The Israel Reserve Law: The Duality of Reservists and Transformed Military Autonomy

Reservists: Duality and Military Autonomy

Established in 1948, Israel’s reserve force is numerically the dominant component of the military comprising about 70% of the total force (IDF Website, 2018). At its inception, the idea was to create a large enough force to offset the numerical advantage of the militaries of the country’s Arab neighbors (Tamari, 2012). The key idea is conscription for a relatively extended period of time during which soldiers are trained and serve in defined missions and upon discharge then enter a pool of reservists (Greenberg, 2001; Heller, 1992; Tamari, 2012). In this way, the needs of the military and the needs of the civilian economy are satisfied (Nevo & Shor-Shmueli, 2002).

Despite the benefits of the model and its suitability for Israel’s (and other countries’) needs, the integration of a reservist force into a military system is problematic because of the duality of reservists. Lomsky-Feder et al. (2008) likened reservists to transmigrants—soldiers, but still civilians, inside and outside the military system, and constantly traveling between the two spheres. In the military sphere, reservists are perceived as a structural problem for the regulars because they are both civilians and soldiers and thus members of the regular military components have tended to treat reservists as “second-class” soldiers: less professional, poorly trained, and lacking up-to-date information about current technological innovations (Duncan, 1997; Griffith, 2005). Indeed, reservists have a different organizational culture than the regulars and conscripts that is marked by more civilian values and different mentalities (Lomsky-Feder et al., 2020). Reservists in Israel also feel that conditions of service and equipment are inferior to those of the regular components (Heiman, 2018).

Yet reservists often serve as a bridge between the civilian and the military worlds contributing to the assimilation of the military into society (Danielsson & Carlstedt, 2011). The “permeable boundaries” between military and society in Israel (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989; Luckham, 1971) are very evident in regard to the reserve forces because reservists cross the boundaries from time to time and ideally the mutual commitment between reservists and the military remains even between periods of duty. Hence, the Minister of Defense may enact constraints concerning reserve soldiers even when they are not in service (Section 33 of the Security Service Law [Integrated Version], The State of Israel, 1986).

Associations and organizations of reservists exist, for example, in Britain, the United States, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Israel. Yet there is a glaring and singular lack in the social scientific literature on military reserves, their activities, and especially their political role. To the best of our knowledge, there is no social scientific publication devoted to these associations. Filling this gap, our study both describes their actions and demonstrates how they worked toward changing attitudes among both civilian decision makers and military commanders. Our study, then, breaks new ground by showing how these associations are an important instrument through which the duality of reservists is expressed and enacted in the political processes by which military autonomy is negotiated and institutionalized.

Seven decades ago, Huntington (1957) delineated the tension between the need to provide national security on the one hand and the preservation of democratic values on excessive military force on the other. While Huntington suggests maximizing military professional autonomy, Janowitz (1960) contended that additional civilian oversight (and a reduction in autonomy) would reduce this tension. This discussion continued throughout the years when other researchers underlined different aspects of civilian control of the armed forces (Croissant et al., 2010; Feaver, 1996, 1999; Schiff, 1995; Travis, 2017). While in all democracies, militaries are subject to legal frameworks stipulating mechanisms of civilian control, there are differences between them in legislation and the leeway awarded the armed forces for institutional autonomy operationally and to manage their wider affairs. The vaguer the legislation and the more ineffective is state control, the more autonomous the military becomes.

Method

To examine the process leading to the legislation of Israel’s Reserve Law and its implications, the first author undertook research between June 2015 and April 2016 (Rein-Sapir, 2016), during which 17 in-depth interviews were conducted with different involved parties and wider issues. Questions were open-ended since we were interested in the circumstances that led to the Law and especially the process by which it emerged. Interviewees included members of parliament, IDF officers, members of reservists’ organizations, and journalists covering the military arena and senior reserve commanders. Questions focused on the prelegislative crisis, previous attempts to deal with problems related to reservists, the role of diverse actors in legislation, the coalitions that were created, and the actual results of the new Law. Interviewees were also asked about the views of the place of the IDF and the reservists in Israeli society. In all these interviews, meetings lasted between an hour and a half and 2 hr. Only some passages from these interviews are included in this article since so many interviewees reiterated the same points and explanations. In addition, we analyzed the websites of the reserve organizations (now partially amalgamated) that contain information, opinions, and personal reflections of reserve soldiers.

A grounded theory method (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2007; Starks & Trinidad, 2007) was used to analyze data: We extracted key insights emerging from the interviews to understand their significance to the research field. To complete the picture, we conducted a content analysis (Bowen, 2009) of the laws and of the protocols from discussions in the Knesset in the days these laws were voted upon (“Minutes of Session 229 of the 17th Knesset,” 2008, “Minutes of Session No 252 of the 16th Knesset,” 2005). Analysis of these protocols complemented the themes raised in the interviews, presenting the reasoning that guided the legislators and that reflected the public mood of that time.

Crises in Israel’s Reserves

For almost two decades before the promulgation of the Reserves Law in 2008, numerous problems regarding the reserves arose. In public discourse and the media, these accumulated problems came to be labeled as “Reserve Crisis.” The transformation of Israel’s economy into a neo-Liberal model from the mid-1980s (Aharoni, 1998; Sharkansky, 2017), an ideology promoting individualism rather than collectivism (Almog, 2001; Ben-Dor et al., 2007; Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2001; Roniger & Feige, 1992) and changes in the budgeting model for reserve service increased the military’s costs which in turn led to an 80% decrease in the yearly amount of days devoted to reserve duty. This situation implied an intensification of the inequality between those who served in the reserves and those who did not (Ben-Dor et al., 2007; Levy, 2011; Nevo & Shor-Shmueli, 2002). In addition, the continuation of peace processes, beginning with Egypt culminating in the early 1990s in the Oslo Agreement with the Palestinians and later peace agreement with Jordan, led to perceptions that peace is coming and that the need for a large military and large reserve forces was no longer necessary (Cohen, 2006). Against this background, the “Reserve Crisis” involving three clusters of issues came to the fore: the motivation crisis, insurance crisis, and equipment and qualification crisis.

Juridification, Legislation, and the Reduction of Military Autonomy

After the Second Lebanon War and the enactment of the new Law, the IDF reorganized the reserve system by allocating resources for training and equipment and creating a 3-year training\deployment cycle defined in terms of maximum days of reserve service allowed each year. Indeed, during the years following the war and legislation, there was a significant improvement in the readiness and qualification of the reserves. However, this arrangement did not provide a complete solution to problems that slowly emerged again. First, the law did not (and obviously could not) engage with changes in society, and a decade after legislation, the reservists’ organizations continued agitating for resolution of lingering problems. Moreover, legislation itself opened up areas for further negotiations as stipulated clauses became starting points for further bargaining. Second, while the Law required tight supervision of the IDF by requiring reports to the Knesset about numbers and training of reservists, in fact, the IDF and the Knesset overlook many of these clauses. Thus, as the years pass, and the crisis and ramifications from the Second Lebanon War fade away, the necessity of constant monitoring of the reserve force is neglected. For example, in 2014, when the Ministry of Defense faced budgetary difficulties, reserves training was the first to be canceled (Staff, 2014). Some of the gaps that appeared in the 2006 war reappeared, and different experts claimed that the reserve forces were again unqualified for their missions (Amit, 2018; State Comptroller, 2014).

Yet more widely, legislation has actually changed some aspects of the IDF’s institutional autonomy. To reiterate, military autonomy is a key part of civil–military relations since it involves the leeway granted the armed forces over managing their internal affairs. Thus, Feaver (1996, 1999) contends that Huntington’s professionalism is not the relevant issue facilitating (or limiting) autonomy but rather contends that it is related to the boundaries between the military and civilian arenas and proposes creating a formal framework to order the relationship between the two spheres. Croissant and others (2010) define civilian control as a distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders and military officers, while Schiff (1995) contends that an integrated political–civil–military relation marked by active and enduring agreements rather than control over the military is what characterizes civil–military relations. Travis (2017) suggests a pragmatic civilian control, instead of artificial segregation between the arenas with an emphasis on the inherent reciprocity between them and the creation of various platforms for the key actors to work together.

Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister and the IDF founder, ensured military autonomy from politicians and society (Peri, 1983). However the permeable boundaries between the two spheres were always integrated (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989). Hence, Cohen (2008) claims that although the IDF is certainly subordinate to the civilian government, it has considerable influence over policy making, hence deviating from Huntington’s objective civilian control model. Against this background, the Israeli Reserve Law can be seen as a document seeking to reorganize the responsibility between the military, civilians, and the state in a way that suits contemporary circumstances.

Analytically, this reorganization implies differentiating between three clusters of actors that interact and bargain over resources and responsibilities. Each cluster—state institutions, the armed forces, and civilian “lobbies”—is not homogeneous, but the overall outcome of negotiations between them is a reordering of relations. Thus, the actions of reservists’ organizations turned a bilateral tie between the military and its (reserve) soldiers into a trilateral one. Furthermore, legislation represented a formalization of these relations. It is here that our argument lies. While the IDF still retains a great measure of autonomy, the Law, ostensibly aimed at improving the lot of reservists and centered on personnel issues, actually instituted elements of governmental control over the military that did not exist before.

More widely, the contribution of the Law to the diminution of military autonomy is part of changes that swept Israel since the late 20th century. Due to internal social and economic changes, alongside the perceived failure of the Yom-Kippur (1973) and the First Lebanon War (1982), the military became more exposed to public monitoring and civilian involvement in the military field (Cohen, 2006; Peri, 2001). Civilians’ intervention included parental involvement in the military (expressed in complaints, phone calls to officers) and organizations in civil society acting as pressure groups to influence the operation of the IDF. Indeed, one striking example involves changes of operational plans due to casualty aversion (Cohen, 2003; Levy, 2011; Peri, 2001). Furthermore, the media has become more critical of the military (Cohen, 2006), and as in other militaries (Forster, 2012; Jones, 2016; Rubin, 2002)—the reduction in autonomy was intensified by the juridification of the IDF. Following public pressure, training and even operational accidents were discussed in civil courts rather than within the military as they had previously been done. Not only was the recruitment of distinct populations (e.g., women, ultra-orthodox men) discussed within the legal system (Cohen, 2006; Peri, 2001) but from the late 1970s, Israel’s High Court also began to activate judicial review of security considerations. All of these moves signal how external considerations have extended far into the realm of autonomous professional military decision making.

In this light, the Reserve Law represents a further erosion of the autonomy of the IDF. Additional laws—the 1997 Amendment of Discharged Soldiers Law, the “Insurance” Law (2002), and the Student Rights Law (2007)—engaged with issues related to personnel, and through them, the parliament and the military hoped to reinforce support systems for reservists. The Reserve Law is seemingly similar because it includes sections concerning the structure of the reserve system, terms of service, and recruitment principles. However, its novelty lies in governing the reserve system as it bears on the operational considerations of the IDF: the required number of reserve soldiers and their competence level as well as training and equipment. Perhaps most significant, the law limits and restricts the IDF’s freedom of action regarding the aims of call-ups for reserve service, the ages of those serving, and their length of service. A key element entails parliamentary oversight over recruiting reservists during emergencies. Before the Law, the Chief of Staff could have recruited reserve soldiers for duty in emergency circumstances without prior civilian approval (but given retroactively). The Reserve Law, however, states that emergency recruitment will now be determined by the Minister of Defense after receiving preliminary approval from the government. In addition, the Minister must seek approval of emergency mobilization from the parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee within 48 hr (Section 8 of the Reserve Service Law, 2008).

In other words, from full (and perhaps excessive) military independence in regard to recruiting soldiers for war, the Law has shifted responsibility to the government. The Law affirms that the government will determine the number of reservists required for the state (subject to the IDF’s recommendations), while previously, it was determined internally by the military according to its needs. In addition, the Law stipulates that the Minister of Defense is obliged to report to the Knesset once a year about the level of qualification required for the reservists and their training programs, while prior to enactment, no designated level of competence was defined and certainly did not require approval from parliament. No less important, this part of the law significantly limits the tasks for which reserve duty is permitted, and any deviation from it requires the approval of the Knesset.

To be sure, the army opposed legislation to prevent civilian–political intervention in its field, but only after reserve organizations had initiated a call for a private bill did the army respond with its own bill. As Lieutenant Colonel (Res.) David, described it, “This whole legislative process, if the army had not faced the organizations’ private bill, it would not have happened.” Throughout the process, the military has tried to minimize damage to its autonomy and bring in as many military discretionary options as possible. In the end, some clauses restricting the autonomy of the army are contingent upon “the Chief of Staff determining them in the orders of the army,” in what can be seen as a last attempt to maintain the military’s autonomy. Further, even after the Law’s enactment, senior IDF officials did not fully understand the change hidden within it. With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that many parts of the Law have not yet been fully implemented.

All in all, the Law reflects a further reduction of the autonomous space in which the military operated as a semi-independent institution, but this reduction was brought about not by civilian politicians in government or parliament but rather by reservists’ associations. Located in-between three spheres—the military, civil-society, and the political arena—they initiated a new mode of regulation and civilian control over the military. Through the political potential embodied in their very duality—being civilians and soldiers—reservists’ organizations chose to act through civilian means to externally influence military activity by forming coalitions with politicians (the Knesset Reserve Lobby) and media to promote legislation. In doing so, they played a role—whether intentionally or unintentionally—in the reduction of the autonomy of the military. As Colonel (Res.) Menahem, an activist in one organization, puts it, the subordination of the military to elected civilian institutions was not the result of its own choice:

The military does not like being viewed with a magnifying glass. In all aspects…it is clear to you that the military will not freely…come once a year to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and say how it is maintaining its competence.

Conclusion

The answer to the question of whether the new Law has had concrete effects is complex. On the one hand, the IDF has indeed changed its model of utilization of reservists into a 3-year cycle, and the number of reservists and annual days served have been reduced. Further, material remuneration and public acknowledgement of reservists’ contribution to the county’s security represent significant changes from before the Law’s enactment. These efforts take time from senior commanders and resources from the military budget. Formally, IDF representatives report to the Knesset’s committee every year on the status of the reserves and receive approvals for various exceptions in recruitment. Yet on the other hand, change is partial since the committee’s discussions often take on the character of a ritual approval or symbolic ceremony. Both, the IDF and members of the committee, are clear that they will approve IDF requests. Reserves’ organizations and various civilian associations (such as associations of employers and the self-employed) attend discussions and present objections, but while some requests are answered, the power of the IDF continues to be strong.

In addition, 12 years after legislation, and despite the pressure exerted by the reservists’ associations, the IDF has yet to report on the number of soldiers required and the level of competence required of them. And the reserve ministerial committee has met only 5 times since the law was enacted. As Ilan, former MK, puts it: “You see this relationship, that there is still no real civilian oversight by civilians over the military. The military has tremendous degrees of freedom.”

However, there is recognition among many top commanders that there has been a significant change. David, a former Personnel Officer, recounted how the new Law was explained to senior generals. Some had trouble understanding that something was really going to change, but he insisted on telling them: “If you stay in your “movie,” you don’t understand where the reserves is going. Guys, you can continue to think that what was before will continue, [but] it’s a law.” The very ritual of getting the Knesset approval, even if approval is assured, shows a change in the responsibility between the systems. Thus, while the Law did not eventuate in a fully comprehensive reform in reserve service, it nevertheless regulated the relations between the IDF, its reserve soldiers, and the country in an ongoing process.

Theoretically, Israel’s Reserve Law represents an expression of the slow but steady decline of military autonomy in a democratic country. While the literature describes the decline in autonomy as a tool to reduce military power in the civilian arena, in the Law, the process centered on problems the military encountered dealing with its reservists, and the resulting diminishing of autonomy was its by-product. Legislation was preceded by a crisis between reservists and the military institution, and several reservists’ organizations were formed to deal with it. These organizations are located on the seam between the civilian and military spheres and, as we showed, can potentially impact the military bidirectionally. No less important, the potential for further change in terms of civilian oversight has been established since its institutional mechanisms have been established. Change may not have gone far enough from some reservists’ organizations nor is it a direct continuation of the previous situation in which the IDF was basically free to do whatever it decided to do with its reserve system.

Our article thus explicitly links the actions of reservists’ organizations to the military’s institutional autonomy to argue that they provide a powerful extra-institutional actor in the processes by which this autonomy is negotiated at the mezzo level (Lomsky-Feder et al., 2020). Of especial importance in this regard is the analytical focus on a hitherto unanalyzed component of this bargaining in a way that goes beyond previous approaches that tend to often deal with the dichotomous relations between military commanders and civilian politicians. Specifically, our analysis shows how the duality at base of reservists as citizen-soldiers gives them a special kind of power through which to influence both the civilian and military spheres. The reserve organizations in Israel, alongside politicians, believed that the right way to deal with the crisis was to regulate the relationship between the military and reservists through law. But by choosing this legislative option, they thereby de facto reduced military autonomy since legislation involves supervision by state institutions not only in regard to the management of reservists’ human resources but much more crucially in the core areas of military activity (the operational use of force). Moreover, the decision to overcome the reserve crisis outside the military system—through a civilian tool—legislation, strengthened the civil component of the in-built duality of reservists. More widely, our study shows the political strengths of reservists as both civilians and soldiers and how they utilize this duality to promote a reservists’ agenda within the civilian and governmental arena. More broadly, the Israeli case gives us tools to look at other cases, which also have roughly similar characteristics, that is, associations of reservists that act as pressure groups based on a voluntary ethos.