A City at War: Clashes,Devastations,and Survivals beyond the Battlefield in China during the War of Resistance against Japan

Indifference and Fears: The First Japanese Air Raid on Changsha

Leading up to the autumn of 1937, the residents of Changsha felt optimistic, believing it improbable that “the Japanese are meeting such remarkable resistance elsewhere, it seems very unlikely they will come here [Changsha].” ¹³ A journalist based in Changsha revealed his observations at that particular moment:

On many occasions, I passed by theaters where a significant crowd gathered to watch operas. I moved through the intricate and shadow-filled roads of Changsha, surrounded by people wearing coats and smoking, all appearing content. Changsha was in a state of peace and prosperity. People presented an air of seriousness and tranquility, replete with emotions of procrastination, repose, and pleasure. Contrary to the rear of the frontlines, Changsha emerged as a unique domain without war. ¹⁴

Therefore, when air-raid sirens started to sound throughout the city after July 1937, it caused anxiety among the residents. Changsha remained peaceful until November. Bombs were dropped by Japanese planes in Liling, Zhuzhou, and Hengyang, but Changsha seemed not to be their target. At 3 p.m. on November 24, 1937, Japan made its first bombing attack on Changsha. Three hundred civilians lost their lives. ¹⁵ Phillips Foster Greene, an American doctor at Changsha Xiang-Ya Hospital (also known as Hunan-Yale Medical School and Hospital), described his observations:

The day was sunny with light clouds. I was working in the office and heard a blast, realized the windows were shaking but did not think of bombs until the second one fell. I went to the roof with the flags as fast as I could. There was a great roaring of planes but all on the other side of a cloud bank. All four bombers seem to have been 250 pounders, all aimed at the railroad station. None hit it or the tracks, but one went into a hotel where a wedding was going on, the place packed. A second hit another hotel filled with down-river refugees–about 60 injured, 20 killed outright. The street there now is lined with coffins, some of the carved camphor wood, some the plain boards. ¹⁶

The first Japanese air raid on Changsha shattered the optimism of those who realized the war was approaching their city. Bombings also precipitated upheaval and dread in Changsha following which all stores and dining establishments were shut and citizens made haste to the countryside to evade aerial bombardments during the diurnal period. Changsha was situated in the Great Rear before the first aerial assault. This implied a feeling of peace at a distance from the frontline. As expected, the city was not exempt from the war however, and people had to cope with the constant threat of Japanese bombings.

Lin Huiyin, an acclaimed poet in China, described her personal experience during the air raid:

During the first Japanese air raid on Changsha, our house was nearly struck, as a bomb landed just 15 yards away from where we were staying. . . No one knows how we were not shattered into pieces. Hearing the dreadful cracking noise and the initial two explosions in the distance, we went downstairs, and our house was instantaneously obliterated. ¹⁷

Liang Zaibing, the son of Lin, also remembered the family’s experience during the air raid:

We were not harmed . . . after we fled to the road the planes could be heard diving again. With no experience of war, we were clueless about the necessity of lying down for safety. The whole family just stood there, but the bombs did not explode. ¹⁸

The Japanese capture of Nanjing (the capital city of China before the war) in the late autumn of 1937 deepened the despair among the people of Changsha. The old streets widened during the ten years of redevelopment before the war, were not equipped to manage the large influx of refugees. This in conjunction with threats from the sky, triggered a mass exodus in Changsha during which “all schools are not open, the seniors go to the countryside to show the farmers guerrilla warfare, and the roads are filled with rickshas and wheelbarrows full of precious items.” ¹⁹

Bombings from the air had continued without interruption since 1938, resulting in extensive damage in many areas of Changsha including the National University of Hunan. The atmosphere in Changsha turned tense and unstable. Nevertheless, owing to repeated air raids and the influx of refugees from the east coast of China, people there attained a profound comprehension of the war and deepened their concern about the likelihood of a Japanese incursion into Changsha. They saw undergoing air bombings were a more acceptable option in contrast to enduring the Japanese presence in Changsha since there was no need to be compelled to leave their homes like those refugees. But this created a lot of difficulties for evacuations led by local authorities, which I further discuss later.

An Unsafe City: The Air-Defense Shelter Problem in Changsha

Changsha was at risk because its air-defense system was insufficient. If an air raid had happened, 400,000 Changsha citizens would have had no access to air-defense shelters and would have been left without a place to seek safety. ²⁰ When air-raid sirens sounded, wealthy families quickly went to the homemade underground shelters near their homes. The municipal government allegedly used over 100,000 yuan of air-defense levies to dig bomb shelters and purchase anti-aircraft artillery which could arrive in Changsha in at least three months. ²¹ There was huge terror and horror among people toward air raids also because the city lacked a proper air-defense network. A war correspondent in Changsha captured how the people there reacted when they were suddenly faced with an air raid and its catastrophic aftermath:

By mid-December 1937, Japanese planes appeared over Changsha, but the city received no warning of an air raid. Instead of attacking the train station, the Japanese chose to bomb two adjacent hotels. A birthday party was held by one family as another family attended a wedding, but the bombing claimed many lives due to poor precautionary measures. ²²

Changsha faced numerous challenges in building underground shelters. Wealthy families donated money to purchase a large volume of wood and concrete materials for shelter construction but underground water remained an issue. No matter how deep they dug, water encompassed the entire structure and resembled a well, making it impractical to pay such a high remuneration of 200 yuan in Changsha for workers to dig shelters. ²³ In the 1930s, the Changsha municipality had a dilemma regarding underground water due to the presence of granite which complicated and increased the expenses of construction projects. ²⁴ Air-defense shelters were crucial in saving lives while providing a sense of safety and reassurance to people during air raids. ²⁵ The total active shelters in Chongqing, including both public and private ones, reached 1,823 by November 1943 with a total capacity of 444,968. ²⁶ Chongqing possessed the highest number of bomb shelters during wartime in China and globally, which benefited from its mountainous terrain that was well-suited for shelter construction. ²⁷ When juxtaposed with the bombings that ravaged London, Berlin, and Tokyo in WWII, bombings in Chongqing, despite causing fewer casualties, persisted for the longest period ever recorded worldwide. ²⁸

Bombardment of Japanese planes in 1937 and 1938 left Changsha citizens feeling frustrated, insecure, and agitated because of a lack of shelters. It was not until 1940 that Changsha saw the construction of just fifty-five air-raid shelters, while Hengyang, another Hunanese city in the south, possessed 1,207 shelters. ²⁹ 1941 witnessed seventeen bombing raids over Changsha, with 481 bombs being dropped, which resulted in 455 deaths and 738 injuries; Hengyang experienced twenty air raids that dropped 738 bombs, leading to 238 deaths and 279 injuries however. Discrepancies in air raid fatalities in 1941 Hengyang and Changsha proved that Changsha was not equipped to defend against air raids. Yet, by June 1942, the number of shelters had increased to 928, encompassing those within Changsha County. ³⁰

Insufficient understanding of air defense also contributed to civilian fatalities in Changsha during 1937 and 1938, as people, much like Lin Huiyin and her families, were clueless about how to defend themselves from air attacks. Evidence of this was presented as many people sighted planes and incorrectly assumed they were part of the Chinese air forces, showcasing their limited awareness of air warfare. Bombs left no chance for escape because both above-ground and below-ground shelters were hard to find in Changsha then. The city was bombarded from the air multiple times by February 1938. People’s responses were still naive and full of fear, but they instinctively fled instead of staying to watch planes in the sky. Gatherings started to disband once the wails of air-defense sirens sounded. Traders and vendors who typically operated out of stores shut their doors, while those who were used to leisurely walks hurried to a faster jog. ³¹ Wealthy women and madams, who were thoroughly terrified, were being transported in motor vehicles that emitted deafening honks. ³² As military vehicles accelerated along the streets, rickshaw pullers were forced to discharge their passengers, who visibly trembled yet were powerless to act.

It was the final days of students and faculty presence at the National Changsha Provisional University (Guoli linshi Changsha Daxue). Warning sirens forced students and faculty to break off their classes and retreat to the underground areas on the campus. Several teenage pupils skilled in running positioned themselves at the doorway to observe the sky, anticipating a possible aerial battle. Most students and teachers chose to stay indoors and engage in dialogue with other people:

Am I correct in conjecturing that the sirens will be sounded on days with sunshine? Fortunately, Changsha is regularly foggy, which otherwise would have hindered us from traversing the river [the Xiang River] to elude the onslaught. Two days from now, we will be heading to the countryside to impart knowledge to the villagers. Our institute is transitioning to Yunnan, would you like to join us? Unfortunately, I shall not. ³³

Talks between students and their teachers demonstrated that people started to realize Japanese planes were absent on rainy or foggy days. They had a better understanding of air raids. This helped protect people from bombs. Somber days shrouded in fog and rain had gone by. In early spring 1938 persistent sunniness inspired the air-raid sirens of Changsha to sound more often. Only being able to hear sirens without any visual proof of Japanese aircraft was tiresome. ³⁴ Changsha appeared to be habituated to the likelihood that Japanese airplanes would not come.

After the fall of Shanghai in 1937, a family moved to Changsha and documented their first experience with a bombing:

On February 9 at noon [1938], customary sirens sounded but with a heightened urgency. We had been engaged in needlework at home that day and did not take it seriously. Loud blasts suddenly shook the windows, causing them to rattle and tremble. . . We realized an aerial attack was coming and quickly went downstairs. We were all remiss in using nearby shelters, though it had already become too late. ³⁵

It was a novel experience for them to be beneath an aerial bombardment, dissimilar from observing air battles in the Shanghai concession. Their responses to the air raid bore a resemblance to Lin Huiyin and her family, because of their inexperience with war. Two weeks later, on February 17, air-defense sirens blared once again. Having been through a similar situation before, the Shanghai family wasted no time in heading to nearby barnyards for protection. ³⁶ The next morning, loud sirens woke everyone up, and many rushed to the shelters to stay safe. After that event, whenever the sirens wailed, the city dwellers were constantly edgy and dispersed chaotically. Even with some bits of knowledge of air raids, Changsha residents remained anxious about potential air attacks. Many times, alarm sirens did not signal the presence of Japanese planes; therefore, the populace had overlooked fleeing, resulting in fatalities. But the people of Changsha had become aware of the looming danger posed by air raids and had learned to take steps to shield themselves from Japanese bombardment.

Yuelu Mountain Burning Up: Airstrikes Hit the National University of Hunan

The Japanese did not give Changsha any respite; instead, they caused destructive chaos on Yuelu Mountain, nearly destroying the National University of Hunan which was engulfed in flames between 2:20 p.m. and 2:40 p.m. on April 10, 1938, leaving a lasting memory for the younger wartime generation. ³⁷ Before the aerial attack, the atmosphere was serene, and there were no signs of a calamity that would ensue. Seeking a break from their routine campus lives, teachers and students of the university crossed the tranquil Xiang River to indulge in city life in downtown Changsha. Weekends were a common time for urban residents to escape the hustle and bustle of the city and industrial districts. They wanted to use their free time during the week to connect with friends, take in the river view from the mountain, and simply enjoy the pleasant spring season. ³⁸ The campus was eerily quiet. This was in stark contrast to the bustling hills and valleys of Yuelu Mountain filled with crowds and noise.

A sudden blaring of air-raid sirens across the river sparked fear and dread among the mountain region, signaling impending bombings. White clouds above seemed to speed up as if trying to escape the people below. ³⁹ Twenty-seven Japanese planes were spotted, but the anti-aircraft artillery was powerless against those at elevated heights. Visible effects of bombs were evident: the mountain was rocked, the white smoke of the anti-aircraft guns was ascending, and the ground was anointed with blood. ⁴⁰ Instant destruction was caused to the library, a factory, student housing, and other structures by a series of incendiary bomb explosions. After fifty minutes, the siren was turned off. Some individuals came out of earthen holes and seemed to have suffered a loss of their ability to hear. ⁴¹ Ambulance service members rescued and transported those in need to medical facilities. Firefighters contained the fire which had spread to the library and other buildings. There were not many casualties because students left the campus for Changsha. Two students and one laborer lost their lives, and around ten students sustained significant injuries requiring hospital treatment. ⁴²

The campus was left in ruins after 140 bombs exploded nearly, with the library heavily damaged by the bombing, suffering a significant loss of its extensive collection because of fire. It was reported that the air raid caused the university to lose resources valued at more than two million yuan and destroyed over 50,000 books. ⁴³ The library had collected 69,010 books amounting to 120,000 yuan in March 1937. ⁴⁴ Barring a small amount that was removed before the air raid, most of the collections were destroyed. After moving to Chenxi, a county in West Hunan, the library recovered its holdings of 30,000 books (only half of its previous book collection before the air raid) by purchasing new and used books and soliciting contributions from the society. ⁴⁵ Until 1942, the library held onto 58,304 volumes. ⁴⁶

Students from Hunan took great pride in the National University of Hunan, esteemed for its historical and cultural legacy, a successor to Yuelu Academy (Yuelu shuyuan), one of the four academies of classical learning in the Song Dynasty. Thus, the university represented important symbolism for Changsha and Hunan, especially for local intellectuals and students. ⁴⁷ The Japanese bombing of the university provoked a surge of younger students engaging in the province-wide peasant training program led by the government to equip peasants with both military skills and resistance awareness. Since 1938, the provincial government had mobilized over 3,000 Hunanese students (high school, college, and university students) to the countryside. Before 1939, when Hunan became a focal point of warfare in China, young students constituted the primary cohort that the Nationalists (Kuomintang, KMT) depended on for orchestrating large-scale mobilization efforts in the countryside across the province. Rural mobilization in Hunan contributed to military-civilian cooperation, which was crucial for the Chinese victory against a Japanese attack on Changsha in early 1942 (Plate 1).

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Plate 1.

National University of Hunan Library. ⁴⁸

From Desperation to Normalcy: The Most Catastrophic Bombing in Changsha, “817 Air Raid”

Since the outbreak of the war on several occasions air-defense sirens were activated without any Japanese planes being seen in Changsha’s sky. Changsha experienced a short respite after the bombing of Yuelu Mountain. Some observed that the pampered sons of wealthy or influential families and dignitaries were seemingly unaware of the war that their nation was embroiled in. ⁴⁹ As the war spread across China, the Japanese began targeting cities in the Great Rear with air raids to weaken the spirits of both the Chinese troops and civilians. The year 1938 saw thirty-six aerial assaults and 466 planes targeting Changsha, making it the most heavily bombed city in Hunan. ⁵⁰ A sudden bombing in Yueyang (150 kilometers north of Changsha) was a shock to Changsha residents who had reasons to expect another air raid on their city in the not-too-distant future.

Another merciless air assault descended upon the city on July 23, 1938. After alarms were heard, an emergency alert was activated seventeen minutes later while Buddhist monks in temples began chanting the sutras as a plea for Changsha. ⁵¹ Many people climbed onto the roofs of their homes to see what would appear in the sky. They seemed to dismiss the risk of looking up while the sirens were sounding. At 11 a.m., the sound of Japanese planes was heard approaching from the north. This disrupted the peaceful atmosphere of Changsha on a sunny day. Taking cover in the clouds, the Japanese stayed undetected and avoided being targeted by anti-aircraft guns. ⁵²

Both Liuyang Gate and the train station located in northern Changsha were targeted, which was witnessed and recorded by a reporter:

When we prepared to leave our house, bombs went off in nearby streets. The building we were in was violently trembling. My companion was petrified and could not move his legs. Another explosion could be heard from a surrounding area as we departed. . .air defense sirens stopped sounding after 49 minutes. ⁵³

The intense heat of summer made it nearly impossible to extinguish the fire which caused significant damage to thirty buildings. People watched the burning houses from a distance because of the ongoing flames. Changsha was filled with sadness and despair, in which families were tirelessly searching for each other and children were desperately calling for their parents. ⁵⁴ The municipality started evacuating people. Those who relied on the city for their survival and were paid low wages could not leave. Leaving Changsha resulted in them losing jobs. The presence of the group of people caused numerous challenges for the Changsha evacuations.

Bombs rained down on Liuzheng Street. A shop that dealt in goods from South China experienced major losses. Approximately thirty people, including employees and the shop’s families, scrambled to a shelter they had built for safety. The shelter was in ruins, and only a young girl was rescued but succumbed to her injuries on the way to the hospital. ⁵⁵ Blaring sirens accompanied by a traffic control halted pedestrian movement, forcing those in a food market to stay inside, with only a few able to leave and survive the bombing. ⁵⁶ On August 7, an air raid destroyed over 100 business stores. A large section of the main downtown road was destroyed, with fire and corpses scattered throughout. About 200 people died. When air-raid sirens sounded the next morning, tumult and chaos broke out on the streets and engulfed the entire city. Although a false alarm, a chaotic aftermath caused multiple fatalities from car collisions. ⁵⁷

The most catastrophic air bombing took place at 10:05 a.m. on August 17. According to reports, eighteen Japanese aircraft retreated from South Hunan and released over 120 bombs in twenty locations in Changsha. More than 200 people died, with sustaining injuries exceeding 500 and 300 building destruction. ⁵⁸ Liang Cilong, a witness of the air raid, remembered that many people who heavily relied on living in Changsha had to choose to leave there after this air raid. ⁵⁹ Liang and his family, too, left Changsha in October of that year, heading to the countryside as a part of a planned evacuation led by local authorities. Another survivor, Chen Sandie, recalled the air raid:

As Japanese airplanes arrived, bombs cascaded down like rainfall, saturating the river, pond and fields with lifeless bodies. Observations of many corpses with only one foot or one hand. My mother pregnant at the time, was at the pond washing clothes when an explosion caused her mouth to be blown off. A lack of money for treatment caused her mouth to regrow in a misshapen manner. ⁶⁰

Changsha residents were terrified by Japanese aerial raids on the city; however, they also learned that living in the Great Rear was no different from living in any other area of the country. Battlefields had expanded to encompass more than half of Hunan by the end of 1938. Aerial bombardments persisted without respite in the city, which was targeted by the Allies in 1944, when the city was occupied by the Japanese. I argue that Changsha citizens and the Hunanese had shown that they were adjusting to living with air raids for the following reasons. First, casualties were reduced after 1938, before which, on average, the Japanese dropped a bomb that killed one person in Hunan. ⁶¹ But from January to June of 1939, one bomb was no longer enough to kill one. ⁶² And even two bombs could not claim a single victim after July 1939. ⁶³ In 1938 and 1939, the entire province was bombarded by the Japanese with 8,141 and 8,155 bombs, respectively, yet casualties in 1939 were 581 fewer than the figure in 1938. ⁶⁴ In 1940 and 1941, Hunan was hit with 3,941 and 4,743 bombs, respectively, resulting in comparable casualties (1940 saw 111 fewer casualties than 1941). ⁶⁵

Second, the initial terror of air raids since 1937 vanished among the people, especially after learning that Japanese bombers targeted cities and transportation centers. According to the provincial government’s statistics, 1939 in Hunan saw a significant increase in building destruction, reaching a total of 13,482, which was twice the amount in the preceding and succeeding years. ⁶⁶ The provincial government also released twenty documents, now collected in the Hunan Archives, from 1937 to early 1941 about Japanese bombings of cities in Hunan. These documents showed that after 1939, Japanese air raids targeted transportation pathways, stations, and industrial factories. ⁶⁷ Tan Gang argues that while the bombings instilled terror and continual unease, the situation did not deteriorate, and the Chongqing residents did not undergo psychological collapse, contrary to expectations of Japan, showing a gradual increase in calmness, strength, and bravery following a series of bombings. ⁶⁸ In the same manner, Changsha residents accustomed themselves to living under the threat of aerial bombardment, leaving when air raids took place and returning when they concluded, a circumstance that had become an ordinary occurrence. A situation in 1943 in Changsha is a good example, according to which:

At 7 am one day in the early summer of 1943, when the sun was shining, the adjacent street shops all closed their doors, hardly seeing any pedestrians. The day that followed saw the sky darken in Changsha, and it soon began raining heavily, creating a feeling of security among its citizens. After the outbreak of the war, clouds were a source of relief for the Changsha people, assuring that Japanese planes would not appear and that air defense sirens would stay silent. Following the all-clear siren, the streets of the city began to be inundated with large, boisterous crowds, which resounded with a cacophony of sounds, such as the clamor of voices, the toll of peddlers’ gongs, car horns, rickshaw bells, and people’s jubilant cheers. A lively cohort of modern women clothed in fashionable shorts and stylish gowns was present. ⁶⁹

This further reveals that 1943 saw a normalization of war-related fears and anxieties among the residents of Changsha, shaping their day-to-day experiences. A dreadful and chaotic situation that took place during Japanese air raids in Changsha at the start of the war dissipated. There was a change in the city, with a prevailing sense of order and stability. Wartime Changsha gradually showed signs of returning to normal, in part due to large-scale, government-led evacuations.

Leaving and Returning to the City: Air-Raid Evacuations as a Provisional Solution

To avert casualties and mitigate the consequences of Japanese air raids on Changsha, both provincial and municipal authorities issued decrees to orchestrate wide-scale evacuations of the city after 1937. Facing difficulties with the construction of air-raid shelters in Changsha, evacuating residents appeared to be the most viable option for protecting people from bombings. Completing evacuations in Changsha before 1939 was particularly challenging in part because of the absence of effective plans. Changsha residents also showed an attitude of “not giving a damn about” air strikes and grew accustomed to disregarding government warnings to move to the countryside. ⁷⁰

Demonstrating the immense destructive capability of bombs, a series of Japanese aerial raids in 1938 compelled people to flee to save themselves quickly. Streets in Changsha filled with people of all ages and genders once air-defense alerts sounded. Almost everyone brought a basket, bag, or suitcase as they fled the city. This particular exodus of individuals might endure for an entire day and night. ⁷¹ It was not uncommon for Japanese planes to be spotted in the Changsha sky before 10 a.m. People soon realized the dangers of conducting business and working in the morning as they encountered these situations more regularly. ⁷² Chaos broke out on the streets as soon as sirens went off. People heading toward the city center abruptly changed direction, while those heading away quickened their steps. Changsha was soon swarmed with different types of transportation, comprising four-wheelers, motor coaches, lorries, and rickshaws (human-powered transport). Many buses and coaches were overcrowded with people. Some firmly grasped onto an iron bar or screw attached to the bus’s sides and back. ⁷³ Urgent alarms prompted shopkeepers, who were the last to vacate due to store closures, to hasten their exit.

Chaotic situations before air raids in Changsha proved that the government had not taken immediate action to maintain order on the streets. Evacuations were disorderly, and government staff and guards were inexperienced in fulfilling their duties. Gendarmes would only take action to maintain order on the streets when they heard urgent alarms followed by air-raid sirens sounded. Thereafter, civil defense groups (fanghutuan), policemen, and the peace preservation corps joined to help people either enter defensive shelters or keep on evacuating. ⁷⁴ Their tardy actions were in part because Japanese airplanes sometimes did not come even though the sounding of sirens. This left them uncertain about their duties. Disorganized evacuations were exemplified by issues with the Xiang River ferry. Finding a safe place in western Changsha required crossing the river into the rural area. Every dawn many people carted their luggage to use ferries. It would have been prudent for local authorities to have marshaled and regulated extra ferries on the river as part of their emergency evacuation protocol. Unfortunately, this was not the case. High demand for ferry rides operated by businessmen caused the price of the ferry rides to skyrocket within a couple of days from 0.01 yuan to 0.6 or 0.7 yuan per person. ⁷⁵ People were only able to purchase affordable tickets again after the Changsha Garrison Headquarters officially declared that intentional price increases were going to be considered acts of robbery and theft. ⁷⁶

Difficulties Encountered in Air-Raid Evacuation

A primary purpose of air-raid evacuation was to minimize the number of people in Changsha during a Japanese air bombardment. Local authorities seemed to have contrived a long-term program to transfer more of the population to inner Hunanese counties or provinces in China’s Great Rear but encountered considerable obstacles, therefore. After the war began and Nanjing fell in late 1937, a huge influx of individuals from provinces east of Wuhan made their way to Changsha. By 1929, Changsha had a population of 310,000, which surged to almost 400,000 before the war, peaking at one million by late 1937, then dropping to 300,000 by October 1938. ⁷⁷ According to the Changsha Police Station’s records, the population in June 1938 was 510,000 people, excluding refugees following numerous evacuations. ⁷⁸ Yet this number might be lower than the actual figure; rumors rose that Changsha was home to around 800,000 people. ⁷⁹ The high population created a substantial difficulty for the government in minimizing harm to personnel during air bombardments. A challenge for municipal officials was quickly and safely moving the large population.

Another difficulty was that different people within Changsha possessed disparate perceptions regarding evacuations. Injured soldiers, refugees, and residents were three distinct groups of people who comprised the focus of the government’s evacuation program. By 1938, over 15,000 injured soldiers had been transported to Changsha, in which the municipality established a management office for treating wounded soldiers. ⁸⁰ Soldiers with healed minor injuries were sent back to the frontlines. Aerial bombardment in Changsha made it difficult for seriously injured soldiers to evacuate rapidly.

A non-stop influx of refugees made their way to Changsha becoming another cohort that the government had to move. Over 1,000 people who had been relocated returned to Changsha. ⁸¹ Convincing refugees to evacuate was a laborious process, particularly for those who came from East China with successful businesses and were reluctant to leave Changsha or move to the countryside. Wealthy refugees and job-seeking scholars in Changsha were not as eager to live in rural areas or less-developed counties. ⁸² Poor refugees relying on selling newspapers or government support faced insecurities when they relocated as they were unable to find work or receive government aid. ⁸³

Changsha residents were the main group to be evacuated. After the bombing of Changsha by Japan in 1937, the government took steps to organize residents to evacuate. The rising number of refugees from the eastern Chinese coasts to Changsha made locals feel that the city was a place of safety. ⁸⁴ Therefore, many of those evacuated to the countryside returned to Changsha. More people actively participated in evacuations during air strikes, but they were expected to return to the city shortly after staying in nearby rural areas. A strategic evacuation plan was created by the government to keep a smaller population in Changsha. This was different from people’s anticipation.

Changsha residents realized the possibility of a Japanese incursion into their city as the war advanced toward the Yangtze River Valley. In October 1938, the largest evacuation in Changsha occurred since the war began. More people left the city after the Mid-Autumn Festival that year. Schools were relocated to the west and south of Hunan, stores were closed down, and business activities ceased. Some affluent families in Changsha erected firewalls to safeguard their homes and belongings before departing. ⁸⁵ In addition, Japanese aerial bombardments, particularly the notorious “817 Air Raid,” pressured people who had relied on Changsha for their livelihoods to leave the city behind in a desperate attempt to find safety. The evacuation this time was a success, as 90 percent of the city’s residents left before a disastrous fire in November. ⁸⁶ The 1938 Great Fire in Changsha, known as wenxi dahuo, is considered the most significant incident in the city’s wartime history. Over five days, the Nationalists orchestrated a fire that wiped out most business spaces (85%) and dwellings (70%). ⁸⁷ The American doctor Greene wrote about the exodus of individuals from Changsha between October 26 and November 1, 1938:

There were a lot of fears among people living in the city. A week later the entire city was leaving by boat, trains, buses, rickshas, and wheelbarrows. The people in town are moving out furiously, buying everything they can. You never saw more business going on in the days before China New Year—this, in spite of the air raids . . . By November 11, only a small fraction of the city’s half-million population remained. ⁸⁸

In 1939, the provincial government published the “Regulations for evacuating resource towns and cities in Hunan Province to avert enemy aircraft bombings (Hunan sheng fangfan diji hongzha ziyuan chengzhen shusan banfa),” according to which over thirty-five key counties, including Changsha, across the province, should organize proper evacuations. ⁸⁹ The regulations also ordered each important county, considering local communication conditions and the distance from the battlefields, to set monthly closing hours across the county, during which time both military and civilians must evacuate to safe areas. ⁹⁰ Most of the counties completed these tasks. To facilitate ongoing production and ensure peaceful living situations for the population following evacuation, the regulations mandated the establishment of new settlements located ten kilometers from urban areas. ⁹¹ Economic challenges led to a situation where only a limited number of counties adhered to this regulation, however. ⁹²

Because of Japanese air raids and evacuations that set monthly closing hours for Hunanese counties including Changsha, many populations of the Hunanese experienced a reduction in their working hours, which meant less income to feed their families during the war. Between May and August 1941, Hunan Tongsu Daily (Hunan tongsu ribao) staff members earned monthly salaries ranging from 40 to 140 yuan and benefited from a 10- or 15-yuan rice allowance. ⁹³ Therefore, the newspaper staff had a satisfactory year thanks to generous salaries and a bonus for rice. Every employee, however, received their wages daily and their monthly incomes were based on the number of days they worked that month. A distribution employee, for example, earned 50 yuan each month as a regular income. A salary register of the Tongsu Daily in June 1941 showed that a distribution employee who worked only eleven days earned 18.37 yuan and a 5.5-yuan rice allowance. ⁹⁴ This person earned below one yuan per day. Notably two battles occurred in Changsha in 1941, one starting in mid-September and lasting until October and the other beginning at the end of December and extending into early 1942. Seventeen air raids took place in the city that year. ⁹⁵ As full-scale combat erupted near the city, the evacuation of civilians was mandated, a point to be addressed next. People had to accept a decline in their incomes due to fewer working hours for that particular year.

After experiencing early disorder, both the Hunan provincial and Changsha municipal governments accomplished their evacuation initiative to forestall additional fatalities from Japanese air raids and the 1938 Great Fire. They also accumulated experiences invaluable in coordinating future evacuations after 1939, when the city faced Japanese invasions (Plate 2).

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Plate 2.

Hospital for wounded soldiers in Changsha. ⁹⁶

Evacuations before the Battles of Changsha ⁹⁷

Apart from air-raid evacuations, the government also cleared out Changsha as an approach to supporting the military after 1939. Following the Japanese attack on Nanchang in April 1939, another evacuation began in Changsha. Greene jotted down his observations:

On April 18, the government started to blow up buildings. The railway machine shops went up one after the other. Nothing remains between here and Yochow [Yueyang], of bridges, rails, or ties. Even the railway stations have been demolished and the building material carried away. They were leaving not one stone on another for the Japanese to possess. ⁹⁸

Greene’s observations indicated that the frequency of comparable evacuations would escalate when Changsha turned into a site of conflict between China and Japan.

After the fire, residents gradually returned to Changsha, yet the population remained under 50,000. By May and June of 1939, the population had increased to 200,000 and 300,000. ⁹⁹ Between 1939 and 1942, the population of Changsha remained consistent with its pre-war numbers. ¹⁰⁰ After the April 1939 evacuation, Changsha went through a tranquil period characterized by beautiful roses, fresh lettuce, a spacious home, plentiful food, and a peaceful atmosphere. ¹⁰¹ Peace was fleeting as the prospect of war soon loomed over Changsha, however.

From 1939 to 1942, China and Japan engaged in strategic tug-of-war conflicts surrounding Changsha. When the first Japanese operation in North Changsha (Xiangbei) ¹⁰² in the autumn of 1939, preparations for a citywide evacuation were made. By September 25, 1939, the battle was nearing the outskirts of Changsha and the Hunan People’s Self-Defense Force aided in the evacuation to ensure a smooth and orderly evacuation. Greene recorded on the night of September 24 the following: “The police woke everyone up about three times saying everyone must leave as the city would be fired. The whole night and the next day people were rushing their belongings out of the city.” ¹⁰³ On September 28, Changsha was “pretty well emptied.” ¹⁰⁴ This time, the local governments demonstrated greater proficiency in both marshaling evacuees and securing essential resources.

Different from their responses to Japanese bombings in 1938, residents were more prepared to evacuate. Having faced several harrowing air raids and a catastrophic fire, more people believed that complying with the government evacuation was a wise means of survival. Changsha saw a sharp decrease in its population by two-thirds within a mere three days after the announcement to evacuate. ¹⁰⁵ For those inhabitants who returned to the city and resumed their lives after the fire, it entailed another exodus from their homes. No one wanted to leave. A reporter captured the sentiments of those who remained in the city on the eve of the evacuation:

All stores and shops were once again shuttered. Most people donned grass-green attire to evade detection from Japanese aircraft flying in the air. There were heartfelt goodbyes as people left the city with many hoping that it would not be the last time they would see Changsha. As evening fell the crowd headed towards the Xiang River. Essential materials for the transfer were found there, and residents facilitated ferry transport. Suddenly the murmur of mortar fire was faintly heard from the north. At that very moment people stared at Changsha under the moonlight, their parting glance at the city. Verbalization could not convey their thoughts and feelings as there was no way of predicting when they would be returning to Changsha. ¹⁰⁶

The Japanese did not set foot in Changsha in 1939. Two years later, in the fall of 1941, they launched another attempt to invade Changsha. A small group of Japanese troops entered the city but quickly withdrew. The Japanese military banned firing on civilian houses, which resulted in no trace of their occupation of the city. The perception among many was that the battle culminated in a Chinese success, as they discovered their homes to be unharmed and in good condition upon their return. The Chinese military in Changsha suffered a defeat but utilized all of its publicity apparatus to extensively promote the “Big Victory (dajie)” through writings circulating in newspapers and journals after the battle. This boosted the populace’s reliance on which the government and the military could fend off the Japanese invasion of the city. A vernacular of Changsha, bu de qingchang, was employed to signify meeting challenging situations. ¹⁰⁷ Once the second battle was over, people modified this slang into a completely different one, bu de qin Chang, to convey that the Japanese could not invade Changsha. ¹⁰⁸ The change in popular slang revealed the shifting public sentiment in Changsha. It captured a transformation from their confusion early in the war to a more determined attitude as it unfolded.

Residents were compelled to leave on December 22, 1941, just two months after the last battle, yet they grew more optimistic about the city’s fate. In advance of the Third Battle of Changsha, the municipality employed two new approaches labeled Guided Evacuation (zhidao shusan) and Protective Evacuation (baohu shusan). The first step involved assigning staff to teach and persuade every household about the need to prioritize transporting seniors and children. ¹⁰⁹ Next was the government to urge and instruct guilds representing different trades to aid in moving important materials and products away from Changsha. ¹¹⁰ On December 30, the evacuation was finished within the stipulated one-week duration, one day before the Japanese attack on Changsha.

The government-led evacuation in 1939 was manageable, yet the requirement to wrap up in three days introduced a level of pressure. In September 1941, the plan to evacuate was hindered by the swift breakdown of the military at the front. After two months, the municipality improved its handling of the situation, in which the government enlisted more social organizations (such as guilds in Changsha) to help with the evacuation. Their performances were successful in achieving their goals of saving lives and mitigating damage. A high level of cooperation between Changsha locals and authorities was reflected in evacuations. This benefited from good cooperation between the army and civilians established after 1938 in Hunan.

Conclusion

The years 1937 and 1938 saw a rise in panic among the residents of Changsha as a result of Japanese air raids on the city. The existence of air-raid shelters in a city was key in saving lives and instilling a feeling of safety among the population. But constructing shelters in Changsha proved to be challenging, resulting in a lower number of shelters than in other cities in Hunan such as Hengyang. Despite challenges brought on by bombings, Changsha citizens demonstrated their remarkable adaptability in living in their damaged city. The number of people killed in air raids decreased after 1939. They had grown accustomed to adapting to a new wartime normalcy − coexisting with Japanese aircraft in their daily lives. In light of the scarcity of shelters in the city, Changsha residents actively joined in evacuations organized by local authorities. It was perhaps the most viable way to prevent them from being killed by Japanese airplanes. As a component of their defensive strategy in Changsha, the Nationalists actively carried out evacuations to protect civilians from Japanese air raids and attacks and to hinder the enemy from acquiring any war resources in the event of a potential occupation of the city. The start of the war was initially met with shock and disbelief but gradually transformed into a grave acknowledgment of the circumstances among people in Changsha. An impressive metamorphosis took place in Changsha bringing about a sense of order and harmony. The streets of the city were once riddled with chaos and destruction but exuded a semblance of normalcy.

Residents of Changsha encountered air-raid experiences that were distinct from those in many other Chinese cities and worldwide. In cities like Chongqing and internationally, including London during the Blitz from 1940 to 1941, people still engaged in recreational activities that became a vital part of shelter life. People in wartime Changsha developed a sophisticated understanding of Japanese air bombings, particularly as they discerned that Japanese bombers more frequently targeted vital sites such as industrial facilities and transport networks. This cut down on bombing-related deaths. The years from 1938 to 1942 saw Changsha subjected to several offensives by the Japanese. People began to evacuate more frequently driven by the need to flee both from air raids and from the ground invasions of the Japanese. Leaving their homes led to intricate emotional responses among the crowd of Changsha who grappled with the unpredictability of when they might be able to return to the city under the Japanese attack in the fall of 1939. The ongoing cycle of leaving and returning to Changsha had evolved into a distinctive shared memory among the populace during the war, representing a broader understanding of their experiences of conflict that extends far beyond the mere events of air raids or evacuations. Geographical settings significantly impacted people’s reactions to the war, which in turn fostered diverse emotional responses and feelings among them. Examining the varied experiences of the Japanese invasion across different locations enriches our knowledge of the impact of the war on Chinese society. The case of Changsha reveals a notable difference in how its citizens reacted to the war, setting it apart from the responses seen in other Chinese cities during the war.