy of nondemocratic rule. 14 As the enlarged middle class demands political liberalization, favoring a pluralistic society, political pressure on authoritarian leaders escalates. In this changed political environment, authoritarian leaders tend to emulate democracies to survive by employing limited political and economic reforms. Norberg nicely summarizes the theoretical link between economic development and democratization: “The accelerating spread of information and ideas throughout the world, coupled with rising education standards and growing prosperity, is prompting demands for genuine political rights.” 15
South Korea’s economic development program brought industrialization and urbanization. 16 For example, in 1970 agriculture and fishing were responsible for 36.8 percent of GDP and only 41.2 percent of the population lived in urban areas. A mere 22.9 percent of GDP came from the manufacturing and construction industries that year. In 1990, however, 38.6 percent of GDP was attributable to the manufacturing and construction sectors, whereas the share of GDP from agriculture and fishing dropped to 8.9 percent. 17 During the same time period the urban population skyrocketed, from 50.2 percent of total population in 1970 to 81.9 percent. 18 Moreover, the population employed in the manufacturing sector in 1979 was a little over 3 million, but this number increased to over 4 million in 1987, showing a more than 25 percent increase. 19 Economic development clearly brought industrialization and urbanization to South Korea, which helped the transition to democracy as all the protests demanding the transition occurred in urban areas, and industrial workers were a significant share of those who participated in the demonstrations.
Transition to Democracy in South Korea
Since Park Chung-hee came to power through a military coup in 1961, public demand for democracy continued until a democratic government was installed in 1987. When President Park was assassinated in 1979, the Korean people expected democracy, but Chun Doo-hwan destroyed the public dream with another military coup in December 1979. In September 1980, Chun Doo-hwan became the 11th president after being elected by the National Congress for Unification, South Korea’s version of an electoral college. In 1981, he changed the national constitution with the indirect election of the president by electoral college, while limiting the presidential term to nonrenewable seven years. He also created the Democratic Justice Party and ran for president. 20 After becoming the 12th president in February 1981, he purged all the politicians who were not sympathetic to him and his loyal followers, Hana faction members. 21 Chun Doo-hwan also brutally suppressed democracy movement in Kwangju, killing and injuring about 5,000 people. 22
Since Chun Doo-hwan came to power through a military coup, demands for democracy continued throughout his tenure. As President Chun’s term was coming to an end, demand for democracy significantly increased. For instance, on October 28, 1986, college students occupied Kon-kuk University demanding democracy. Riot police went to the campus and broke up the protests, arresting approximately 1,200 students and indicting about 80 of them for being communists. In January 1987, Seoul National University student Park Jong-chul was killed during his police interrogation. The Chun government tried to cover it up, but it was later revealed that Park Jong-chul was killed by torture. Thousands of people went to the streets to protest for a ban on torture and to demand democracy including a constitutional amendment to change the presidential election from an electoral college system to direct popular election. 23
Despite these demands, on April 13, 1987, President Chun declared a public ban on any political discussion of constitutional revision for a direct presidential election. In the announcement, he also proposed to postpone any dialogue on constitutional revision until after the 1987 election and the end of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Chun believed the constitutional debate was not constructive and would result in social disorder that might endanger a peaceful power transition and jeopardize a successful hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games.
Strong resistance followed. Moderate intellectuals and middle-class citizens joined the protest demanding constitutional revisions. Beginning with thirty professors at Korea University on April 22, thousands of intellectuals including professors, religious leaders, literary persons, and artists issued statements giving their views on the situation and urging a direct presidential election. 24 In addition, the opposition Reunification Democratic Party and representatives of broad sectors of social movements organized the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC) in May 1987 as the umbrella organization to lead the democracy movement. On June 10, the NCDC organized the “People’s Rally to Denounce the Cover-up of the Torture-Murder and the Scheme to Maintain the Current Constitution.” Approximately 240,000 people from twenty-two cities joined the demonstration. Protests spread all over the country, which peaked in the “grand peace march” on June 26, 1987, during which over a million people from thirty-four cities participated. 25
In addition, this time the United States was firmly behind the democracy movement. Due to the confrontational nature of the Cold War and the hostility between the two Koreas, the US government traditionally supported the Korean government, preferring stability over political reform in South Korea. However, since hundreds of thousands of middle-class citizens took part in the democratic movements in 1987, Washington could not take its usual position. The US government realized that dissatisfaction with the authoritarian Chun regime was not confined to radical students, labor, dissident groups, or opposition forces; now, the majority of the South Korean population desired a democratic system of government. Facing the outbursts of mass demonstrations and the peoples’ increasing demand for democratization, Washington put pressure on the Chun government not to use military force or declare martial law to deal with the protests. To clearly express Washington’s opposition to any type of military intervention, Assistant Secretary of State, Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., visited Seoul on June 23, 1987. 26 It was difficult for Chun to use the military against Washington’s wishes. 27
In the face of continuing mass demonstrations, the authoritarian regime had two options: mobilize troops to quell the demonstrations or make concessions to the opposition forces. According to knowledgeable politicians and foreign diplomats, during this tense time, South Korea had come much closer to military intervention than most people ever realized. 28 However, President Chun was unable to call the troops into the streets for a number of reasons. First, Chun Doo-hwan witnessed the consequences of Park Chung-hee’s attempt to suppress nationwide protests for democracy. Park’s administration was divided between the hawks who preferred the use of military force against the demonstrators and the doves who recommended political liberalization and accepting some of the protestors demands. Eventually, Park Chung-hee was assassinated as his government struggled with how it should respond. Chun Doo-hwan did not wish to have a similar fate. Moreover, he was well aware of the aftermath of the military crackdown due to the Kwangju massacre in 1980. It was impossible for him to obtain political legitimacy after the crackdown; another use of military force to suppress dissent would only make this worse.
Second, Chun and all South Koreans wanted successful hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games but feared international public opinion and the media would react negatively if military force was used to suppress the public demand for democracy. Thus, Chun would have faced a number of serious consequences if he chose to employ military force to crackdown on the democracy movement.
On June 29, Roh Tae-woo, the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Justice Party announced an eight-point democratization package that included revising the constitution for a popular presidential election along with a complete amnesty for dissident leader Kim Dae Jung. 29 This announcement, the so-called 6.29 declaration, came at a critical moment for the transition to democracy in South Korea. Based on this agreement, a popular presidential election was held in December 1987, reaching the goal of democratization.
When Roh Tae-woo made the 6.29 announcement, he hinted that he alone had made the decision, but many suspected Roh could not do such things without prior consultation with President Chun. 30 Later, it was revealed that Chun Doo-hwan had made the decision to accept the peoples’ demands to change the constitution including the presidential election system. Roh Tae-woo initially opposed this idea, believing he would have no chance to win if a popular presidential election was held. Chun persuaded Roh by arguing that opposition leaders Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung were unlikely to unify; if both ran, the opposition vote would be split and Roh had a good chance to win the election. 31
To increase Roh’s chance to win, two measures were employed. First, Roh made the 6.29 announcement and indicated that he was solely responsible for the decision. With this move, he tried to distance himself from an unpopular Chun Doo-hwan and improve his image as a strong, confident leader. Second, to ensure both Kims ran in the presidential election, Kim Dae-jung was pardoned. In both instances, Roh wanted to create an impression that he supported democratization and political freedom. 32
Conclusion
In “Intra-Military Division and Democratization in South Korea” Insoo Kim argues that economic development and civil society explanations for South Korea’s democratization are not sufficient. Instead, he argues the transition to democracy was possible because of conflict in the military due to unfair promotion practices that undermined the ability of the Chun Doo-hwan government to suppress the democracy movement. In this article, we refute Kim’s argument for two reasons. First, economic development clearly made significant contributions to South Korea’s democratization by enhancing education attainment and facilitating industrialization and urbanization.
Second, there is no clear evidence of schism in the military as well as among political elites. President Chun enjoyed strong support in the military, and there was no visible challenge to President Chun throughout his tenure. 33 In fact, Chun was able to appoint his men to key posts in the military, such as Defense Security Command, Capital Garrison, and 3rd Army commands, even after Roh succeeded him. 34 There was no known problem with the army’s cohesion and Chun enjoyed the loyalty of key generals throughout his tenure. 35 Thus, Kim’s argument that unfair promotion practices in the military caused division that made South Korea’s democratization possible by weakening the Chun administration’s ability to suppress the protests for democracy is not plausible. Instead, later evidence indicates that the authoritarian leader Chun Doo-hwan accepted the public demand for constitutional revision including changes in the presidential election system based on his political calculation and concerns about the consequences of cracking down on the protests using military force, particularly against Washington’s opposition and possible disruption of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: Uk Heo’s participation in this work was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies Grant funded by the Korean Government (MEST) (AKS-2012-AAZ-2101). Seongyi Yun’s participation in this work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2010-330-B00017).