Abstract
The World Bank has pioneered the concept of “private” in developing countries with the aim of creating economic and social sustainability since the 1990s. This study examines private universities by focusing on the accountability framework in Bangladesh. Using a multi-method approach (a survey of 1,046 students from all 52 universities in the country and policy documents from 1992-2014), the study reveals that weak macro accountability (specifically, a vague regulatory framework, lack of enforcement, government leniency, and corruption) is a contributing factor in the unsuccessful drive for higher growth of private higher education institutions (HEIs). The study also raises a question on the success of the Washington Consensus in a developing country. The findings demonstrate that urgent attention is required from the Bangladesh government and donor agencies (The World Bank, the UNESCO, and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]).
Keywords
Introduction
The underlying philosophy of neoliberal economic reform emerged in most developing countries 1 in the mid-1980s due to public sector inefficiency. Keynesianism in the mid-1970s was replaced by free market economies (as per the Washington Consensus). A turning point came with the Berg Report (The World Bank, 1981), which blamed governments for perceived development failures in sub-Saharan Africa, criticizing widespread state intervention in the region (Cramer, 1999). The state itself was conceived as the problem rather than the solution (Öniş & Şenses, 2005). The idea of the “Washington Consensus,” meanwhile, was coined by Williamson (1993) to refer to the economic policy agenda that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank followed during the 1980s. It recommends that governments should reform their policies by following a number of measures, specifically, “pursue macro-economic stability by controlling inflation and reducing fiscal deficits; open their economies to the rest of the world through trade and capital account liberalization; liberalize domestic product and factor markets through privatization and deregulation” (Gore, 2000, pp. 789-790). The primary aim of this policy approach was to reduce the role of the state to generate the necessary conditions for a market-led economy through the private and deregulation of markets (Babai, 1988; Battaglio, 2009; Cramer, 1999; Galal, Jones, Tandon, & Vogelsang, 1994; Gore, 2000; Marangos, 2009; McCleery & De Paolis, 2008; Öniş & Şenses, 2005; Williamson, 1993, 1997; The World Bank, 1981, 1994a, 1995). Private has become the most significant agenda of the World Bank (Richardson & Haralz, 1995) and it should also be noted that, since the 1980s, the World Bank has influenced the education sector enormously in developing countries (Bonal, 2002). For instance, about 70% of all structural adjustment loans made during the 1980s contained a private component (Cook, 1997; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995), and the World Bank’s funding accounted for 25% of the total International Development Assistance to education in the mid-1990s (Bennell, 1996, p. 235). Education loans in the World Bank budget increased from less than 4% in 1980 to 10% by 1996 (Mundy, 1998). Currently, the World Bank is the largest funder of education in developing countries.
The concept of the private higher education is not new in the global economy and it has played a significant role in developing countries (Altbach, 1999; Banya, 2001; Biesta, 2004; Hopper, 1998; Rabossi, 2010; Ransom, Siew-Mun, & Selvaratnam, 1993; Tilak, 1991). Since the 1990s, private sector universities have emerged in developing countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bulgaria, Egypt, Ghana, Hungary, India, Russia, Cyprus, Bolivia, and Brazil (Amaral & Teixeira, 2000; Ball, 2007, 2009; Quddus & Rashid, 2000; Tikly, 2003; UNESCO, 2014; The World Bank, 1994b, 2000, 2008, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). It has also been argued that despite the growth of private sector higher education, the question of “what private sectors can and cannot deliver” should be investigated (The World Bank, 2000). The accountability issues of private universities are not addressed in reality (The World Bank, 2014d). The World Bank has recently put more effort into recommending that states establish a regulatory framework to oversee their private universities’ activities (Fielden & LaRocque, 2008; The World Bank, 2008). As this is an under-researched area, this study explores these accountability issues by investigating the following research questions:
The study is focused upon private higher education in South Asia 2 with specific reference to Bangladesh for the following four reasons. First, Bangladesh, with more than 156 million people (156,594,962 in 2013, 151,125,475 in 2010, up from 67,627,868 in 1971) is one of the E9 3 countries. The population has increased by 131.56% since its independence in 1971. Furthermore, 29.9% of the population is below 15 years of age. However, due to the high level of poverty, the Gross National Income (GNI) 4 per capita has not increased significantly over the last 5 years (US$620 in 2009, US$690 in 2010, US$770 in 2011, US$830 in 2012, and US$900 in 2013).
Second, Bangladesh has seen an increasing demand for private higher education. In 1970, there were only six public (state-run) universities, with 26,390 students (16.8% were female) in comparison with 34 public universities with 197,252 students in 2012. After the introduction of the concept of private higher education in 1992, the number of students grew exponentially, with 314,640 students enrolled in private HEIs in 2012 (The University Grants Commission of Bangladesh [UGC] Annual Report, 2012). Private universities provide for 61.46% of the university students, up from 44.74% in 2003, a clear indication that the demand for private higher education has significantly increased.
Third, Bangladesh’s government is allocating an increasingly lower percentage of the national budget to the higher education sector. Figure 1 shows that the government allocated 0.83% of the national budget in 2011-2012 compared with 0.81% in 2002-2003. It has also been argued that the government allocates “only 2.1% of GDP to education, but just 0.12% to tertiary education, of which 85% goes to meet the recurring expenditures” (The World Bank, 2014b, p. 1; 2014c, p. 1). However, UNESCO in its “Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2014” argued that the allocation of states’ national budgets for education should be at least 20%, and 6% of the GDP. In terms of budget allocation, Bangladesh is the lowest in South Asia (10.3% in Maldives, 4.7% in Bhutan, 4.6% in Nepal, 2.4% in Pakistan, and 3.3% in India). The continuously lowest public spending on education relative to GDP in Bangladesh encourages the establishment of more private HEIs. This is due to the fact that private universities are not funded by the state and can meet demand created by poor state provision.
Higher education budget as a percentage (%) of national budget in Bangladesh (2002-2011).
Finally, despite a positive employment growth rate (the unemployment rate in 2012 was 5%) and higher university participation, there is also the paradox of high graduate unemployment in Bangladesh. The total graduate unemployment rate is 47%, which is the highest in South Asia (“High University Enrolment,” 2014, p. 9). So, this disparity between higher enrollment and unemployment raises a question on the quality of education providers in Bangladesh. This is possibly because the government is not concerned about the misalignment between labor market needs and higher education provision. Therefore, the number of private universities is increasing rapidly.
The study is organized into seven sections. The next section provides an overview of private higher education in Bangladesh, including its historical influences. Section “Literature Review” offers a literature review, and an accountability framework is presented in section “Accountability Framework.” The “Method” section describes the research methodology. The “Results and Discussion” section reports the findings of the study, and the final section contains the conclusions and limitations of the research and suggests directions for future research.
Background of Private Higher Education in Bangladesh
The current education structure of Bangladesh can be divided into three major stages: primary, secondary, and higher education. Primary education (Grades I-V, ages 6-10) is a 5-year cycle taught by primary level institutions; secondary education is a 7-year cycle (Grades VI-XII, ages 11-17), with 3 years in junior secondary, 2 years in secondary, and 2 years in higher secondary level institutions; and then higher education (age 18 and above, Grades XIII and above) is a 3- to 5-year cycle, managed by higher level institutions. In addition to public schools, private primary and secondary schools also receive support from the government. HEIs consist of two categories: private and public. HEIs provide degree passes (3 years), degrees with honors (4 years), master’s (1 and 2 years), and other higher degrees (e.g., MPhil, PhD, MBBS, and DBA).
Historically, higher education in Bangladesh has been influenced by the British Education system. This is because Bangladesh was a British Colony until 1947 and then part of Pakistan until 1971. The Hunter Commission (1882, the Legislative Council of the Government led by Lord William Hunter), the Raleigh Commission (1902, led by Sir Thomas Raleigh), and the Calcutta University Commission, also known as the Sadler Commission (1917-1919, led by Sir Michael Ernest Sadler) made significant recommendations for education reform in British India. The Hunter Commission emphasized primary education and proposed private higher education and the Raleigh Commission focused upon higher education (the Raleigh Bill became the “Indian Universities Act 1904”). The Sadler Commission investigated the overall state of British Indian Education and suggested that the European model was not suitable in India for socioeconomic reasons. The Sadler Commission also proposed that the first 2 years of university education were to be incorporated into the state system in 1917 and the first public university, Dhaka University, was subsequently established in 1921 (now in Bangladesh).
During World War II, Sir John Sargent, the Educational Advisor to the Government of India, provided a comprehensive scheme of education for educational reform in India. The Sargent Report of 1944 recommended that the standard of university education must be raised; admission policy must be revised; competent teachers should be appointed; the duration of bachelor courses should be 3 years; and a higher education monitoring authority should be established. According to the recommendations of the report, the University Grants Committee was constituted in 1945, later renamed the UGC in 1956. After British rule ended, two committees, the Akram Khan Committee (1947) and the Ataur Rahman Khan Committee (1957) introduced a compulsory School Textbook Board in 1954 and separate streams for education in 1959: Arts, Science, and Commerce.
After its independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh had six public universities with only 26,390 students (Ministry of Education, Bangladesh) because of a lack of development of the private sector. No new public universities were established until 1980. To promote higher education, the government established the National University in 1992. Later, with the help of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Open University was established in 1993 (Bangladesh Open University Act, 1992). During the mid-1980s, the private sector started to increase its involvement in education. Subsequently, private universities were founded in Bangladesh based on the Private University Act, 1992, Act No. 34 of the BNP’s (Bangladesh National Party) rule (Figure 2).
Number of private universities from 1992 to 2013 (n = 79).
The BNP and the Awami League are the two main political parties in Bangladesh. They have been in power as follows: BNP from 1991 to 1996 and from 2001 to 2006; Awami League from 1996 to 2001, 2009 to 2013, and 2014 to present; Military-backed government from 2006 to 2008. Under the BNP Political regimes (1991-1996 and 2002-2006), a total of 44 universities were established. The present government of the Awami League was not initially in favor of private higher education policy. They established only eight during 1996-2001. Surprisingly, 27 private universities were established in the last 2 years (2012 and 2013) under the present democratic government of the Awami League. No universities were established in 8 years (1994, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010).
As of August 30, 2014, there are 79 private universities in Bangladesh (UGC Annual Report, 2014; Figure 2). Fifty-six universities are located in Dhaka (the capital of Bangladesh) and 23 are located outside Dhaka. According to its 2012 Annual Report, the UGC suspended four universities in October 2006; however, they are operating again after getting a stay order from the High Court. The number of students of private universities has been increasing significantly during the last 5 years (61.46% in comparison with public universities with 38.53% in 2012). Table 1 shows that during 2013, the total number of students who enrolled for various courses was 314,640 (25.27% were female students); there were 11,755 teachers (26.26% females); the student–teacher ratio was 27:1. The low number of enrolled female students indicates a gender disparity in higher education in Bangladesh. Strikingly, 32.5% teachers are part-time, which is a matter of concern regarding teaching quality.
Students Enrollment and Teachers in Private University (1997-2012).
Source. Data are available from Ministry of Education (2014), Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information & Statistics (BANBEIS; 2014), http://www.banbeis.gov.bd/db_bb/university_educaiton_1.htm, and The UGC Annual Report 2012.
Note. — indicates data are not available; UGC = University Grants Commission.
Addressing the governance of private higher education in Bangladesh, the government introduced the Private University Act, 2010, Act No. 35 of 2010. According to this Act, the Ministry of Education is responsible for overall policy formulation, planning, monitoring, evaluation, and the execution of plans and programs of higher education. The UGC ultimately carries out the state’s monitoring of private universities. The initial aim was to enable more stakeholder involvement via various committees (Board of Trustees, Syndicate, Academic Council, Faculties, Institutes, Curriculum Committee, Finance Committee, Faculty Recruitment Committee, and Disciplinary Committee; Figure 3). However, The World Bank (2014d) stated that “Most of the private universities have failed to meet the minimum requirements of physical infrastructures, full-time qualified faculty, libraries, teaching aids and other facilities to provide proper education” (p. 1). For example, 23 of 79 universities have no vice chancellor and most of the universities have no permanent campus; their trustees were given excessive powers because the trustees were present on all the state committees, which had no detailed guidelines and no guidelines for an accreditation council. These loopholes attract non-compliant activities in relation to the Act. The UGC Chairman also stated in 2012 that none of the Private universities are obeying the Private University Act 2010 properly. Only a handful—10 private universities—are in good position. Others are not accountable. Moreover, we are annoyed to see that ownership problems still remain in most of the private universities . . . they aren’t listening. If we terminate their all academic activities and other activities, they restart their activities again after gaining permission from the high court. So, the UGC needs more power to stop such activities. (Eduicon, 2012, p. 1; “Study of Corrupt University,” 2014)
Current governance structure of private university.
Again, no foreign universities or their branches can operate any academic activities or confer degrees in Bangladesh. The governance structure raises a serious question regarding accountability issues (Figure 3).
Literature Review
The current state of higher education in developing countries is somewhat weak and no developing country can claim to have achieved complete success with private HEIs (The World Bank, 2000, 2008, 2014d). This is because of a lack of domestic capacity to meet demand (Altbach, 1999), and political and cultural factors (Bøyum, 2014). Bøyum (2014) also argued that educational justice is treated in isolation from social justice in developing countries. Quddus and Rashid (2000) argued that the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe brought many profound changes, the most remarkable of which is the private of higher education. They found that policymakers in developing countries necessarily adjusted both their mind-sets and practice to embrace the free market in an effort to assure good-quality higher education. They found inconsistencies in tuition fees and private HEIs, mainly in serving the elites in the societies.
With regard to Portugal’s experience, Amaral and Teixeira (2000) found that a very large private sector of HEIs has developed, but also that no real market has emerged. This is because private sector is less responsive (a simultaneous lack of regulation, lack of quality in degrees) to economic and social needs than the public sector. In sub-Saharan Africa, Banya (2001) found that because public HEIs face huge challenges (such as increased enrollments, fiscal challenges, quality issues, and rising graduate unemployment), the governments in the region have less control over private HEIs. The governments think that establishing private HEIs is an alternative route to solving the problems of public universities. Meier (2004) found a high level of corruption in the education sectors of developing countries. The consequences of corruption are endemic and result in high education drop-out rates, especially among the poor who cannot afford to pay bribes and irregular fees (Transparency International Bangladesh [TIB], 2014).
Fielden and LaRocque (2008) revealed that private HEIs in developing countries have an uneven record of self-regulation, and tend to operate with low-quality physical infrastructure and human resources, and with a lack of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. They argued for establishing an accreditation agency in developing countries. Countries like Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Indonesia, and the Philippines operate accreditation systems at the private HEIs level.
Regarding the World Bank’s role, Collins and Rhoads (2008) found that the private sector was relatively weak in developing countries such as Uganda and Thailand. They argued that one-size-fits-all solutions do not work in developing countries. They noted that the World Bank is legitimizing its position through private programs, but on the contrary, is also imposing “conditions to loans that restrict national support for higher education and the development of public universities” (p. 215), raising the issue of contradictions in the World Bank’s real ambition toward HEIs in developing countries. In a developed country’s experience, Ubillos (2005) argued that “the most striking point about privatization in Spain is the succession of different privatization policies used by the central government, involving three different stages and very diverse economic and political rationalities” (p. 131). However, Al’Abri (2011) found that education policy in Oman had been seriously affected by private processes.
In a cross-country study, Holzhacker, Chornovian, Yazilitas, and Dayan-Ocher (2009) examined the private experiences of four countries, including the development and expansion of private HEIs, the increased reliance of public HEIs on private funding, and the operation of colleges and universities in a businesslike manner in Brazil, Mongolia, the Netherlands, and Ukraine. In Mongolia, they found that the country followed a market-driven approach, with minimal government control and a diminished involvement of the public sector, as well as the full transfer of institutions from state to private ownership. The criteria for establishing a new HEI were weakly defined, with a lack of experienced teachers, and a lack of monitoring guidelines. In Ukraine, despite having a wide range of private HEIs, the government exerted strict control over both state and private HEIs. The study revealed that government officials accepted bribes for licensing and accreditation and that cheating is rampant in Ukrainian HEIs. In Brazil, the government was also actively involved in the regulation of private HEIs. In the case of the Netherlands, independent agencies were involved in regulation.
Levy (2013) argued that the overall decline of private HEIs raises a question on the credibility and realities of education quality. For example, there has been a decline in enrollments in Romania from 36% to 22% (1992-2005; Pachuashvili, 2009) and in Argentina only seven private HEIs were established between 1995 and 2008 (Rabossi, 2010). Similarly, Levy found some mixed evidence of private HEI success. For example, despite the high growth of private HEIs, government policy in Ethiopia was detrimental to the growth of HEIs, possible because of public sector lobbying with government agencies. He also concluded that heavy regulation would restrict the growth of private HEIs.
In discussing the widening participation in private HEIs in Ghana and Tanzania, Morley (2014) raised questions about value for money and how far students are valued. She found that students who enrolled for private HEIs were from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds and had a history of being failed by the education sector; also, many universities were below minimal quality standards, and some unscrupulous lecturers were found to be involved in corruption (e.g., enhancing grades in return for sexual or monetary favors).
In the Case of Bangladesh, Hopper (1998, p. 5) noted that “3-year undergraduate degrees took an average of 6 years to complete in major prestigious public universities in Bangladesh.” M. Alam and Haque (2004) found that due to some unscheduled closures of public universities, students were motivated to study in private universities in Bangladesh. M. Alam, Haque, and Siddique (2007) found that the politicization of higher education had an adverse impact on quality assurance in Bangladeshi private HEIs. They observed that the number of students was growing in private HEIs, but also found an ineffective administrative structure, a lack of regulation, and an absence of quality control among HEIs.
Al-Samarrai (2008) argued that the country’s poor governance structure and the lack of effective accountability mechanisms were weakening the links between policy and implementation in terms of achieving national education goals in Bangladesh. G. M. Alam (2009) also mentioned that private HEIs in Bangladesh are now considered as a business good rather than a public good due to poor governance. He strongly argued that the governance and regulatory mechanisms initially set up for public systems may not be suited to private HEIs. In a recent study, The World Bank (2014b) evidenced that the governance arrangements in HEIs reflect the politicization of academic decision making and operations in Bangladesh. Some other issues were also highlighted, including the lack of internal and external quality assurance measures, and the recruitment of properly qualified staff.
Accountability Framework
Accountability can be defined as “being answerable to audiences for performing up to prescribed standards that are relevant to fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations, and other charges” (Schlenker, 1997, p. 242). Individuals are expected to adopt and implement a solution involving the least effort (cognitive miser or acceptability heuristic) when audience views are known (Tetlock, 1983, 1992). In contrast, they are more likely to engage in complex and self-critical thinking (preemptive self-criticism) when audience views are unknown (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Proper accountability ensures more transparency in HEIs (Altbach, 1999; Altbach & Teferra, 2004).
In the public administration literature, accountability is regarded as the central concept of public administration (Acar, Guo, & Yang, 2008; M. Bovens, 1998, M. A. P. Bovens, 2005; M. Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014; Dubnick, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2011; Dubnick & Frederickson, 2010; Dubnick & Justice, 2004; Dubnick & Yang, 2011; Johnston & Romzek, 2008; Romzek, 1996, 2000; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, 1998; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000; Romzek & Johnston, 2005; Romzek, LeRoux, & Blackmar, 2012; Romzek et al., 2011; Ryan, & Walsh, 2004; Yang, 2012). Romzek and Dubnick (1987) emphasized accountability as answerability and managing expectations. Similar to this idea, M. Bovens (1998) highlighted accountability as the sense of liability among agents of governance. It is something that is imposed on actors and to which actors must respond (Dubnick, 1998). According to Romzek and Dubnick (1987), “public administration accountability involves the means by which public agencies and their workers manage the diverse expectations generated within and outside the organization” (p. 228). Dubnick and Yang (2011) opined that “Accountability involves the means by which public agencies and their workers manage the diverse expectations generated within and outside the organization” (p. 171). Prior research has made significant progress over the two decades and has focused on various accountability issues. Regarding New Public Management (NPM), Dubnick (2005) argued that the performance-centered program improves government accountability. Johnston and Romzek (2008) argued that privatization and hybrid organizations lead to great accountability challenges and require particular accountability capacities (Acar et al., 2008; Romzek et al., 2012). Acar et al. (2008) therefore suggested that accountability should be viewed as managing diverse expectations from multiple stakeholders. Yang (2012) questioned that accountability remains to be an irritating problem: It is unclear exactly how public managers deal with conflicting accountability pressures and how accountability systems can make a positive difference. This problem becomes more pressing in the new governance environment that is more fluid, uncertain, and complex and in which power is shared by actors with relatively equal standing. (p. 256)
Several studies have examined accountability issues in relation to HEIs in developed countries (Ball, 2007, 2009; Biesta, 2004; Boer & Goedegebuure, 2007; Dean, 1999; De Lissovoy & McLaren, 2003; Huisman & Currie, 2004; Hunt, 2009; Olssen, Codd, & O’Neill, 2004; McLendon, James, & Russ, 2006; Tikly, 2003; Webb, 2011). The key condition with accountability is dependent on an axiological argument (Ball, 2009). Most prior studies discuss the theoretical paradigm of accountability and HEI policies. Huisman and Currie (2004) and Webb (2011) called for a broader dimension of accountability to measure the outcome of policies and practices in HEIs. In this study, accountability may be defined as policies, practices, procedures, and assessment of outcomes that measure the quality of performance of private HEIs. Following prior studies (Romzek, 2000; Webb, 2011), the accountability framework in this study builds up an analytical heuristic triangle, illustrating four propositions (“A” denotes the Accountability dimension) as Figure 4 shows.
A1: Management and Administration,
A2: Academics,
A3: Regulatory Framework, and
A4: Government’s action.
Accountability dimensions—Conceptual model.
These four propositions describe specific aspects of accountability in an attempt to ascertain how more accountability can provide benefits for private HEIs. First, the Accountability of Management and Administration in HEIs includes tuition fees, registration/enrollment, classroom facilities, students’ involvement in decision-making processes, library facilities, research, campuses, personal counseling services, and not-for-profit motives (Boer & Goedegebuure, 2007; McLendon et al., 2006). Second, the Accountability of Academics involves university teachers’/instructors’ specialized degree(s) in their respective fields, assessment criteria, feedback, required office hours, effective communication via email or blackboard, and caring about students’ academic issues (Huisman & Currie, 2004). Third, the Accountability of the Regulatory Framework encompasses existing laws such as the Private University Act (1992, 2010), and the effective implementation of the national regulatory framework (Hunt, 2009; Romzek, 2000). Fourth, the Accountability of the Government’s action is concerned with the rapport between the government’s role (via the Ministry of Education and the UGC of Bangladesh) and HEIs, as well as considering political pressure and corruption (TIB, 2014; TI, 2014; Webb, 2011).
The first two dimensions (A1 and A2) can be described as micro forms of accountability and the next two dimensions (A3 and A4) are macro forms of accountability. Macro forms of political accountability deal with the governing mentality toward societal control and demarcate the governing practices to some extent (Foucault, 1991), whereas micro forms deal with individual organizational behavior within the society (Tikly, 2003). The linkages between these macro and micro forms portray the overall accountability scenario of HEIs (Biesta, 2004). Understanding the linkages can also be useful in relation to the private–public partnerships in HEIs (Ball, 2007).
Prior research highlights that there is no perfect model of accountability (Weber, 1999). Romzek and Johnston (2005) stressed that accountability is based on the classic principal-agent model but it has serious limitations in the context of private HEIs. This is because private organizations are not subject to direct political accountability (M. A. P. Bovens, 2005). Dubnick and Yang (2011) offered accountability matrix that can be regarded as a problematic situation, which is perceived occurs at different stage (input, process, outcomes). At the input stage, accountability mechanism is associated with how to structure, manage, and monitor the problematic situation that results. However, the tensions exist among the various notions of accountability (input, process, and output; Dubnick, 2005). In this study, I focus upon input- and process-based accountabilities (the problem-solving agent assigns to the solution). The key issue here is how input and process-based accountabilities tend to drive the adoption of private HEIs in Bangladesh (also addresses the answers to the questions of “for what?” and “to whom?”). However, due to paucity literature on accountability in private HEIs in developing countries, future research could be conducted by linking input–outcome accountability mechanism.
Method
A multi-method (also referred to as a mixed methodology) approach involving survey and document analyses was adopted for this study. Such an approach entails the application of two or more sources of data or research methods to the investigation of a research. According to Fuentes (2008), a multi-method approach provides “richer detail than either method can generate alone” (p. 1592). The complementary principle in terms of the acceptability of multi-methods means that this is often a better approach than a single method (Jick, 1979). Importantly, in terms of the generalization of the conclusions reached, a multi-method approach offers insights and evidence that will contribute toward a wider set of plausible explanations (Bennett & Braumoeller, 2006), which can also be applied more widely. This approach also creates a bridge between ontological (quantitative) and epistemological (qualitative) schools of thoughts in the research paradigm (Modell, 2010).
First, in terms of the present research’s survey, all the respondents met the following criteria: They were students studying undergraduate or postgraduate courses in private universities in Bangladesh and were willing to participate voluntarily. The data were collected from 52 private universities between June and December 2012. The population of the current study represents all Bangladeshi private universities (as of June 2012, the total number of private universities was 52). Initially, a total of 1,560 questionnaires were sent to the 52 universities (30 questionnaires to each university). In total, 900 respondents replied by October 2013. Further requests for participation were subsequently made in early November 2013 for the rest of the participants, and a further 215 replied. Out of 1,115 (initial 900 + further 215) respondents, 69 respondents’ questionnaires were excluded due to missing information. The adjusted sample size was therefore 1,046 (900 + 215 – 69) and the true response rate was 67.05% (1,046/1,560). The response rate is typically seen as high and acceptable compared with prior studies (G. M. Alam, 2009). The non-response bias was mitigated through extensive effort and a follow-up strategy by the researcher. A statistical test (a chi-square) was also conducted to detect bias. The result does not show a statistical significant difference. Non-response bias was unlikely to be a problem for this study. The present study is unique in gathering a large sample of a developing country’s experience.
The preliminary questionnaire was developed based on the accountability framework and on prior research (Boer & Goedegebuure, 2007; Huisman & Currie, 2004; Hunt, 2009; McLendon et al., 2006; Romzek, 2000; Webb, 2011). Then, it was modified and peer reviewed by a focus group of 43 participants (28 students studying undergraduate and postgraduate programs at five private universities, five academics from four universities, six management staff from three universities, and a member of governmental staff from the UGC). One official of the Ministry of Education was invited to participate but declined. The feedback from this focus group helped to ensure that the wording, format, length, and sequencing of the questionnaire were appropriate. The questionnaire was made up of three parts: Demographic information in Section A, Accountability of private universities in Section B, and Open space for opinion/comments in Section C (see the appendix for the Survey Questionnaire of this study). All the questions in Section B were closed-ended and constructed according to the Likert-type scale with a value of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), as suggested by Bryman and Bell (2007). The 5-point Likert-type scale was used because the majority (31 out of 43) of the participants in the focus group felt uncomfortable with a more complex scale of 7 points. The study followed the appropriate ethical guidelines. Students were given the absolute right to withdraw at any time and their anonymity was guaranteed (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Henslin, 1995). All the respondents were coded and pooled for analysis so that individual students could not be identified.
Second, the study also evaluates selected public documents, including official reports by the government (Private University Act, 1992, Bangladesh; Private University Act, 2010, Bangladesh; Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information & Statistics; The UGC of Bangladesh; Ministry of Education; Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education (Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education, 2014); The Higher Education Quality Enhancement Project [HEQEP, 2014]), those of donor agencies (The World Bank, IMF, ADB, IFC (International Finance Corporation), UNICEF, UNESCO), and by independent research institutes (TIB, TI), newspapers (The Daily Star, New Age, The Bangladesh Observer, Prothom Alo, University World News, The Economist). All documents were published between 1992 and 2014 in relation to private universities in Bangladesh. The primary objective in evaluating the documents was to triangulate the research method and to understand the ways in which the private HEIs idea was constructed in Bangladesh. This approach was followed by prior research (Bøyum, 2014; Gür, Çelik, & Özoğlu, 2012). The ethical argumentation used is based on Walton’s (2003) model.
Results and Discussion
Respondents’ Characteristics
From the survey results of the 1,046 respondents, it was observed that respondents were 78.1% male and most of them were aged between 18 and 27 years (97.6%); 88.6% were single, 67.9% were from a small university, and 91.1% were Muslim (Table 2). This is understandable because Bangladesh is a predominantly Muslim country and only 25.27% of students enrolled for courses in private universities in 2012 were female (The UGC Annual Report, 2012). The reason for the large number of respondents in this study being from small universities is that there were only six universities (American International University Bangladesh; BRAC University; East West University; Independent University, Bangladesh; North South University; and Southeast University) in the “large” category in the country, whereas the other 46 were “small.”
Respondent Characteristics (n = 1,046).
Note. Tk. = Taka, the local currency unit of Bangladesh.
In addition, 88.4% respondents were studying for undergraduate degrees whereas only 6.3% represented postgraduate studies. In terms of education years, there was on an average an equal selection of year 1 to year 4 students (97.5%), whereas only 2.5% were in year 5 and above. The tuition fees vary across different universities in an academic year (from Tk. 30,000 [US$384.12] to 131,000 [US$1,664.53] and above 5 ). This is because there are no clear guidelines for unified tuition fees in Bangladesh from the UGC (“Certificate Business in Private Universities,” 2014; Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), 2014). Furthermore, 67% of the respondents were absent for fewer than 10 days in the last 6 months of the academic year. The underlying factor for this limited absence was that the instructors of private universities award marks for presence in class (for instance, 5% out of 100%) and so students are inclined to get this easy mark.
Factor Analysis
A factor analysis was carried out to reduce from 43 statements to four Accountability Dimensions (Table 3). Principal components analysis and varimax rotation were used to transform the data into composite variables in a summarized form (Gorsuch, 1983). Following the factor analysis, statements with factor loading of less than 0.4 were excluded in the analysis. Furthermore, statements with eigenvalues equal to or greater than 1 were considered significant. The analysis resulted in a reduced 29 statements, as follows: A1: Management and Administration [Q1, Q2, Q3, Q7, Q8, Q10, Q11, Q16, Q17, Q18]; A2: Academics [Q21, Q22, Q23, Q27, Q28, Q29, Q30, Q31, Q32, Q33, Q34, Q35]; A3: Regulatory Framework [Q36, Q37, Q38, Q39]; and A4: Government’s action [Q41, Q42, Q43]. The factors from this analysis were able to explain 65.92% of the total variance. This is higher than the prior studies: Kwan and Ng (1999) reported 54.2% and Tan and Kek (2004) reported 65%.
Factor Analysis With Varimax Rotation.
Note. Extraction method: principal components analysis; rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalization, which converged after four iterations.
Reliability and Validity
A reliability test was conducted for each accountability dimension. It was found that the Cronbach’s alpha (α) coefficients for the four dimensions ranged from .759 (Regulatory Framework) to .878 (Academics), which exceeded the recommended .7 level (Cronbach, 1951). To test the construct and discriminant validity, Nunnally’s (1978) method was used in this study (Table 4). For instance, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy exceeded .50, the level recommended in a prior study (Bryman & Cramer, 1997). Bartlett’s Sphericity test of four dimensions was significant at a .0001 level, which led to a rejection of the null hypothesis of the four accountability dimensions and the conclusion that there were correlations in the data set that were appropriate for factor analysis. Bryman and Cramer (1997) suggested that correlation between variables should not exceed .8 or .9. In this study, all the correlations were measured at lower than .8 (Table 5).
Reliability and Validity.
p < .0001 level.
Correlations Matrix and Descriptive Statistics.
Correlation is significant at the .01 level, one-tailed.
Regression Analysis
To further investigate the determinants of the overall accountability dimensions as dependent variables, a regression analysis was conducted. Most studies on accountability in the literature are qualitative or conceptual in nature (Acar et al., 2008; Dubnick, 2003, 2005; Romzek, 1996; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, 1998; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000; Yang, 2012). Yang (2012) noted that “Few studies use accountability institutions/expectations as the dependent variable, and even fewer studies examine them as the independent and dependent variables simultaneously” (p. 260). In the present study, overall accountability as dependent has been derived from the survey instrument.
The regression analysis was performed by taking the ratings of 1,046 respondents in relation to the four accountability dimensions and items related to the extracted factors. These extracted factors have been taken as four independent variables. The purpose of the analysis was to identify the significant factors in contributing to the accountability framework in this study. The regression model of this study is as follows:
where the dependent variable OA is the overall accountability. The independent variables are as follows: A1 = factors score of the Management and Administration, A2 = factors score of the Academics, A3 = factors score of the Regulatory Framework, A4 = factors score of the Government’s action, β0 = constant, β1–β4 = the parameters or regression estimates, and ε = the stochastic disturbance term.
The multiple regression results are shown in Table 6. In all four accountability dimensions, variance inflation factors (VIFs) were less than 10 and the tolerance levels were more than 1 (see Table 6). This suggests that the regression model was not subject to any multicolinearity problems in interpreting the regression analysis results (Myers, 1990). The Durbin–Watson score was 1.818, which means that the regression model was significant. Table 6 also shows that the model that emerged from the regression had an adjusted R2 value of .759, which means that the four accountability dimensions accounted for 75.9% of the variation. All four independent variables were significant (p < .001).
Regression Analysis: Four Accountability Factors (n = 1,046).
Note. Dependent variable: Accountability; Independent variables: Management and Administration (A1), Academics (A2), Regulatory Framework (A3), and Government’s action (A4). VIFs = variance inflation factors.
The findings indicate that all four dimensions are contributing factors to the overall accountability of private higher education sector in Bangladesh. The standardized coefficients beta (parameter estimation) value indicates that Regulatory Framework (.160) and Government’s action (.125) were less able to explain accountability, whereas the Management and Administration (.416), and Academics (.407) factors were more likely to determine the level of accountability of private HEIs in Bangladesh. This is understandable because the respondents, as students, are not familiar with the regulatory issues surrounding private HEIs in Bangladesh. It is also apparent that private HEIs should be more accountable through more effective governance and ensuring that they use qualified academics.
The statistical results warrant caution as to the limitations of findings because it is difficult to generalize (Tan & Kek, 2004). Therefore, the results need to be interpreted in relative rather than absolute terms (particularly the findings on the Regulatory Framework and Government’s action).
Micro Accountability
As indicated in the “Accountability Framework” section, micro accountability in this study focused upon the Management and Administration (A1) and Academics (A2) of private HEIs. Regarding Management and Administration, 43.4% of the respondents agreed on the management and administration’s effectiveness (Figure 5); 27.5% were undecided and 28.2% disagreed. Respondents were critical of higher tuition fees because these were increasing every year but the relevant authority failed to provide any guidelines or a cap policy to stop that trend (Quddus & Rashid, 2000). The governance structures did not involve stakeholders in the committees (G. M. Alam, 2009; Al-Samarrai, 2008; Fielden & LaRocque, 2008) and managements were careless about research and library facilities. Unsurprisingly, like other developing countries, most of the private HEIs in Bangladesh operate as profit centers (M. Alam et al., 2007). In addition, with the exception of few large universities, the majority of universities did not have their own permanent campus.
Accountability of Management and Administration (A1).
In relation to academics, the majority of respondents (52.4%) were positive about their instructors (Figure 6) whereas 27.4% were not certain about the efficiency and effectiveness of the academics they knew. Interestingly, although the respondents were generally positive about the qualifications of their instructors (66.57%), the assessment criteria and feedback appeared meticulous and quite complex to them. Corruption in terms of enhancing grades is rampant in Bangladesh. Corruption in all sectors is well known because Bangladesh has been declared one of the most corrupt countries in the world (TI, 2014). However, corruption in the education sector is quite new. One implication is that this will create a culture, which will be unlikely to vanish in the future. Similar findings were reported by Meier (2004) in developing countries, Holzhacker et al. (2009) in Mongolia and Ukraine and Morley (2014) in Ghana and Tanzania. Furthermore, the majority of respondents did not make any comment on their instructors’ ability to explain things clearly, or on required office hours or effective communications. This is possibly because of the shortage of full-time academic staff in Bangladesh and because part-timers have less commitment toward maintaining office hours. Overall, there were 32.5% part-time instructors in 52 universities in 2012 (The UGC Annual Report, 2012).
Accountability of Academics (A2).
Macro Accountability
In this study, “macro accountability” is based on the two factors of Regulatory Framework (A3) and Government’s action (A4) in relation to private HEIs in Bangladesh. With respect to the regulatory framework, respondents were not divided in their opinions. Most of them expressed the view that the existing regulatory framework is not effectively implemented; 31.2% also doubted the existing regulatory framework (Figure 7). This could be due to the fact that the UGC is not active in enforcing the regulations; rather, it is a provider of policy prescription. The two relevant Acts (the Private University Act, 1992, Bangladesh, and the Private University Act, 2010, Bangladesh) regarding private HEIs both share a lack of guidelines and implementation measures. For instance, in 2004, according to “40-45 Varsities Way Behind Prerequisites” (2004), 40 to 45 out of 49 universities lacked compliance with regulations; in 2005, 50 universities were offering courses without approval from the UGC (“Eleven Private Universities Offer 50,” 2005) but notices were only given to six universities (“Ministry Serves Notice on Six Private Universities,” 2005). Related allegations were also raised in 2006 based on the announcement that 15 universities were advertising courses in daily newspapers without the UGC’s approval; unfortunately no action was taken against them (Illegal Courses, Mysterious Outer Campuses,”2006, “Private Universities Continue to Hoodwink UGC,”2006). Similar findings were reported by Amaral and Teixeira (2000) in Portugal and by Banya (2001) in sub-Saharan African countries. However, the findings of this present study contradict Levy (2013) who argued that heavy regulation will restrict the growth of private HEIs in developing countries. In the context of Bangladesh, the regulations are there, but lack sufficient enforcement.
Accountability of Regulatory Framework (A3).
Regarding the government’s action, 34.6% respondents were critical of the government’s role in privatizing HEIs in Bangladesh (Figure 8); 24.8% did not provide any comment. One possible reason for silence is that some respondents felt intimidated with regard to making any comments on the government in a developing country like Bangladesh. The current tendency of the government agencies (in particular, the UGC of Bangladesh, the Ministry of Education, and the Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education) is approval for new universities after accepting bribes and sometimes via political connections (M. Alam et al., 2007; “Private Univs Make Money at Education’s Cost,” 2014). As mentioned, the UGC of Bangladesh is the single statutory body responsible for external quality assurance in higher education in Bangladesh. The major functions of the UGC are to assess the needs of university education and formulate plans for its development; determine the financial needs of the universities; evaluate the educational programs of university teaching departments, institutes, and other constituent bodies; and to visit the universities as and when necessary to evaluate programs and assess their needs and requirements. However, the UGC has repeatedly been questioned over its inspection and supervision of universities since the inception of private universities in Bangladesh. The UGC has only 13 personnel and one of its members is responsible for supervision. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education has only seven staff who are responsible for the approval, auditing, supervision, and disciplinary action where necessary against private universities in the whole of Bangladesh (“‘Thieves’, Certificate Business and UGC’s Alarm,” 2014).
Accountability of Government’s action (A4).
According to TIB (2014), 29.6% of private universities are run by businessmen with strong political connections with the government. It was also found that during 2012-2013, most of the approved new universities’ owners were democratic government officials (the Awami League), such as relatives of the Prime Minister, the State Minister’s wife, the Whip of the Parliament, three Awami League leaders, a relative of an adviser to the Prime Minister, the Home Affairs Minister, the former Awami Students’ League (Chattra) President, an Awami League Advisory Council Member, an Awami League lawmaker, and the Minister and Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Education (“Seven New Private Univs Soon,” 2013). Allegations have been made regarding selling certificates (certificating businesses; “Certificate Business in Private Universities,” 2014), having no vice chancellors or faculties (“12 Universities Run With Unauthorized Staffs,” 2007; “Twenty Seven Private Varsities,” 2004), and having no compliance with current regulations. No corrupt universities have been shut down to date. Interestingly, the government denies the findings of the report of the TIB (2014), which also imply that the government has played a role in exerting corruption (“Prove Allegations or Apologise,” 2014; “TIB Report and State of Denial,” 2014). Prior research has also found that the government is lenient in overseeing the overall activities of private HEIs in developing countries (Collins & Rhoads, 2008 [Uganda and Thailand]; Holzhacker et al., 2009 [Mongolia]).
Moreover, 133 of the 1,046 (12.72%) respondents provided additional views on three of the accountability dimensions (Table 7). The majority of respondents were male and from large universities. None of them commented on the regulatory framework dimension. The majority (64.66%) commented on administration and management and 19.5% commented on the government’s role. In summary, these views highlighted the unhelpful nature of student advice, the misbehavior of admin staff, corruption in relation to student admission, the profit-making motives of management, the nepotism of some academics in grading, the political connectedness behind promoting low-graded universities, unequal grading policies across private universities, high tuition fees, and high student-to-teacher ratios. Corruption, unfair grading and profit-making issues were highlighted most often. Despite the high growth in the enrollments of private universities in recent years in Bangladesh, low numbers of foreign students have sought to study there due to the perceived low-quality assurance and lack of accountability (“International Students in Private Universities,” 2014; TIB 2014). The government’s Private University Act (2010) focused on quality assurance, the accreditation council, and research issues. As part of this process, the HEQEP was established to improve learning and research in the private HEIs (Ministry of Education, 2014).
Respondents’ Additional Views (n = 133).
Note. Respondents additional views characteristics: male = 89, female = 44; large university = 70, small and medium university = 63; Management and Administration: 86; Academics: 21; Government’s action: 26. UGC = University Grants Commission.
Conclusion
The study has investigated the accountability issues of private universities in a developing country, Bangladesh. In particular, the following questions were explored: What are the roles of the private HEIs in terms of accountability? What is the role of the regulators in privatizing HEIs? And, what are the major obstacles to bridging the accountability gap in private HEIs? An accountability framework (encompassing macro and micro accountability) was derived from the prior research (Huisman & Currie, 2004; Webb, 2011). Based on a survey (1,046 respondents from all 52 universities in Bangladesh) and documentary analysis, the study has revealed two interesting findings. First, the study is one of the first to explore the accountability gap in a developing country through research involving all private universities. Hence, the study contributes to the literature on the private of HEIs as to how accountable they are. Second, macro accountability (complexities in the regulatory framework, lack of enforcement, and governmental leniency toward quality control issues) is the most important contributing factor to the unsatisfactory consequences of the rapid growth of private HEIs in Bangladesh. Corruption (in terms of both macro and micro accountability) is rampant in Bangladeshi HEIs. For instance, corrupt practices in approving HEIs, corruption via enhancing grades through bribes, and the effects of political connectedness all contribute to an accountability gap. Continually corrupt practices and violation of regulations with impunity are part of a well-established culture over the last 22 years, raising a serious question on the accountability of the government and the regulator. In this regard, the study contradicts Levy (2013) who found that private HEIs were declining worldwide. In Bangladesh, the growth of private HEIs is not due to market demand or social justice but seemingly part of the government’s political agenda.
In addition, in common with prior studies in developing countries (G. M. Alam, 2009; Al-Samarrai, 2008; Amaral & Teixeira, 2000; Banya, 2001; Fielden & LaRocque, 2008; “High University Enrolment,” 2014; Holzhacker et al., 2009; Morley, 2014; Quddus & Rashid, 2000; TIB, 2014; The World Bank, 2008, 2014b), this study finds higher tuition fees, higher student–teacher ratios, unequal grading policies, a lack of clear assessment and feedback, a lack of universities with their own campus and full-time teaching staff, and a profit-motive mentality.
Although privatization is the most tangible manifestation of economic development and growth for developing countries required by the Washington Consensus (Battaglio, 2009; Cramer, 1999; Megginson, 2005), by the beginning of the 1990s the Washington Consensus was itself facing serious challenges. Gore (2000) argued that the main challenge to the Washington Consensus is the convergence between East Asian developmentalism and Latin American neostructuralism (p. 789). The Washington Consensus’s blanket demand for privatization is weak (Stiglitz, 1994). McCleery and De Paolis (2008) also opined, After guiding development policies for nearly 20 years, the Washington Consensus lies in shambles. Although selected components remain relevant for development policies around the world, some specifics of the broader policy package and, more generally, the concept of a standardized package of policies applicable to all developing countries have clearly been discredited. (p. 438)
The post-Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a; 1998b) has a concept of private unlike that reflected in structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s (Marangos, 2009). The key issues, including regulation and competition policy, are both seen as the preserve of the post-Washington Consensus state (Stiglitz, 1998a). The post-Washington Consensus recognizes that privatizations were often not well planned: “From today’s vantage point, the advocates of privatization may have overestimated the benefits and underestimated the costs” (Stiglitz, 1997a, p. 19). Öniş and Şenses (2005) also accepted that the post-Washington Consensus provides an improvement on the Washington Consensus (p. 263).
Yet, at the same time, the failure of the post-Washington Consensus is reflected in the findings of the current study. The present findings suggest that pervasive state failure with corruption in government is major areas of concern in the context of neoliberal reforms in a developing country like Bangladesh. It is inevitable that the World Bank’s influence on the education policies of developing countries has been characterized by strict loan conditionality. Their capacity to shape international policy making has grown enormously whereas the accountability of their projects simply has not: “The IMF or the World Bank were neither created nor structured to undertake or to be accountable for such far-reaching activities” (Woods, 2001, p. 89). This lack of accountability both of the government of a developing country and of the international donors undermines the dogmatic attachment to private as a developmental panacea in Bangladesh.
The paucity of the prior research means that important opportunities to contribute to the policy-making agenda in developing countries remain ready to be explored. These findings suggest policy implications for government, the World Bank, and the IMF. For instance, the need for more stringent enforcement and lower levels of corruption still must be addressed seriously by the state and the World Bank. If successful, this could assist local and international policymakers (The World Bank, the IMF, the ADB, and UNESCO) in applying this concept more effectively to HEIs in developing countries.
The study has some limitations. For example, a large number of respondents were reluctant to talk about the government’s role and stayed silent. The control variable has not been used for that. Although this is understandable in a developing country context, future research could be done on how to control undecided responses. The study did not explore donor agencies’ behavior toward the private of HEIs. There is scope for future research on how donor agencies’ funding is disseminated to private HEIs in developing countries and its effectiveness using a longitudinal study. Finally, the study has focused upon a developing country, but studying a group of countries may enrich the findings. There is need to extend the literature and integrate the current accountability framework comprising private HEIs of a group of developing countries so that the flux and transformability of accountability can be better illustrated. Nevertheless, the findings of the present study can be generalized in terms of the failure of the post-Washington Consensus on private HEIs in a developing country’s experience.
Footnotes
Appendix
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.