Calling out the Troops to Manage Environmental and Health Crises in Australia: Public Understandings of Domestic Armed Forces Operations

Abstract

Domestic deployment of armed forces as part of state-led responses to environmental and health hazards is a common occurrence across liberal democracies. Yet we know little about how these domestic operations influence public attitudes. Using six focus groups, we examine Australians’ views on the performance and appropriate roles of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) in the context of two domestic operations: Bushfire Assist (2019–2020) and COVID-19 Assist (2020–2022). We find high trust in the ADF and the capabilities of its personnel in assisting the civil community in crisis response—but a trust often based in “blind faith.” Likewise, we find broad support for domestic deployments, but with a clear caveat: military personnel should not undertake any roles of coercion or enforcement. The findings suggest democratic governments must carefully balance the benefits of leveraging military resources against potentially weakening the public support sustaining military legitimacy and “social license” to operate.

Keywords

disaster response COVID-19 wildfires civil–military relations domestic deployment

Domestic deployment of armed forces is an historically regular feature of state-led responses to environmental and health crises. Military involvement is a key feature in U.S. disaster response, for example (Kapucu, 2011). Likewise, there exists a strong tradition in both European and Latin American countries of the armed forces adopting a wide range of domestic duties—and most commonly, responding to fires, floods, and other environmental catastrophes (Pion-Berlin, 2016; Schnabel & Krupanski, 2012). Outbreaks of both H1N1 and severe acute respiratory syndrome corona virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) prompted widespread use of military personnel, equipment, and logistics, even in countries with considerable civilian state capacity (Acácio & Passos, 2024, p. 231; Erickson et al., 2023). Indeed “calling out the troops” for disaster and crisis response has become a core, frequent, and often mandated responsibility for militaries in many democracies (Ratchev & Tagarev, 2018). There is considerable advantage for governments in involving militaries in crisis and disaster response, from leverage of otherwise unused resources through to “borrowed prestige” in settings where the armed forces enjoy considerable public esteem (Kenwick & Maxey, 2022; Robinson, 2022). Militaries have often eagerly taken up requests to aid the civil community, though occasionally demonstrate hesitancy where there is risk of confrontation with the public (Esterhuyse, 2019). Despite the frequency of domestic deployments, however, we know relatively little of what democratic publics think of using militaries for such purposes.¹

Citizens in liberal democracies constitute one of three main players in civil–military relations, alongside governments and the armed forces. Political leaders’ tendency to call out the troops holds the possibility of threatening the “trinitarian agreement” between citizens, their governments and the military. According to Schiff (1995, 2009), this centers primarily on a “concordance” among these three players as regards the appropriate roles and missions of the military. In liberal democracies, public attitudes underpin the social license for, and determine the parameters of, the actions of the armed forces (Krebs et al., 2023). For example, public opinion toward the military can influence government decision-making regarding initiating or continuing military operations, or levels of defense spending (Foyle, 2004; Gelpi et al., 2006; Tomz et al., 2020). Public admiration can also affect the decision-making of individuals to join or leave the armed forces (Asch, 2019). High esteem and, especially, trust in the military also influences the range of tasks deemed appropriate for the armed forces to undertake, including domestically (Feaver, 2024, p. 221). Olson and Gawronski (2010, p. 208) argue that “disasters are revelatory. . . of the actual values, qualities, and operational codes of the responding political leadership.” We posit that disasters can be similarly revelatory of the military, heightening public attention to the question of the appropriate role of armed forces in internal crisis response.

We focus our study on Australia, an established liberal democracy with sustained domestic use of military personnel and resources in managing crises caused by natural and biological hazards. In doing so, we exploit two recent domestic military operations as cases. Operations Bushfire Assist (2019-2020) and COVID-19 Assist (2020-22) marked unprecedented Australian Defense Force (ADF) commitments to assist the civil community. These operations featured as part of Australian federal and state government response and relief to, respectively, the “Black Summer” bushfire season of 2019–2020 and the SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic. Using six online focus groups, we examined Australians’ views and narratives as regards trust in, and the performance and appropriate roles of, the ADF when operating internally. We find that many participants hold the ADF in high esteem but recognize that their knowledge of ADF activity is limited and indirect, mediated through news consumption. Tied with this trust is a permissive and even encouraging attitude toward ADF involvement in disaster response. Yet there are clear boundaries on this support: that internal operations do not distract from “core” external security roles, not involve coercion of the public, and neither result from nor cause improperly resourcing civilian agencies. A social license for armed forces in disaster response and relief appears to exist, but it is a contingent one.

In the next two sections, we set out the background to our study and present our research questions. When then introduce the Australian cases, and outline our methods in using focus groups. In the findings section, we present participant narratives and understandings of the ADF as regards main roles, contexts for acceptable deployments, risks and advantages of domestic deployment, trust and esteem, and perceived performance. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss the implications of our study.

Military Domestic Deployment and Disaster Response in Democracies

Disaster response and relief routinely involves a range of actors, including civilian agencies, nongovernment organizations, and private volunteer groups. Adding to these actors, armed forces are deployed internally with increasing frequency across almost all western democracies, even in states with legal or conventional restrictions on the domestic use of the military (Clarke, 2016; Lutterbeck, 2010). Certainly, the armed forces offer considerable advantage to governments amid crises; military personnel, resources, and logistic expertise represent a “strategic reserve of state capacity” (Acácio & Passos, 2024, p. 234). Militaries, however, occupy a controversial role in disaster response owing to their unique position within liberal democracies as a “manager of violence” in ensuring the security of the state (van der Meulen, 2005, p. 299). Liberal democracies are commonly associated with the contention, drawing on Huntington (1957), that there ought to be a separation between external and internal security, with the latter primarily the responsibility of police forces and other civilian agencies. This association, however, is better considered one of broad principle rather than consistent practice, with the domains of “security” regularly blurred (Erickson et al., 2023; Lutterbeck, 2005; E. Murray & Taylor, 2019). The boundaries between civilian and military are shifting and permeable, the roles of the latter reshaped by political leaders responding to both public demands as well as political advantage (Forster, 2006).

Four main theories have been advanced for the escalating reliance of political leaders on the armed forces for disaster response and other internal tasks: shifting understandings of national security, widening securitisation, political motivations, and constrained capacity of civilian agencies. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and each is potentially relevant to public perceptions of increasing domestic presence of the armed forces. To explore each in turn, first is a functionalist contention that what constitutes national security is shifting. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, defense of territorial sovereignty has receded as the overriding requirement and organizing principle of regular military services (Edmunds, 2006). Instead, evolving trans- and international threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, and climate change have placed new, or intensified, pressures on state security apparatuses. As the security environment shifts, so too do the roles of the military, particularly where there is serious risk to state legitimacy or capacity (Dahlberg & Dalgaard-Nielsen, 5). Indeed, public and political expectations have changed in many democracies in response to emergent security threats, many of which maintain strong domestic elements (Forster, 2006).

The second line of argument similarly takes as its foundation the decline in importance within core military roles of territorial defense. Yet, in contrast, it highlights the securitisation of widening aspects of society as part of intentional strategies to sell publics on the need for large militaries underpinned by significant public funding (Kalkman, 2019). In this view, militaries (and sympathetic political leaders) seek out expanded domestic responsibilities stemming from self-interest or ideological commitment. Watterson and Kamradt-Scott (2016) note, for example, the securitisation of influenza and other infectious disease—a pattern continued through the COVID-19 pandemic. France was among the earliest to incorporate the military in its COVID-19 response, with President Macron declaring a “sanitary war” against an “invisible, elusive, and advancing” enemy in the SARS-CoV-2 virus (Macron, 2020). In this second approach, serious policy challenges, such as pandemics, crime, and irregular immigration certainly exist, but their consideration as security threats, often met with a militarized response, is questioned.

The third theory asserts that there can be political motivations distinct from generating support for military funding. Political parties, particularly of a conservative bent, can perceive electoral benefits from militarizing and securitising further aspects of society, or leveraging high public support of the armed forces as political cover for unpopular decisions (Dahlberg & Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020; Lutterbeck, 2019). Indeed, Kenwick and Maxey (2022, 1964) find that the popularity of the armed forces “empowers civilians to shift authority and responsibility onto military elites when justifying risky decisions to the public” and allows political leaders to “reduce the costs of inaction and failure by publicly referencing military advice.” Furthermore, governments can seek out “borrowed prestige” of militaries, associating themselves with an institution often enjoying higher public confidence (Robinson, 2022).

Fourth, but relatedly, a practical driver may simply be the inability of civilian organizations and response systems to effectively manage national crises; domestic military deployment is born of necessity (Malešič, 2015). Whether this necessity stems from a chronic underfunding of civilian organizations and emergency services, enfeebling of those organizations due to prior reliance on the miliary, or the changing severity and frequency of national emergencies exceeding conventional state capacity, varies from case to case (Jenne & Martínez, 2022).

What is unclear in these discussions, though, are the attitudes and perspectives of the public as regards the acceptable internal roles of militaries—and whether citizens adopt the theoretical approaches outlined above in their understandings. This leads us to our first three research questions for our Australian cases:

Research Question 1 (RQ1): How do the public understand the main roles and responsibilities of the ADF?

Research Question 2 (RQ2): In what circumstances do the public consider it appropriate for the ADF personnel to be deployed domestically?

Research Question 3 (RQ3): How do the public evaluate the benefits and risks of domestic deployment, and how do they explain the underlying motivations for call outs?

Public Opinion, Trust, and Perceptions of Performance

There is a considerable literature on military involvement in health crisis and environmental disaster response. This scholarship, however, is dominated by historical accounts, contentions of securitisation, human rights implications, and case studies of crisis response efficacy (e.g., Enemark, 2009; Head & Mann, 2009; Kapucu, 2011). Other studies examine international, humanitarian deployment of armed forces, rather than domestic (e.g., Egnell, 2008; Shanks, 2020). On civil–military relations specifically, Brooks (2019) rightly argues there is a strong tendency toward normative analysis. Of course, this scholarship is of great value. Yet there is scant empirical evaluation of the link between domestic deployment and public perceptions of, and relationships with, the military. This is somewhat surprising, as domestic deployment provides a distinctive setting in which civil–military relations, and public opinion, can shift. As Forster (2006, p. 250) explains:

domestic military assistance tasks bring armed forces personnel into contact with citizens more directly than any other role. . . undertaking such tasks poses challenges to the armed forces because their credibility is tested in what are typically crisis situations which require them to adapt their cultural and organisational structures constructed for military tasks.

While liberal democracies have rarely lived up to the normative ideal of strict separation between external and internal security, increasing domestic deployment of armed forces comes with considerable risk. Heighted domestic military action can threaten civilian control over the armed forces, militarize policing and disaster responses, erode civil liberties, divert military resources away from core security tasks, and associate the military with party politics (Kalkman, 2019; Lutterbeck, 2010).² Moreover, domestic deployments may undermine the authority of public institutions and authorities, and normalize militarized responses to events—including use of the military against citizens (Head, 2009; Jenne & Martínez, 2022). Coercive or enforcement roles, Ben Sasson-Gordis (2022, p. 13) argues, “express enmity toward their targets” and, furthermore, treating citizens as enemies causes an “expressive harm” incompatible with democracy. Moreover, there are enduring questions as to whether armed forces personnel possess appropriate training, equipment, and organizational culture for domestic operations, especially operations with serial interaction with civilians (Parker, 2020). The main apprehension here is again the use of force, but there are wider concerns (Head & Mann, 2009). For instance, the ADF was criticized for sending (potentially unvaccinated) personnel to households as part of COVID-19 quarantine compliance checks, with disproportionate presence in multicultural areas with migrants from conflict zones (Smith et al., 2021).

How people are treated by institutions of the state influences overall public trust and approval. As in many other Western democracies, the Australian public hold the armed forces in high esteem. But excessive or mis-use of domestic military mobilization, politicization of the armed forces, or poor performance amid national crises by military personnel, “could conceivably both be damaging and chip away at an otherwise favourable public image of the armed forces” (Dahlberg & Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2020, p. 6). Lowered public approval has consequences for civil–military relations, the military itself, national security, and disaster response. Complex, widescale national emergencies, such as disasters triggered by natural and biological hazards, necessitate state intervention where problems of social coordination are met with institutional response. Yet institutional efficacy is severely limited without underlying public trust and approval; as Citrin and Stoker (2018, p. 62) contend, “trust is a resource enabling government action.” Confidence in and support of institutions can promote compliance with state directions and regulation—key, for instance, in public observation of COVID-19 public health orders (Bargain & Aminjonov, 2020), which military personnel were involved in monitoring in Australia. Civil–military relations marked by mis- or distrust can hamper disaster response efforts where those efforts feature a significant role for the armed forces (Erickson et al., 2023, pp. 13–14).

There is, however, some evidence that military aid to civil organizations and communities during disasters has considerable public support. German opinion polls, for instance, have demonstrated armed forces disaster relief operations regularly receive the support of nearly 90% of the population (Lutterbeck, 2010, p. 91). Similarly, the Australian Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements (Commonwealth of Australia, 2020, p. 187) indicated broad public support for military involvement in, at least, disaster relief. Simultaneously, however, the Royal Commission noted a significant disparity between what the public expected of the ADF in disaster relief, and what the ADF could reasonably deliver (Commonwealth of Australia, 2020, p. 187). Some studies have examined the roles of militaries in COVID-19 management (e.g., Dietrich et al., 2023; Gibson-Fall, 2021). But public support for such domestic deployments, in which militaries were occasionally involved in compliance and enforcement tasks, is less clear (Clarke, 2020).

Nonetheless, overall, military aid to the civil community in times of crisis feasibly enhances public confidence in the armed forces, and increases support for internal and external military operations alike (Erickson et al., 2023, pp. 13–14). The thinking goes that the public witness the armed forces swiftly providing essential supplies, logistics, and personnel to assist in disaster response, creating a “halo effect” conducive of a permissive public consensus toward the military across a range of activities (Feaver, 2024; Harig, 2022). The preceding therefore leads us to our final two research questions:

Research Question 4 (RQ4): How do Australians explain their trust, or lack thereof, in the ADF and its personal to do the right thing when on domestic operations?

Research Question 5 (RQ5): What are public perceptions of ADF performance during Operations Bushfire and COVID-19 Assist, and from where do these perceptions arise?

Methods

In this section, introduce the Australian domestic deployment cases, and outline our approach in using focus groups. We examine two cases of domestic deployment of ADF personnel and resources, Operations Bushfire Assist (2019–2020) and COVID-19 Assist (2020–2022). There are differences in the nature of military assistance to the civil community—such as in intensity, scale, and duration—between responses to disasters stemming from natural hazards and those from biological hazards. Yet both scenarios “seriously disrupt the normal functioning of society” and, where militaries are called upon, involve personnel engaging in activities well outside normal scope (Acácio & Passos, 2024, p. 232). Furthermore, we select these cases for three reasons. First, Bushfire Assist and COVID-19 Assist are domestic ADF operations of considerable significance—in size, duration, geographic spread, and scope of activities. Second, as these cases entail two distinct types of military assistance to the civil community, they allow us to identify differences in public attitudes and narratives between them, and analyze the role of the armed forces in crisis response in democratic settings. Third, both cases were recent at the time of the focus groups, improving the likelihood of research participants being able to recall, discuss, and critically reflect on relevant details and personal experiences.

At its peak, Operation Bushfire Assist entailed 6500 ADF personnel deployed across six Australian states and territories. Defense personnel provided support to emergency services and state authorities in tasks as varied as civilian evacuation, water purification, and road clearance. Among these 6500 ADF members were approximately 3000 ADF Reserves, many of which became involved in the Operation following Australia’s first ever compulsory call out of Reserves. As the Department of Defense annual report (Department of Defence 2020, p. 20) highlights, Bushfire Assist was significant for two main reasons: first, it involved the largest domestic mobilization of the ADF in response to a domestic disaster; and second, it initiated a “new era” of domestic deployment. Indeed, Prime Minister Scott Morrison presaged a significant future expansion of domestic ADF roles (Prime Minister of Australia, 2020). Ultimately, the ADF undertook more than 1500 tasks in Operation Bushfire Assist.

COVID-19 Assist, while lacking the peak mobilization numbers of Bushfire Assist—at roughly 3500 ADF members in September 2020—nonetheless reflects a unique domestic Operation in both its longevity and duties assigned to Defense personnel. Indeed, between 2020 and 2022 over 18,000 ADF personnel, across all states and territories, contributed to pandemic control though, inter alia, swab testing, contact tracing, administering vaccines, assisting at internal border checks, and monitoring compliance with public health directions (Department of Defence 2021, p. 6). The Australian COVID-19 response, like that of many nations, therefore entailed political leaders placing considerable demands on its armed forces, many of which sit outside conventional understandings of military responsibilities (Beaumont, 2020).

Across both operations, these are striking numbers of ADF members to be mobilized domestically, corresponding with Australian governments demonstrating greater willingness to “call out the troops” in the face of domestic crisis and risks to internal security (Head & Mann, 2009). Operations Bushfire and COVID-19 Assist are by no means the first domestic callouts for the ADF. What is changing, however, is that “the array of tasks that political leaders feel comfortable with having soldiers perform continues to grow in both scope and extent” (Clarke, 2016, p. 22). Moreover, this expansion often has support across the political spectrum. For example, the Liberal-National federal government mobilized ADF personnel to aid in managing a “crisis” in aged care facilities stemming from the Omicron wave of COVID-19—a mobilization later extended by the newly elected Labor government (Jeuniewic, 2022). In a context of constrained resources, limited personnel, and specific role training requirements, regular domestic callouts threaten to overwhelm ADF organizational capacity (Edmunds, 2006; Forster, 2006; Woodward, 2011). As the Australian Department of Defence’s (2020–2021) annual report notes in relation to the Australian Army, “the cumulative effect of sustained domestic operational demands and restrictions on training poses a risk to preparedness” (Department of Defence 2021, p. 35).³ Strained organizational capacity raises questions about ongoing suitability, and public evaluations, of military involvement in domestic disaster relief.

To evaluate these two domestic deployments, we commissioned six asynchronous online focus groups.⁴ Qualitative research methods, like focus groups and interviews, have long been successfully deployed online (P. J. Murray, 1997; C. D. Murray & Sixsmith, 1998). Although there are broad similarities to their corresponding “offline” format, asynchronous online focus groups are best considered a distinct research method (Graffigna & Bosia, 2006). Asynchronous groups do have some drawbacks. For instance, the focus on text-based communication removes physical cues and can make more difficult the interpretation of participant meaning (K. Stewart & Williams, 2005). Furthermore, the asynchronous nature can reduce the likelihood of dialogue and interaction between participants (Mann & Stewart, 2000).

Yet there are considerable advantages to asynchronous online focus groups, and many prior disadvantages have been met by technological innovation. Both text-based communication and asynchronous participation allows for more careful participant reflection and can foster detailed accounts of opinion, experience, and emotions (Williams et al., 2012). Participants effectively transcribe their own data, removing the possibility of researcher errors and reducing complexities in interpretation (Oringderff, 2004). While some participants will be more comfortable expressing views orally, text communication is now familiar to many and expands accessibility to those that struggle with verbal expression (Tanis, 2007). Online delivery can also help balance group power dynamics, encouraging a diversity of views and reducing the potential for conversations dominated by one or small numbers of participants (D. Stewart & Shamdasani, 2017). Online groups, particularly where anonymity (or pseudonymity) is employed, can also provide a “safer” environment for participants to express unpopular or sensitive views. Finally, online focus groups entail significant practical benefits: they tend to be lower cost, recruitment has no geographic limitation, and options for synchronous or asynchronous participation opens involvement from a broader range of people (Halliday et al., 2021; Keemink et al., 2022).

We conducted online focus groups across 3 days, 6 to 8 December 2021. While COVID-19 remains a global problem as of writing, the timing of these focus groups occurred during “peak” political and public concern (Ryan, 2023). This timing strengthens the research design—for example, participants reflected on Operation COVID-19 Assist while a live operation—but results should also be interpreted in light of the pandemic context. For example, confidence in Australian governments increased alongside state pandemic response—though, this effect had largely waned by 2022 (Biddle et al., 2024). Participants were required to log on and complete several written “tasks” each day (see Supplemental Appendix, Tables A–C, for full list). The structured tasks involved predominantly open-ended questions, with a custom online platform allowing participant interaction through “liking” comments and direct written replies. Moderators actively encouraged interaction between participants and prompted individuals to further explain answers where necessary. As Table 1 shows, participants were recruited into groups based on location and ADF Operation.

Table 1.

Online Focus Group Recruitment.

Operation bushfire assist		Operation COVID-19 assist
Group 1	National	Group 4	National
Group 2	Bega Valley and immediate surrounds, NSW	Group 5	Inner Melbourne & Western Sydney
Group 3	Gippsland and immediate surrounds, Victoria	Group 6	Queensland-NSW border, Gold Coast to Tweed Heads
Focus groups each conducted 6–8 December 2021

We dedicated three groups to each Operation: one national group with recruitment from across Australia, and two groups recruited exclusively from regions disproportionately affected by the underlying emergency (and thus experiencing high ADF presence). All groups were asked a common set of questions, in addition to questions specific to their associated ADF Operation. An initial 72 participants were recruited, with 66 remaining through the research, making for an average 11 people per group—a cooperation rate well above typical for either online or offline focus group research (D. Stewart & Shamdasani, 2017, p. 53). Participants were recruited via targeted social media advertising and screened for eligibility on the basis of age (18+), gender, Australian citizenship, and occupation (no ADF personnel).

Results

In this section, we discuss findings from focus group tasks relevant to our five areas of inquiry relating to the ADF: roles and responsibilities, circumstances for domestic deployment, advantages and risks of domestic deployment, trust, and performance. For each research question, we highlight emergent themes, narratives, and viewpoints resulting from constant comparison analysis—a process first developed in grounded theory research (Strauss, 1987), but easily adapted for focus group analysis (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). Furthermore, we compare these findings across groups: between each national group and geographically targeted groups, and across Groups 1–3 (Bushfire Assist) and 4–6 (COVID-19 Assist). Below, participants are anonymised, but we provide their location, sex, and age range alongside any direct quotations. Quotes are reproduced verbatim, as written by participants, inclusive of any typographical errors. We also report the number of interactions participant comments received from others when said comments were made in a Task with these functions enabled.

Main Roles and Responsibilities (RQ1; Task 1b, 7a, 18a)

A core concern regarding domestic deployment is a potential misalignment between what individual citizens see as the responsibilities of a defense force and for what governments actually use defense personnel (Berndtsson et al., 2015). Focus groups began at this broad level, asking participants to discuss what they see as the main responsibilities of the ADF (Task 1b). Participants couched responses in generalized terms of “protection” and “defense,” but were quick to add context, referencing in particular the ADF’s responsibility for Australia’s external security. The military is seen primarily as both a deterrent for invasion and foreign threats, as well as a means for supporting allied nations in conflict, peacekeeping, and providing humanitarian assistance.

Roughly one quarter (16/66) of initial comments made unprompted reference to assistance with disasters caused by environmental hazards as a core military task. Several participants justified disaster relief as a facet of managing threats and protecting Australians, aligning with the notion that conceptions of “national security” are shifting—including among the public.

I think that the Australian Defences Forces main responsibilities are to protect the people of this country and the land in which we live. That protection could be from outside attack, but within our borders it may be providing protection or assistance where needed such as the case of disaster. (Female, 51-60, Gippsland; comment received two likes and three replies)

Within the Gippsland group, however, there was brief discussion of the malleable definition of “threats” to Australian security and interests, with one participant raising concerns regarding potential politicization of the military. A similar discussion occurred in the Melbourne and Sydney groups, centring on contested definitions of ‘harm’:

[The main responsibility of the ADF is] . . . “To protect the Australian public from harm” (Female, 21-30, Inner Melbourne; 4 likes and 4 replies)

——‘Despends what harm??” (Female, 51-60, W/SW Sydney)

——I think these days ‘harm’ can come in various forms such as foreign countries physically attacking our borders (less likely these days), keeping communities safe during extreme weather events (flood, fire or drought) or cyber security. (Female, 31-40, Inner Melbourne; 1 like and 1 reply)

——I agree with [Female, 31-40, Inner Melbourne]. I think harm can include attacks from foreign nations (protecting our borders) and supporting our allies with protecting their borders, or harm from natural disasters (e.g. helping with evacuating people from bushfire affected areas). (Female, 21-30, Inner Melbourne; 2 likes)

There is thus some support for the notion that ideas of “threat,” “harm,” and “security” are changing (Edmunds, 2006), and that there exists a segment of the Australia population readily incorporating domestic crises into understandings of the remit of the military. There was little variation across groups in this tendency. Strikingly, though, just six respondents made any reference to pandemics, public health, or COVID-19—one of which was explicitly critical of military involvement—suggesting there is, even in the abstract, less-immediate connection between ADF core roles and domestic health crises.

In Task 7a, discussion moved specifically to the primary activities participants believe ADF personnel engage in during international deployment. A notable minority of participants specified assistance with foreign natural disaster relief as a core activity undertaken, suggesting that, for some Australians, legitimate ADF involvement in crisis relief is not necessarily limited to domestic settings. This perhaps reflects substantial contributions to disaster relief made by the ADF, particularly in the past two decades, to nations within Australia’s region—such as through Operation Sumatra Assist following the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami (Greet, 2008).

In Task 18a, we asked groups to explain their understanding and opinion of roles undertaken by military personnel in either Operation COVID-19 Assist or Bushfire Assist. Some participants in Bushfire Assist groups—particularly those in areas most affected by fires—readily identified central ADF responsibilities in fire response, including road clearance, hazard reduction, logistics support, evacuation, provision of food and supplies and, later, rebuilding assistance. Others, while expressing a general gratitude toward Defense members, nonetheless expressed unfamiliarity with what military assistance entailed.

Most participants in COVID-19 groups could accurately name one, sometimes several, ADF responsibilities as part of pandemic response. Most commonly, however, military tasks named were those that have proven more controversial and relatively uncommon among comparable democracies (Opillard et al., 2020, p. 251): internal (subnational) border checks, stay-at-home quarantine order monitoring, and medi-hotel quarantine security. Participants also regularly noted military involvement in contact tracing. There was little difference between COVID-19 groups in their explanations of ADF roles, and misunderstandings regarding the extent military involvement in “policing” was equally common. That is, participants believed the military to have had far greater remit for citizen coercion than was actually the case, with ADF members predominantly providing civilian agencies with ancillary support. Participants recruited from areas of higher COVID-19 Assist presence tended to be more critical of the Operation, with phrases such as “enforcement,” “intimidating,” and “unsettling” prominent in discussion, adding support to the idea that citizens do draw distinctions between certain types of domestic military roles.

Re: enforcing lockdown in Sydney, they definitely helped the police with having more boots on the ground but at the same time, it is intimidating to see military personnel patrolling the streets. (Female, 21-30, NSW)

Deployment of the ADF (RQ2; Tasks 6, 8, 9, 10b, 15a, 15b, 18b)

We asked focus group participants a series of questions on ADF deployment, beginning with deployment generally, through to targeted questions about Defense personnel responding to domestic health and environmental crises. Pertaining to deployment generally (Task 6), respondents largely expressed views in line with their prior statements on core ADF responsibilities, but often with greater detail and examples. One participant whose view of the ADF’s remit is predominantly focused on external security further nominated military defense of Australia and its allies, joint training exercises, “supporting peacekeeping where strategically significant . . . [and] asserting Australian rights in case of unlawful foreign claims like in South China Sea” (Male, 51-60, NSW).

Others expanded on prior Task answers to include a wider range of reasonable domestic deployment scenarios, including response to terrorism, natural hazards, and, for a small minority of respondents, civil disobedience. Interestingly, Task 6 marked the beginning of a recurring theme, in justifying further ADF domestic use because of high defense spending—a need for value for taxpayer money—a slight twist on Kalkman’s (2019) argument of self-interested militaries seeking out a greater domestic role to justify public expenditure.

War, aid, natural disasters, construction, science, health, teaching. As long it is not at the cost of compromising national security I feel there are many situations where the ADF could be more utilized. The amount of money spent on defence is astounding. The high skill set that is required to be part of the ADF could be utilized to boost the economy, assist in public health and improve infrastructure. (Male, 21-30, Bega Valley; 3 likes and 1 reply)

Tasks 8 and 9 involved groups discussing when and under what circumstances it would be appropriate to deploy ADF personnel domestically. When asking participants about domestic deployment specifically, group dynamics shifted. There was widespread agreement that it is appropriate for military personnel to be used within Australia, even among many participants not earlier including domestic duties as part of primary ADF charges. A common view was that the ADF is being under-utilized in this capacity. A popular comment (five likes, three replies in agreement) in the Bega Valley group expressed belief in the great work of Defense personnel during the Black Summer bushfires, but detailed, at length, the participant’s belief that the ADF could have done far more to alleviate “unbelievably stretched” Rural Fire Service resources (Female, 61–70, Bega Valley). The participant added, “given the ADF budget and critical nature of the bushfires, their presence seemed thin on the ground,” aligning with a value for public money theme. Groups from bushfire affected regions were not significantly more likely to support ADF domestic roles, but participants were better able to draw on personal or local experience in answers.

Supportive participants, however, often qualified their backing of domestic deployment, offering parameters within which internal ADF activity is acceptable. Almost all participants in this category stated a requirement of a clear national crisis being present, with the most frequent example being floods and fires. Other caveats included that domestic duties do not distract from core ADF responsibilities, stretch Defense personnel too thin, or deplete scarce resources better utilized for territorial defense—a concern regularly raised in the literature, also (e.g., Gibson-Fall, 2021, p. 168).

If there is capacity to attend to domestic issues then the appropriate resources should be deployed. . . without jeopardising the roles of the ADF external to domestic issues. (Female, 31-40, Qld/NSW border; 3 likes)

Strikingly, COVID-19 and health crisis response were rarely mentioned, though more common among the “Operation COVID-19” targeted groups. Here, however, opinion was roughly evenly split as to the desirability of armed forces involvement. Critics often tapped into a prevalent theme throughout these and later tasks: disquiet with the military being used in enforcement, compliance, or any “coercive” roles directed at citizens. Similarly, a concern across groups was the need for adequate oversight of ADF domestic activities, with strict limits on powers. Limitations were not pitched as solely relevant to the military’s orientation toward citizens, but also regarding any military encroachment on civilian agency responsibilities. Participants thus readily self-identified leading apprehensions among the literature around domestic deployments directed at citizens, of the need for civic protections and military accountability, and of military assistance gradually eroding civilian capacity for problem-solving (Ben Sasson-Gordis, 2022; Jenne & Martínez, 2022; E. Murray & Taylor, 2019)

I am concerned that the ADF will have too big a role or too much power domestically, which would undermine the appropriate civilian groups, who may not even welcome/require ADF deployment. I think there still needs to be accountability, where the ADF are only deployed in situations where civilian groups cannot properly/ sufficiently respond to the situation. (Female, 21-30, NSW)

Utilizing Defense personnel as a “last resort,” where civilian services are at risk of being overwhelmed in the face of a crisis, emerged as an unprompted theme. In Task 15b, we therefore asked participants directly whether the ADF should be deployed during national emergencies regularly, under certain conditions, or as a last resort—with groups asked about either health or environmental disaster response depending on Operation categorisation. The predominant response among Operation COVID-19 Assist groups was that Defense personnel should only be relied upon in health crisis response as a last resort, should not occur regularly, and only after civilian agencies have received government support for “surge” capacity. There was little difference among the national and targeted groups in this regard, but participants in regions of high and prolonged ADF activity were more likely to criticize particular tasks (perceived or actual) undertaken by military members.

I believe deploying ADF to respond to a health crisis should be absolute last resort, in the case of people dying indiscriminately. NOT like has occurred in the COVID pandemic where they were used to enforce ridiculous government mandates and restrictions. (Male, 21-30, Queensland/NSW border)

Opinion on Operation Bushfire Assist was more diverse, albeit with a clear plurality expressing approval of ADF members’ assistance as part of an “escalation procedure” response to severe disasters stemming from natural hazards that threaten to overwhelm civilian services (Male, 61–70, Gippsland). Participants in areas most affected by the Black Summer bushfires (Bega Valley, Gippsland) showed a propensity to support more urgent ADF intervention, with fewer qualifications, but still demonstrated a strong preference for Defense personnel to only act in secondary, support capacity. Even among these groups, however, participants did begin—spontaneously, at this point—to reflect on the potential risks versus rewards of more regular ADF presence within Australia.

As a last resort, due to the risk of other service budgets being depleted if the ADF is deployed too much and too readily. Also, too much public visibility of armed forces might create a sense of the militarisation of our country. This creates an environment ripe for anti government sentiment and that ultimately is a risk for any healthy, progressive democracy. (Female, 51-60, Bega Valley)

Risks and Advantages of Domestic Deployment (RQ3; Tasks 16, 19)

We asked groups directly about what advantages and risks they envisioned, or any general concerns, associated with future ADF domestic deployment. Again, questions were tailored toward either health crises or disasters caused by natural hazard response. In each group, though, a strong majority (at least three quarters) of respondents recognized both potential risks and benefits, acknowledging the complexities of crisis response and associated policymaking. Few remaining respondents gave an entirely one-sided view; rather, participants more commonly conceded they lacked the information to confidently answer. Several listed advantages were shared across groups, including: the expertise and skill of ADF members, logistics capacity, quick response time, ability to deploy to isolated regions, and considerable pool of personnel. Frequently identified risks include that Defense personnel might be insufficiently trained for domestic roles, put at risk, unfamiliar with local communities, lack clear direction and operational parameters, difficult to keep accountable, and diverted from external security roles. One key difference, however, is that groups discussing health crises were again more likely to voice unease about potential ADF powers, especially relating to “policing” style tasks:

alot of people question whether its a bit heavy handed ADF patrolling and door knocking alongside police for contact tracing may cause confusion and resentment from the general public. (Male, 31-40, Victoria; 3 likes and 1 comment)

Many participants expressed a modest knowledge of the armed forces, their relationship to citizens, and role in liberal democracies. Nonetheless, each group engaged in relatively nuanced discussion of apprehensions about the militarisation of emergency response or society generally, of civil liberties, and of the potential for—and consequences of—increased public animosity or distrust of the ADF.

I believe it will infringe upon civil freedom and liberties if the army is called in on situations that are not life threatening to the majority of the population. If they took a heavy handed approach on their own people it would lead to mistrust and resentment to the ADF, a service that relies heavily on public perception to recruit soldiers. (Male, 21-30, Queensland/NSW border)

The ADF are here to protect Australians and should not be put in the position of conflict with civilians. Not only is it stressful and u fair on the staff themselves, but I think it would turn public opinion against the military and cause their funding to be questioned. (Female, 61-70, Gippsland; 1 like)

Such comments closely align with concerns raised in scholarly literature (e, g, Berndtsson et al., 2015; Kasher, 2003). Likewise, in addressing general concerns about future domestic deployment, some participants, across both Bushfire and COVID groups, expressed skepticism of the underlying need for ADF intervention. There is some resonance among the public with the notion that domestic military deployment is in part born of necessity—from an inability, in some circumstances, of civilian services to effectively manage certain national crises alone (Malešič, 2015). But suspicion remains as to why this necessity exists, and whether more frequent ADF involvement might exacerbate the problem (Jenne & Martínez, 2022, p. 60). That is, are civilian services exhausted by crises because of a chronic underfunding—especially relative to a significant Defense budget? And would an ability to use Defense personnel only encourage governments to reduce funding to first response services further?

If the states beleive that every time there is an issue the ADF will come flying in the temptation of the states will be to reduce funding and resources to those services mentioned. (Male, 51-60, Gippsland; 1 like and 1 reply)

The only worry I have. . . is if it green lights the government to pull back on correct funding for pandemic management. I think government might exploit the ADF if given the chance. (Female, 51-60, Bega Valley; 1 like)

Some civilian agencies, such as the Rural Fire Service, depend on volunteers to a great extent and always appear to be in need of more funding and resources (I don’t see the Army holding raffles). (Female, 61-70, Bega Valley)

. . . we should be bolstering and funding the existing health and tracing services that we already have—to ensure lockdown, we should be improving health literacy and providing essential services to people. (Male, 18-20, W/SW Sydney; 2 likes and 1 reply)

It is important to note, however, that few of these concerns appeared to develop from mistrust or dissatisfaction with ADF performance. Rather, the skepticism was aimed primarily at state and federal governments. Indeed, as other Tasks show, there is considerable admiration for ADF personnel among most participants.

Trust (RQ4; Task 10a)

We asked participants how much trust they have in the ADF to do the right thing when deployed within Australia in two ways. First, we asked participants to indicate on a scale between 1 and 9 (where 1 represents distrust, 5 skepticism, and 9 trust) the extent to which they trust the ADF. Second, we asked participants to explain their choice. Quantitatively, the results indicate high public trust in the ADF; the average trust score was 8.5, with no significant difference between groups. This is quite remarkable in a context of generally low to middling institutional trust in Australia, albeit in line with public surveys finding “security” institutions like the armed forces and police tend to be trusted more than, political institutions (Manwaring & Holloway, 2022, p. 10). Participant explanations for indications of trust (or lack thereof), though, raise the possibility that public confidence in the ADF is “brittle” (Berndtsson et al., 2015). That is, it is based on a lack of awareness or scrutiny, and therefore susceptible to rapid deterioration should unpopular decisions or serious scandals surface in the public sphere. Brooks’ (2019, p. 388) observation that “while Americans venerate the military, they also know little about it” is similarly applicable to Australia.⁵

According to Möllering (2006), trust derives from three potentially interactive bases: reason, routine, and reflexivity. Trust from reason refers to trust that is rational, calculative, selective, and decisive. Trust from routine describes trust stemming from habit or custom. Finally, trust from reflexivity is trust generated from reciprocal, interactive, and relational processes. An institution like the ADF is relatively abstract from the everyday lives of most Australians; indeed, even among focus groups recruited from regions with heavy Defense personnel presence in recent years, few participants had direct, personal interaction with the ADF. For many Australians, there is scant opportunity for reflexive trust-building through interaction with Defense members. There is some scope for Australians to come to a reasoned judgment of ADF trustworthiness, but likewise, lacking direct interaction leaves participants largely reliant on media reporting and secondhand information.

All the stories I have heard of ADF help in domestic emergencies have been extremely positive, with highly skilled, compassionate and hard-working service people doing everything they can to support others I have never heard a bad story. (Female, 61-70, Gippsland)

While not an informed opinion to the extent where I am able to argue either way regarding my trust/distrust of the ADF, from that which i do know I have confidence that if and when required, the ADF fulfil their duties as required, and trust that if needed, they would meet and/or exceed expectations. (Female, 31-40, Queensland/NSW border)

The clearest foundation for trust in the ADF in domestic operations, however, appears to be routine. Routine trust is not entirely without reason, but it is largely ‘blind trust’—as Möllering (2006, p. 52) explains, “the routine is performed without questioning its underlying assumptions, without assessing alternatives, and without giving justifications every time.” Routine trust is often grounded in social norms and broader culture, and in the ability to “take for granted” the stability and effectiveness of an institution.

I trust them because they are a government organisation, so should be acting for the good of the Australian public. (Female, 21-30, Inner Melbourne)

I do not think anyone working for the ADF would do things to purposefully corrupt their own country. Although everything might not always play out as intended, I do not think there is ever mal-intent. (Male, 18-20, Gippsland)

Routine judgments also appear supported by perceptions of efficacy in other institutions, namely government and the media, to direct and scrutinize domestic military operations. This is understandable as it relates to trust in a public institution. Ordinary citizens have little chance of seeing the inner workings of any military organization, and thus a core component of routine trust is a belief in the effectiveness of controls and means of accountability (Luhmann, 1979; Möllering, 2006).

I assume they are governed by strict guidelines and their job is to serve and protect the australian people. (Female, 31-40, Queensland)

they are more in the public eye to the Australian tax payer, its not hard for them to get filmed and that video to hit the media. (Male, 31-40, Queensland/NSW border)

Yet the interconnection between the ADF and other public institutions can also lead to a habitual mis- or distrust. This was not the only source of low trust, as other participants expressed mis- and distrust on account of a general skepticism of military force, or due to the ADF’s involvement in COVID-19 management. Yet for the minority of participants who voiced a lack of trust in the ADF, a common explanation was a corresponding mis/distrust in government or other institutions. Even among more trusting individuals, feelings about the government especially influenced views on the military, suggesting public views of the ADF can be directly influenced by, inter alia, party politics.

I have utmost trust in the capabilities of individual personnel—but my trust is tempered by current distrust in our government. (Female, 51-60, Bega Valley).

Performance (RQ5; Task 20)

The routinised nature of belief is also present in many participants’ assessments of ADF performance during both Operations Bushfire Assist and COVID-19 Assist. In Task 20, participants were again asked their opinions based on the Operation their group had been assigned to discuss. Participants readily acknowledged they had little to no information—even through media reports—to base any accurate judgment of ADF activity. Despite this, however, most participants were also willing to resolve that uncertainty in a positive manner—to, in effect, trust that Defense personnel fulfilled their duties successfully.

Because of my favourable impression of the ADF personnel, I’m sure they did a great job—but I didn’t hear enough about it—so I think there needs to be more publicity and the government’s role is to ensure adequate public service communication and promotion occurs. (Female, 51-60, Bega Valley; 3 likes)

Not really sure but i would assume it was of a very high standard as per all their training and resources. (Female, 51-60, Queensland/NSW border)

With that said, some participants were able to draw from personal experience or observation to make more confident assessments. This was more common, as expected, in the targeted groups recruited from regions of more intense ADF activity. Not all such observation produced a positive response in the COVID-19 Assist groups, however:

Was ok as far as how well but need to treat people with care. (Female, 51-60, W/SW Sydney; 1 like)

——You said ‘but need to treat people with care’—do you think that the ADF treated people with care during operation COVID Assist? (Moderator)

——Not in some of lgas [Local Government Areas] of concern. Compliance checks in at least one area were performed as though they were in trouble for something and being put in a cell being their house and lack of English spoken was confusing for them. (Female, 51-60, W/SW Sydney; 1 like)

Yet, for the majority of participants with some degree of personal interaction or local observation of Defense personnel, they were left with a markedly positive impression. Across groups—but especially those discussing Operation Bushfire Assist—praise was effusive. Indeed, such interactions support a notion introduced by several participants throughout Tasks. That is, despite risks entailed in domestic deployment of the ADF, there is the potential for these deployments to foster greater public understanding and approval of the armed forces, as occurred for several participations in the Bushfire Assist groups.

After the immediate threat passed and I was returning to my little farm I was struggling to carry and lift a large tea-chest into the back of my vehicle. A young Army officer stepped up and asked if he could help me. Exhausted, I gratefully accepted his offer. He said: “Let me help you, that looks heavy, what’s in the box, Mam?” I replied: “My four chooks.” They had been living in the poultry pavilion—along with hundreds of other chooks, ducks, cats, dogs, goats, sheep and horses—while I, and hundreds of other people, were trying to save our homes. He asked if the chooks were OK, if my farm was OK and if I was OK. I will never forget that moment. (Female, 61-70, Bega Valley; 2 likes and 1 reply)

Conclusion

In this study, we present findings on a thoroughly under-research aspect of both disaster response and the domestic use of militaries: public understandings and attitudes. In sum, we find that, on first considerations, Australians view the primary responsibilities of the ADF to be centered on external security but, when prompted, express approval for certain domestic military roles within specific parameters (RQ1). While domestic roles for the ADF are a secondary thought for many participants, later group discussions demonstrate considerable support for utilizing Defense personnel for relief of disasters triggered by natural hazards and, to a lesser extent, pandemic response. There is thus no evidence of pervasive misalignment between public views and current ADF responsibilities, but significant potential for such a gap to develop if the public is not sufficiently integrated into discussions of any shifts in future forms of military assistance to the civil community. Indeed, the source of much participant disquiet regarding COVID-19 Assist ultimately stemmed from misunderstandings of the extent and nature of Defense involvement. Given that most participants cited legacy and social as their sources of knowledge regarding ADF activity, future research ought to examine the information environment surrounding domestic deployments—and appropriate educational roles for defense and other institutions of state.

Most focus group participants consider response to and recovery from regional and national crises—notably, fires and floods—as appropriate circumstances for domestic callout of Defense personnel (RQ2). Some participants see wider scope for domestic deployment and a greater social role for the ADF as desirable, albeit with constraints on powers, duration, and nature of interaction with the public. For many, domestic use of the ADF should occur largely as a last resort, in response to a potential overwhelming of civilian services and state capacity. Even those most supportive of domestic ADF operations add caveats, chiefly that there be a genuine, pressing domestic crisis, and that military personnel are not stretched so thin as to risk external national security. On particular tasks the ADF may undertake, there is considerable unease among participants about any form of policing, enforcement, or coercive activities. For some, aspects of COVID-19 Assist fit these descriptors. There is potential for further research to be conducted on public opinion toward precise tasks that may be assigned in future domestic callouts, and the consequences of misalignment between public and government-military expectations.

Most participants could articulate risks and benefits of further domestic ADF operations (RQ3). In Australia, national security and Defense policy are rarely a domain of political and policy competition, or topics of robust public debate and media scrutiny (Chubb & McAllister, 2021). Elite-driven policymaking dominates, to the exclusion of a more inclusive, pluralist approach where priorities and conceptualisations of security are more collectively determined. Our research shows clear capacity and interest among the public for greater involvement. Indeed, there is some awareness among the public that conceptions of security, risk, and threat are evolving. Furthermore, many participants find the notion that escalating and intensifying domestic emergencies necessitates occasional reliance on the armed forces. There is considerable public skepticism as to the underlying reasons for these changes, and particular apprehension about concealed political motivations. Indeed, overall, our findings for the first three research questions suggest public attitudes shaped by all four theoretical approaches to understanding escalating domestic deployments democratic settings. Overlooked in these approaches, however, at least as regards drivers of public sentiment, is citizen expectations of “value for money” in funding armed forces. That is, if significant public revenue is to be expended on the military, the military have a responsibility for assisting the civil community in times of crisis.

Nonetheless, Australians hold high trust in the ADF to do “the right thing” during operations within Australia; it is, however, potentially a “brittle” and uniformed trust stemming more from routine (RQ4). Routine trust is not necessarily harmful, but does point to a public for whom the military is largely abstracted from their lives. The risk of such a trust relationship is that, should local or personal experience, or greater media scrutiny, contradict favorable assumptions, public trust could swiftly dissipate. Participants recruited from regions of heavier ADF presence were more likely to be able to draw on personal or local experience in articulating their views, but still with acknowledgment of limited knowledge. As several participants note, considerable benefit could be derived from greater civilian–military interaction, more detailed media coverage, and government-led information campaigns—before, during, and following domestic callouts.

Evaluations of performance in domestic operations (RQ5) followed this routinised form, with most participants largely assuming that Defense personnel executed their tasks satisfactorily. Some participants could reflect on first- or second-hand interaction with Defense personnel during Operation Bushfire or COVID-19 Assist. In this cohort, opinions were highly favorable among those in regions affected by Black Summer bushfires. Participants in inner Melbourne, Sydney, and border communities had more mixed views on COVID-19 Assist. It is noteworthy, though, that criticism focused not on Defense personnel performance per se, but on the appropriateness of the ADF given such assignments at all. While the consensus view is that the ADF can be trusted to do the right thing and operate with efficiency, there is enough concern among participants to suggest careful consideration of any future domestic military deployments involving duties that may be perceived as edging into policing domains of internal security. Certainly, the political and security cultures through which domestic deployments are considered vary across country settings. Yet our detailed exploration of the Australian case study gives clear indications that democratic governments likely must carefully balance the benefits of leveraging the military against weakening the public support that sustains military legitimacy and “social license” to operate—including during domestic disaster response.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-afs-10.1177_0095327X241301612 – Supplemental material for Calling out the Troops to Manage Environmental and Health Crises in Australia: Public Understandings of Domestic Armed Forces Operations

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-afs-10.1177_0095327X241301612 for Calling out the Troops to Manage Environmental and Health Crises in Australia: Public Understandings of Domestic Armed Forces Operations by Josh Holloway and Rob Manwaring in Armed Forces & Society

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on our manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by a grant from the Australian Army Research Center’s Army Research Scheme. This research received ethics approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (ID: 4485) at Flinders University.

Ethical Approval

All research conducted was in line with the stipulations of this Committee, as well as in adherence to the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research Ethics.

ORCID iD

Josh Holloway

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Author Biographies

Josh Holloway is a lecturer in Government in the College of Business, Government & Law at Flinders University. His research focuses on comparative party politics, political opinion, and democratic resilience to crisis;

Rob Manwaring is an associate lecturer in the College of Business, Government & Law at Flinders University. Rob’s research interests center on political parties and center-left politics. In 2021, his book “The Politics of Social Democracy” was published with Routledge, which examined the changing ideological and policy profile of the mainstream center-left parties.

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