Abstract
A good place to begin a review of Thomas Crosbie’s book—Military Politics: New Perspectives (2023) is to examine The New York Times opinion article by retired four-star general, Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. 1 McKenzie covers numerous politically charged topics to include the likely misuse of the Signal messaging app by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (Associated Press, 2025), the merits of U.S. airstrikes in Yemen, the potential for war with Iran, and the need for the American people to have “the political will” to win wars (McKenzie, 2025). Such displays of political judgments by U.S. military officers are habitual. 2 Samuel Huntington recognized this trend and developed a civil–military relations (CMR) theory known as objective civilian control to assess relations between civilians and the military. 3 Hence, McKenzie represents the apotheosis of the Huntingtonian military officer: educated in global politics, being intimately involved in geopolitical affairs, while staying clear of partisan politics. McKenzie’s foray into the public square to shape foreign policies accentuates Huntington’s influence on CMR theory. 4
This review opens with Huntington’s impact on military policies because his theories are prominently featured and critiqued in Crosbie’s book Military Politics, which is a compendium of mostly European-dominated perspectives regarding the challenges of having military establishments grapple with politics under the shadow of Huntington’s CMR theory known as objective civilian control. 5
The book’s 11 authors incorporate two dominant themes. The first is that the CMR theories of Huntington are flawed. 6 Likewise, Peter Feaver’s (2003) principal-agent theory is inadequate because it adopts some of Huntington’s theoretical assumptions. To Crosbie (and other authors), Huntington and Feaver mistakenly assume that an adversarial relationship exists between civilians and the military; or that military preferences might be at odds with civilian priorities and goals (pp. 21–24). Also, six of the 11 authors 7 adopt Risa Brooks’ assertions that challenge the validity and usefulness of Huntington’s theory of objective civilian control. 8
The second theme is that politics pervades everything related to militaries: personnel, institutions, doctrine, organizations, training, war planning, operations, and so on (pp. 19–38). So, all 10 chapters are devoted to demonstrating the fact that politics and militaries are inextricably linked, thereby debunking Huntington’s view that military officers should eschew all politics. One key assertion is that ignoring politics is “bad for strategy-making during war” (pp. 24–26, 166, 180). Crosbie closes the volume by exhorting readers to realize the need to adopt a new research field of social science: military politics (pp. 246–247).
The book’s three parts and 10 chapters offer unique perspectives on the ways that politics are integral to military affairs. In Part I, “New Theoretical Perspectives on Senior Officership,” Crosbie (Chapter 1) describes the conceptual meanings of military politics. He explains how his new approach “breaks with [previous] versions of civil-military relations. . . Huntington’s assertion that military professionals are apolitical, and [Peter] Feaver’s assertion that military interests are advanced only at the expense of their civilian principals” (p. 21). 9 Crosbie then introduces the influence of Risa Brooks’ analyses regarding her “paradoxes of professionalism” assertions that are repeated throughout the book (pp. viii, 2, 13, 24, 157, 196, 220, 222, 236, 238, 239). Brooks maintains that Huntington’s civil–military theory demands that military officers be “apolitical.” Yet, in leveraging her assertion, Crosbie falls short in offering an alternative definition of military politics, of which he simply asserts is: “those political processes pertaining to or primarily involving military organizations” (p. 19). Curiously, the actual meaning of the word “politics” is avoided and is instead replaced by the idea that military politics is a “plural noun form” or “collective noun,” with its own inherent or epistemological meanings. Military politics as a field of study would examine those organizations, institutions, policies, and activities that are “the centerpiece of analyses of security and defense dynamics.” Therefore, military politics is given a “proper name” that aspires to be its own research field in military sociology (pp. 19–20). To Crosbie, accepting military politics as its own field of study with a unique body of knowledge is simply exposing “a commitment to reality” (p. 19). The additional nine chapters are devoted to showcasing how politics is inextricably connected with military operations and activities, thereby proving conclusively (according to Crosbie) the published proclamation by Risa Brooks that Huntington’s assertion regarding the military’s need to eschew all forms of politics is misguided and demonstrably false.
In Chapter 2—“Rethinking Clausewitz’s Chameleon,” Anders Bollmann and Soren Sjogren examine the two schools of thinking on war’s nature—those that believe war’s nature (and epistemology) changes, versus those that believe that war’s nature does not change. This debate is reviewed through the lens of the writings of Carl von Clausewitz. They conclude that “war is not a chameleon that alters its appearance but essentially stays the same. Instead, each war is its own chameleon . . .” (p. 64). They therefore advise military colleges to “take it easy on the doctrine” and remain open-minded to respond to changing conditions to allow military capabilities to align with desired outcomes.
Part II of the book examines “New Perspectives on Senior Officership” under four chapters. In Chapter 3—“Military Contrarianism”—Yagil Levy examines “modes of resistance undertaken by the military command” toward “elected civilians in democracies” in Israel (p. 73). He analyzes three cases—the Second Intifada of September 2000; the disengagement from Gaza in 2004; and the “lone wolf” attacks of 2015–2016 and Iran—to identify “the conditions in which contrarianism appears” between Israeli Defense Force (IDF) commanders and their civilian leaders (p. 73). Levy identifies a number of factors that foment internecine conflicts between civilian and military leaders amid times of high alert for Israel that include the military’s concerns over their power status, organizational autonomy, and what Levy calls “professional outlook” (p. 81).
In Chapter 4—“Embedded in Politics” Sharon Weiner examines the political influences of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the role of its chairman regarding the application of policies and statutory laws during several politicized events that spanned the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations from 1993 to 2009. After examining three budget cycles that covered more than 20 years, she concludes that service preferences (of the Army, Navy, and Air Force) continue to dominate political agendas, that the Chairman remains beholden to the JCS members, and that long-established JCS norms remain in place as a dynamic of the power sharing that happens in the federal government writ large (p. 108–109). In Chapter 5—“Civil-Military Challenges and the Militia”—James Campbell addresses a number of tensions between the “Active Component and the National Guard [of the 50 States], and between state and federal political and military leaders and institutions” in the United States (p. 117). 10 Several tensions between the States versus the Federal military system include budget battles between competing components and services, 11 border control in the southwest U.S., and COVID-19 vaccination mandates. In Chapter 6, “Strategic Civil-Military Relations,” Steven Katz shares findings from an online survey of 221 U.S. military officers attending war colleges conducted from late 2020 to early 2021 (p. 141). The survey examined their views “on dissent, disobedience, and resignation to determine whether they exhibit a military or civilian supremacism preference” (p. 143). Among a number of findings, 92% of respondents believed that they had a responsibility to advocate against a civilian leader that might be choosing a perceived disastrous policy (p. 144).
In Part III—“Military Politics and Military Operations”—authors continue to validate how politics permeate military affairs, proving that Huntington’s theories are flawed. In Chapter 7, “Military Politics on the Battlefield,” Carrie Lee argues that “Huntingtonian conventions of civil-military relations” are not adequate in “organizing civil-military relations” (p. 166). Using Operation Torch (the 1943 Allied invasion of North Africa) as a case study, Lee argues that generals should not be completely divorced from political considerations when developing plans and carrying out operations. In Chapter 8—“Begging Permission, Asking Forgiveness”—Stephen Saideman examined the politics of multinational operations by looking at the war in Afghanistan (2001–2021) to illustrate the various political challenges and dilemmas that confronted commanders from Denmark, Canada, and the Netherlands (p. 187). In Chapter 9, “Judges on the Battlefield?,” Lena Trabucco examines the role of courts in national security policymaking, asking “how does judicial accountability shape national security policymaking?” She employs the concept of “judicial observer effects” to examine the impact of lawyers on military policies, actions, and operations. She also reviews legal contexts and ramifications of military policy decisions (p. 202). Finally in Chapter 10, “Small Powers’ Civil-Military Relations,” Carsten Roennfeldt examines the short-comings of Huntington’s CMR theories from “a small-power perspective” (p. 221), illustrating how such theories adversely impacted Norway’s strategic effectiveness in operations conducted by Libya (2011) and Latvia (2014).
Complications With the Book
There are two interrelated concerns with Military Politics: the absence of a clear definition of politics, and the misapplication of Huntington’s objective civilian control theory. First, Crosbie does not provide a valid answer to the question: “What is Military Politics?” The concept of politics as it relates to militaries and the research field of “military politics” require better explanations than what is provided in this volume. 12 The word politics is defined in numerous ways. 13 Peter Feaver explains how “politics pervade civil-military relations,” and emphasizes that “politics is about who gets what and how, . . .and deciding how a group of actors is going to decide who gets what and how” (Feaver, 2003, p. 11). 14 Yet, by advocating for the ideas on politics promulgated by Risa Brooks, Crosbie and other authors make it appear that Huntington and Feaver disregard politics entirely and assume that everyone should know what politics means in relation to militaries. By sidestepping any realistic meaning of politics regarding the power complications that exist between civilian authorities and military establishments, authors in the volume leave a void in the reader’s understanding of just what is actually meant by “military politics.” 15
The second problem is the misrepresentation of Huntington’s objective civilian control theory. Power struggles between competing groups are an integral part of political science studies and so remain prominent in Huntington’s and Feaver’s theoretical approaches. 16 To address both concerns, the concept of politics is operationalized into three types: Type 1 involves the “webs of politics” that exist day-to-day: the politics of the family, local community, village, city, county, state, or province, to include laws and policies related to a national government within a sovereign state. Type 2 politics involves the actions and activities of nation-states when making decisions on public resources, dealing with international relations, international commerce, and “security or insecurity . . . the relations of countries with each other and . . . the likelihood of peace or war.” Type 3 politics is associated with classical liberal democracies 17 (free societies under the rule of law and led by elected public servants) and involves the processes in elections, or the competition for leadership to control governments within a democratic nation-state: “elections, referenda, laws, court judgements, administrative decisions” (Deutsch, 1980, p. 3). Type 3 is partisan politics: the processes and actions to win public support and votes in competitive elections that involve public debates to determine who will be in power.
Huntington’s objective civilian control theory assesses how civilians will maintain power if military officers endeavored to be “politically sterile and neutral.” Military leaders, as unelected/appointed soldiers, strive to be “a politically neutral officer corps” (1957, pp. 84–85) to gain greater autonomy. This feature of the theory involves Type 3 politics (not Types 1 or 2). 18 Theoretically, American military officers surrendered an important aspect of their citizenship (partisan politics) to secure organizational autonomy when planning for, and waging war. 19
Nevertheless, according to Crosbie, Katz, Lee, and Roennfeldt, Huntington’s objective civilian control theory requires military leaders to avoid all manners of politics (Brooks, 2020, pp. 11–12, 2021, p. 19). Crosbie asserts that “the most characteristic concern of [civil-military relations scholarship]—to keep officers out of politics—is not only unrealistic but undesirable” (2023, p. 1).
20
The following assertion by Brooks is the source of Crosbie’s arguments: Huntington’s apolitical professionalism requires that the military abstain across the board from all that is political. . . Huntington’s model does not distinguish among aspects of politics or types of political activity. . . the ban on military involvement in politics encompasses everything from partisan behavior to public advocacy in support of military activity or policies pertaining to the armed forces. It also includes intellectual engagement with how political factors might bear on the efficacy of strategy or conduct of military operations. (Brooks, 2020, 11–12; 2021,19–20)
21
In social science, it is important to avoid speculative absolutes. As Huntington was referring to partisan politics (Type 3) only, he also made it clear that abstaining from partisan politics was probably not achievable (Huntington, 1957, pp. 85, 88–89, 94–97, 191–192). Nowhere does Huntington assert that military officers should avoid all types of politics. 22 Furthermore, Crosbie’s assertions that politics and militaries are intertwined is not at odds with the ideas of either Huntington or Feaver. A thorough reading of The Soldier and the State validates the reality that Huntington did not expect military leaders to be able to abstain “across the board from all that is political.” 23 According to Huntington: “The military man emphasizes the importance of power in human relations . . .” (Huntington, 1957, p. 90). Huntington’s objective civilian control theory involved an ideal type: military power is maximized, and is made more efficient, if soldiers remained divorced from partisan politics and instead devoted their energies toward maximizing military effectiveness (Huntington, 1957, pp. 83–85). This ideal is accomplished proportionally: military officers strive to avoid partisan political struggles, by degrees, or probabilities. If this is impossible to achieve, it was an ideal worth struggling for to maximize military power (Huntington, 1957, pp. 94–97). When the military is rendered “politically sterile and neutral” (Huntington, 1957, p. 84), “neutral” meant being non-committal among competing groups seeking more influence in government agencies. 24 Military strategists need to know about, and plan for, the political realities of foreign adversaries. As demonstrated by the likes of Kenneth McKenzie, a mark of an officer’s competence is having a grasp of foreign politics when conducting military operations (Huntington, 1957, pp. 70–74, 94–97). 25
Huntington’s theories remain grounded in the political realities of the United States. 26 As a central issue of the early Cold War years, citizens were confronting a large and permanent, newly entrenched, and unplanned military establishment amid a well-entrenched elected civilian government (Hogan, 1998, pp. 23–118; Huntington, 1961; Mills, 1956). In this context, The Soldier and the State codified ideals that became functional and predictive civil–military guidelines.
To Crosbie’s credit, an academic field of military politics is long overdue. It would be worthwhile to incorporate Huntington’s and Feaver’s theories into this new sub-field. Further questions that scholars might address include: what is the dividing line between what is military versus what is civilian? Is being “military” defined by one’s ideology, personal financial interests, or degree of indoctrination? Is Kenneth McKenzie a civilian after retirement from military service? Do his opinions on waging war in Yemen, and the potential for war with Iran, qualify as a reflection of civilian or military sentiments? Can Lloyd Austin and James Mattis (as Secretaries of Defense) be viewed as civilians after they each completed more than 40 years of active military service? These questions should concern all nation-states.
Follow on volumes of Military Politics might address the power struggles that frequently occur between civilian (non-military) power brokers versus unelected career military leaders, and include defense corporations, military contractors, multinational corporations, and elected legislative leaders and their supporters who get their backing from well-entrenched military-related interests. Human nature compels us to recognize that military officers are far from being Saints. Grounding civil–military theory in the realities of politics is the best approach to developing a valid Military Politics research discipline.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their excellent insights, feedback, and guidance.
