Governance Beyond Government

Abstract

Our methods of governance are shifting. We increasingly rely on an interconnected web of public, private, and nonprofit actors working across organizational, institutional, and sectoral boundaries to deliver public services. Our understanding of these new practices, however, is reliant on models of individual rationality and social behavior developed for hierarchical organizational forms. I argue that collectivist models of decentralized, self-organizing social forms may advance our understanding of modern governance practices and balance tensions in three areas: perspectives on organizations (structure or process), between individual liberty and collective responsibility, and whether increasing freedom or control over individuals enhances organizational efficiencies.

Keywords

governance networks emergence self-organization

Government is not just about government anymore. As governmental walls become more porous, actors from a range of sectors are becoming involved in the processes of governing. We are undergoing a transformation of government (Kettl, 2000), one that emphasizes collaboration among interdependent actors, the growth of horizontal relationships, networking, decentralization, and indirect provision of government services through contractual relationships with private and nonprofit organizations. In short, the patterns of governing are changing (Peters & Pierre, 1998) in ways that have been captured as the “shift from government to governance” (pp. 223-224). This shift involves the “focus of administrative practice” moving outside the walls of government—away from “the bureaucratic state and direct government” provision of services and toward what has been labeled “third party government” (Hill & Lynn, 2005, p. 174). In other words, the ways in which we govern are moving beyond governmental boundaries—the traditional mechanisms and institutions of government are becoming less involved with, and less central to, the ways that we govern ourselves. Put another way, there’s a gap between the governed and the government.

The key features of government are representation and institutionalization (Plumptre & Graham, 1999). Of particular salience for this project, is the fact that without institutionalized representation, government is simply “us” (p. 2). In other words, government exists precisely as a set of activities that we no longer do ourselves but have relegated to a defined set of actors (representatives) within a defined context (institutions). Government is government precisely because someone else, somewhere else, is doing it for us.

However, governance is fundamentally “about power, relationships and accountability: Who has influence, who decides, and how decision-makers are held accountable” (Plumptre & Graham, 1999; World Bank, 1992; see also Institute on Governance, 2003). The administrative practices of governance are, in contrast to those of institutionalized government, hybrid in form and emphasize horizontal, networked associations and a collaborative approach to service provision.

These aspects seem particularly relevant in an era of devolution, decentralization, contracting out, and other trends that impact the form, process, and capacity of government to deliver services. The “standard bureau model” of direct service provision is giving way to a complex web of government agencies, regions, nonprofits, partnerships, and collaborative networked arrangements (Lynn, Heinrich & Hill, 2001, p. 1). My contention is that as these activities increasingly take place outside the walls of government, our perspective must also include more than a traditional framework.

Governance seeks multilevel coordination rather than authoritative decision-making; it is therefore seen as emerging from the interaction of active stakeholders (Karkatsoulis, 2010). More plainly, governance returns us to Mary Parker Follett’s (1920) notion that we create community through our participation in that community. As opposed to government, governance cannot neatly be handed off to others, and more importantly here, is useful in a variety of contexts and across levels of societal interaction. When we are actively participating in our own governance, we don’t create government as much as we create community. This theme resounds throughout Follett’s work, particularly in her view of the interdependent reciprocal relation between individual and community: Not only are we “responsible for serving your community, [we] are partly responsible for there being any community to serve” (Metcalf & Urwick, 2003, p. 134).

My point of departure for this article is that although we are moving from government to governance, we continue to view the processes of governing from a framework of the institutions of government. This is not to say that government institutions are no longer relevant or central to governing. A compelling case has been made that even as networks, decentralization and privatization are increasing, they occur “in the shadow of hierarchy” (Scharpf, 1994) with relatively little time spent on collaborative activity and the majority of public managers working within a hierarchy (Agranoff, 2006). Hierarchy remains a necessary component of governance (Frederickson & Smith, 2003), with horizontal relationships adding to, rather than supplanting, vertical ones (Kettl, 2002). However, as government institutions are no longer the sole mechanism for governing, it may no longer be useful to rely on a single dominant perspective. Rather, the inclusion of other perspectives may enrich our understanding of governance as it moves beyond government. In doing so, I follow Farmer’s (2010) advocacy of using multiple perspectives to enrich public administration theory and practice. Specifically, I draw on the anarchist concern with alternative organizational structures. Anarchism “is not opposed to organization . . . It is about creating and enacting horizontal networks . . . based on principles of decentralized, non-hierarchical consensus democracy” (Graeber, 2002, para. 19). Here, I consider how anarchism may improve our understanding of governance. I do so by identifying and discussing anarchist perspectives in three areas: A view of organizations as structures is contrasted with anarchism’s view of organizations as processes; a focus on self-interested individuals is compared with anarchism’s notion of collective action; and a focus on control is contrasted with the anarchist value of freedom on organizational design and operation.

For a variety of reasons, the environment in which we govern is changing. Devolution, decentralization, globalization, privatization, and so on move us away from an institutional context. Anarchism is useful precisely because it is so far removed from an institutional perspective. In addition, anarchism’s focus on process and action within community (e.g., Amster, 2012; Bookchin, 1971) echo the characteristics of governance discussed above. In exploring how anarchism may add to our understanding of governance, I neither advocate for the abandonment of government nor advocate anarchism as the proper end state for governance. Rather, as the practices of governing move outside the boundaries of bureaucratic institutions, our orientation should also move toward those practices. As such, this comparison will be beneficial to the extent that it sparks further comparisons and the consideration of governance from a wider array of positions. The anarchist perspective is also useful because it is an ideal form—it represents the point at which the state as imposed structure is no longer required (Dahl, 1989). As such, it points out that no state can be perfect, while providing a basis for assessing an actual state against the ideal of informed, autonomous consent: The exercise of social authority “may be judged relatively good or bad according to the extent to which it maximizes consent and minimizes coercion” (Dahl, 1998, p. 50). Dahl’s (1998) larger point is that democracy is successful to the extent to which it increases civic participation and returns control of the political agenda directly to the public; anarchism is the expression of these values at their limit. As such, its ideals and practices may guide collaborative efforts and lead to increased citizen participation.

In employing anarchism as an orientation to governance, I draw specifically from the collectivist strain of anarchism, which holds that individual freedoms can only be safeguarded by cooperation and “the reality of community” (Woodcock, 1977), an anarchism that “favors the organic, bottom-up development of networks of federated associations that devolve responsibility onto the individual in an effort to maximize personal liberty” (Wachhaus, 2011, p. 36). In this view, “sociability is as much a law of nature as mutual struggle” (Kropotkin, 1902, chap. 1). The fundamental human orientation is not toward competitive self-interest, but toward cooperation, and association is seen as a natural component of existence (Wachhaus, 2012). The state is viewed not as a thing but as “a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of human behavior” (Landauer, 2010, p. 214). Anarchism promotes social order but does not hold that hierarchical leadership is necessary to that order (Proudhon, 2011). Instead, it emphasizes the power of voluntary association, cooperative action and local, grassroots efforts to nurture community and develop social good. In short, anarchism is concerned with the goals of governance, not of government. Anarchism is useful to the study of governance precisely because it shares these common goals but approaches them from a perspective that is firmly outside the bureaucratic framework.

Previous work has examined connections between anarchism and network governance, focusing on the possibilities of anarchism to address persistent questions of the formation of, stability of, and accountability within, governance networks (Wachhaus, 2012. I propose here general observations on the use of an anarchist perspective of governance. Specifically, I compare and contrast bureaucratic and anarchist perspectives in three areas: (a) structure versus process, (b) individual versus collective, and (c) control versus freedom.

Structure Versus Process

In bureaucracies, structure determines organization. That is to say, organizational behavior is a result of structural features. The flow of information, resources, and accountability are all determined by the structural layout of centralized hierarchy. Management, in turn, is a response to that structure—POSDCORB are activities appropriate to hierarchical organizations; the need for an equivalent set of network management activities has been listed among public administration’s “big questions” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; see also Agranoff & Yildiz, 2006).

The organizational chart is key to understanding a hierarchy—it demarcates the boundaries of the organization so that positions, resources, and responsibilities are clearly located either inside or outside the organization; it sets procedures for the movement of information, resources, and responsibility within the organization and defines contact points with other organizations. An emphasis on centralized authority enhances accountability, transparency, and clear lines of communication.

A structurally dominant approach to organization does not work particularly well in the conditions that have increasingly come to describe modern governance: High levels of complexity and uncertainty, and collaboration among interdependent actors working in relatively flat and decentralized relationships characterized by fluid participation (Kettl, 2000).

From a hierarchical perspective, these are all negative attributes as they are indicators of instability. Complexity includes the notion of wicked problems (Van Bueren, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 2003)—the notion that it may neither be possible to define the problem at hand nor to use disaggregation as a problem-solving strategy. Uncertainty refers to informational instability on several levels—probabilistic uncertainty (ambiguity due to missing information), as opposed to fundamental uncertainty (due to information not existing; Dequech, 2001; Dunn, 2000); as well as strategic, institutional, and substantive uncertainties (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

Because actors may not possess the resources, skills, or knowledge to solve problems on their own, they form coalitions to work toward common goals (e.g., Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Doing so adds to organizational complexity and multiplies lines of communication and responsibility, as an actor may be involved simultaneously with multiple groups working toward several ends. Furthermore, the increase of interorganizational networks (Agranoff, 2007; Frederickson, 2002; O’Toole, 1997) blurs or dissolves organizational boundaries, increases complexity and lowers accountability as actors collaborate without formal structural connections (Kettl, 2000). Taken together, these issues erode the traditional structural strengths of hierarchic bureaucracies and raise the question of whether a new perspective may help resolve these “problems” into a clearer focus.

Organization as Process

Anarchism views organizations not as things but as social processes: Organizations are what happen as a result of people coming together. Anarchy may be seen as the “theory and practice of relationships” (Amster, 2012, p. 116). Community is created precisely through the process of participating in it. The emphasis is no longer on the nodes—the positions in the organizational chart—but on the links that connect those nodes. Without vibrant connections, there is no organization, only a collection of isolated individuals. “The state is not [a thing], but is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings” (Landauer, 2010, p. 214). It is these connections themselves that form and define the organization—boxes on an organizational chart only exist insofar as they are nodes of intersecting connections. The pre-eminent example of organization as social condition may be the Internet—it can be defined solely in terms of its function to provide immediate, direct connection between people (Moglen, 1999). Removing the connections destroys the Internet; conversely, its value lies within those connections. Institutions have traditionally been built around a function or end goal—they are structured to produce something. Efficiency may subsequently be improved by tweaking that structure so as to increase desired outputs. The anarchist orientation is entirely other: The creativity resulting from connectedness is primary (Moglen, 2003). Anarchism, with its emphasis on horizontal, egalitarian, and border-spanning networks (Amster, 2012) has been called “the cultural logic of networking” (Juris, 2009). Accordingly, the first order is to foster connections; figuring out how best to use what is developed as a result of those connections is the secondary problem.

Collaborative Governance

Spontaneous voluntary association is seen as a natural part of human existence (Ward, 1973). We are, after all, social animals. Kropotkin (1902) worked extensively to document cooperation and mutual aid across human society, arguing that they are natural impulses at least as strong as competition. Given this natural desire to associate, the need to justify cooperative action loses meaning; our self-interest is realized precisely through voluntary association. “It’s an emergent property of connected human minds that they do create” (Moglen, 2003, para. 12). This is what Ward (1973) referred to as spontaneous order:

given a common need, a collection of people will, by trial and error, by improvisation and experiment, evolve order out of the situation - this order being more durable and more closely related to their needs than any kind of externally imposed authority could provide. (p. 28)

When we begin to act in this manner, actively governing ourselves, we create a community of shared governance that obviates the need for external, third-party government.

Jacobs (1961) made precisely this point in her discussion of keeping the peace in urban public spaces. She noted that peace, order, and safety are maintained not by the police but primarily by

an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves . . . No amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down. (pp. 32-33)

In other words, where there is no governance, there can be no effective government. She emphasizes this point by observing that safety in public spaces is most effective where people are voluntarily using those spaces and are conscious in doing so, they are exercising governance.¹

The evolution of order and efficient production among Durham coal miners has been documented by Herbst (1962). He described an arrangement

in which the group takes over complete responsibility for the total cycle of operations involved in mining at the coal-face. No member of the group has a fixed work role. Instead, the men deploy themselves, depending on the requirements of the on-going group task. Within the limits of technological and safety requirements they are free to evolve their own way or organizing and carrying out their task. They are not subject to any external authority in this respect, nor is there within the group itself any member who takes over a formal directive leadership function . . . The income obtained is divided equally among team members. The income obtained by each member of the team thus becomes dependent to an important extent both on the effectiveness of their cooperation with one another, and the effectiveness of the work organization which the group is able to devise for itself. (p. 4)

A later report on the miners notes that self-regulating, autonomous groups of 40 to 50 men were able to maintain high levels of productivity over the span of working a coal face for 2 years while efficiencies continued to increase throughout the period (Trist, Higgin, Murray, & Pollock, 1963).

Countless other examples may be given, including the formation of the English Lifeboat Association (Kropotkin, 1902; 1926) and the development of “junk” or adventure playgrounds following World War II (Allan, 1969 & Bengtsson, 1972). This process-oriented, dynamic and social perspective results in a bottom-up (Bookchin, 1971, p. 214) and decentralized (Woodcock, 1977) view of organizations. As Ward puts it,

we have to build networks instead of pyramids. All authoritarian institutions are organized as pyramids . . . with a small group of decision-makers at the top and a broad base of people whose decisions are made for them at the bottom. Anarchism does not demand the changing of the labels on the layers, it doesn’t want different people on top, it wants us to clamber out from underneath. It advocates an extended network of individuals and groups, making their own decisions, controlling their own destiny. (Ward, 1973, p. 22)

It is precisely this transformation that has been widely characterized as the shift from government to governance.

As direct communication is central to the efficient exchange of information and resources, anarchism has focused on small organizations (Woodcock, 1977), specifically on the community—the level of organization where direct exchange has historically been possible—and has seen the state as a superstructure artificially imposed on communities in an attempt to unify them (MacDonald, 1957). MacDonald stresses that “anarchism leads back to the community” where “individuals can live together as variegated human beings instead of as impersonal units in the mass sum” MacDonald, 1957, p. 28). Bookchin (1971) discussed the importance of “affinity groups”—small, autonomous communal groups of deeply connected people that are described in terms strongly resonating with networks:

they provide initiative and consciousness, not a “general staff” and a source of “command.” The groups proliferate on a molecular level and they have their own “Brownian movement.” Whether they link together or separate is determined by living situations, not by bureaucratic fiat from a distant center. (pp. 220-221)

Affinity groups are small to facilitate the close relationships on which they depend while also allowing sufficient space for members to develop as individuals and social beings. However, affinity groups may effectively scale up by federating with other groups to realize common goals (Bookchin, 1971). What remains constant is the emphasis on direct involvement, an emphasis that is echoed by calls for increased civic participation in governance (e.g., Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007).

In a collaborative, interdependent environment, the power to get things done is a function of one’s connectedness to others and one’s ability to communicate and exchange resources with others in the network—it’s not where you are, but who you know (and how you relate) that matters. The institutional framework of rules and regulation was developed in part to facilitate the flow of information and resources in a systematic manner. However, bureaucracies establish an adversarial relationship between those inside the organization, who control information and resources, and those outside (the public), who have no formal connection to the organizational structure. Calls for increased civic engagement address this tension, with some advocating for a larger role for citizens in the public service, while NPM (New Public Management) reform efforts concentrate on increasing bureaucratic discretion responsiveness to customer needs (Borins, 1997; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Anarchism addresses this tension at its source by highlighting the porosity of institutional boundaries and pointing out that institutional actors are first and foremost citizens themselves who rely on close contacts with a wide range of others across a variety of organizations. As we continue to blur institutional boundaries in practice, it makes little sense to maintain them as rigid conceptual guides. Rather, acknowledging the benefits and challenges posed by porous boundaries and the participation of citizens and private organizations in governance activities may facilitate more effective and efficient governance practices. This theme of interconnectedness and collaborative action is continued in the next section, discussing the relationship between individual and organization under anarchism.

Collective Versus Individual

Bureaucracies are populated with rational actors: Individuals who pursue their own self-interest. While the collective good may be derived by aggregating individual interests, much effort is expended to control the impulses of the individual and to direct (and continually re-direct) them toward the goals of the bureaucracy. Organization is imposed on individuals, who must be continually subordinated toward its ends. In short, the relationship between bureaucracies and individuals is oppositional. Anarchism views the relationship of the individual with the collective in an entirely different light.

Locating the Individual Within a Group

Anarchism values each individual in the context of a group rather than as an independent actor: “The individual will be ‘good’ in the degree that his individuality is realized within the organic wholeness of the community” (Read, 1956, p. 5). Humans are, first and foremost, social animals—spontaneous collaboration is seen as a fundamental truth of human behavior. Anarchism advocates personal liberty but notes that control of one’s destiny is carried out through an extended network of associations; one exercises one’s freedom within a group context (Ward, 1973). As Follett (1998) noted, “A man is ideally free only so far as he is interpermeated by every other human being; he gains his freedom through a perfect and complete relationship because thereby he achieves his whole nature” (p. 69). The challenge for anarchism is not to force an individual into an organization but to prevent that organization from dominating the individual and unduly prescribing her freedom (Dahl, 1989; 1998).

It is precisely our unique qualities as free individuals that add value to collaborative groups—the unique skillsets and perspectives that we are able to collaboratively use in the context of a larger group. Dolgoff (1972) captured the relationship between individual and collective nicely by describing individuals as cells in the social body. Biologists have learned to treat cells as individuals—they can be identified, isolated, and studied as to type and function. Biologists have also learned that study of the individual cell can only generate limited knowledge of the larger whole. Cells must be understood within a specific context—cells cannot be interchanged throughout a body or system; In addition, they have no meaning—literally no life—outside that context. As they cannot meaningfully exist outside a larger body, that body is not merely the sum of its component parts, but a new and emergent structure.

People naturally organize themselves into functional groups as a means of filling their needs (Read, 1971). Thus, we need not search for what might motivate an individual to join a group. It is not necessary to find the rationale for leading people to act; as Carpenter (1911) noted, “Work in a free society would be done because it was useful. It is curious, when you come to think of it, that there is no other conceivable reason why work should be done” (p. 15). Here too, Kropotkin’s discussion of the English Lifeboat Association—a voluntary society organized for the purpose of rescuing sailors wrecked off the coast, operating for no material benefit and at considerable risk—is relevant, as are the accounts of spontaneous organization among children in adventure playgrounds to build temporary structures for group play (Allan, 1969 & Bengtsson, 1972).

Emergent Collaborative Governance

The value of our unique worth is realized to the extent that it is integrated into a group. On this basis, Read (1940) distinguished between two levels of social association: The more primitive is an aggregation of impersonal units formed to promote a single purpose but otherwise functioning as discrete individuals; in the other, individual activity and goals have been suspended to realize mutual support. His analogy for this latter group is an orchestra, where, by subsuming the component instruments’ tones, an entirely new level of sound and order emerges (Read, 1940). Music is fundamentally collaborative, as is society. The aim of ensemble music is the higher level of order that emerges through attentive collaboration between musicians. This may be facilitated by some amount of regulation (e.g., using a conductor or sheet music) but spontaneous order may also result solely by each musician actively listening and respecting the free choices of the others (e.g., free jazz or jam bands). There is no individual winner—The goal of an orchestra is to blend sound so as to realize a new level of organization rather than to distinguish individual instruments. We judge an orchestra’s success by its ability to subsume individual instruments within an integrated whole sound. This integration rests on the recognition that individual rights are possessed equally by all; therefore, the means of securing one’s own rights are to respect others’ (Kropotkin, 1902). Or, as Bakunin (2004) stated, “each directs and is directed in his turn. Therefore there is no fixed and constant authority, but a continual exchange of mutual, temporary, and, above all, voluntary authority and subordination” (p. 33).

Darwin (1871) observed that the most successful communities were not those dominated by competitively successful individuals, but those with the largest proportion of “sympathetic members”—those willing to work for the good of the larger community (p. 79). Kropotkin (1902) wrote extensively on this topic through his exploration of mutual aid across human history and throughout the animal kingdom. From an anarchist perspective, collaborative action is seen as a natural and efficient means to an end. The observation that decentralized collaborative networks exhibit fluid participation bears on this point. Actors collaborating toward a given end do not remain in stable relationships, but tend to drift into, and out of, the collaborative effort as that effort meets their own needs. This is problematic when viewed from a hierarchical perspective, as structural rigidity is the foundation of organizational stability. However, anarchism’s emphasis on a natural inclination to work collectively, along with the view that collaboration is a means of increasing efficiency, shifts fluid participation from a “problem” to a natural consequence of interconnected community life.

Anarchist communities, whether on the scale of the village/geopolitical region or as smaller affinity groups, are neither exclusive nor all-encompassing. By this, I mean that members are neither expected to belong only to one group nor is any one group expected to provide for all the needs of its members. Rather, individuals may belong to multiple small groups simultaneously; they may also shift between various groups according to shifts in their needs and goals. Or, as Read (1971) stated in a reimagining of the foundations of social behavior, anarchist communities replace the monolithic social contract with multiple functional contracts. Rousseau held that the state was a necessary intermediary force, uniting the desires of the individual with the will of the collective. However, Read (1971) claimed that the state is an artificial structure that displaces the naturally occurring associations of individuals. He asserts that “human beings, according to their needs and sympathies, will spontaneously associate themselves into groups for mutual aid, will voluntarily organize an economy which ensures the satisfaction of their needs” (p. 370, italics in original). In other words, left to their own devices, people naturally form societies. When we operate in a closely connected, collaborative, and interdependent environment, Read (1971) suggested that the monolithic social contract be replaced with a series of functional contracts. Functional contracts spring from the voluntary association of individuals working toward a common goal and extend only to the fulfilling of that specific goal. As Read (1971) stated, “the political unitarian or authoritarian conceives society as one body compelled to uniformity. The anarchist conceives society as a balance or harmony of groups, and most of us belong to one or more such groups” (p. 370). For example, I may be, simultaneously, a parent, a teacher, and a member of a political party. Membership in these groups may or may not overlap. Each group has its own specific goals and means to achieve these goals. However, membership in one group should not affect my ability to participate in other groups as long as their goals do not conflict with one another: For example, my politics should not impact my classroom performance. This allows for multifaceted civic engagement across a range of interests and activities. “Anarchy is a function, not of a society’s simplicity and lack of social organization, but of its complexity and multiplicity of social organizations” (Ward, 1973, p. 50). The measure of engagement is how harmoniously an individual is subsumed in the activities of her community, not on how loud her voice is in the political debate.

Control Versus Freedom

The problem of how to align the goals of self-interested individuals with those of the organizations in which they work is a central one for bureaucracies. Bureaucratic institutions attempt to control individual behavior to ensure that organizational goals are met. The bureaucratic mind-set is opposed to individuality. This is a consequence of the dominance of position over person that led to professionalization and accompanying increases in efficiencies—the notion that it does not matter who fills a position as long as they are able to fulfill the functions of that position. One result is that the person stops being a person and becomes merely a functionary during work hours. Thus, a fair amount of effort is expended to ensure that individuals identify closely with the organization and internalize organizational goals as much as possible, as well as to prevent individuals from pursuing their own interests while at work.

Anarchism does not subscribe to this view of the relationship between individual and organization, instead viewing attempts to control and constrain individuals as impediments to organizational efficiency. This is partially the result of the points discussed above: Collective action is seen as a natural activity rather than an artificial structure imposed on individuals. Pursuing multiple functional contracts simultaneously rather than a single monolithic social contract shifts notions of efficiency from the external (ends imposed by the organization) to the internal (ends valued by the actor), allowing the individual to determine an effective balance of time, attention, and effort among competing values—that is, to multitask. “[Anarchism] is about creating new forms of organization . . . It is about creating and enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down structures . . . networks based on principles of decentralized, non-hierarchical consensus democracy” (Graeber, 2002, p. 70).

Anarchism also values freedom deeply, viewing it as an element of good design that enhances efficiency and effectiveness in its own right and seeing external control mechanisms as a drag on efficiencies. Recall Read’s (1971) assertion that people naturally form associations to meet their needs, and that imposed that organizational structures are an impediment to these naturally occurring organizations. This sentiment also informs Carpenter’s (1911) statement that “work in a free society would be done because it was useful” (p. 15). Moglen (1999), law professor and free software advocate, has expended considerable thought and effort on the virtues of freedom for design. First, he sees the Internet as a social condition, defined primarily by the immediacy of connection between participants. Because we are directly connected to other users on the web, it is meaningless to talk of the structure of the Internet, but only of the strength and extent of the social relations—the exchange of information—that the Internet enables. Second, he holds that these connections will generate results: “It’s an emergent property of connected human minds that they do create” (Moglen, 2003, para. 12). In other words, the Internet can be seen as an anarchy. Accordingly, freedom is a paramount value; attempts to control or regulate these connections and exchanges can only destroy the system:

The building of networks means building the systems for sharing data . . . What we are actually deciding is whether to free the network to be a network, or to control the network as a . . . form of proprietary distribution by a few favored individuals . . . (Moglen, 2003, para. 28)

A controlled and regulated Internet, for example, simply is not an Internet, as Google’s ongoing cycle of negotiation and boycott with China over search censorship attests.

As an example of freedom as good design, intimately connected with notions and practice of governance, consider New Zealand’s recent comprehensive overhaul of national police legislation, resulting in a rewrite of the foundational legislation and accompanying regulations governing all facets of police services and procedures (Perspectives on Policing, 2007). With a broad mandate for the review, the New Zealand Police ultimately opted to examine not only delivery of police services, but fundamental questions of governance and accountability, ranging from the legislation underlying the Police Act, to standards of professionalism within the force as well as the use of reasonable force by the police, to respect for human dignity and the role of police within a society (Policing Directions, 2007). More astonishing, this review was undertaken in direct partnership with the citizenry, those most directly affected by the police. As New Zealand’s Guide to Online Participation in government notes, “People who are affected by public policy and services are in a good position to help improve them” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2007). This echoes Marshall (2008), that contemporary anarchism opposes the imposition of power but acknowledges the authority of expertise as long as it is grounded in voluntary consent. Civic participation was facilitated through several practices. First, care was taken to include all citizens through the publication of review documents in Maori and a variety of Asian Pacific languages in addition to English (Police Act Review, 2007, p. 3). Second, public input was solicited through a series of townhall meetings and requests for written and emailed comments (Policing Directions—summary, 2007). Third, and most significantly, the legislation as well as the review process was opensourced. A wiki was created for the review, functioning as an online white board where citizens could log on and comment on existing legislation as well as proposed revisions. They could also propose revisions to the law as well as comment on fundamental issues underlying the legislation. The officer in charge of the review reports peak postings of 10,000 per day, although this level of participation was not maintained over time. He further notes the low incidence of malicious or offensive posts; also that while there were off-topic posts, some contributors also took it on themselves to moderate the wiki (McCardle, n.d.). This approach actively involved the public throughout the process of reviewing and writing the revised law and engaged government and public as partners in the creation of new policy.

In direct contrast to the way that we typically think of legislation being developed at a remove—by professional representatives or more commonly by their paid staff or special interest groups—and then being applied by a professional bureaucracy to the citizenry, the New Zealand police review is a striking instance of anarchic freedom applied to the review and improvement of one of government’s most basic services and showing how governance can effectively move beyond the walls of government.

Anarchism is not opposed to organization or society; anarchism is opposed to the imposition of authority, of government, onto a society (Amster, 2012). It is “a mode of human organization, rooted in the experience of everyday life, which operates side by side with, and in spite of, the dominant authoritarian trends of our society” (Ward, 1973, p. 11). By directly involving the citizenry through all facets of reviewing and rewriting of the law, New Zealand made extraordinary efforts to engage the populace thoroughly as possible, returning to community governance. For those dissatisfied with the new law, the onus lays not with a state disinterested in their participation but with themselves for not acting within their community.

The U.S. patent office’s ongoing experiment with distributed review provides another striking example of an bureaucracy explicitly designing freedom into their processes as a means of increasing efficiency and effectiveness. The patent office is approaching a backlog of 1,000,000 applications. Although the work time of patent examiners have been reduced to an average of 20 hours to review applications, the backlog continues to grow by nearly 100,000 per year (Noveck, 2008). In response, the office opened its boundaries and began an experiment in collaborative democratic action. The Peer-to-Patent program allowed patent applications to be submitted for online review. Qualified members of the public—functional experts—could join an online forum to review applications. Working groups emerged for each application with the power to conduct relevant research, comment on applications, and rate their quality. These groups self-moderate: They critique and rate their own work, eventually identifying the most relevant comments and reference materials to each application. These, in turn, form the basis for a patent examiner’s review (Noveck, 2008). By moving the initial review process outside the institution’s walls, the patent office was able to overcome structural limitations related to personnel and information-processing capabilities and bring in much wider sources of information as well as relevant expert knowledge. In other words, government is inviting the public to help row. This process has harnessed competitive self-interest, as IBM and Microsoft, along with other corporations, have encouraged employees to participate in the program during business hours (Noveck, 2008). At the same time, democratic governance is enhanced, as the more open decision-making process increases transparency and accountability. As more people become involved in the processes of governance, the opportunities for corruption decline. Thus far, the program seems to be a success. It has received highly favorable reviews from those involved with the program and similar programs have been adopted in Australia, Japan, Korea, and United Kingdom.

In both examples, government agencies found ways to move beyond their boundaries and to actively involve the public in the processes of governing. Doing so promotes Dahl’s (1998) notion of dynamic, vivid democracy where citizens are political equals and share collective sovereignty. Specifically, Dahl (1998) noted that this “promotes freedom as no other feasible alternative can,” in the forms of self-determination, autonomy, and responsibility on individual and collective levels (p. 311). This development cannot occur within the confines of institutional boundaries. Institutional rules and regulations may provide a framework for steering governance; opening that framework sufficiently to include the public as active participants in the process of governance has the potential to increase not only civic participation and democratic principles but also organizational efficiency and effectiveness.

Conclusion

Anarchy Is Democracy Taken Seriously—Edward Abbey

Governance is shifting our notions of government: Moving outside governmental walls; shifting the flow of resources, power, and accountability much closer to the citizenry; altering that flow from a top-down to a two-way flow; and de-centering the locus of power, resources, and accountability. Our perspective on government and governance must shift accordingly—the lens used to view one may not be appropriate to the other. I have suggested here that a social, dynamic, and process-oriented one may advance our understanding of modern governance practices. I do not suggest that one perspective replace another; instead, that moving beyond the confines of a single perspective may enhance our understanding of a complex, multifaceted topic (see Farmer, 2010).

Anarchism provides a rich body of theory and experience that speaks directly to organization under environments of complexity and uncertainty, where policy goals are maintained in the face of fluid participation and where bottom-up involvement and devolution to local levels is prevalent. It emphasizes personal freedom balanced with responsibility, recognizes that we are social animals and therefore act collectively, and seeks to ensure equality and autonomy. These are, at heart, democratic ideals as well.

Anarchism highlights the priority of governance before government. Civil society is built from the ground up through interconnected, interdependent social relationships and is maintained through those relationships. There can be no effective government where there is no governance. Anarchism resents having government imposed from above as an external force that interferes with those relationships. Anarchism promotes order—as Proudhon (2011) noted, society seeks order in anarchy as a man seeks justice in equality with his fellows.

This article has addressed several ways that anarchism may be useful in closing the distance between those governing and those governed. In this regard, insights from anarchism may complement other, ongoing efforts to increase civic engagement on one hand, and government responsiveness on the other; they may also provide a new perspective on current trends of moving governmental power away from centralized locations, and often from the public sector. However, anarchism is only one alternate perspective; the application of additional perspectives to governance issues may provide further insights.

Central to this project is the focus on governance as a dynamic process rather than a structure. The connections between actors are critical to maintain a healthy community of any size. Traditionally, this has led to a focus on small communities because direct communication is key to establishing and maintaining close relationships. The emergence of new technologies (e.g., web 2.0) that facilitate relationship-building may enhance our abilities to have direct relationships on a larger scale. Efforts to develop “gov 2.0” applications should be encouraged.

Anarchism recognizes that people are inherently social; when left alone, we naturally form all sorts of collaborative groups to solve problem and improve our social condition. Families, neighborhoods, church groups, and civic associations have historically provided a great measure of social support. Anarchism encourages this emergent organization and acknowledges that this may lead to unexpected outcomes. In general, anarchism encourages local experimentation, using communal moderation to evaluate programmatic success: The Peer-to-Patent program originated as a blog post (Noveck, 2009). Innovation has been a driver of America, economically and socially; there’s no reason why government shouldn’t benefit as well. Finally, anarchism acknowledges that individuals must balance their personal liberty with social responsibility—that we are individuals in the context of our society. Anarchist communities are strong and vibrant to the extent that their members are actively engaged in building and renewing those communities. I have focused on ways that an anarchist perspective can enhance governance; however, it is not sufficient for government to reach out to citizens if the public is not willing to join in the work of governing.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Aaron Wachhaus is an instructor at Penn State Harrisburg. His work examines the ways that public services and functions are moving beyond traditional government structures and processes. More specifically, his interests include the use of networks and platforms as organizational tools as well as means of delivering public services. He advocates the development of new theoretical perspectives to better understand emerging governance trends and the relation between public and state.

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