Pakistan,Military Coup,and Concordance

First Objection: Concordance as Cause of Military Intervention

Stating some sources of evidence as weak and substantiating with examples, Professor Schiff argues that a military coup in Pakistan is certainly a result of discordance. Which is to say that I was wrong to establish concordance as a primary cause of military intervention in Pakistan.

Schiff provides three sources of evidence to support discordance between the military and citizenry: punishment of Geo TV, separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), and “obedient population.” ² If we look at the deeper level, the conflict between Geo TV and the military establishment cannot be qualified as discordance between citizenry and military.

In the first place, Geo TV is a private media organization, so it might be more governed by the consideration of market economy than by services to the society. Taking it as a representative of citizenry does not seem right. Second, Geo TV publicly conceded its mistake, made a public apology, and faced suspension together with fine. ³ Third, there are more than twenty news channels in Pakistan. Most news channels and journalists considered Geo TV’s allegation against Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) chief irresponsible and few as felony. ⁴ It becomes more interesting, perhaps even complicated when the minister of Defense, Khawaja Asif, an elected member by the citizenry, insisted upon severe punishment and termed Geo’s allegation against ISI as an attempt to endanger national security and to defame military institution. ⁵ Finally, Pakistan’s media channels’ creditability, especially of the anchor persons and of owners, is also in question. ⁶ Under these circumstances, considering the conflict between Geo and the military in terms of discordance between citizenry and military is inept especially when public-elected representative, occupying a key portfolio in the cabinet, labels it antistate.

The separation of East Pakistan shows signs of serious discordance between the people of the East Pakistan and the military institution. Schiff is right to insist. ⁷ But we need to put this discordance into a social context. The discordance owes more to culture, language, politics, and economy than just between the institution and a considerable portion of citizenry. The roots of discordance were deep underlying in cultures and societies of two wings: East and West Pakistan. So, in the broader picture, the discordance between the citizenry of the East wing and the military establishment of the West wing had deep cultural roots dividing citizenry into two rival poles. ⁸ Unlike concordance theory’s assumption, Pakistan’s conditions have not given birth to homogeneous and singular citizenry. ⁹

This reply reiterates that military coups in Pakistan are welcomed by a larger portion of citizenry. But, Schiff is right to point out that, the article, while discussing the results of independent polls, referred to the secondary source. ¹⁰ Taking this reply as an opportunity, the mistake has been redeemed here. According to Gallup Poll, approximately 75 percent of urban population approved the 1999 military coup. ¹¹ More than 70 percent of public supported the removal of the Governments in 1990, 1993, and 1997. ¹² In the backdrop of the worst performance of political institutions during 2010, PEW revealed that 84 percent of Pakistanis still say the military has a good impact on their country. ¹³ These figures reveal public’s confidence and trust in the military institution.

Public support for military coup disputes concordance theory’s claim that a military intervention is necessarily a product of discordance among three partners: military, political elite, and citizenry.

Schiff also discusses the reasons why the public of Pakistan supported the military takeover. To this end, she introduces a new notion of “obedient population.” ¹⁴ According to the new proposed explanation—though it is at odds with the fundamental constructs of concordance theory—the public support for the military intervention in Pakistan should not be considered a valid determinant.

Through Schiff’s argument, the public approval of military coups can only be counted as “concordance” and so it would be regarded counterevidence against the theory if the citizenry is not under strict censorship. Additionally and necessarily, most people should be literate and a considerable portion of female must be allowed to take part in casting votes and politics, and media must have the freedom to report without fear. Since Pakistan does not meet these conditions, the public support to the military takeover is not to be counted as evidence against the theory. ¹⁵

The notion, “obedient population” is new to us, there is no such discussion in Schiff’s major work. ¹⁶ On the contrary, concordance theory defines citizenry without making any distinction between informed and uninformed. Even “disenfranchised” groups are included in the category of heterogeneous groups citizenry. ¹⁷ Here for the sake of argument, why illiterate people or the people under strict censorship cannot be included in the category of citizenry?

Definitely Pakistan’s conditions are underdeveloped. But, surely the people of Pakistan cannot be referred to as “obedient population” and the state apparatus as despotic. According to the most recent figures provided by Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement (PSLM), the literacy rate is approximately 60 percent. ¹⁸ Pakistan’s social context is dominated by twenty news channels and fifty-six entertainment outlets. Considering Pakistan’s sociopolitical conditions, it would be inappropriate to evaluate the media on the Western norms and protocols. ¹⁹ In the recent years, the media has gained a considerable amount of power and become vibrant and active. ²⁰ But, of course, it needs time to be fully responsible and autonomous.

The notion of “obedient population” will not help the case of concordance theory. Besides the other flaws, it would also severely restrict the scope of concordance theory’s application. For example, military coups usually take place in societies, especially in the third world, where the population is already “obedient.” So in the third world, the citizenry would not emerge to be a legitimate determinant of national concordance. In absence of (informed) citizenry, the use of concordance theory is not viable in such societies. “Obedient population” creates a paradox. The goal of concordance theory is to avoid military intervention by encouraging dialogue among three partners, but concordance theory cannot be applied to the most military coups because the majority of the people in these societies are illiterate, living under censorship, and so on.

Schiff is right to state that Musharraf like his predecessors, being a part of the military coup, cannot be an objective commentator on the issues especially relating to political elite. ²¹ But I referred to Musharraf’s statement while explaining the military intervention as well as military interest into the political process of Pakistan. Musharraf’s revelation that the political matters were discussed in the formal meetings of Core Commanders endorses the point that Pakistan’s military takes deep interest in the political affairs. ²²

Second Objection: The Three Partners

Schiff is also right to point out that there is no, perhaps can never be, any hard evidence to prove the US’s role in the military takeover in Pakistan. ²³ We know that the governments, intelligence agencies, and officials usually do business differently. Here, it would be relevant to discuss Professor Edward Mason’s comments, a key figure in the formulation of American Aid Policy during 1950s, “In many of the countries to which we extend foreign aid, the army is the best organization in the country and frequently one of the most forward looking. In my own experience, this is conspicuously so in Pakistan.” ²⁴ In terms of mutual interests, military intervention during 1950s ideally suited the Americans and their Pakistani counterparts. On February 29, 1953, Charles Withers, First Secretary to American Consulate in Lahore, recounted earlier events and confirmed that they (American) were fully aware of Pakistan military’s intention. ²⁵ So I repeat that the US’s role must be recognized as an important influence in determining the military takeover in Pakistan.

Acknowledging the key role of Pakistan’s judiciary and media which is highlighted by my earlier article, Schiff accepts my suggestion that the judiciary together with media should be added as a fourth partner in the scheme of concordance theory. ²⁶ So, three-partner scheme may be useful in several other case studies, but not for Pakistan.

Third Objection: Significance of the Four Indicators

Schiff, in DSF, still holds that the four indicators—officer corps composition, political decision making, recruitment method, and military style—does not provide an oversimplified framework. ²⁷ Schiff provides two sources of evidence for this: first, the most prominent military scholars have recognized the (functional) importance of at least three indicators and, second, the structure and form of indicators find unique meanings from the given cultures and societies. ²⁸

“Contradiction of Concordance Theory” did not question the functional importance of those four indicators. ²⁹ Instead, it tried to bring in focus the other factors that may be important for fuller comprehension of the military coup. Pakistan, with powerful military and nuclear capability, occupies a key geopolitical location. The international and regional actors have deep interests in the region. Considering these conditions, it is argued that assessing military intervention on domestic factors (four indicators) and ignoring the regional and international conditions would generate a partial account of the military coup. ³⁰ In addition, the article showed that Schiff’s discussion of the four indicators, although being largely drawn on Pakistan’s societal and institutional conditions, missed a couple of important indigenous facts. ³¹

Fourth Objection: Cultural Neutrality of Concordance Theory

Schiff argues that concordance theory could never superimpose the Western model of governance on Pakistan. ³² First, she asserts that concordance theory is the product of the resistance against the approaches suggesting superimposition. Giving central role to the “dialogue” among three partners and presuming no civil–military model as universal shows its determination against superimposition. Second, all cultures possess three partners including four indicators in some indigenous forms. Third, concordance theory is grounded in the deductive generalization where each hypothesis is empirically verified. Fourth, the intellectuals and students around the world endorse the view that concordance theory does not encroach into other societies. ³³

On Schiff’s ideal of Concordance theory as “not superimposing,” we have to see that the struggle against “superimposition” does not rule out the prospects that it would not, in turn, impose a set of foreign values and constructs on the cultures of other societies. Scholars around the world might be right about the liberal role of concordance theory, but there may have been some other case studies and not Pakistan. The best attribute of concordance theory is the placement of “dialogue” among “three partners.” But, unfortunately despite allocating a decisive role to “dialogue” among partners, concordance theory fails to realize that it, in the process, imposes the Western constructs and a set of values on Pakistan. ³⁴

In the broader theoretical framework, concordance theory is drawn on some form of (postcolonial) liberal framework. ³⁵ It treats military, political elite, and citizenry as (equal) partners. Along the notion of partners, it views societies and cultures as functional entities. That is why concordance theory puts resistance to “superimposition” and embraces “dialogue.” But, neither the Pakistani society nor the state is a liberal entity. Arrogance, inequality, polarization, disparity, distrust, and division are the salient features of the society and the state. I have already shown how deep these characteristics are in the culture and state apparatus of Pakistan. ³⁶ Under these conditions, the military does not emerge a partner, nor does the political elite grant equal status to the citizenry. So, concordance theory is too good to be actualized in the illiberal conditions of Pakistan.

Conclusion

This response article adds that Schiff’s defense of concordance theory has missed an important part of my critique. Undoubtedly, the 2014 article attempted to establish the failure of concordance theory in the context of Pakistan. But, this is the upshot of the article’s position. In fact, the “Contradiction of Concordance Theory” brought the rival approaches into focus. ³⁷ The article tried to show the internal contradiction in the theory. The idea was not just to establish the failure but also the cause of the failure. The article argues that since concordance theory is driven by the rival approaches, it could not produce a cultural account of the military coup. In Schiff’s response article, we are surprised not to see any discussion of abstract theoretical and multicultural approach, which was used by my article to demonstrate the failure of concordance theory.