Abstract
This is a commentary on Morris Janowitz’s article, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies,” published in February 1976, in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 185–204. In the article, Janowitz links sociopolitical changes to the rise and subsequent fall of mass popular Armies. Military service during the 19th century was an integral part of citizenship. However, in the 1960s, mass militaries based on compulsory service began to transform into smaller volunteer forces “with profound implications for social structure, political power, and nationalism.” In this article, I highlight Janowitz’s analysis of the rise and fall of the mass armed forces. I also discuss the three sets of factors Janowitz used in his analysis: (a) technological and organizational change, (b) a rise in small professional militaries that are unrepresentative of the larger society, and (c) ideological and normative change. I end with a brief discussion on how Morris Janowitz’s legacy helps to shape our understanding of civil–military events that have taken place over the last 50 years.
Keywords
Morris Janowitz was an American sociologist who researched and published studies in multiple areas of sociological inquiry including social theory, mass communications, ethnic relations, prejudice, urban, and community studies. However, he is most celebrated for his scholarship on military studies, and as the founder of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. According to archival documents held at the Pritzker Military Museum and Library, Janowitz was born in 1919 and grew up in Paterson, New Jersey. He was drafted into the Army in 1943 and was assigned to the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (Burk, 1991; Luce & Martinez, 2018). He worked in the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). For his military service, Janowitz was awarded a Purple Heart and a Bronze Star.
Janowitz began his graduate studies in Sociology at the University of Chicago in 1947, graduated in 1948, and taught at the university for 3 years before accepting a tenure track position at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, where he was promoted to full professor in 1957. He was appointed to the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago in 1962 and retired in 1987. As so eloquently stated by James Burk (1991, p. 1), Janowitz’s “studies of the military . . . opened up systematic study of the institutionalization of legitimate coercion. 1 ” Extensive documentation on the biography of Morris Janowitz from 1940 to 1989 can be found at the University of Chicago library in the Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center.
In this paper, I reflect upon the breath and depth of Janowitz’s article, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies,” which was published in Armed Forces in Society in 1976. Many of the topics found in other works by Janowitz (namely, citizenship, obligatory service, mass armed force, all-volunteer force, civil–military relations, etc.) are echoed in this article. Janowitz traces the American modern military to Western Europe’s post-feudal institution of the Eighteenth Century. He observed that parliamentary, multiparty systems of Western Europe and the United States had emerged in the same geographic and cultural region where modern professional military institutions, including “citizen” conscription, first emerged, and were institutionalized. This trend did not occur in non-Western nations that underwent industrialization (i.e., Russia and Japan) and Janowitz wanted to know why. How can one account for the simultaneous emergence of massive modern military institutions and multiparty parliamentary institutions in Western industrialized nations? For Janowitz, an examination of mass citizen armies and obligatory military service help to provide answers.
Focusing on sociopolitical changes in Western Europe and the United States, Janowitz linked the rise and fall of the mass popular armies from the end of the 18th Century to the 1970s. He characterized mass citizen armies, as being composed of professional cadres of officers and enlisted personnel, augmented by conscripts and in wartime by mobilized citizen reservists. Janowitz traced the massive modern military of the United States to Western Europe’s post-feudal institution of the 18th Century. He found that only in the West was military service seen as being compatible with the duties and rights of citizenship. In mass conscripted armies of the 19th Century, military service emerged as a hallmark of citizenship and citizenship as the hallmark of a political democracy. 2
From World War I onward, citizen military service had been seen as a device by which excluded segments of society could achieve political legitimacy and rights. This was certainly true among white ethnics who served in the U.S. military during WWI and for other minorities and women in subsequent years. In addition, service as a citizen-soldier had historically been a powerful asset for candidates seeking election to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. However, that would later change in more advanced industrial societies as military service would no longer be an integral part of citizenship.
In this article, Janowitz provides a framework through which to examine civil–military relations. He asserts that armed forces and society can be studied through the lenses of three theoretical-empirical intellectual traditions: (a) technological and organizational dimensions; (b) the social stratification and professionalization of the armed forces dimension; and (c) the ideological dimension supplied by the normative and symbolic content of social and political movements. The transformation of each of these variables is related historically to the rise in the mass military and then to its contemporary decline.
Technology and Organizational Format
For Janowitz, the technological base of the mass armed force has rested on two elements: (a) The increase in firepower effected by the introduction of the rifle and modern artillery. (b) The development of transportation and communication systems allowing for the concentration of large numbers of military personnel and machines. As technology advanced, large proportion of the civilian population became mobilized into the military or into war-related production. The use of aerial warfare during World War II blurred distinction between the military and civilian populations. Contemporary advanced-industrial societies have access to the most lethal weapon, nuclear power, which represents the “perfection” of the modern military by vastly increasing its destructiveness. Following 1946, the military function shifted from making war to deterring war. According to Janowitz, advanced technology carries the seed of its own destruction as the outbreak of total nuclear war can no longer be perceived as a national interest.
In recent years, the trend toward eliminating or reducing conscription has been a general development in Western industrialized nations. Today, mass armed forces have been replaced by all-volunteer professional forces augmented by part-time soldiers, or short-term militias. Janowitz observed that military service is no longer an integral aspect of citizenship. He was concerned that without obligatory service, the military runs the risk of becoming isolated and detached, placing a burden on the parliamentary government.
Social Stratification and Professionalization
We learn from Janowitz that the professionalization of the military in the 19th Century meant the introduction of middle-class elements into a structure dominated by the upper class with its close connections to the landed elements. The officer corps during feudalism contrasted with contemporary militaries in that it was “dominated by the nobility and were manned by mercenaries, men impressed into service and a small, delimited groups of volunteers.”
The process of extending the officer corps to the middle class occurred as early as before the French Revolution. This was due in large part, so Janowitz argued, because larger military establishments in Western Europe required that the middle-class officers be used to fill positions in artillery, engineering, and logistics. The influx of new personnel was most extensive among the lower ranks of the officer corps. By the end of the 19th century, the presence of the middle class extended to all units but elite infantry and cavalry units with high personalistic attachments to surviving monarchies.
In the United States, although there was no feudal tradition, a comparable social selectivity in recruitment served to develop a similar set of values. Recruitment was concentrated among native-born White Protestant families from rural and hinterland backgrounds, especially in the South. In the United States, as with England, and France, revolutionary movements left their impact on the officer corps. The traditional heroic model inhibited officers’ direct intervention in politics. However, the vestiges of the heroic model emphasized traditional values plus personal allegiance to the ruler. This, according to Janowitz, permitted widespread acceptance of an emerging parliamentary system.
Today, with the decline in the mass armed forces and the movement to an all-volunteer system, social recruitment reemerges as a relevant issue. Recruitment has become less representative of the societal population. In the post-World War II period, the trend in Western industrialized nations has been toward a heavier concentration in the officer corps of self-recruitment. Janowitz noticed that sons of non-commissioned officers are more likely than others to self-select. For Janowitz, the unrepresentative officer corps of the all-volunteer force was concerning. Although an unrepresentative officer corps does not necessarily pose a threat to parliamentary institutions, it does weaken the legitimacy of the military.
Normative and Symbolic Content of Social and Political Movements
The third set of variables focuses on the normative and symbolic content of social and political movements that have supplied the ideology of the nation-state. In his discussion of prerequisites for the development and growth of political democracy, Janowitz references Barrington Moore, Jr.’s (1966) perspective of a “revolutionary break with the past.” That is analyzing nation-building as a social and political movement using mass agitation as a means to forge sociopolitical change. Janowitz notes that the American and French revolutions were social and political movements that resulted in democratic change. Both movements led to extensive armed conflict against existing standing armies, in which the revolutionary forces were victorious. Janowitz attributed those victories to the ability of revolutionary forces to mobilize new rank-and-file cadres and simultaneously use professional officer elements. Central to Janowitz’s analysis is that “the effective consequences of these revolutionary movements were not military dictatorships or oligarchies, but parliamentary institutions with varying degrees of stability and effectiveness.”
Janowitz outlined three elements in the ideological content of the American and French revolutions (nationalism, citizenship, and weakening of existing power). These elements were significant in influencing nationalist propaganda (using nationalist symbolism of identification) and the ideological and normative definition of citizenship. The legitimacy of these armed forces was based on an appeal to defend individual freedom and achieve social and political justice. For Janowitz, the armed forces of the 19th and 20th centuries epitomized modern nationalism. Mass conscription contributed to the democratic political institution. The French and the American Revolutions resulted in the breaking of the monopoly that higher social groups had over recruitment into the officer corps. Concomitant with the French and American revolutions, participation in armed conflict became an integral aspect of the normative definition of citizenship. That the rank and file could and should be armed and that the armed citizenry would be loyal was, at the time, a revolutionary formulation. The establishment of the principle that the officer corps be open to recruits from all social groups was indeed revolutionary.
However, the weakening of the power and attraction of nationalism and the contraction of mass armed forces do not automatically strengthen parliamentary institutions. Janowitz noticed that the attenuation of nationalist sentiments and ideology is a popular expression of an advanced industrial society with a high level of income and education that produces strong powerful hedonistic concerns. In advanced industrial nations, resistance to military service has become widespread. Moreover, the logic of nationalism is under heavy scrutiny. Finally, the rationale for the military has become obscured by the reality of nuclear weapons.
A Convergence of Consequences
Janowitz deduced that there is a convergence of consequences resulting to new dimensions of technology, social stratification, and the normative content of social and political movements. Changes that have occurred threaten to separate the military from civilian society resulting in greater ideological differences, and social divisions between military careerists and non-military societal members who render the military little moral legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, civil–military relations of advanced-industrialized nations are experiencing a weakening of nationalist sentiments and ideology among societal members. Demographic differences such as age, sex, ethnic-religious, race, and new forms of occupational stratification create social divisions that are persistent and disruptive to society. Furthermore, high levels of income and education found in advanced industrialized nations produce self-indulgent concerns and resistance to service for the common good. Janowitz concluded that there is a growing fissure between the military and the civilian sectors of society, creating a strain on the parliamentary system of advanced-industrialized nations.
Discussion
Structural changes that have taken place within Western militaries over the last 50 years have sparked a renewed interest in Janowitz’s theories of civil–military relations. Military scholars still examine large-scale social processes to further our understanding of civil–military relations in a changing world. Janowitz laid a solid foundation for contemporary theorists, particularly those who espouse the pragmatic perspective, to reference and build upon (see e.g., Coletta & Crosbie, 2022; Nielsen & Liebert, 2021; 2023; Travis, 2017, 2020). However, he did not provide a blueprint on how to close the civil–military gap which has only widened in the contemporary military.
Perhaps the most robust theme in the article is Janowitz’s theory of a Constabulary Force. Janowitz elaborated upon the following three trends that evidenced the increase in military missions other than war: (a) the use of nuclear weapons, (b) the loss of the citizen-soldier ideal, and (c) a trend toward civil–military role convergence. As I highlight these trends below, focusing on the United States as a case in point, I find it useful to frame my discussion in terms of three historical epochs: modern, late modern, and postmodern (See Moskos et al., 2000). The modern military dates from the nineteenth century to the end of World War II. The late modern type dates from the mid-twentieth century into the early 1990s, which is coterminous with the Cold War (Moskos et al., 2000, p. 1). The postmodern military refers to the contemporary era, the end of the Cold War to the present (See Moskos, 1992; Moskos & Burk, 1994; Williams & Moskos, 1997).
Shifting From Defense to Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Missions
The Use of Nuclear Weapons
Janowitz’s article examined Western militaries during the modern and late modern historical epochs. The major event that helped to reshape the mission of the Western military establishments was the use of nuclear bombs. The U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, events that ended World War II, resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of people, most of whom were civilians. The unprecedented use of nuclear weapons gave rise to the nuclear arms race ushering in a period of intense competition between the world’s two superpowers at that time, the United States, and the Soviet Union.
Following World War II, the world experienced a Cold War, which was rooted in a long-standing ideological disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. During World War II, the United States and Russia allied with each other to defeat Nazi, Germany. Following the war, antagonism between these two superpowers reignited, resulting in nuclear arms buildups, propaganda, espionage, economic aid, and proxy wars between other nations. The forces of Western Europe and the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Soviet Union and its European satellites formed the Warsaw Pact. Although conflicts took place on every continent, Europe (where actual fighting did not take place) was the epicenter of the Cold War. The Cold War ended with the destruction of the Berlin Wall followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both the United States and the Soviet Union devoted vast human resources and large sums of money preparing for a large-scale war that never developed. The Soviet thermonuclear bomb (Tsar Bomba), detonated in 1961 is the largest nuclear device ever recorded (reportedly 4,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb). Contemporary scholars theorize that the more militarily powerful a nation state becomes, the less likely it is to wage a large-scale conventional war; a phenomenon referred to as a “hegemon trap” (Travis, 2020).
As the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world has witnessed a decrease in wars between states and an increase in wars within states. The potential devastation of nuclear weapons has shifted Western militaries emphasis from fighting to deterring war. There has been a rise in peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, and other military operations other than war (MOOTW). Recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a growing reliance on China to supply food, clothing, electronic devices, and even the world’s leading destination for mobile videos, TikTok app(lication) describes the postmodern era. These and other political and economic issues have been interpreted by some observers as indicators that the United States is moving toward a period of new cold wars (Sanger & Brooks, 2024).
For Janowitz, the introduction of ballistic missiles, accompanied by an excessive power of destruction, would limit wars, and struggles between nation-states would employ means other than total war (Janowitz 1971: 266). Advancing a pragmatic approach to the study of civil–military relations, Janowitz saw the need for institutions to be adaptive as society is constantly changing, and wars in postmodern societies vary. The way civilians control the military, and how conflicts are addressed, are determined by the kind of conflict the nation is faced with (Travis, 2017). Janowitz forecasted that the military establishment would assume an additional role as a constabulary force; committed to the minimum use of force and seeking viable international relations rather than victory (Janowitz, 1971). Still, Janowitz acknowledged that it is also necessary for the military establishment to retain traditional warfighting capabilities which are essential for national defense.
Military involvement in weather-related disasters resulting from tornadoes and hurricanes, and health emergencies are examples of MOOTW. The 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization in March of 2020. Ninety-five percent of the world’s nations used their armed forces to respond to the disaster. Militaries assumed a variety of roles including health care and logistical support (Erickson et al., 2023). Militaries also cleaned hospitals, apartment complexes, and other facilities experiencing outbreaks of the virus. Soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command joined forces with the Republic of Korea Army’s 2nd Operations Command to disinfect an apartment complex in Daegu where an outbreak had occurred in March 2020 (Donnelly & Goodall, 2021).
Most political upheavals today occur within states resulting from ethnic struggles (i.e., former Yugoslavia) or food starvation and ethnic conflicts as those which exist in African nations (i.e., Rwanda, Darfur, and Biafra war in Nigeria). Examples of western militaries performing the role of peacekeepers include the actions of the United States and other NATO forces in the former Yugoslavia in 1995. Similarly, from 2001 to 2021, the United States and Coalition Forces invaded Afghanistan in opposition to the Taliban regime in the war on terrorism. Other peacekeeping missions occurred when the United States and Coalition Forces invaded Iraq in 2003; and Northwest Pakistan in 2004. Since 2007, the United States and Coalition Forces have been in a struggle against al-Shabaab in Somalia and Northeastern Kenya. United States led intervention in Iraq, and Syria in 2014. In 2015, Saudi-led coalition and United States, France, and the United Kingdom against the Houthi rebels, and the United States intervened to help Libya fight against ISIS. The current Isarel-Hamas war in the middle east constitute another example of a non-conventional war (Baldor & Gambrell, 2024). The use of U.S. soldiers in completing the installation of floating bridge for the purpose of providing food and supplies to the people in Gaza is a humanitarian effort. These (and many more) are examples of the postmodern military operating in a variety of ways as a constabulary force. Two additional trends that have helped to accelerate movement of western military establishments toward a constabulary force include: (a) the decline of the citizen-soldier ideal and (b) the convergence of military and civilian occupations.
Farewell to the Ideal of a Citizen-Soldier
Germane to Janowitz’s theory was the importance of the citizen-soldier in a democratic nation. As mentioned earlier, Janowitz viewed the modern military as one that epitomized nationalism. Mass conscription contributed to the democratic political institution and played a crucial role in sustaining democratic values through a citizen-soldier ideal (Burk, 2002; Janowitz, 1971, 1975, 1976). The decline of the mass armed force resulted in a cleavage between the military and civilian realms of society resulting in greater ideological differences between military careerists and non-military societal members. Bruce Fleming (2010) argues that it is essential that the civil–military gap in the United States be closed. He suggests that this may be accomplished by a mutual respect between the civilian and military spheres such that the military fulfills its responsibility of national defense and the civilian sphere provide the military with the financial, legislative, and personnel support it needs to do so. For Fleming, there must be a shared commitment between the two spheres.
I contend that in a democratic society, cultural differences exist not only between the civilian and military sectors, but also within each realm. What seems to be lacking is a tie that binds multiple cultural interests. The problem of civil–military divide is directly linked to the lack of obligatory service. The rise of the all-volunteer force (AVF) widened the gap even further. The draft was ended in the United Kingdom in 1960, New Zealand and Australia in 1972, the United States in 1973, France and Spain in the mid-1990s, followed by other nations in subsequent years (Moskos et al., 2000).
In the United States, the idea of an AVF raised numerous concerns among scholars and government officials which were documented in the Gates Commission Report (U.S. President’s Commission, 1970). Three concerns most relevant to this paper were: (a) fear that an AVF would cost more than the nation could afford, (b) fear that an AVF would undermine patriotism by weakening the traditional belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve his country, and (c) concern that higher pay associated with an AVF would be especially appealing to African Americans, who have relatively poorer occupational opportunities in the civilian sector. Some worried that high rates of unemployment in the civilian sector combined with higher re-enlistment rates for African Americans would lead to a disproportionate number of them serving on active duty. These critics claimed that the rate of white enlistment and reenlistment might decline due to a greater presence of African Americans, which could lead to an all-black enlisted force. They argued further that the problem would only be exacerbated by a resulting black resentment at bearing an undue share of the burden of defense (U.S. President’s Commission, 1970).
Suffice it to say that the architects of the AVF used a laissez-faire model which did not emphasize the traditional values of duty and honor to the country (Moskos & Wood, 1988; Segal, 1985). Thus, incentives to serve in the military are framed in terms of economic gains for prospective soldiers and their families. Since the advent of the AVF, more African Americans and Hispanics without prior service have been enlisting in the U.S. military, while the proportion of white males have decreased. In addition, the military cost for personnel is increasing, underscoring economic concerns when addressing the problem of personnel procurement. The services continue to increase benefits for personnel, not only in pay but also in quality-of-life programs, particularly in the areas of family life and childcare services. Arguably the postmodern military operates more like an occupation, emphasizing rights and privileges, rather than an institution, stressing duty and obligation (Moskos, 1977; Moskos & Wood, 1988). A consequence of the AVF is that servicemembers are motivated extrinsically, acting out of a desire for monetary pay (Moskos & Wood, 1988). By contrast, servicemembers of the World War II draft era were motivated intrinsically, acting out of personal value to help keep the world safe from totalitarianism, fascism, and dictatorship of communist regimes.
There is evidence, however, that both economic and non-economic factors influence attitudes of active duty servicemembers in the U.S. Army. A study I conducted in 2002 revealed that extrinsic rewards predicted whether enlisted members would enroll in the U.S. Army (Moore, 2002). However, noneconomic (or intrinsic) variables were more significant in predicting the propensity of junior enlisted personnel to remain on active duty than were economic variables (Moore, 2002). This finding suggests that values associated with citizen-soldiers remain relevant, to some degree, in a postmodern military. A central question that warrants further investigation is how the identity between citizen and soldier be cultivated in the absence of a mass-armed force.
Janowitz and others have advocated for a national service, guaranteeing all participants the opportunity to engage in full-time community service or conservation projects for a year or more (Eberly, 1977; Janowitz, 1983). Although this may have the potential of instilling a sense of duty and honor in the absence of a mass armed force, the idea has not been supported politically in the United States (Burk, 1991). Another alternative would be to re-institute the draft. However, that idea has also been opposed in the United States.
Convergence of Civilian and Military Occupational Structures
Another change catapulting postmodern militaries toward a constabulary force is the growing similarity between military and civilian occupations. This trend is largely due to technological innovation; the military occupational structure shifted from one of manual combat to one of greater technical support (Janowitz, 1975). Janowitz observed that the military relies less on authoritarian domination and more upon persuasion and group consensus as methods of control. The skills and orientations of military officers, Janowitz explained, resemble those of civilian leaders.
Similarly, Moskos (1977) found that the military structure had transformed from one based on the legitimation of institutional values to one legitimized by the remuneration of the labor market. There has been a growing similarity between military and civilian occupations. It is instructive to note that during the pre-Civil War era, the American military emphasized vocational skills. Huntington (1957) referred to this period in American history as the age of “technicism.” Speaking of nineteenth-century West Point graduates, Huntington claimed they had gone into the academy for the explicit purpose of becoming scientists or engineers rather than Army officers. According to Huntington these men were “. . . much in demand by private employers and were utilized by the government in topographical surveys, railroad building, and construction of other internal improvements. . . (Huntington 1957: 99).”
Nevertheless, this period, as Huntington indicated, predated the professional military that exists today. During the period of the mass armed forces, military skills were different from those of civilian professions. Before the end of World War II, with the growth of aerial warfare, the distinction between civilian and military functions blurred (Lasswell, 1941). Scholars found that military occupations in the medical, dental, electronic, mechanical, and craft fields were transferable to the civilian sector (Biderman & Sharp, 1968).
In the postmodern world, military and civilian occupations are becoming more interchangeable. According to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Occupational Conversion Manual, military enlisted occupations are separated into five broad categories: technical, clerical, service, craft, mechanical production, and military unique. Except for the military unique category, all military occupations have a counterpart in the civilian labor market (U.S. Department of Defense, 1984). Many of the occupations once filled by active-duty personnel are now outsourced to civilian companies. It is becoming commonplace for civilian and active duty servicemembers to work side by side.
A more recent study illustrates the similarities between military and police roles (Campbell & Campbell, 2010). For these authors, police departments in the United States are becoming more militarized using PPU (police paramilitary units) and SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams in high-risk situations (such as the war on drugs, raids, terrorism, or hostage situations). This is yet another example of the robustness of Janowitz’s theories when it comes to explaining change in the structure of the armed services and civil–military relations in the postmodern era.
Concluding Remarks
I met Morris Janowitz in 1981 when I was considering the University of Chicago for graduate studies in Sociology. I had returned to the United States 2 years earlier after completing a tour of duty in USAREUR (U.S. Army Europe) and was an undergraduate student at SUNY Stony Brook. I remember sitting in Janowitz’s living room and telling him that I wanted to research social stratification in military organizations. I informed him that I had recently returned home from Schweinfurt, Germany where I served as a Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Specialist in Third Infantry Division.
I enrolled in the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago, shortly thereafter. Upon completion of my required core courses, and my preliminary examination, I enrolled in Janowitz’s Military and Militarism class offered in the Spring of 1982. The class met every Tuesday and Thursday on campus, and was quite rigorous. Among the many topics we studied were those found in the article I just reviewed: military institutions in the Western Nation-State, the rise and fall of the mass armed force, professionalism and military institutions, ideology and strategic conceptions, citizenship, political democracy, and more. In the following quarters, I participated in seminars on armed forces and society held at Morris Janowitz’s home.
I met with Janowitz regularly as I completed my MA thesis and then later my doctoral dissertation on the effects of the all-volunteer force on civilian status attainment of men and women, which was conferred spring of 1987. The following year I joined the Department of Sociology at the University of Buffalo as an Assistant Professor. Two months later, Morris Janowitz died leaving volumes of intellectual works on social theory, communities, and the military establishment that continue to influence scholarly works globally.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge helpful comments from anonymous reviewers on an earlier version of this manuscript.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
