Abstract
This article aims to identify and clarify the types of knowledge necessary in the military for developing interoperability in peacekeeping and stability operations. These operations are complex endeavors that often require close collaboration among different services, functions, and nations to achieve their goals. However, the taxonomy of knowledge requirements for effective interoperability remains unorganized and undertheorized in scholarly literature. Combining deductive and inductive methods, this exploratory article seeks to address these issues. It employs a pragmatic deductive framework and explores four relevant categories of knowledge from Lundvall’s Taxonomy (know-what, know-why, know-how, and know-who). The inductive inquiry draws on primary interviews and data from the Armed Forces of two important case studies: the United States and Brazil. The article aims to contribute to theoretical growth and future studies while also informing practical approaches to military interoperability in peace operations.
Peacekeeping and stabilization operations are fundamental to managing conflicts and building peace in the 21st century. These operations encompass a wide range of resources and activities in the international community, including the protection of civilians, the stabilization of conflict zones, security sector reform, humanitarian assistance, electoral assistance, mine action, and more (United Nations [UN], 2024; United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2022). 1 New roles and mandates have also emerged, such as responding to global health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, which has required cooperation of military and civilian services through various mechanisms (Erickson et al., 2023). Moreover, trends in armed conflicts present a greater risk profile to mission personnel, especially in areas affected by violent extremism, which also require specialized military capabilities and collective efforts with civilian, humanitarian, and nongovernmental organizations (Rietjens, 2023; Shawn et al., 2023).
In all these contexts, a pivotal factor for mission success constantly lies in abilities to cooperate across services and interact smoothly with other military units with whom they are supposed to implement their mandates, as well as organizations with other agendas (Marsh, 2017; Verweijen, 2017). These expressions of “cooperation across services,” and “interacting smoothly” grounded in human, procedural, and technical factors, are at the core of the concept of interoperability in scholarly and military discourse (Nisser, 2022; Rubinstein et al., 2008).
There is wide recognition that interoperability is crucial to sustain operational capacities, rationalize costs, and implement the mandates of these missions. However, often viewed as a kind of management concept, social scientists usually do not identify interoperability as a catalyst for relationship-building, which forms the basis for positive peace (e.g., Shields & Rissler, 2015). Interoperability and its human factors can be seen as a context for building positive relationships, including attitudes, institutions, and structures that sustain peaceful relationships well beyond the absence of war. It is accompanied by the skills and knowledge of people to resolve problems in the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation.
Several authors have contributed to understanding human aspects of interoperability (Fürst & Kümmel, 2012; Jared, 2009; Mattingsdal et al., 2023; Missildine & Clift, 2019; Paget, 2020; Rosson, 2022; Rubinstein et al., 2008). In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. military contexts, cross-cultural challenges and skills required for cooperation in a range of interpersonal and cognitive factors have given rise to the concept of “cognitive interoperability,” as explored by Paget (2016) and Rosson (2022). First introduced by Blad and Potts (2002), this concept is defined as a “confidence and mutual understanding based on shared military education and values” (p. 140). This overlaps with related concepts, such as “co-operability” in the United States, “interoperability of the mind” in the United Kingdom, and “einheit im denken” [unity in thought] in Germany (Rosson 2022). Yet, Paget (2020) argues that the narrower meaning of “perceptive interoperability”—the ability to understand and respond to the intentions and actions of a multinational partner—may be a more precise term for what is required as the base level for cooperation.
However, the taxonomy of the kinds of knowledge that are necessary for successful interoperability remains unorganized and undertheorized in the specific literature. Previous efforts, such as publications from RAND, introduced a valuable framework for categorizing JIIM competencies (Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational) required at strategic, operational, and tactical levels (Markel et al., 2011). Drawing from intercultural theory, Moelker et al. (2007) have also made important theoretical contributions, for example, the underpinnings of “sympathy” in successful interoperability. More recently, Missildine and Clift (2019) studied granular cognitive and learning metrics of “human performance interoperability” in immersive environments—for example, sensemaking, coping with complexity, prioritization, and emotional regulation.
In the UN context, authors such as Ruffa and Rietjens (2023) have analyzed how military peacekeepers learn and produce meaning while interacting in operational settings (also Howard, 2010; Rubinstein et al., 2008; Ruffa, 2017). Relatedly, Autesserre (2010) observes that “collective understandings can either precede action or emerge from practice” (p. 24). Notably, the work of Howard (2010) has been seminal in more systematic studies in “levels” of organizational learning in operational contexts, while other scholars have contributed to the knowledge management perspective in peacekeeping (Bolisani & Damiani, 2010; Junk et al., 2017). Through these important studies, we can suggest that interoperability is more likely to be successful when soldiers are actively learning from the environments in which they are deployed (Shields & Soeters, 2017).
However, the taxonomy of the kinds of knowledge and their specific relevance for interoperability at different levels of military operability remain unclear in the literature. This raises a core question: What kinds of knowledge are necessary in the military for effective interoperability in integrated peace and stabilization operations?
This exploratory and theorizing article seeks to address this question. By combining deductive and inductive methods, the article aims to identify and clarify the kinds of knowledge necessary in the military for developing interoperability in peace operations. The study also aims to provide a pathway for theoretical growth now and for future studies by utilizing epistemological insights from the philosophy of pragmatism (Addams, 1907/2007; Dewey, 1938). Classical pragmatism transcends rigid dualisms such as war/peace, friend/enemy, and warrior/peacekeeper and rejects absolutist dogma in favor of a contextual, problem-centered perspective, which can be useful in the dynamic environments of peace operation (Shields, 2003; Shields & Soeters, 2017).
Our deductive inquiry adopts a pragmatic analytical framework and working hypotheses based on categories of the Bengt-Åke Lundvall’s Taxonomy of Knowledge (Lundvall, 2006; Lundvall & Johnson, 1994). This framework provides four flexible and useful categories of knowing in organizations: know-what, know-how, know-why, and know-who. Using these “question-categories,” we systematically examine knowledge and abilities required to address key interoperability challenges at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of analysis.
The inductive inquiry draws on primary interviews and documents from the Armed Forces of two case studies: the United States and Brazil. These two important countries are able to provide substantial insights on interoperability in peace and stability operations. The U.S. military transformation experiences—often alongside NATO allies—have been a reference for numerous countries worldwide, including Brazil, for the development of standards, ideas, and concepts related to interoperability (Ferreyra, 2023; Teixeira & Freire, 2019). Notably, the so-called U.S. joint and expeditionary mind-set (Fürst & Kümmel, 2012) has been influential in the human factors for cooperating in smaller missions worldwide, which includes “stability operations,” considered by the Department of Defense (2009) as a “core mission” alongside combat operations. As for Brazil, it is an emerging power in the Global South and has been an outstanding contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping among Latin American countries and globally. Recently, the Brazilian Armed Forces assumed a high-profile role in the UN Mission in Haiti and leading roles in UN missions in Africa and other regions.
To collect primary data, during a research visit to the United States in 2023, we established official contact points and conducted in-person interviews with experts at an army installation of the Joint Readiness Training Center, Louisiana. We also conducted remote interviews with officers from the Joint Forces Staff College in Virginia, and officers who have worked at the Defense Department, the Navy, and NATO. For Brazil, we conducted remote interviews with experienced officers in UN peacekeeping operations. For both cases, we also consulted official documents and secondary data material, for example, books, articles, and magazines.
A Pragmatist Approach to Interoperability
The need to orchestrate armed forces, interagency actors, specialty functions in multinational or joint components, contractors, and host-nation participants to achieve effects on a nation’s populace often makes peacekeeping and stability operations unique and complex endeavors. We argue that a pragmatic analytical framework is necessary for addressing challenges in interoperability within these operations, and that the philosophy of pragmatism provides a useful theoretical starting point for this purpose.
Classical pragmatism, which emphasizes practical consequences and experiential learning, originated with thinkers like Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and Jane Addams (Shields et al., 2023). However, for the purpose of this study, the ideas of Dewey (1938) and Addams (1907/2007) are most relevant due to Dewey’s focus on communities of inquiry and experiential learning and Addams’ emphasis on social cooperation and reform.
Overall, pragmatism recognizes problematic situations in human experience as an opportunity for purposeful inquiry. Most problematic situations require further investigation, learning, and action (i.e., inquiry) (Shields, 2003). According to Shields (2003), notable in peace studies and public administration for utilizing pragmatism to advance research, pragmatism’s focus on the problematic situation is fruitful because it is not a solution as end-of-quest oriented and thus addresses critics’ concerns. “An all-knowledgeable expert, for example, would never have a final solution, rather a useful approach to the problematic situation” (Shields, 2003, p. 516).
According to Dewey (1938, p. 104), inquiry is a controlled and directed process that transforms the “the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.” The original situation corresponds to problematic scenarios where responses to the environment are inadequate to provide desired solutions. This stimulates the next stage of the process, where transformations are achieved by two kinds of means. One refers to the isolation of ideational or conceptual subject matter, which defines parameters for reconstructing the original situation. The other phase, reflective phase of the process, involves the cognitive components of inquiry (ideas, theories, techniques) as resolutions to the original causes of the problem that are tested in action (Shields & Rissler, 2015). The knowledge yielded by this process is not infallible; it is subject to revision and adjustment as the operations of inquiry take place in experiential contexts.
From the perspective of classical pragmatism, interoperability emerges as a context of problematic situations, but it is also a dynamic context of inquiry and resolutions in organizations. Interoperability practices ideally involve a commitment to act to resolve problems and to learn from results with an (experimental) scientific attitude (Shields, 2003). The knowledge obtained in this process is rooted in experience and culture. Therefore, facts, perceptions, ideas, techniques, or lessons necessary for developing interoperability are not pre-existing knowledge that are passively absorbed or artificially applied. Rather, these elements are understood genetically. Here, we can think of peacebuilding and stabilization environments as “interoperability laboratories” for learning organizations, where resolutions of inquiry can be tested in action.
Interoperability is a learning and developmental activity, and its function in peace operations is practical or pragmatic, that is, the construction of fluid and positive relationships aiming to support the transformation of warlike situations into “peace.” Yet, as a form of collaborative effort, inquiry extends beyond individual decision-makers to encompass a “community of inquiry” (Dewey, 1938; Shields, 2003). A community of inquiry connects a variety of communal experiences of people who are able to learn from one another and inform decision-making by identifying common purposes and means to achieve them. These ideas closely align with the pragmatist ideas of Jane Addams (1907/2007), a pioneer in peace theory.
Interoperability as Peaceweaving
The philosophy of Jane Addams (1907/2007) is both comprehensive and problem-centered. In her book Newer Ideals of Peace, Addams presents a perspective that envisions communities in which cooperation is developed around a quest to address common problems (Shields et al., 2023). Taking Addams’s pragmatist, feminist ideas, we can go beyond traditional visions to understand interoperability as a potential form of peaceweaving. This term was originally coined by Patricia Shields to capture the organic concept of positive peace in Addams: Peaceweaving is about building the fabric of peace by emphasizing relationships. Peaceweaving builds these positive relationships by working on practical problems, and engaging people widely with sympathetic understanding while recognizing that progress is measured by the welfare of the vulnerable. (Shields & Soeters, 2017, p. 331)
From the peaceweaving perspective, interoperability practices take place within the community of inquiry, which begins with a concrete problematic situation. This provides the context for developing interoperability as a catalyst for building positive relationships, including attitudes, institutions, and structures that sustain peaceful relationships well beyond the absence of war. The focus on relationships as is also a focus on process (Shields & Soeters, 2017). Relationships grow and change and can be strong and flexible, weaving into the organizational fabric of peacekeeping and military operability at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Taking Shields’s ideas, inspired by Addams’s experiences, the basis for developing interoperable mindsets in these relationships is the ability to see the world from another’s point of view, avoiding dogmatism and rigid moralism (Shields, 2003). It is hard to develop cognitive and perceptive interoperability strong and flexible enough when rigid mindsets dominate. For this reason, the concept of sympathetic knowledge, or the ability to “atleast see the size of one another’s burdens” (Addams, 2002, p. 6), is central in the Shields’s concept of peaceweaving (Shields & Soeters, 2017, p. 331). Sympathetic knowledge emphasizes “actively knowing other people for the purpose of understanding them with some degree of depth” (Hamington, 2009, p. 71). It helps to suspend prejudices and learn from each other while working in practical problems.
Sympathetic understanding can be manifested between different military cultures or among military, civilian, and police components as they learn about their various roles in integrated operations, relationships referred to in the literature as horizontal interoperability (Rubinstein et al., 2008). One might also expect that local citizens in conflicting areas can learn from mission officers, just as members of the mission can learn from the local population, interactions often called vertical interoperability (Piché, 2018). Sympathetic understanding can also take place between mission troops and host-country forces, which some scholars describe as diagonal interoperability (Verweijen, 2017).
Together, horizontal, vertical, and diagonal relationships can become a community of inquiry and weave a transformed community in conflicting contexts. Communities of inquiry need “leader-mediators” in these relationships. It is because there are often language and other barriers that discourage cooperation (Shields, 2003). According to Shields (2003), “mediators build bridges between different points of view and different experiential references” (p. 526). The mediator role operates at the various strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command in organizations. However, Addams’s peaceweaving ideas find their clearest practical manifestation with local communities at lower tactical levels.
Drawing on the Addams’ model of the civic household, the city or neighborhood, as a cooperative context, functions like a caring household guided by caring leaders-mediators (Shields & Soeters, 2017). Interoperability materializes through “multiform activities” ideally accompanied by skills had by good “housekeepers.” Under this model, rooted in the feminine experience (although not inherently female), leader-mediators promote interoperability practices organically through an ethics of care and a sense of obligation to the welfare of people. This aligns with various core competencies and the reflection required in peacekeepers (UN, 2010) to create reliable connections with women, men, and children in conflicts while supporting essential services such as sanitation and health care for the most vulnerable in the community of inquiry.
Yet, peacekeeping-oriented skills must be balanced with competencies required for survival in violent environments. Militaries should be able to combine “the warrior right hand” (core combat competencies to counter violence) with the “underdeveloped positive peace left hand sustained by Addams’s ideas” (Shields & Soeters, 2017, p. 334). These contradictory demands reflect the “ambidexterity” that flexible soldiers need to cope with various problems while interoperating with joint forces and various nonmilitary organizations (Soeters & Ferreyra, 2023).
However, different types of problems for interoperability typically emerge at higher strategic military levels as well as through the operational and tactical levels of command within communities of inquiry. As Missildine and Clift (2019) argue, each level may have bespoke solutions, making interplatform, intertask force or group, interservice, and international data nontransferable. This suggests the need to examine how the knowledge, techniques, and skills required for interoperability can differ across these levels.
Practical Problems at Multiple Levels
The strategic, operational, and tactical levels of analysis broadly correspond to the three levels of war in modern military theory (Harvey, 2021). The literature on interoperability has applied these hierarchical levels as a framework to analyze practical problems in interoperability. Key challenges and resolutions emerge in communities of inquiry as the focus and scope of interoperability vary across these echelons within military organizations (Deni, 2014; Larson et al., 2003; Lockyer, 2012; Markel et al., 2011; Nisser, 2022; Piché, 2018; Soeters & Manigart, 2008). While these levels are useful conceptual tools, their boundaries tend to blur and do not necessarily correspond to levels of command in military and deployment organizations (e.g., European Security and Defence College [ESDC], 2021; UN, 2012).
Strategic Level
The military-strategic level is usually the context where political objectives are converted into achievable military-strategic objectives (e.g., Liddell Hart, 1991). In the American system, this level is usually within the realm of the highest national military commanders who advise on how military components will be structured and utilized to achieve national- or theater-level goals (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017, I-7). In the UN system, the management of peace operations at the UN Headquarters in New York is regarded as the strategic level of authority, command, and control and overlaps with the Head of the Mission (UN, 2012, p. 9).
According to Deni (2014) and Lockyer (2012), interoperability at this level can be defined as the harmonization of worldviews, values, and strategic interests. Key problematic situations in communities of inquiry include aligning values and competing interests. In the UN peacekeeping system, for instance, conflicting interests among international stakeholders have often constrained the smooth extension of mandates and delayed time-sensitive processes such as force generation and military planning at the Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO; Security Council Report, 2023; Smith & Boutellis, 2013). In the U.S. context, interoperability problems in NATO operations have often been linked to the incongruence of military-strategic concepts and doctrines, which are influenced by national cultures and legal factors. These problems can reverberate throughout the chain of command and control, affecting the process of standing up operations and coalition-building (Larson et al., 2003; Pernin et al., 2019).
The degree of inquiry and understanding required to navigate these problematic contexts differs from those at lower echelons. According to Markel et al. (2011, p. 33), strategic military leaders should have a deep understanding of the broader strategic issues at play, even if not indisputably military in nature, as well as an understanding of allies’ and partners’ capabilities and cultures. Wolfley (2021) highlights tools of military statecraft (e.g., military diplomacy) to shape relationships and modify conflicting interests. While understanding these issues is useful at operational and tactical levels, officers serving at lower echelons require a more detailed, intuitive understanding of joint and service capabilities (Markel et al. 2011; Soeters & Ferreyra, 2023).
Operational Level
The operational level, as introduced by Luttwak (1980), “seek to attain to goals set by theater strategy through suitable combinations of tactics” (p. 61). Communities of inquiry achieve these goals by using operational art, which in U.S. military doctrine refers to a “cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment”—to develop strategies, planning, coordination, and execution of operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019, vii). In the UN system, the field-based management of operations at the Mission Headquarters is considered to be the operational level (UN, 2012).
At this level, interoperability is often presented as the ability to combine systems, forces, and planning across services (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 118; Nisser, 2022). Challenges typically emerge from differences in language, beliefs, doctrines, and practices among personnel (Soeters & Ferreyra, 2023; Soeters & Manigart, 2008; Soeters 2020). Interactions occur in mission headquarters, in project teams with different nationalities and working in missions, exercises, and operations. These encounters are not exempt from tensions or caveats among mindsets about the meaning of partnerships, competencies, technologies, and information (Ferreyra & Soeters, 2024; Ruffa & Rietjens, 2023).
To address several of these issues, officers use cognitive skills such as perspective taking (Abbe, 2023) to understand how different partners approach problems to combine different effects. Officers serving at the operational level experience significantly different stimuli and have to think on a somewhat different time scale, using significantly different thought processes than officers at tactical echelons—for example, employing “systemic operational design” to understand the various, intricate interactions involved within the community of inquiry (Markel et al., 2011; also: Soeters, 2020).
Tactical Level
The tactical level is usually the focus of subtheater commands and the ordered engagement and deployment of specific formations, tasks forces, and subunits. Problems arise from integrating forces with different performance capabilities, military hardware, or shortfalls in communication systems and compatible tools (Deni, 2014; Larson et al., 2003). Problems also involve misunderstandings about the meanings and rationales of actions between mission troops and local communities, particularly in vertical interoperability (also Rietjens, 2023), as well as in diagonal interoperability with local host-country forces. For example, in exploring the “not so joint” operations between MONUSCO troops and the Congolese army, Verweijen (2017) examined how these were limited by distrust and cultural differences.
In these contexts, troops that develop adaptive language use and culturally sensitive behaviors are better equipped to mitigate misunderstandings and build trust with local actors (Paget, 2016; Rosson, 2022). Officers on the ground experience considerably different environmental cues compared to staff officers at operational levels. Following Markel et al. (2011, p. 70), tactical officers often base their responses on immediate physical stimuli, such as sight, sound, and the body language of the people they are engaging with. In contrast, operational-level staff officers rely mostly on assessments from reports and analyses, creating two distinct contexts of interoperability and feedback processes.
As observed above, while the three levels of interoperability overlap, each context requires knowledge and tools of inquiry tailored to particular problems. But what are the types of knowledge that fragment the knowledge base of interoperability at these levels? The next section describes Lundvall’s Knowledge Taxonomy to address this question.
A Knowledge Taxonomy for Interoperability
Knowledge management studies generally make a difference between “explicit knowledge” and “tacit knowledge,” that is, a knowledge that cannot be adequately articulated and codified through documents, words, or images (Polanyi, 2009). Beyond this distinction, Lundvall’s Taxonomy of Knowing provides four helpful and flexible categories to explain different kinds of useful knowledge in organizations: know-what, know-why, know-how, and know-who (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994). 2 These can be described as follows.
Know-what refers to knowledge about “facts.” Here, knowledge is close to what is normally called information—it can be broken down into bits and communicated as data. In preparing a contingent for peace missions, know-what comprises facts about the country—for example, its geography, population, language, and religion—as opposed to knowing-how to negotiate or communicate in the local language properly. Know-what can be obtained through learning-by-using and by interactions between knowledge producers and users (Schmidtchen, 2006).
Know-why refers to knowledge about underlying principles, cause-and-effect relationships, as well as laws of motion in nature and society. For instance, know-why is embedded in military principles of operational art of linking details of tactics to a unified system or understanding their effects in operational environments. This kind of knowledge is typically obtained through reading books, attending lectures, and experimentation. Access to know-why makes advances in techniques (know-how) and reduces the frequency of errors through the evaluation of causation and explanation (Lundvall, 2006).
Know-how refers to skills—that is, the ability to do something or apply a technique. Training is usually the process for improving an ability. Learning-by-doing is not learning by collecting facts. Knowing how to operate drones with anti-jamming capabilities is not the same as knowing the reason why this technology works. In times of rapid innovation, knowing-how to achieve a desired output can be independent of any reason why a technique works.
As the knowledge base and division of labor become more complex in military operations, know-who becomes a key enabler of social capital and trust with various operational partners to get access to and use their expertise in a range of workforce mix options. Know-who involves information about who knows what and who knows to do what. But it also involves the skill of forming relationships with other specialists and drawing on their expertise, which is often tacit and highly localized.
The four knowledge categories are complementary and overlap in many useful ways at individual and organizational levels (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994). From a Deweyan perspective, these categories are not cut in stone, and there is fluidity and interconnectivity at play. However, these knowledge distinctions provide useful assistance in conceptualizing and communicating about the fragmented base of knowledge. They often manifest in more idiosyncratic formats or are more interdependent with their societal/organizational context. This is a reason why concepts such as “operational art” and “statecraft” exist—so we can distinguish these contexts from a practical doing perspective (know-how). As pragmatism emphasizes, these question-categories reflect elements of inquiry rooted in experiential contexts, which provide indications of what needs to be done, what is appropriate, or what is not. In so doing, actors presuppose one or several epistemologies (know-why) about what counts as useful knowledge.
Yet, in Lundvallian terms, codification and efforts to make knowledge explicit in international security may be seen as an important way to enhance the capacity to globalize knowledge in society (Lundvall, 2006). Education and training systems generalize knowledge and “embody” knowledge in people. For instance, Howard (2012) explored how peacekeepers learn innumerable daily lessons by operating on the ground. When aggregated, these lessons can be generalized and reused by members of the Secretariat operation to inform mandates in other settings. This suggests the importance of combining these perspectives to examine contextual differences in the forms of knowledge used in military interoperability, as well as their similarities across organizational and strategic contexts.
Methodology
We employ qualitative research methods, combining both deductive and inductive methods of analysis. Our focus is on military-civil as well as military-military interoperability. The deductive inquiry consists of a priori framing of knowledge-based categories according to the Lundvall Taxonomy and hypotheses with the potential to bring coherence to the analysis.
The working hypothesis (WH) asserts that the relevance of the knowledge categories for developing interoperability varies across strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning/execution. This suggests that the different echelons of decision/execution would incorporate the four kinds of knowledge. To explore and compare relevant examples, such categories have become the basis for subhypotheses (SHs). These are as follows:
SH1: Effective interoperability in practice incorporates Know-What knowledge.
SH2: Effective interoperability in practice incorporates Know-How knowledge.
SH3: Effective interoperability in practice incorporates Know-Why knowledge.
SH4: Effective interoperability in practice incorporates Know-Who knowledge.
The inductive research component is based on case studies of the United States and Brazil. We conducted primary interviews with experienced officers from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). In addition, we interviewed highly commissioned officers and experts from the Department of Defense, the Navy, and NATO. For the Brazilian Armed Forces, we conducted remote interviews with experienced peacekeepers and military leaders who have participated in UN missions as well as training and education officers working at the Joint Center of Peace Operations of Brazil (CCOPAB). In total, we developed 34 primary interviews —in English or Portuguese—generating 1808 minutes of audio with corresponding transcripts.
We evaluated selected participants as appropriate to our research given the significance of their expertise (all of them at mid-senior career levels) in specific jobs/positions at strategic, operational, or tactical levels. In particular, we valued their experiences in peacekeeping and/or stability operations, in which they have confronted challenges and managed various aspects of interoperability.
Table 1 aligns the echelons of some examples of positions in the U.S. Armed Forces and the UN system with the three levels of planning/execution. As the levels overlap, some positions may operate at more than one level (e.g., the UN Head of the Mission).
Military Positions/Ranks at Different Levels of Authority/Decision at the United Nations and the U.S. Armed Forces.
Note. Prepared by the author based on Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08 (2006), UN Staff Officers Specialized Training Materials (2018) and Markel et al. (2011).
We implemented semi-structured interviews centered on practical challenges and issues participants encountered in their professional experiences. We also formulated questions on knowledge, skills, and training issues they considered as critical to strengthen interoperability.
To test the SHs, we systematically coded and analyzed data collected within the Lundvall Taxonomy to observe how the knowledge categories manifested in practical forms at the different levels of interoperability. Our comparative analysis examined the relevance of the knowledge categories among these three levels while also considering contextual differences between the United States and Brazilian case studies. Although not structured around fixed contextual indicators, our comparison between the case studies allowed us to identify context-specific differences and similarities in the manifestation and application of knowledge categories.
In this process, our inductive analysis provided flexibility beyond our deductive codes to explore new ideas and insights derived from data collection. Systematic questioning revealed consistent themes in the discourses of our respondents regarding core competencies and recurring barriers to interoperability at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. To complement our interviews, we analyzed UN training materials, manuals, JRTC and JFSC training documents, and other primary sources. Triangulation of data ensured that our findings are not only grounded in individual experiences but also in broader institutional frameworks, enhancing both validity and reliability. Interview information can be requested at the Department of Political Science, Texas State University website. Data collection adhered to ethical norms for protecting human subjects. If accepted for publication, the publisher of the article will provide a link option for access to the interview questions.
Results
As a means of summary and guidance throughout our findings, we have compiled two comparative tables. Table 2 contains examples of knowledge categories that are relevant for interoperability at the three levels of operations. Table 3 is presented in the next section.
Knowledge Categories and Examples at the Different Levels of Interoperability.
Note. Prepared by the author.
Relevance of the Types of Knowledge Across the Three Levels of Interoperability.
Note. Own elaboration.
Strategic Level
Know-What (Strategic)
Building sustainable peace is often a strategic long-term goal in the structures of international peace operations to be achieved through various forms of peaceweaving (Shields, 2017). Among various dimensions, peaceweaving involves an informational context at strategic levels where relationships of all sorts are strengthened and transformed as people share information to resolve problems and achieve shorter-term goals. While different kinds of knowledge interweave in this process, one may see how distinctions of know-what are central to interoperability at strategic levels.
Following the experiential insights of our informers, the use of accurate, explicit information at this level enables strategic decision-makers and military advisors to navigate complex planning processes, supporting know-how abilities to identify numerous needs and activities to collaborate with various services and agencies (also Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020; UN, 2023). For instance, military and civilian advisers at the DPKO share know-what through daily and weekly operational reports to ensure that all components remain informed about ongoing events in peacekeeping (UN, 2018). As part of a dynamic, iterative process of data collection within communities of inquiry, know-what involves the isolation of data and subject matter, which helps define parameters within which different problematic situations are addressed in interagency strategic contexts.
Knowledge about facts is linked to a scientific attitude and involves flexibility and abilities (i.e., know-how) to redefine problems and strategies as data collection proceeds (Shields, 2003). Yet, incorporating information is not always straightforward. As one officer who worked at the United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) in New York exemplified from its experience at the DPKO, when a new officer begins at a DPKO office, “they often don’t have enough time to assimilate legal and technical information and readapt from their military background, as the planning systems are different, the doctrines and terminologies are different.” Then, many times they try to bring their planning systems and concepts from their countries, which makes the work (know-how) at the UN difficult.
These problems show that effective interoperability needs to be based on facts and information, and officers should be able to consider facts that may not align with their preconceived notions (Shields, 2003). Furthermore, absorbing know-what is not the same as understanding the value of information (know-why) nor knowing-how to interpret and share classified information in specific channels. For instance, a U.S. interviewee hinted that, when U.S. officers lack a firm understanding of classification rules and disclosure procedures, it can lead to over-classification and shutting down the necessary flow of information between U.S. departments, strategic commanders, and partners (also Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, A2; Markel et al., 2011).
We observe, however, that the UN multilateral system in which Brazil operates emphasizes broader information-sharing and accessibility at strategic levels, while the U.S. military is typically more selective in associations and restricted in sharing military information (e.g., Soeters & Ferreyra, 2023, p. 79). The UN promotes broader accessibility of global know-what as a basis for developing global strategic interoperability among diverse international stakeholders in peacekeeping. For instance, the UN-Peacekeeping Resource Hub and DPKO provide reports, standardized training, and strategic plans openly accessible to various stakeholders (UN, 2023). This inclusive approach to know-what aligns with the global dynamics of peaceweaving by promoting transparency and enabling a public network of trust and information from which stakeholders can co-create solutions.
In the U.S. context, information-sharing can be more contingent on knowing-who the trustworthy partners are—those with whom strategic values are shared. As a former Pentagon officer argued to us, “value alignment is the building block of interoperability at strategic levels.” Aligning values would facilitate trust-building as the context for sharing goals and information with like-minded partners. This caution around strategic know-who (a combination of information with strategic relationships) is evident in the “Five Eyes” alliance (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), which shares all kinds of military information, while excluding others like Germany, despite its NATO membership. Selective partnerships show how nations with a common language (in this case, English) and a common history (British Commonwealth or colonialism) often trust each other more and collaborate more closely on classified information (Soeters & Ferreyra, 2023). It shows how knowing-who can constrain or support the access to know-what. However, this know-who-driven approach inherently limits strategic interoperability and peaceweaving by narrowing the circle of trusted partners.
Know-Why (Strategic)
Collecting data is different from effectively interpreting that data within the community of inquiry. As some of our interviewees commented, while strategic partners can agree on the longer-term horizon of a sustained peace, they often understand its strategic problems and shorter-term goals through different lenses. This can constrain strategic interoperability and undermine peaceweaving as a process. However, acquiring forms of know-why, or knowledge of causal relationships, can mitigate these challenges by helping decision-makers and military advisors develop shared interpretative frameworks to evaluate decisions and priorities in strategic environments.
Following reflections from our informers, strategic know-why may support critical thinking skills (know-how) required to assess the short- and long-term impacts of specific collaborations, as well as the challenges of integrating contributions across international, interagency, and intergovernmental contexts (e.g., Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019, D-15). Both case studies highlight that a deep understanding of the principles, theories, and goals shaping international politics is essential for grasping dynamics of international cooperation (also JFSC, 2020; Markel et al., 2011).
However, the focus of these frameworks differs between the case studies. In the U.S. context, the analytical and interpretative focus is primarily on understanding problems and practical consequences of aligning values with specific partners. For instance, a former Pentagon officer described situations of “poor interoperability” between U.S. security forces and the Afghan army. As he said, “our values never aligned with afghani values,” including the U.S. Defense Department reluctance to engage with an army associated with practices like “Bacha bazi”—a tradition involving adolescent boys for entertainment and sex.
Although this situation is specific, our informer emphasized the importance of questioning and learning from these experiences to gain a deeper understanding of the implications of working with different partners and allies. American interviewees emphasized the importance of sympathetically understanding “how socialization works in our partners, what makes them part of the groups with which they identify, what are the consequences of their belief systems across levels and lines of operations.” It also highlights the importance of knowing-who to better understand the know-why implications of specific collaborations. A U.S. officer distinguished strategic allies, such as Germany—whom the U.S. works closely with on various strategic issues—from other partners like India. Through these partnerships, strategic leaders (e.g., Combatant Commanders) should be able to discern that the kinds of abilities required to interoperate may differ in technical, procedural, and interpersonal aspects (also Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, a-9).
In contrast, Brazilian officials at strategic levels within the UNHQ tend to focus on understanding the challenges and requirements of operating in the UN system, including collective security dynamics and multilateralism. As one experienced Brazilian officer explained, “Officers must possess an in-depth knowledge of how the UN system works as a whole.” For instance, this systemic understanding frames the know-how of military advisers at the DPKO, who must collaborate in developing generic guidelines and procedures for military components (UN, 2012). This includes grasping the key issues, actions, and underlying needs in force generation and relationships with troop-contributors, stakeholders, and humanitarian agencies, which sustain the development of ties and interpersonal interconnections at this level.
Know-How (Strategic)
Overall, knowing-how to build bridges and relationships across intergovernmental and cultural divides—where people-to-people ties are not usually a given—can be a valuable asset for developing strategic interoperability. This is a reason why our interviewees emphasized relationship-building and interpersonal skills as core abilities in officers serving at strategic levels (also Deni, 2014; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, A2; JFSC, 2020; UN, 2010). Relationship-building connects with the know-how of leader-mediators to facilitate relationships and negotiations between different experiential references (Shields, 2003). These are often more tacit forms of knowledge in interagency contexts that can repair fractured relationships and prevent the undermining of a healthy peaceweaving process. Contextual differences in case studies help to discern the environments in which these abilities take place.
For instance, a former strategic planner at the U.S. European Command commented to us that “Washington, D.C. is a problematic place,” as officers in executive bodies there often lack the ability to work with people from specific countries. Yet, “they have to make decisions about our relationships with like every country in the world very quickly.” In these contexts, he pointed out the importance of working with specific military officers—those who have personal experiences or who have worked with specific countries and can, for instance, call upon foreign-area military officers and use rapport with partners, thereby avoiding misunderstandings and miscommunication in planning activities.
At the UN strategic headquarters, a Brazilian commander, drawing from his experience, described interpersonal relationship abilities as the capacity to understand and accommodate conflicting interests. He illustrated this with financial issues: The countries that send their troops to the missions are not always the largest financial contributors. Therefore, we may have conflicting interest. On one side, there is an aim for the mission to be as cheap as possible. On the other side, there are people seeking to have all the means necessary to accomplish their mission and to be properly reimbursed for their contributions.
In these problematic contexts, military leader-mediators are the ones who try to balance the interests of financial cost, efficiency, risk, and speed in fulfilling the mandate by putting mechanisms in place that facilitate negotiations. Furthermore, communication skills prove crucial in both case studies for bridging problematic communication dualisms and successfully articulate the strategic and “larger often-evolving end-in-view” of organizations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, A2; Shields, 2017; UN, 2010). Successful strategic interoperability requires strategic leader-mediators who possess creative thinking and flexibility to adapt messages to different audiences (e.g., civilian or nonmilitary actors), thereby effectively inspiring the acceptance of “big ideas” in the community of inquiry (also Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], 2011, p. 81; JFSC, 2020, p. 4).
Know-Who (Strategic)
As communities of inquiry work on strategic problems, their members transform various situations by drawing on their know-how as subject matter experts and the information (know-what) and understanding (know-why) they acquire within their respective services, nations, or departments (also Markel et al., 2011; Rosson, 2022). In Lundvallian terms, this reflects the composite base of knowledge at strategic levels of relationship-building where organizational solutions are often the result of a complex combination of knowledge from various services. Thus, strategic interoperability requires military leaders who can effectively leverage and complement knowledge of numerous partners, systems, and services, that is, know-who.
For instance, a Brazilian officer argued that those serving at the UN strategic level must understand how the Security Council (SC) establishes mission mandates, who in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly oversees budgeting, how the DPKO and UN Field Support implement SC resolutions, and which specialists manage force generation (e.g., UN, 2018). Yet, as previously mentioned, accessing know-who is seldom automatic. Unlike global know-what, often tacit and highly localized know-who can be inaccessible to those who lack the necessary connections, experience, or organizational membership. A Brazilian commander noted this difficulty: “Military officers working at UNHQ often encounter challenges to develop a clear understanding of the UN organization’s various systems and functions.” Less experienced officers, in particular, may encounter more difficulties to grasp who politically and technically supports relevant courses of action within specific agencies.
As for the U.S. contexts, know-who is at the basis of building trust with selected partners, a cornerstone of effective strategic interoperability and peaceweaving, as mentioned earlier. A U.S. Army officer suggested that inquiry into know-who must go deeper, as commanders at strategic/operational levels need to understand as much as possible about the ontology of their partners and allies. “How does the cultures in which they’re gonna be working? How do they define realities which then defines their worldviews? Besides, what are their epistemologies?” This emphasis on ontological understanding highlights the importance of developing sympathetic knowledge while actively learning about partners. Such knowledge enables strategic leaders to suspend judgment of others, which helps to advance a reflexive process of inquiry and peaceweaving in communities of inquiry (Shields & Soeters, 2017).
Operational Level
Know-What (Operational)
While strategic know-what encompasses a broad informational landscape and peaceweaving dynamics through various institutional frameworks, missions, and operations, operational know-what tends to be more contingent on particular operational environments. According to the experiential insights of our informers, when applied effectively, know-what provides operational-level officers with the factual interagency context that frames operational art as know-how, enabling them to coordinate activities and interoperate effectively. For example, operational know-what is applied through mapping critical terms, protocols, geospatial data, and community needs, which are shared to resolve discrepancies and misunderstandings in multinational headquarters (CALL, 2019b; JFSC, 2016; UN, 2018).
However, interviews with American and Brazilian officers highlighted limitations in the information they typically gather due to short mission rotations. In UN contexts, for instance, this often restricts access to local insights and the development of institutional memory that longer-term civilian components or civilian organizations tend to possess (also JFSC, 2016). As a former UN Chief of Staff in South Sudan noted, “Information management, civilians are much better than us [. . .] We often don’t have enough time to build trust with local leaders, to better understand history, local dynamics, and culture.”
These rotations translate into more limited personal or authentic experiences to make meaning in inquiry, which affects peaceweaving as a process that requires continuity in engaging with the content/material in questioning (know-what) (Shields, 2003). This also affects the depth of inquiry and sympathetic understanding (know-why) needed to effectively respond to the intentions and actions of various partners—what Paget (2020) terms perceptive interoperability.
Both American and Brazilian officers interviewed pointed out the importance of working with civilian information through civil affairs officers or CIMIC officers to develop the commander’s visualization of the operational environment and shared situational awareness (also CALL, 2019b; JFSC, 2020). Nevertheless, the forms of information-sharing may differ between case studies. In UN integrated operations, civilian operational authorities (such as the Head of the Mission [HOM], usually a civilian) absorb military information and also produce know-what (e.g., guidelines, instructions, briefings) for the Head of the Military Component, who reports to the HOM (UN, 2018). Our Brazilian interviews highlighted that Force Commanders and military staff share information hubs with civilian and police components. For instance, the Joint Operations Centers (JOC) gather “raw facts” that are codified, stored, and made available for a broad range of users (UN, 2018, p. 243). Know-what may refer to organizations working in an area to facilitate communication, local customs, essential services, infrastructure, or as simple as identifying where populations need protection.
In contrast, operational information-sharing in U.S. stability operations flows within a more military-centric framework. Know-what is often more naturally associated to “military intelligence” in joint command structures (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, II-2). Some interviewees mentioned frameworks like PAMISSI (Political, Administrative, Military, Information, Social, Infrastructure, and Economic) for systematically breaking down key dimensions in analyzing operational environments. As a JFSC respondent argued, “breaking them down into subsets and parts to evaluate what is happening helps in developing and maintaining relationships with a broad range of people to understand needs and gain support” (also CALL, 2019b; JFSC, 2020). In this form, know-what provides elements for testing hypothesis in the community of inquiry about the implications of facts (know-why)—for instance, to predict trends in early warning systems. However, as we will see, common interpretative frameworks as forms of know-why are not naturally a given in interagency/multinational headquarters.
Know-Why (Operational)
Some interviewees described problematic situations with staff officers who focused exclusively on their tasks and were hesitant to share information with civilian components, which reflects typical challenges for peaceweaving at operational levels. As commented by a former Brazilian commander recalled from experience in missions: “I saw resistance from the military component, as if, at that moment, their tasks were the most important part of the missions, often seeing our own partners as people who were there to hinder the fulfillment of our mission, to tell us what we could not do.” These officers might require time—often after participating in various missions—to understand the added value of involving other partners in the same mission. Learning-by-doing in mission headquarters may occur without any exposure to theory (know-why). However, know-why can provide an advantage in inquiry by reducing the need for trial and error in experience (Lundvall, 2006).
In U.S. operational contexts, know-why is often grounded in stability (including counterinsurgency) theory and doctrine, particularly as it helps to interpret the roles and patterns of behavior of civilian and military organizations and the emphasis these theories place on interagency cooperation (e.g., Markel et al., 2011). According to our informants, these know-why forms help mitigate problems in when and how to collaborate with other organizational cultures and services by leveraging anticipatory dynamics practices, systems thinking, and futuring (CALL, 2016, p. 40; Joint Forces Staff College [JFSC], 2020; National Defense University 2022). Know-why also supports in “connecting the dots” within the operational environment. As a JFSC officer explained, “everything is part of a system in which you, the partner, the adversary, or the competitor—all are part of a system of opposition, along with other dynamic nodes in-between, affecting each other” (also Marsh, 2017, p. 17).
While stabilization doctrines have influenced many UN missions in volatile areas (e.g., Ruffa & Rietjens, 2023), UN peacekeeping operations typically demonstrate greater know-why interpretative constructs within peacebuilding theory. This difference was evident in practical concerns about impartiality principles in our Brazilian interviews. Maintaining unbiased relationships is crucial to securing the consent and cooperation of all parties in conflict, to arrive at a ceasefire and implement a peace-agreement. The UN theory of change prioritizes sustainable, nonmilitarized resolutions, even if military action is part of the mission (De Coning, 2021). In military stabilization, however, the theory of change is to restore and maintain order where effective military cooperation to manage hostile groups is often viewed by some as a partial actor helping to protect local governments (De Coning, 2021; Marsh, 2017).
Know-How (Operational)
The differences described in the theoretical/interpretative frameworks orient practices of cooperation and doing interactions (know-how) in different ways. These reflect different models of interoperability at operational levels—that is, ways of thinking and behaving embedded in organizations that guide cooperative practices and peaceweaving dynamics in communities of inquiry. The UN peacekeeping model of integrated operations emphasizes abilities to coordinate various components—civilian, police, and military. Effective interoperability in inclusive peace processes requires military leader-mediators to act “on the tap, not on top” in mission headquarters, as Appleby (1962, p. 175) understood it. This model implies military attitudes and abilities to cooperate as one of various components serving and facilitating solutions within the mission, proceeding as a third party with people in conflict. In contrast, the U.S. interoperability model is more hierarchically integrated around military command structures. This prioritizes know-how in conflict management or containment in stabilization, often through diagonal interoperability with security forces of the host-nation, as well as in military coalitions and collaborations with civilian organizations (JFTC, 2020; Marsh, 2017).
However, both contexts need leader-mediators because there are often language and other intercultural barriers that constrain interoperability and relationship-building. According to our informants, both cases require leader-mediators to be flexible, understanding, and empathetic toward other organizational cultures in headquarters and among staff officers (National Defense University 2022; Shields, 2003; UN, 2010). Closer to a context of diagonal interoperability—for example, in Iraq—a U.S. officer recalled Iraqi military officers struggling to understand basic concepts of staff work with U.S. security assistance officers, explaining, “there was concern that many of them couldn’t read or understand documents properly.”
In such contexts, leaders-mediators with sympathetic understanding to interoperate and negotiate with other mentalities are critical. Operational interagency environments require military officers with intellectual humility to recognize the limits of the own knowledge (metacognition) as well as a healthy respect for what other partners know—or do not know. Relatedly, our informers pointed out the quality of thinking analogically from one case to another—the ability to step outside events, observe how other services and organizations respond, proceed, and learn in operations (CALL, 2011; National Defense University 2022; UN, 2012 p. 18).
Sensitive leader-mediators combine core competencies “for developing personal ties that will facilitate the day-to-day running of a mission and ensure the smooth flow of events” (interview). A retired general described the importance of direct connections: “sending the right liaison officer to another organization is akin to looking them in the eye and having a fruitful conversation” (also CALL, 2011). In UN contexts, a former UN Chief-of- staff told us that “active listening” is an essential skill. Furthermore, affective components—how officers react to and understand the emotions of other partners—are highly valued in commanders and staffs, although often more implicit and harder to address in formal education.
Know-Who (Operational)
As described above, know-how is a type of knowledge developed within the borders of individual performance or within a single team/function. As the complexity of the knowledge base increases at operational levels, however, commanders and staff officers need to be able to share and combine elements of know-how across different services to resolve common problems (JFSC, 2016; UN, 2018). This is a reason why know-who becomes important for interoperability and relationship-building at operational levels. From a pragmatist perspective, know-who is less about having deep knowledge of others’ skills and more about “the ability to judge of the bearing of the knowledge supplied by others upon common concerns” (Dewey, 1954, p. 209).
Following a JFSC officer we interviewed, know-who plays a central role in inquiring comprehensively and with sympathetic understanding about planning: “How do the other countries think about planning? Organizationally, who’s responsible? How do they handle logistics, which will then affect tactics?” Similarly, a JRTC informant emphasized know-who’s value in identifying the right officers for specific roles or functions, referred to as “talent management” (also Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. 7).
Having access to experts (know-who) can save a lot of time and yield more precise results, as it helps leverage other constructs of know-what, know-how, and know-why to effectively coordinate operations (know-how). In UN contexts, a former military observer working at Force Headquarters reflexively argued about the importance of know-who in experiences: I have to say today that, during the one-year mission as a military observer, I didn’t fully understand the role of each entity in the mission, each military group, the police component, those responsible for the rule-of-law, the humanitarian and electoral components. Who was who, the objectives of non-governmental organizations? What their performance indicators were, so that we could precisely understand the role of each one.
As previously noted, tacit or often highly localized know-who often depends on positions of access. A former UN Force Commander explained to us how understanding specific strengths and limitations of national troops, variations in organizational culture within headquarters, national caveats—and the unique risks each partner faces in operations—helped him navigate complex partnerships. In this form, know-who supports commanders in developing what is termed “relational learning” across services and nations to align efforts effectively.
Tactical Level
Know-What (Tactical)
Military operations below Mission Headquarters and the supervision of personnel (e.g., Brigades, Regional, Sector Commanders) are considered to be at the tactical level in UN peacekeeping (UN, 2012). In U.S. stability doctrine, units’ leaders and the lowest tactical units are usually the ones who encounter the local population and security forces during deployments (Joint Forces Staff College, 2016). In both contexts, units that fail to prioritize know-what or information are susceptible to poor interoperability, as well as to weakening peaceweaving and security at the tactical level. A former Force Commander of the UN Mission in the Congo (DRC) and a U.S. officer with experiences in Iraq we interviewed argued that a lack of interoperability can lead to collateral damage, including loss of life, if units are not well-informed and coordinated (also JFSC, 2016; JRTC, 2020).
A Brazilian air officer recalled his experience in South Sudan, where UN contingents often lacked comprehensive standard operation procedures (SOPs) in pre-deployment training. This severely compromised interoperability during protection tasks (know-how) in a city facing extreme risks with hostile groups. When applied effectively, codified, explicit knowledge in SOPs reduces risks and enables a shared operational language to weave safe, collaborative relationships in tactical communities of inquiry.
In UN peacekeeping contexts, Brazilian interviews emphasized information for know-how in areas such as the protection of civilians (POCs), self-defense, monitoring ceasefire, and supporting humanitarian/development actions (UN, 2022). UN peacekeepers absorb know-what in Rules of Engagement (ROEs), which often impose stricter limitations on the use of force in combat operations. In these contexts, know-what can help to bridge gaps in know-how. For instance, a Brazilian officer shared that while various partners in MINURSO had limited skills in English, the mission’s official language, and their adherence to “a simplifying manual” with well-structured SOPs facilitated interoperability in procedures such as evacuations and reconnaissance patrols.
In U.S. stabilization, while similar types of information are relevant, our American interviewees emphasized a greater focus on the requirements of joint military operations. Sharing information with local security forces, for instance, can help U.S. brigades identify adversarial targets within a city, while commanders obtaining know-what from civilian entities can prevent unintentional damage to civilian infrastructures (CALL, 2019b). For instance, accessing know-what through a Civil–Military Operations Center (CMOC) is crucial for minimizing the impact of operations on civilian populations. One interviewee illustrated this with SWEAT-MSO data (Sewer, Water, Electricity, Academics, Trash, Medical, Safety, and Other), which helps commanders recognize how essential services, often at risk during operations, are essential to survive in the city. In this way, know-what provides a framework for the know-how of commanders to reconsider maneuvers, balancing military objectives while weaving civil–military collaborations at tactical levels.
Know-Why (Tactical)
As observed above, subordinate units may strengthen interoperability by introducing codified knowledge. However, rapidly changing environments or nuanced socio-cultural dynamics may not be fully captured by pre-established protocols, leading to oversimplification in decision-making (also CALL, 2016; Rosson, 2022). Furthermore, incorporating know-what (SOPs, ROEs) is not the same as understanding “why” such instructions are strategically important to the broader community of inquiry. This underscores the importance of the complementarity of knowledge types and the distinctive roles of know-why in tactical interoperability.
As explained in JRTC analyses, unit and subunit commanders deployed in rapidly changing situations sometimes struggle to understand the different objectives between units. One unit might see another as focusing on inconsequential tasks, while the other might not grasp the ramifications of targets they are not tracking (CALL, 2016, 2019a). Resolving such “interorganizational myopia” requires more than just better communication techniques (know-how) or additional know-what between tactical units but also incorporating interpretative frameworks about cause-and-effect connections between changing contexts and the value of assigned tasks. In this form, know-why fuels the awareness of subordinate officers about the higher commander’s intent and its continuous prevalence—or UN civilian mandates—even as assigned tasks change at tactical levels. In this form, know-why is crucial in fostering adaptive and informed decision-making under dynamic conditions (JRTC, 2020; UN, 2018).
Know-why also involves understanding cultures in these contexts. As one Brazilian informant stated, “It’s not enough to have the same material [know-what] and to know how to talk to you if I don’t understand and respect your organizational culture.” As a former Pentagon officer remarked, “soldiers don’t always develop the mind-set of understanding other cultures, which is a mental hurdle for many of our line units, either whether they’re air wings combat ships or army and marine combat units.”
Researchers like Rosson (2022) highlight that failures in international negotiations (know-how) often stem from a lack of cultural understanding/awareness (know-why). Both UN and U.S. institutions promote cultural training in fields such as sociology and anthropology to address these problems (CALL, 2016; UN, 2018). For instance, cultural metaknowledge supports perceptive interoperability and mediator-roles by deeply understanding how one’s own culture influences perceptions and behaviors during deployments and how even behaviors toward gender/sex or food can affect relationships. It also includes sympathetically understanding problems from the perspective of people facing risks, restrictions, or abuses. By incorporating sympathetic know-why, problem-solving can emerge as a focus in leader-mediators, addressing various problems that discourage peaceweaving between units, civilians, and local communities.
Know-How (Tactical)
Based on insights from our interviewees, we observed that the kind of housekeeping skills in caring leader-mediators, rather than expertise in equipment/weapons, underpin sympathetic know-how in human, perceptive interoperability. Sympathetic know-how encompasses abilities such as cultural empathy, flexibility to listen and understand, perspective taking, agility to adapt to different attitudes and accents, and still skills of interpreters/translators in negotiations and peaceweaving (CALL, 2016, p. 62; JRTC, 2020; Rietjens, 2023; UN, 2022).
Sympathetic abilities require leader-mediators working alongside local communities rather than over them (top-down). Tactical personnel must work pragmatically “on the tap, not on the top,” that is, they prioritize serving local needs directly and equitably rather than imposing preconceived solutions. These officers weave relationships and human interoperability by valuing the problematic experiences of local communities. Sometimes, the problems may be primarily “physical,” as described by a U.S. civil affairs officer, such as military–civilian collaborations to restore essential services like hospitals, health services, clean water, or food (e.g., CALL, 2016, p. 14; UN, 2018). In these cases, working collaboratively ensures that resolutions are co-created and adapted to the local community’s needs and capacities within the broader community of inquiry.
The appreciation of certain skills, however, may differ across case studies. The Brazilian interviewee demonstrated more attention and examples of tactful abilities to negotiate and build consent with local actors, demonstrating impartiality, mediation, and de-escalation techniques (UN, 2012). For example, a former chief-of-staff in the UN mission in Haiti described how a platoon commander trained troops to learn the local language (Creole) and sing the Haitian anthem to build trust and rapport with people. This facilitator-approach proved effective a while later to resolve tense situations, for instance, with demonstrators in the street, in which the Haitians themselves cooperated to withdraw the demonstrators.
While U.S. military stabilization often incorporates these kinds of peaceweaving-oriented skills in various contexts (CALL, 2016), our U.S. interviews emphasized a more robust, military-driven approach focused on operationalizing local partner into the U.S. strategic network (Department of Defense 2018). For instance, a former leader of a combat advisor team partnering with an Afghan infantry battalion highlighted know-how “to foster the capability or even to help incite the capability where it does not already exist,” which demands skills in technical advising, multidomain training, and liaising with partners. In Iraq and Afghanistan, interoperability often relied on military readiness and resources, with U.S. Security Force Assistance Brigades playing a key role in the development of these relationships.
Know-Who (Tactical)
While some problems are easy to observe at tactical levels (e.g., infrastructure problems), others can be deeply rooted and harder to discern, such as conflicts between populations persisting over generations. “And small slights or perceived slights can cause real problems,” as a U.S. informer noted (also CALL, 2019a). In such contexts, local actors often possess the best understanding of social and political dynamics, as well as the constraints on peaceweaving. Here, know-who, or local knowledge accessed through interpersonal relationships, can be as vital as technical and procedural know-how for navigating local dynamics and interoperating effectively in peace missions.
One informant shared how, by closely interacting with tribes in conflict in the Congo (DRC), he was able to identify the nuanced causes of the conflict, such as one tribe destroying the other’s plantations, rather than merely a “territorial dispute,” as informed by other (know-what) sources. These insights enhanced mediation efforts (knowing-how) and peaceweaving dynamics by fostering trust and dialogue while also incorporating local insights crucial for navigating complex jungle terrain during protection tasks. Another informant, who served with the first contingent entering Sudan during the early stages of the mission, reflected: “Everything was still very new for the mission, and we didn’t have much information.” However, his ability to speak Arabic with local citizens allowed him to grasp subtle political dynamics, facilitating interoperability in reducing gang-related violence and strengthening the social fabric of local communities.
However, in volatile contexts where local governance structures are neutralized or local leaderships are unclear, know-who can be complicated to obtain and often less effective in vertical/horizontal interoperability. As observed in various contexts of stabilization and failed peace efforts, in which our interviewees were deployed at some point—such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Congo (DRC)—governance structures were significantly disrupted by years of conflict and internal strife (e.g., Howard, 2012; Ruffa, 2017). The presence of numerous fragmented actors often made it harder to engage in constructive dialogue, forcing tactical personnel to rely more on their own means of information (know-what), rather than knowledge obtained through local forces or local populations (know-who).
Problems in tactical know-who can also reverberate in horizontal interoperability. Tactical units often have little interaction on the ground, afloat or air, still within a single branch/arm. A Brazilian Air officer shared an illustrative example: a brigade officer might look up and think, “I’d like to understand what the pilot on board is seeing . . .” At the same time, a pilot flying overhead, he looks down and thinks, “if only I could share the view I have from up here with those on the ground.” The Air Force, with its three-dimensional perspective, can have a broader perception of the space, but the soldier on the ground may struggle to understand how an Air Force officer conducts a reconnaissance or a screening action. These complexities stress, once again, the importance of continuously engaging with other experts to effectively interoperate in tactical environments and within the broader community of inquiry.
Relevance of the Knowledge Categories Across the Three Levels
As observed above, we found evidence of the four forms of knowledge across strategic, operational, and tactical levels of interoperability, which support the SH of this article. However, this does not imply that the relevance of these categories is the same at each echelon within communities of inquiry. A comparative analysis indicates that the relevance of these forms of knowledge could vary across levels, as argued in our main hypothesis, given that the scope and focus of interoperability vary across the three levels. Table 3 contains a correlation of the knowledge categories and examples most relevant at each level.
These analytical correlations do not suggest that certain types of knowledge inherently “belong” to certain levels of interoperability or are hierarchically fixed as inherently more important for peaceweaving at particular echelons. Rather, the presence and interconnectivity of different forms of knowledge, as observed through this study, persist across countless and dynamic context-specific situations at all levels of operability. However, based on experiential insights of our informants, and using a broader, comparative scale of analysis of the three levels, these “useful distinctions” provided by Lundvall Taxonomy can be associated with distinctive characteristics that elucidate different processes and competencies required at each level.
For instance, a general assessment from our interviewees is that the higher the level of decision, the greater the importance of reflection, abstraction, and critical thinking to address a variety of transversal problems in communities of inquiry. This level is usually influenced by the seniority and maturity of military officers. For them, the scope of interoperability is broader and more conceptual, involving the alignment of values, world outlook, and often long-term strategic interests. In contrast, at the operational and tactical levels, the scope is typically narrower and focused on joint operations and individual tasks in more immediate terms. For these reasons, know-why would have greater relevance at the strategic level of interoperability. Know-why serves as a critical enabler for the specialized knowledge of experienced strategic officers, characterized by qualities such as strategic thinking, leadership, analytical skills, and creative thinking to navigate interorganizational environments comprehensively. This specific combination and interconnection of categories (why/how) helps distinguish this level of interoperability from the lower levels.
As we move to the operational level, commanders and staff officers will be dealing more and more with different types of units and the joint/interagency level. Here, interoperability involves interactive learning and forming relationships with different specialists and drawing on their expertise (know-who) for coordinating operations. Know-who networks are necessary for planners to share and integrate elements of know-how. Know-who thus complements skills in planning and coordination across various timeframes, expertise, and perspectives. Due to the heightened emphasis on leveraging others’ knowledge, know-who categories can be deemed more relevant at this level.
Understanding the tactical level of military interoperability appears relatively straightforward, with know-who being relatively less significant as compared to other levels, for two primary reasons. First, the scope of action remains narrower, with officers typically having a better-defined horizon of events to consider. Second, at the tactical level, there may be less interaction and integration between different units. As observed in numerous peacekeeping missions, tactical units often operate within their own areas of responsibility, with interactions being more spontaneous and limited. In this context, the primary knowledge focus lies on know-how, as soldiers primarily execute assigned tasks by applying knowledge. Prerequisites for tactical know-how notably complement specialized know-what, enabling the performance of tasks with shared understanding of what needs to be done.
Of course, this doesn’t imply that individuals at tactical levels don’t require know-why as shown in this research, but rather, that reflective thinking, from this comparative perspective, can be less needed at this level since operational or strategic thinking attitudes are less relevant. However, the depth of this requirement varies depending on the service branch and specific job roles. Furthermore, as mentioned before, knowledge types are not hierarchically fixed at specific levels but interweave dynamically at the different situations and levels of interoperability.
Conclusion
This article offers valuable epistemological insights into the types of knowledge that underpin effective military interoperability. By elucidating how knowledge categories manifest in specific contexts at various organizational levels in peacekeeping and stabilization operations, the study provides a nuanced understanding that can inform both theoretical and practical approaches. Using the peaceweaving perspective, sympathetic knowledge emerges as a building block for developing “interoperability of the mind” in communities of inquiry. As observed in our case studies, the four Lundvallian categories manifest in various sympathetic forms of knowledge incorporated by leader-mediators and organizations to address core problems in cognitive and perceptive interoperability. Through these forms, effective interoperability can be evaluated through the lens of successful peaceweaving, that is, by the extent to which interoperability facilitates conflict resolution and promotes lateral progress while engaging all participants in communities of inquiry with sympathetic knowledge.
It is important, however, to acknowledge certain constraints in our findings. First, we faced limitations in conducting additional interviews and obtaining primary data. Specifically, bureaucratic restrictions beyond our control hindered access to more primary data from U.S. military institutions during the research visit. This was partly due to the researcher’s status as a foreign national and the absence of required security clearance.
In addition, this exploratory article provides initial responses to questions about “who learns what,” but not “how learning takes place” through specific channels. At this stage, exploratory research has offered us the flexibility to test new ideas, which can be refined in future studies (e.g., Casula et al., 2021). For instance, future research could explore and systematically compare “models of interoperability,” that is, ways of behaving and thinking embedded in organizations that orient practices of interaction and collaboration.
This aligns with the nature of our findings that reflect perceptions and experiences of our informants, their organizations, and the researcher, which also can limit the generalizability of our findings. As observed in this study, knowledge categories are variable elements whose relevance and application depend on organizational and geopolitical contexts. Variability manifests not only in context-specific formats of knowledge but also in the constraints of obtaining it in specific contexts, as we last observed in tactical know-who. Moreover, knowledge required to cooperate may manifest according to the nature of operations; for example, hybrid warfare could demand different know-how skill sets compared to peacekeeping missions.
The robust foundations of pragmatism philosophy underpin this variability in our findings. Classical pragmatism emphasizes practical outcomes and experiential learning in specific practical situations. But it could mean that broader theoretical questions may be overlooked. For instance, questions such as how military powers have historically produced and diffused interoperability knowledge globally may lack immediate practical relevance in military settings. These issues highlight the need to complement pragmatism with other analytical lenses. For instance, sociological neo-institutionalism provides useful approaches to explain the dynamics of diffusion and circulation of military knowledge through different contexts (e.g., Farrell, 2005; Goldman, 2006). Ideas, models, and standards are permanently adapted and reshaped as they travel through interorganizational fields and networks influenced by normative pressures of military professions and education. This reveals how our findings could be relevant and adapted beyond the immediate context of case studies.
For instance, know-what insights on well-structured SOPs for tactical units could inform training programs for regional forces with a still limited deployment experience, such as the Eastern Africa Standby Forces or the Southern Cross Peace Force (Ferreyra & Soeters, 2024). Know-how insights on Addams’ housekeeping skills could inform military training programs within the EU Petersberg tasks to strengthen civil–military interoperability with a focus on reforms and security needs of populations rather than those of the military or states (ESDC, 2021). Strategic know-who, regarding value alignment and ontological understanding of partners, could guide coalitions like ECOWAS, where shared values like noninterference in internal affairs are foundational, but recalibrations might be necessary to protect democracy. Furthermore, in various failed peace efforts like those in Mali and Afghanistan, findings about know-why and perceptive interoperability could guide lessons learned about failures to interpret the motivations and cultural dynamics of local insurgencies.
Our findings offer various practical recommendations for military education and training institutions aiming to enhance the adaptability and interoperability of military personnel. The Lundvall Taxonomy and the peaceweaving perspective can be integrated into core curricula and specialized courses for the military officer profession. The taxonomy can be useful to group learning outcomes at the different levels of military operability. It can also be applied in qualifications frameworks to organize competence area by learning area in tabular formats (e.g., ESDC, 2021). Sympathetic knowledge and its various practical forms can inform the design of training programs. By linking knowledge categories to operational frameworks and interagency contexts, institutions can align curricula with job requirements while verifying how officer profiles are supported by learning outcomes. The taxonomy can serve as a tool for harmonizing competencies and for developing matrices that connect competencies with learning outcomes. Regular reviews of the taxonomy of interoperability learning could ensure training programs remain relevant to evolving operational contexts.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the reviewers for their valuable insights and suggestions, which helped improve various arguments and ideas in this article. I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Professor Patricia Shields, for her guidance and inspiration throughout the research, and to my partner, Marcela Pereira, for her support.
Author’s Note
I currently do not have a formal institutional affiliation. I have read in some places that, in some cases, it may be acceptable to mention the institution where the research was conducted. I have some doubts about this and would like to consult with you on whether it would be allowed to list Texas State University as the affiliation, as I conducted my postdoctoral research there. Mailing address:
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
