Militarization as Personal Cultivation: Student Military Training in Guomindang China,1928–1937

The Making of Citizen-Soldiers in Early Twentieth-Century China

Trained as an army officer in Japan before the 1911 Revolution and appointed the first commandant of Whampoa Military Academy by Sun Yat-sen in 1924, Chiang Kai-shek firmly believed in the reformatory power of military training in cultivating good citizens and rectifying social mores (Chiang, 1989: 65–66). However, the fetishization of a militarized Chinese national body began much earlier than the rise of Chiang in GMD politics. Following Qing China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Chinese nationalist elites such as Cai E 蔡鍔 (1882–1916) and Liang Qichao 梁啟超 embraced the “citizen-soldier” as an ideal form of modern Chinese citizenship and advocated for “civic militarism” 軍國民主義: the cultivation of soldierly knowledge, spirit, and capability among civilians (Fenhesheng, 1902; Liang, 1903). In 1906, the Qing’s newly established Ministry of Education declared the “upholding of martial virtues” 尚武 one of its five policy goals (Chyu, 1984: 37). Even after the fall of the Qing, civic-military education remained one of the chief objectives of Republican education officials such as Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940) (Cai, 1987: 5).

The conclusion of the First World War in 1918 and the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 marked the emergence of pacifist and anti-militarist movements in the West, which led to an increasingly critical stance against militarism among Chinese educators in the late 1910s and the early 1920s. In 1919, the National Federation of Educational Associations 全國教育聯合會 passed a resolution to abolish civic-military education as one of China’s main educational goals (Wang, 2014: 123–24). It was not until the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925 that demands for large-scale student military training reemerged among students and educators, who became actively involved in a new wave of nationalist movements targeting Japanese imperialist aggression against China (Chyu, 1984: 44–45).

Nevertheless, the fragmentation of political authority prior to the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1928 resulted in the lack of a nation-wide, centrally coordinated scheme for school-based military training. According to Culp, military training remained a marginal feature of physical education classes in the 1910s and 1920s. The 1923 New School System curriculum did not include military education as part of students’ mandatory physical training. In the lower Yangzi region, military education mostly existed in the form of “military calisthenics” 兵式體操, which was incorporated into the regular physical education curriculum and occupied no more than an hour or two of students’ time each week. Some of the middle schools in the region did not offer any military education at all before 1928 (Culp, 2007: 198).

Another significant avenue of youth military education was the Chinese scouting program, which was first introduced to missionary schools in the 1910s as an elitist form of civic training and became prevalent across coastal provinces in the 1920s. Based on the English Boy Scout program founded by the British Army officer Robert Baden-Powell (1857–1941), the Chinese scouting program offered an eclectic collection of lessons that combined collective military drills and jamborees with hygiene and etiquette classes, arts and crafts, outdoor experiences, practical skills training, and social services (Culp, 2006: 540). Robert Culp and Brian Tsui have shown how the Nanjing government co-opted preexisting scouting organizations in China to promote the specific kinds of civility, everyday lifestyle, and social activism sanctioned by the party-state (Culp, 2000: 25–26; Tsui, 2018: 94). Although Chinese scouting featured military-style uniforms, ceremonies, and organizational structure, it subsumed its military elements under a comprehensive educational program that focused on nonmilitary technical training, character building, and leisure activities (Tsui, 2018: 82). While Culp has illustrated how the coexistence of diverse modes of training produced irresolvable internal tensions, Tsui argues that the scouting program’s militaristic and liberal-leaning elements complemented each other to advance the GMD’s goal of forging an energetic community geared toward anti-communism, military preparation, and industrial production (Tsui, 2018: 71). Taking the reform of everyday culture as its focus, scouting was “symptomatic of a distinct GMD approach to mass politics that conflated everyday morality, physical strength and rejection of left-wing ideology” (Tsui, 2018: 109).

As we will see, Nanjing-decade student military training also exhibited similar quasi-military characteristics while placing a distinct emphasis on the refinement of everyday practices. Building on Culp’s and Tsui’s observations on GMD youth policies, this article highlights how Nanjing’s diplomatic dilemma significantly conditioned the implementation of its student militarization program. Acting under the constraint of its appeasement policy toward Japan, the GMD showed a subtle inclination to demilitarize the training program, so as to convert anti-Japanese militant activism into a voluntary commitment to self-betterment, social service, and anti-communism. Driven by the dual needs to mobilize and discipline students’ nationalistic energies, the program showcased the intriguing interplay between the GMD’s diplomatic predicament and the multiple layers of ideological ambiguity underlying the party-state’s engagement with urban youth.

Toward the Total Militarization of Everyday Life

The consolidation of the GMD regime in Nanjing in 1928, following the anti-communist purge in Shanghai on April 12, 1927, coincided with the Ji’nan Incident, in which a minor dispute between Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition forces and Japanese soldiers and civilians in Ji’nan escalated into an armed conflict between the two countries in May 1928. The incident sparked a flurry of new anti-Japanese protests in China and intensified student demands for military training. As Culp pointed out, the Nanjing government’s student military training program was a product of the intersecting forces of “student demands, state directives, and school administrators’ accommodation of both” (Culp, 2006: 534). Under the anti-Japanese political climate in May 1928, the Military Affairs Commission 軍事委員會 (MAC) chaired by Chiang Kai-shek drafted China’s first centrally mandated student military training program. Officially named the Military Education Scheme for Senior Middle Schools and Higher Institutions 高中以上學校軍事教育方案, its stated aim was to standardize and regulate the localized practice of military education so that “a certain degree of effectiveness can be achieved” (AH, 001-012350-0001: 12). It stipulated military training as a compulsory subject for all male students enrolled in senior middle schools, specialized schools, and universities. Under the scheme, the students were all subjected to three hours of weekly training during the regular school term and three weeks of continuous training during the summer. Attached to the scheme were a syllabus and a list of objectives for both “classroom study” (xueke 學科) and “practical training” (shuke 術科), which were also formulated by the MAC and covered an elaborate program consisting of collective drills, bayonet fighting, calisthenics, shooting, military commands, frontline duties, surveying, and military lectures (AH, 001-012350-0001: 15–16). The scheme was forwarded by the MAC to the National Educational Congress 全國教育會議, which took place from May 15 to May 18, 1928, for its review and approval. The National Educational Congress was the policy-making institution of the short-lived University Council 大學院, which was headed by Cai Yuanpei. The Congress comprised mostly non-GMD educators from all over China and was responsible for enacting national educational policies (Linden, 1968: 774). ² In the aftermath of the Ji’nan Incident, the resolution to launch the Military Education Scheme was unanimously passed by the congress (AH, 001-012350-0001: 12). After the Nanjing government’s ratification, the scheme was officially implemented by provincial and municipal educational authorities in all state-run schools starting from August 1928 (AH, 001-012350-0001: 89–91).

In the summer of 1928, students in southeastern China geared up for an anticipated fight against Japan. According to a survey in August 1928, “student armies” had been established voluntarily in twenty-eight schools in Shanghai, with duties organized according to the specialty of individual schools. The student army of Nanyang Medical University 南洋醫科大學, for instance, was an infantry division that was in charge of hygiene, while the Marine Fishery School’s 水產學校 student army received training to become marine corps (Jiaoyu zazhi, 1928: 12). Furthermore, to bring together all students in Shanghai for the formation of a city-wide student army, the Shanghai Students’ Union (SSU) established its own military training committee with the intent to create “a well-disciplined, well-trained, and high-spirited revolutionary army” (AH, 001-012350-0001: 29).

In June 1928, the Shanghai Student Army organized by the committee was ready for review. The SSU dispatched an invitation letter to the GMD government on June 4, asking government officials to attend the review, which was scheduled to take place on June 10 at the Shanghai Public Stadium located at the city’s West Gate (AH, 001-012350-0001: 36). The invitation letter was on letterhead printed with the GMD emblem, and it reiterated that the SSU’s student army would support the government’s diplomatic cause (AH, 001-012350-0001: 29, 36). Nevertheless, this initiative was met with skepticism rather than enthusiasm from GMD officials. The Secretariat of the Nanjing government asked the Shanghai municipal government to advise the SSU against holding the event (AH, 001-012350-0001: 28, 35). In a memorandum to the Nanjing government dated June 7, the MAC showed its appreciation for the patriotism of the Shanghai students but regarded the SSU’s proposal as “a big problem” that might contradict some of the regulations laid out in the Military Education Scheme (AH, 001-012350-0001: 38). Despite the reservations voiced by GMD officials, the review on June 10 turned out to be a huge success. It was reported that a total of sixteen thousand students, male and female, had participated (Liangyou, 1928: 8).

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 triggered another round of zealous anti-Japanese student protests in major Chinese cities. In Shanghai, groups of enraged youths petitioned the GMD government for more intensive military training. According to Jeffrey Wasserstrom (1991: 173), students from twelve different schools in Shanghai formed a student army and more than eight thousand students had joined military training within the first week after the news of the incident reached the city. As an ad hoc response to mounting student pressure, the GMD’s Central Executive Committee put forward the Educational Program for Student Volunteer Armies 學生義勇軍教育綱領 in late September, which was to supersede the Military Education Scheme of 1928. The decree urged Chinese students to unite themselves, undergo practical training, and exert their utmost effort to save the nation. Under the new program, each senior middle school and tertiary institution should set up a school-based youth volunteer army, while junior middle schools and primary schools should organize their own volunteer scouts (AH, 001-012350-0002: 92–93). The scheme, however, fell short of any substantial plan to arm the students. Instead, it emphasized the teaching of diplomatic history, namely “the facts about Japan’s invasion of our nation,” as well as the promotion of a martial form of nationalism through the cultivation of national pride and masculine traits in art and literature classes (AH, 001-012350-0002: 94). The training guidelines released in October also specified that “education in the soldierly spirit and physical training” came first, whereas “military knowledge and skills” came second (ZMSDZH, 1994: 1270).

The GMD’s announcement of the student volunteer army program coincided with the energetic self-mobilization of student militias. In Shanghai, for example, five hundred students in Fudan Experimental Middle School 復旦實驗中學 launched a training program that consisted of three hours of daily military drills. In January 1932, a battle broke out between Japanese and Chinese armies in the Shanghai International Settlement following an upsurge of anti-Japanese demonstrations caused by a violent clash between Japanese and Chinese civilians at a Japanese-owned factory in the city. Students from the Fudan Experimental Middle School’s volunteer army organized an “Iron and Blood Corps” 鐵血隊 along with their seniors at Fudan University during the winter break of 1932. Some of the corps members even joined the GMD’s Nineteenth Route Army, which put up vehement resistance against the Japanese advance into the city (Changhan, 1934: 5).

The growing militancy among urban youths alarmed the Nanjing regime. In late January 1932, the Ministry of Education warned against the rapid radicalization of students, pointing out that their patriotism could be manipulated by anti-GMD forces, leading them to disregard their own duties and cause social instability. It stressed the importance of discouraging students from “taking to the streets and resorting to empty slogans” (ZMSDZH, 1994: 1272). At the same time, the ministry sought to impose greater control on the implementation of the student volunteer army program, having noticed that students in certain schools had been joining and leaving the official volunteer armies without proper approval (Liu, 1932: 107). The ministry reiterated that students should attend the mandatory two-hour daily military training session taught by government-appointed instructors and complete noncommissioned officer training at their schools within six months (ZMSDZH, 1994: 1273).

On May 5, 1932, a ceasefire agreement, brokered by the League of Nations, was signed between China and Japan to end the fighting in Shanghai. The following year, Sino-Japanese combat in northern China also concluded with the signing of the Tanggu Truce on May 31, which resulted in the acknowledgement of Manchukuo and a demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall. The brief stabilization of Sino-Japanese relations, which lasted until the Xi’an Incident in December 1936, coincided with renewed efforts by the GMD to eradicate the Jiangxi Soviet by waging the “fifth encirclement campaign” in September 1933, as well as to strengthen its position as a “tutelage regime” through the founding of the New Life Movement in 1934. The main objective of the New Life Movement, as declared by Chiang Kai-shek on February 19, 1934, was to “totally militarize the lives of all citizens in the country, so that they can form habits and dispositions to behave bravely, act swiftly, endure hardship, work industriously, and, above all, be in unison with each other and sacrifice for the nation at any time” (Chiang, 1989: 66). Henceforth, the national student military training program became one of the vital instruments for the GMD to bring about the military lifestyle of “orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, and frugality” that Chiang envisioned (Chiang, 1989: 56).

After the abolishment of the Student Volunteer Army program by the GMD Central Executive Committee in July 1932, the original Military Education Scheme was reinstated and amended in 1934 to become the Revised Military Education Scheme for Senior Middle Schools and Higher Institutions 修正高中以上學校軍事教育方案 (Kunshan jiaoyu, 1932: 2–3). ³ To ensure that middle school and university students fulfilled the mandatory military training requirement, the 1934 scheme stipulated for the first time that any student who did not pass military training was not allowed to graduate. Exceptions were female students, students with disabilities or chronic illnesses, and students in medical schools, all of whom were subject to a different set of assessment criteria (AH, 001-012350-0002: 107). Moreover, the new scheme put stronger emphasis on the organization of centralized summer training camps at provincial capitals, which had not been effectively carried out after the promulgation of the original scheme in 1928. It significantly extended the period of intensive summer training from three weeks to three months for senior middle school students and two months for students from specialized schools and universities (AH, 001-012350-0002: 111–12).

The implementation of the new scheme was reinforced by the expansion of the Department of National Military Education 國民軍事教育處, Nanjing’s central organ presiding over the training program, into other cities and provinces in the early 1930s. By the end of 1934, National Military Training Commissions 國民軍事訓練委員會—the Department of National Military Education’s provincial and municipal branches—had started operation in Nanjing, Shanghai, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Henan, Hebei, Shandong, Yunnan, Beijing, and Qingdao (AH, 001-012071-0327: 52; Guo, 1984: 398). In 1934, a total of 42,657 middle school, specialized school, and university students from fourteen provinces and three municipalities had enrolled in school-based military training. This represented a 130 percent increase from 1929, when the total number of students participating in military training only amounted to 18,485. Centralized training camps for middle school students were successfully organized for the first time in the summer of 1934, when 19,022 students participated. In 1935, the total number of students joining the summer training camps rose to 26,807, which included 22,740 middle school students and 4,067 specialized school and university students (ZMSDZH, 1994: 1286–87).

Most importantly, the 1934 Revised Military Education Scheme gave unprecedented impetus to the total militarization of daily school routines. Under the scheme, all schools were to manage their students in accordance with the “Internal Service Regulations of the Army” 陸軍軍隊內務規則 so as to “cultivate soldierly habits” (AH, 001-012350-0002: 107). With the blending of military-style training into the mundane aspects of school life, the state-appointed military training instructors saw their responsibilities and power extended beyond the original scope of military training classes for the first time. Under the new scheme, they were charged with general disciplinary duties at their schools and required to attend meetings to discuss educational and disciplinary matters with civilian teaching staff (AH, 001-012350-0002: 108). Such measures to incorporate army regulations into the everyday conduct of school activities were intensified by the introduction of the Military Management Scheme for Senior Middle Schools and Higher Institutions 高中以上學校軍事管理辦法 in early 1936. The scheme required all male students to wear “Zhongshan suits” and military caps and greet their teachers and seniors with military salutes. To teach the virtues of cleanliness, alacrity, diligence, unity, and self-discipline, stringent rules were imposed to regulate student behavior in classrooms, dormitories, canteens, and playgrounds (ZMSDZH, 1994: 1313–22).

The regulations of the Military Management Scheme were very similar to the training and management regulations enacted at provincial centralized training camps. ⁴ These rules specified how one should dress, eat, greet others, walk and keep pace with one another, ask or answer a question in class, and respond to superiors’ orders. For example, upon hearing the bugle call for mealtime, students were required to gather immediately at a designated place, line up, and enter the dining hall under the guidance of a duty officer. Meticulous instructions were provided to stipulate how students should behave in the dining hall:

Regulation 36. When the superior officer arrives, the duty officer shall issue the command “lizheng” 立正 [“attention”] and all students shall stand up. After the superior officer returns the salute, the duty officer shall issue the command “zuoxia” 坐下 [“sit down”]. The students shall not start eating until they hear the command “kaidong” 開動[“begin”].

Regulation 37. After entering the dining hall, every student shall sit at his assigned position. No one shall disrupt the order.

Regulation 38. Students shall close their mouths and chew carefully when eating. Do not make any noise. Do not eat too fast. Do not speak or rap at the bowls. (ZMSDZH, 1994: 1317)

These exacting restrictions sought not only to establish a proper order for everyday routines but also to regularize and synchronize even the tiniest bodily movements, such as chewing.

Rigorous vigilance and unfailing adherence to military-style regulations was also expected in the private arena. Such intrusiveness was most evident in the surveillance of student sleeping quarters. According to the Military Management Scheme, the layout of sleeping quarters should conform to the New Life Movement standard of “tidiness, cleanliness, simplicity, and frugality” (ZMSDZH, 1994: 1318). In the summer training camps, these rules were enforced through regular inspection of individual students’ personal spaces by superior officers. According to an account written by a student from Jishan High School 稽山中學 in Shaoxing, Zhejiang, every trainee was provided with a handout that contained highly specific instructions on how to put one’s bedding, clothing items, and other supplies in correct order. During these “interior service” 內務 examinations, inspectors would ensure that a trainee’s folded blanket had perfect right-angles, and that his pillow, puttees, belt, underwear, and books were positioned properly. To do so, the distance between each article had to be measured by a ruler in centimeters (Jingkun, 1934: 59). This exertion of strict control over daily routines was in line with the training at Whampoa Military Academy, where GMD cadets were required to observe strict rules on dining, clothing, transportation, walking, and even on how to organize books and fold laundry (Xu, 2019: 33).

The GMD’s obsession with such military ideals as “order and uniformity” 整齊劃一 manifested itself in the centrality of collective drills in the training regimens of both regular and summer sessions. The 1934 Revised Military Education Scheme stated that one-third of the time in summer sessions should be dedicated to the drilling of different battle formations. The shuke training during regular school term consisted of two hours of weekly training that mainly involved basic foot drills (AH, 001-012350-0002: 110–11). Through prescribing and monitoring every motion and gesture, military drills molded individual bodily habits and taught students how to stand, march, and turn in a disciplined and homogeneous manner. Repetitive practice helped to synchronize the marching steps of trainees as well as to ensure automatic responses to top-down commands. Treating every individual as a modular unit, military drilling trained students to integrate themselves seamlessly into squadrons, platoons, or larger military formations for ceremonious reviews, which were usually conducted under the oversight of GMD officials on the last day of summer centralized training. The idea that disparate individuals could be maneuvered, coordinated, and assembled into one single entity proved to be particularly appealing to GMD leaders. For Chiang Kai-shek, the key to making a coherent, organized collectivity lay not only in teaching citizen-soldiers how to move as a team, but how to remain perfectly still as a unified body. In a lecture given to the GMD’s middle- and lower-level military cadre in the Emei Military Training Corps 峨嵋軍訓團 on September 6, 1935, Chiang highlighted the importance of adopting the correct posture in collective drills, arguing that the foundation of well-disciplined troops, like a solidly built house, lay in every trainee striking the right pose when lining up in parade formation and standing steadily at attention (AH, 002-060100-00100-006).

The fetishization of military drills as an ideal form of social organization, as well as the concomitant stress on externalized discipline, homogenization, and absolute obedience, has been regarded by Arif Dirlik and Robert Culp as strong evidence of the GMD’s collectivist, or even fascist, impulses (Dirlik, 1975: 973; Culp, 2006: 536). The imposition of uniformity on the parade ground and the maintenance of order and compliance in the camp routine entailed a punitive mechanism. Contravention of the training regulations would lead to penalties of varying degrees. Depending on the severity of the offense, trainees were subject to disciplinary treatments ranging from punitive calligraphy assignments, which involved the repetitive practice of small regular script 小楷 writing, to detention in “confinement rooms,” in which the detainees would be provided with regular meals but prohibited from meeting others for a certain period of time (Jia, 1936: 738). In view of these authoritarian measures, the GMD’s operation of the summer camps was severely criticized by student activists writing for Xuesheng husheng 學生呼聲 (Students’ Voice), a publication founded by the Shanghai-based anti-Japanese student organization the All-China Federation of Students for National Salvation 全國學生救國聯合會, which was known for its fierce opposition to the GMD’s appeasement policy toward Japan. ⁵ One student writer named Li Zhenwei 李振威, for instance, condemned the “barbarity” of the summer camps and compared the “unreasonable oppression” inflicted on Chinese students with the dreadful conditions of German concentration camps (Li, 1936: 17).

Training Commissions and Training Instructors

According to the 1935 “Revised Regulations for Provincial and Municipal National Military Training Commissions” 修正各省市國民軍事訓練委員會規程, each training commission should be chaired by a senior official appointed by the Ministry of Training and Supervision 訓練總監部, which was set up in December 1928 to oversee all matters pertaining to military training (AH, 001-012071-0327: 52). ⁶ Both Lloyd Eastman and Frederic Wakeman have identified the close connection between the National Military Training Commissions and the Lixingshe 力行社, the fascist-leaning organization that represented the Whampoa Clique of the GMD. Six of the thirteen commission chiefs were Lixingshe members (Eastman, 1972: 17). Many of the military training instructors were graduates from the MAC’s Training Class for Cadres 幹部訓練班, which was also organized by Lixingshe members (Wakeman, 2003: 114, 120–21). Nevertheless, an examination of GMD archival documents shows how personal relationships with educators and civil bureaucrats—not only factional links—formed an important consideration for the GMD in the selection of provincial and municipal training commission chiefs. For example, in Beijing, Bai Xiongyuan 白雄遠, a graduate of the Baoding Military Academy 保定陸軍軍官學校, was appointed because he was highly trusted by Cai Yuanpei and Jiang Menglin 蔣夢麟 (1886–1964), both of whom had served as chancellor of Peking University. In Jiangsu, a Whampoa graduate named Xu Pu 徐普 was appointed to serve as the head of the commission, but only on account of Xu’s “excellent character and knowledge,” as well as the “friendly relationship” he enjoyed with Chen Guofu, the head of the Jiangsu provincial government (AH, 002-080200-00187-085).

School military instructors were initially appointed by the MAC chaired by Chiang, but the Department of National Military Education took over the recruitment of instructors after its establishment in 1929. Eligibility criteria were as follows: (1) graduation from an official military academy, at least one year of experience serving as a battalion, company, or platoon commander, and deep knowledge of party ideology; (2) propriety of moral conduct, no addiction problems; and (3) physical strength and health (AH, 001-012350-00002-001). In addition to a physical examination, the applicants were tested on their Chinese-language proficiency, field commanding skills, speaking, and party ideology and general military knowledge (Jiangxi jiaoyu xingzheng xunkan, 1932: 9–10). In practice, however, priority was given to the military officers who had been recently dismissed because of the demobilization of the GMD forces after the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1928 (AH, 001-012350-00002-001). ⁷

While all instructors were officially appointed by the Ministry of Training and Supervision, they were directly managed and paid by the schools to which they were posted (AH, 001-012350-0001: 14). The subordination of military instructors to school administration was written into the original “Regulations for Military Training Instructors Serving in Senior Middle Schools and Higher Institutions” 高中以上學校軍事教官服務條例, which was drafted by the MAC in 1928. All the instructors were subject to the “direction and control of the heads of their respective schools” (AH, 001-012350-0001: 13). In addition, they were prohibited from interfering with school affairs without proper justification, forming cliques to pursue self-interest, or causing interruptions to regular class schedules. Disobedient students were punished by school principals, not the military instructors (AH, 001-012350-0001: 113–16). Although the instructors were entrusted with greater disciplinary powers under the 1934 Revised Military Education Scheme, their position remained subordinate to school administration because they were funded by their respective schools (AH, 002-080200-00198-102). Even after the implementation of the Military Management Scheme in 1936, the GMD sent a decree to reiterate that all military instructors should act under the supervision of school principals, and that the National Military Training Commissions should not bypass local education departments or school principals to issue direct orders to military instructors with regard to school affairs (Ji’nan xiaokan, 1937: 1).

The policy to subordinate military training instructors to the control of school administrations originated partly from Chiang’s distrust in the quality of the instructors. In Chiang’s view, the selection of school military instructors had been too hasty, and some of the officially appointed instructors were merely “literati who dressed up as military men” (AH, 002-080200-00418-018; AH, 002-080200-00420-069). In 1935, the GMD identified a total of 67 school military instructors who had unsatisfactory performance and organized a three-week “special training class” in Nanjing during the winter break to retrain underperforming instructors (Central Department of Statistics, 1935: 52–53). In a telegram dated July 22, 1937, to Minister of Training and Supervision Tang Shengzhi 唐生智 (1889–1970), Chiang again complained that most of the school military instructors were “naive” and “lacking common sense and self-respect.” He stressed that the instructors must be placed under the command of their school principals, so as to prevent them from “forming a faction of their own” and “spoiling the educational system” (AH, 002-010300-00001-024).

Warriors of the Everyday

Despite the intensity of the training regulations and the intrusiveness of the surveillance measures deployed at the centralized camps, these externalized modes of collectivist discipline did not, as suggested by Culp, aim to reduce the student trainees into mere mechanical components of an “artificial machine” (Culp, 2007: 197). Military training, as construed by Chiang, was a productive mechanism: by exposing youth to “a life of hardship and toil,” military training would regenerate youth culture, evoke a sense of duty to the Chinese nation, and create young patriotic fighters who were physically strong, high-spirited, and willing to sacrifice for the collective good (Chiang, 1984: 14:331). While promoting such attributes as uniformity, order, and complete obedience, the GMD also incorporated into the training program other forms and ideals of citizenship education that advocated civic voluntarism and social participation, which potentially contradicted its intention to exert total control over student behaviors through the practice of foot drills and the imposition of a state-delineated everyday routine. The Military Management Scheme, for instance, encouraged students to help the needy by voluntary actions, such as “giving one’s seat to elders, children, and women when a public vehicle grows crowded” (ZMSDZH, 1994: 1317). The GMD’s fundamental understanding of modern citizenship as active, dedicated service for the national community was reflected in efforts to stimulate a sense of responsibility and public-mindedness in the course of military training. To turn students into the vanguard of the masses, the GMD mobilized the participants in the summer training sessions to take part in various social activities and propaganda campaigns. For example, trainees were asked to perform “laboring services” by sweeping the streets. Some were organized into propaganda corps to publicize the New Life Movement ideals of road cleanliness, while others were assigned the task of directing road traffic and maintaining public order during air raid drills (Jia, 1936: 738; Kenzhai, 1936: 2).

Rather than “mere cogs” for the “smooth operation of the machine” (Dirlik, 1975: 968), the training program sought to create socially active and martially spirited citizens through the sternness and austerity of military life. Students were expected to unite themselves in a self-motivated but well-disciplined manner, patriotically fulfilling their duties at a time of national crisis. In particular, the cultivation of soldierly vigor was highlighted by Chiang Kai-shek as one of the essential goals of the training program. Through conducting field exercises, which included hiking, topographic surveying, and warfare simulation, Chiang believed that trainees would develop the “capability of adventuring, enduring hardship, staying calm and being alert.” The trainees’ morale was to be further enhanced by military music and songs, which, according to Chiang, would help invoke “enthusiastic energies,” “unleash the trainees’ emotions,” and foster “vitality and progressive spirit” (AH, 002-080200-00416-138: 152). Chiang even instructed Zhou Junyan 周駿彥 (1872–1940), the head of the Military Supplies Department 軍需署, to bestow a souvenir dagger inscribed with the words “given by Zhongzheng [Chiang Kai-shek]” 中正贈 on student trainees to honor their participation in the program (AH, 002-010200-00162-034).

It should be noted that the Nanjing regime’s commitment to practical war preparation by means of student military training was not disingenuous, in spite of its ambivalence toward student demands for military retaliation against Japan. As Hans J. van de Ven has shown, while Nanjing strove to avoid military confrontation with Japan, it set up a National Defense Planning Council as early as 1932 to discreetly devise proposals for preparing China for imminent armed conflict with Japan (van de Ven, 2003: 151). To train students for the future defense of China, the Military Education Scheme of 1928 included a comprehensive curriculum to teach basic military knowledge and combat skills through field exercises and shooting practice during the summer session (AH, 001-012350-0002: 19; 001-012350-0002: 24). During field exercises, students were organized into militias to practice how to carry out a mission in the open country, as well as to learn about different battle formations, military tactics, the use of weapons, and the digging of trenches (AH, 001-012350-0002: 25–27). Under the revised scheme of 1934, field exercises made up one-third of the training time in summer camps (AH, 001-012350-0002: 111). In fact, the 1934 scheme was treated by the GMD as an organizational device for the full implementation of the Military Service System Act 兵役法, which paved the way for universal conscription in China (AH, 001-012350-0002: 107). The scheme stipulated that senior middle school students and university students should receive non-commissioned officer training and reserve officer training respectively during the summer sessions (AH, 001-012350-0002: 111–12). Students who successfully completed the training program would be issued with certificates by the Ministry of Training and Supervision and have their names listed on the army register (AH, 001-012350-0002: 110).

Nonetheless, archival evidence indicates that the Nanjing regime had been compelled by Japanese diplomatic pressure and treaty obligations to tone down the military implications of the training scheme. In a telegram addressed to Chiang Kai-shek dated March 21, 1935, Mayor of Shanghai Wu Tiecheng 吳鐵城 (1888–1953) reported that the Japanese consul in Shanghai had expressed reservations about the launch of a citywide student military training session in April. Since military officers would be sent by Nanjing to instruct students on military tactics, the Japanese side warned that the municipal government’s plan might constitute a contravention of the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement. To defend Nanjing’s position, Wu clarified that all the training instructors were attached to civilian schools, performing their duties under the supervision of the municipal education bureau. Wu concluded his report by stating,

The Japanese side is not entirely opposed to the plan, since they consider student centralized training an equivalent of military calisthenics in Japan. My understanding of the position of Ishii [the consul general of Japan in Shanghai] is that Nanjing’s appointment of military officers on active service as military training instructors is the only thing regarded by Japan as a contravention of the ceasefire agreement, which concerns the Japanese side greatly. (AH, 002-090200-00015-387)

While no further evidence is available to establish a direct connection between Japanese pressure and Nanjing’s policy to subsume school military instructors under civilian educational staff, the influence of the GMD’s diplomatic dilemma was discernible in the regime’s strategic decision to conceal the military nature of the program. In fact, Wu Tiecheng’s concern over the Japanese reaction was shared by He Yingqin 何應欽 (1890–1987), the GMD minister of war. In February 1935, a month before Wu Tiecheng’s meeting with the Japanese consul, He Yingqin telegraphed Chiang and cautioned against “exaggerated publicity” for the youth militarization project. He noticed that excessive information about the national military training program had been published in newspapers, which might “catch outsiders’ attention and induce their jealousy and hostility.” Chiang took his advice. On February 27, 1935, Chiang ordered the Ministry of Training and Supervision and the Ministry of Education to prevent “unnecessary publicity” surrounding the training program (AH, 002-080200-00211-042).

The GMD’s precarious diplomatic position resulted in efforts to suppress anti-Japanese dispositions among student trainees in the summer centralized sessions. Any outspoken criticism of the party’s foreign policy would not be tolerated. In a summer training camp in Beijing in 1934, a student who openly questioned the party’s appeasement policy in a discussion session was suspected to be a communist spy and immediately carried away (Wakeman, 2003: 121). To avoid the radicalization of students by anti-Japanese, or “communist,” propaganda, the GMD organizers placed strict restrictions on the circulation of reading materials in the training camps. For example, students were prohibited from ordering their own newspapers (AH, 002-010200-00160-076). In Xuesheng husheng, a Shanghai student writing under the pseudonym A Ying 阿瑩 complained that progressive newspapers and magazines such as Libao 立報, Dushu shenghuo 讀書生活, and Funü shenghuo 婦女生活 were banned in the Suzhou centralized camp of 1936. According to him, the camp’s Discipline and Education Committee 訓育委員會 kept a watchful eye on students’ “secret activities at night” to guard against leftist infiltration. It had also screened and confiscated letters and publications sent from Shanghai (A Ying, 1936: 20). A Ying’s description corroborates an earlier account written by a student named Lin Mengbo 林夢波 from Ji’nan, Shandong, who also mentioned the lack of newspapers and the examination of private letters by his superior officer in the training camp (Lin, 1934: 99, 117).

Partly stemming from the imperative to curb students’ anti-Japanese vehemence, Chiang in his speeches to student trainees exhibited an evasive attitude toward the immediate use of military force to reassert Chinese sovereignty in the Northeast. In fact, Chiang shied away from any mention of Japanese encroachment on China. Rather than China’s most formidable military threat, Chiang referred to Japan as an admirable competitor—an emerging world power whose enviable success in modernization and national revival should serve as a model for China (Chiang, 1984: 14:340–41). To suppress the warlike mood among Chinese students, Chiang sought to dissociate the martial qualities promoted by the militarization program from the possibility of an approaching war with Japan. For example, when addressing student trainees from Jiangsu and Zhejiang during the graduation ceremony of the 1936 centralized session, Chiang stated that foreign oppression was not the result of “a lack of weapons and military men” but “a lack of martial virtues” (AH, 002-060100-00115-009). In two other high-profile speeches titled “Lifestyle and War” 生活與戰爭, which were given by Chiang at Nanjing University in February and March 1936, the notion of “war” was drastically redefined as the total devotion of one’s fighting spirit and combative energies to the trivialities of everyday life. Resisting the “narrow” understanding of war as “shooting, bombardment, and fighting tooth and nail with the enemy on the battlefield,” Chiang celebrated “war” as an all-embracing concept:

We are at war regardless of where we are and what time it is; our eating, clothing, housing, transportation, thoughts, words, and work are all matters of war! Therefore, we do battle at each and every moment, in many intangible ways. We will be defeated if we have a tiny bit of carelessness or a single moment of sluggishness! On the contrary, we will win a victory over our enemy anywhere and anytime if we can truly uplift our spirit and exert ourselves to struggle! . . .

To be a modern citizen of the nation and an adequate, healthy, and sound warrior, we of course have to have the knowledge, ability, virtues, and spiritual discipline of a modern warrior. Where should we begin and on what occasions can we exhibit these qualities most easily? They are our actions, bearing and attitudes in everyday lives. Only when everything in our everyday lives conforms to the principles of “orderliness,” “cleanliness,” “frugality,” “diligence,” “swiftness,” “precision,” “quietness,” and “secrecy” can we meet the requirements of “militarization.” In doing so, we lead a “life of war” and successfully become modern citizens of the nation. (Chiang, 1984: 14:107–108)

By depicting all aspects of quotidian life as theaters of “war,” Chiang urged Chinese student-soldiers to “militarize” themselves through the practice of soldierly etiquette, such as “straightening one’s back with chest out when sitting, standing, or taking any action,” as well as not putting one’s hands in one’s pockets when walking (Chiang, 1984: 107–108). According to Chiang, the rectification of daily habits and manners through military training was conducive to the development of the moral attributes of zhi 智 (wisdom), xin 信 (sincerity), ren 仁 (benevolence), yong 勇 (courage), and yan 嚴 (strictness), the five martial virtues fundamental to the moral cultivation of modern military men (Chiang, 1984: 14:214–18). ⁸

It should be stressed that this conceptualization of youth military training as a form of moral cultivation was not simply a rhetorical tactic to steer students away from anti-Japanese activism. As shown by Jianli Huang, the emphasis on character building and self-cultivation constituted part of Nanjing’s longstanding policy to depoliticize Chinese students and regulate youth participation in national politics (Huang, 1996: 70–72). Even in private correspondence, Chiang understated the importance of battle techniques and conceived of the cultivation of proper habits and the refinement of mundane activities as the primary goals of the program. Rather than merely focusing on xueke and shuke training, Chiang insisted that military instructors should pay particular attention to students’ everyday attitudes and behaviors, such as whether they wiped down the firearms after use, took good care of the bathrooms and kitchens, and cherished every grain of rice (AH, 002-090102-00002-165).

The training program’s emphasis on everyday morality corresponds to the New Life Movement ideology that infused the minute aspects of daily life with moral significance, valorizing the propriety of everyday dispositions as the center of personal moral improvement, social betterment, and the smooth functioning of an organized national community. ⁹ The ideals of Confucian-style moral cultivation, which played a part in shaping Nanjing-decade civic education, were also incorporated by the GMD in its student military training program. ¹⁰ Military instructors were expected to effect personal reform among student trainees through their moralizing influence rather than through physical coercion or stiff penalties. The 1928 “Regulations for Military Training Instructors,” for instance, required that instructors “strengthen students’ moral character” by “providing guidance” 誘導 but not by “scolding” 斥責 (AH, 001-012350-0001: 114–15). In his public speeches, Chiang urged training instructors to exert “corrective influence” 感化 on students through exemplary conduct, as well as to act as the vanguards of the masses by practicing the principles of li 禮 (propriety), yi 義 (righteousness), lian 廉 (integrity), and chi 恥 (sense of shame) (Junshi zazhi, 1934: 221; Minzuhun, 1936: 1). In private, Chiang issued a directive in June 1936 to prohibit the instructors from “punishing students by asking them to run or slapping them in the face.” Instead, he reiterated that the instructors should conduct themselves with dignity and love and protect their students (AH, 002-010200-00160-076). Even in his communication to Lixingshe cadres, Chiang instructed that political training in school military education should be carried out through “imperceptible” suggestion and influence. He also stressed that no Lixingshe cadre should try to recruit new members for the organization during the course of military training (AH, 002-080200-00416-106). ¹¹ For Chiang, military training sessions should be separated from factional politics.

The program’s emphasis on the educative transformation of personal character by means of exemplary leadership and attentive care for students’ well-being was akin to the Confucian-style mentoring practices adopted by Republican-era schools in civic education, where the ideal teacher-student relationship was characterized by moral responsibility and subtle influence rather than externally-imposed discipline and punishment (Culp, 2006: 540–42). Despite these similarities, however, the military training program did not aim to directly reproduce the Confucian vision of social order that centered on relational ethics and reciprocal interpersonal relations. While Chiang called for “mutual trust” and a nurturing, affectionate relationship between training instructors and students, personal bonding and private loyalties were to be overridden by a collective culture of military fraternity and communal spirit that was geared toward the advancement of the party-state’s interests (Chiang, 1984: 14:216). Under the Whampoa motto of “qin’ai jingcheng” 親愛精誠 (love your comrades with utmost sincerity), Chiang asked individual trainees to disregard their private interests and participate in an organic totality that shared a common belief in “one cause, one government, and one leader” (Chiang, 1984: 14:216). Such soldierly solidarity, sustained by close comradeship and patriotic passion, was to be totally committed to the project of national revival and made answerable to the organizational needs of the GMD.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of Confucian-style moral instruction ideals in the training program appeared to endorse modes of moral thinking that could disrupt the absolute form of authority and loyalty pursued by the GMD in its social militarization project. The demands of moral leadership and reciprocity underlying Confucian visions of good governance, which were also endorsed by the GMD in its civic education and party ideology textbooks (Culp, 2006: 543), allowed student trainees to form a more critical perspective on the Nanjing regime. Student recollections of their training experiences were often mingled with overt criticisms about the failings and misbehaviors of training instructors and GMD officials. Biting remarks like those of Yu Zhenjian about the corrupt practices of GMD members, quoted at the outset of this article, were often seen in the published writings of student trainees in the mid-1930s. Many of these criticisms were predicated upon the expectation that training instructors—and those in power in general—would act as moral exemplars to the masses. For example, an account written by a student named Junqi 君奇, published in the popular Shanghai periodical Libailiu 禮拜六 (Saturday), reveals how students participating in a summer session in 1936 complained about the words and actions of their training instructors during their nighttime conversations in the dormitory. “Our military instructors always preach about the virtue of getting up early, which, according to them, constitutes the first step towards national salvation,” one trainee was quoted as saying. “This is sheer nonsense. Do all the important leaders of our party-state, who are entrusted with extremely difficult duties, leave their beds at six o’clock every morning?” (Junqi, 1936: 15). Such sarcastic comments show how student-soldiers’ loyalty and obedience were conditional on whether state actors fulfilled their exemplary role as morally upright leaders in the national community.

Engaging the “Shaoyebing”

Nanjing’s resolution to bolster youth militarization through the enactment of the Revised Military Education Scheme in 1934 contrasted with the general decline in students’ enthusiasm for military training after the end of the Shanghai War in 1932. As has been shown above, students’ motivation for militarization was driven more by a collective sense of urgency for military preparedness than by the initiative of the GMD state. The signing of the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement in 1932 and the Tanggu Truce in 1933 temporarily ended the hostilities between China and Japan in Shanghai and the Northeast. It also signified the strategic stance adopted by the GMD toward Japan in the early 1930s—rather than inducing a military showdown, the GMD opted to cope with Japanese incursions through diplomatic negotiations and concessions. The immediate period of armistice following the conclusion of the two peace treaties witnessed growing apathy among students towards GMD-led military training, especially in Shanghai. An article published in Shiritan 十日談 (The Decameron) in 1933, written by a pseudonymous student named Yingying 鶯英, recalled how his fellow students in Shanghai had valiantly joined military training in yellow woolen uniforms and performed maneuvers at school gymnasiums during the Shanghai War of early 1932. Such patriotic fervor, however, turned out to be a “five-minute passion,” which quickly dissipated following the resumption of peace talks between China and Japan later that year. “Although military training has been reduced to a mere two-hour session in the curriculum,” Yingying observed, “very few students are willing to participate” (Yingying, 1933: 10). Another writer named Bai Yun 白雲 expressed similar disappointment in an article published in the Hangzhou-based journal Chenguang 晨光 (The Dawn). Bai criticized Chinese students’ ignorance of a deepening national crisis, exemplified by their lukewarm response to the call for serious military training following the peace settlement of 1932. Referring to them as “shaoyebing” 少爺兵 (“young masters-turned-soldiers”) who were spoiled by the depraved treaty-port culture, Bai noticed that even the more progressive students withdrew from school military training after a brief period of militant activism and returned to their beloved dance halls in the summer (Bai, 1932: 26).

The waning of student enthusiasm presented a major headache for school administrators and military training instructors who were responsible for securing student participation in the mandatory training program. In September 1933, for instance, the Office of Military Training Instructors 軍事教官辦公室 at Shanghai’s National Ji’nan University 國立暨南大學 made five consecutive announcements in the school’s bulletin to urge students to enroll in training squads and show up on the parade ground on time for military training. One of the announcements specifically condemned student leaders’ reluctance to accept their assignments and discharge their duties (Ji’nan xiaokan, 1933: 4–5). Ji’nan students’ indifference toward military training persisted into 1934, when the Nanjing government introduced the Revised Military Education Scheme to shore up the mandatory training program. In the fall of 1934, the Office of Military Training Instructors reported that a significant number of students had evaded the mandatory shuke session in early October and that the office had to arrange for an additional session to enroll the absentees in the training squads (Ji’nan xiaokan, 1934: 2). In 1935, a group of first-year students, led by a student named Qiu Zhen’an 丘振安, even wrote directly to Shen Pengfei 沈鵬飛, the acting president of Ji’nan, to protest against the policy that required first-year students to spend their summer vacation on centralized military training (Shen, 1935: 6). The reluctance and resistance seen at National Ji’nan University was by no means an isolated instance. Another student account published in Libailiu also revealed how students who participated in the summer training session of 1935 sought to exploit the loopholes in the training regulations, such as pretending to feel unwell and applying for a “partial sick leave” to avoid the daily collective drills (Yi’an, 1935: 68).

To impart new momentum to the militarization project, the GMD organizers blended elements of athletic activities and team competition into the training program. During the annual review of student troops conducted by the Jiangsu National Military Training Commission in Zhenjiang in early April 1934, 1,377 students representing twenty-three schools competed to give the best performance on the parade ground. The winner of the competition, Nanjing Middle School 南京中學, was awarded an honorary flag by Chen Guofu, the head of the Jiangsu provincial government (AH, 002-090102-00001-194). On May 30, 1934, another review was held in the Gaoqiao Provincial Stadium 高橋省立體育場 in Hangzhou, where more than one thousand local middle school students participated in military parades and maneuvers (Weinong, 1934: 6–7). What attracted the most attention, however, were the “military competitions” in which student athletes in full battle gear took part in a 400-meter race and competed in “grenade throwing.” While the former represented a military twist to conventional track events, the latter resembled the discus throw and adopted its scoring method. ¹²

But the incorporation of competitive sports encouraged a sense of individual accomplishment and group distinction rather than collective dedication to the Nanjing regime’s political causes. The above-mentioned military review at the Gaoqiao Provincial Stadium quickly evolved into an emotionally charged tug-of-war between two traditional rivals, Hangzhou Senior Middle School and Huilan Senior Middle School 蕙蘭中學. Both sides treated the review as an opportunity to boost school reputation as student audiences cheered for the heroic winners in the military competitions (Weinong, 1934: 6–7). Invoking a competitive spirit among the trainees, sporting events transformed an orderly gathering of student-soldiers into an athletic jamboree, where the motivation to compete and excel became the focus of festive celebration. The integration of personal and group contests into military reviews exemplified the heterogeneous nature of Nanjing-decade student military training and complicated the GMD’s efforts to devise a coherent strategy for disciplining Chinese students into faithful soldiers of the party-state.

“Knowing Shame, Teaching War”

In early July 1934, more than seven hundred senior middle school students from all over Zhejiang left their hometowns and traveled to Hangzhou, the provincial capital, to assemble at the Zhejiang Provincial Stadium for the opening ceremony of the first centralized military training session held in Zhejiang (Xu, 1934: 2–3). According to a participant from Shaoxing’s Jishan High School with the penname Jingkun 竟髡, who later published his training journal in Xuexiao shenghuo, the first few days in the summer camp were marked by a feeling of constant hunger, hesitation, and anxiety about the “inexplicable” military commands. The strains of drilling and exercising under the sweltering weather of midsummer made six students pass out on the parade ground at the opening ceremony (Jingkun, 1934: 58). At first, Jingkun had found the stringency of barracks life uncomfortably similar to the harshness and alienation one would face in a prison. However, he and many of his fellows in the camp gradually adapted themselves to the intensity of the training routine and actively participated in the military exercises arranged by the camp organizers. They were particularly captivated by the live-ammunition shooting sessions, which took place at a shooting range located outside the Wangjiang Gate of Hangzhou. These sessions allowed civilian students a rare chance to experiment with rifles and bullets. To simulate the environment of a battlefield, targets were set up in a trench. The nerve-racking sounds of gunshots were constantly heard, but Jingkun and his fellow trainees quickly overcame the uneasiness. In fact, Jingkun wrote in his journal that the shooting practice gave him “indescribable pleasure” (Jingkun, 1934: 59, 63).

Such martial excitement was enhanced by three sessions of field exercises, which taught student trainees the basic skills of conducting military operations in the open country. Students learned how to carry out a reconnaissance mission as well as how to measure distances, keep their bearings, transmit messages using semaphore flags, and hide in covered positions during an enemy aerial assault (Jingkun, 1934: 60, 64; Zhu, 1934: 19, 20; Zhang, 1934b: 9; Lu, 1934: 21). The novel experience of going on an expedition in soldierly attire and the electrifying notes of the bugle enthralled the student trainees. After putting on his grass-green military uniform, haversack, and bayonet, Fan Anshi 范安士, a student serving in the Second Battalion, recalled the “solemnity” 莊嚴 and “mightiness” 威武 of the soldiers of the Nineteenth Route Army, who fought courageously in the Shanghai War against the Japanese troops in early 1932, and likened himself to those fervent warriors (Fan, 1934: 24). These feelings of martial heroism climaxed in the final session of field exercises conducted on July 19, when all student participants, each carrying their dummy rifles and grenades, were divided into an offensive force and a defensive force to fight each other at Baoshi Hill. The mock battle took place in a rugged land of weeds, thorn bushes, broken walls, and abandoned graves. Student-soldiers tried to ambush the enemy from their hiding positions. Firecrackers were used to imitate the loud cracks of machine guns (Jingkun, 1934: 69–70). In the training journal he published in Xuexiao shenghuo, a Hangzhou student named Zhang Weifang 張維芳 recounted the exhilarating experience of the mock battle under an entry he titled “Back from the Front Line”:

Kill! Kill! After being trained for nearly twenty days, we reached the final destination and wholly enjoyed the killing. We stood on the rugged and rough graveyard. It was raining. The shrubs were as high as my knees. We took our rifles and waited for the command. Upon hearing the word “kill,” we sprang up and rushed to the other side. . . .

After coming back, I took off my rain-soaked military uniform. My legs were hurt by the tree roots. There was a bleeding wound near my waist, too. I did not notice it when I fell down. . . . When I came back, I felt I had come back from the front line! (Zhang, 1934a: 19–20)

Zhang’s journal elucidates how the quasi-military adventures of simulated warfare effectively captured the martial imagination of student trainees in Zhejiang, many of whom had initially entered the summer training camp with doubts and reluctance. To commemorate the soldierly spirit and hard work of the students, the training commission presented every participant with a souvenir badge inscribed with the words “ming chi jiao zhan” 明恥教戰 (Knowing shame, teaching war) at the end of the 1934 centralized training session as a graduation gift (Jingkun, 1934: 71).

However, while the summer camp converted the initially unenthusiastic students into self-perceived warriors of the nation, their devotion to military training was inseparable from the shared belief that total war with Japan was imminent, and that restoration of military strength was the fundamental solution to China’s prolonged national crisis. ¹³ In his journal, Zhang Weifang urged his fellow students to brace themselves for the outbreak of the Second World War, and even expressed his desire to sail across the East China Sea to sink Japanese warships along the coast of Kyushu (Zhang, 1934c: 14, 16). Another Zhejiang trainee named Zheng Zhi 鄭擲 asserted that the twentieth century was the century of force. “Might is right,” he wrote. “The only way to ensure our nation’s survival is to wake up from our dream and strengthen ourselves” (Zheng, 1934: 2). Such sentiments were shared by some of the training instructors themselves. After the conclusion of the 1934 Zhejiang centralized session, Han Zhi 韓治, a training instructor from Zhejiang University, exhorted all young patriots to arm themselves and dedicate all their youthful energies to a “great, heroic battle” amid the gathering war clouds in Asia (Han, 1934: 2).

These accounts shed light on how state-mandated centralized training provided avenues for students and even training instructors to vent their martial desires and energies in ways that defied the guidance and interests of the GMD. Despite Chiang’s emphasis on personal cultivation and the GMD organizers’ attempt to silence anti-Japanese voices, grassroots participants in the training camps responded to the GMD’s call to make patriotic sacrifices by eagerly rehearsing the much-anticipated war with Japan rather than by refining their daily habits or perfecting their postures in the collective drills. As Japan aggressively expanded its influence in North China by orchestrating the pro-Japanese autonomy movements in 1935 and sending reinforcements in 1936, Chiang’s vision of cultivating good character through the disciplinary power of camp routines became increasingly irrelevant in the course of training. “We must immediately learn how to shoot,” a trainee in the 1936 Suzhou summer camp wrote, “and practice our shooting skills so as to fight against Japan” (Meisheng, 1936: 821).

As the prospect of an armed struggle against Japan continued to energize student participation in military training, Nanjing’s perceived unwillingness to militarily confront the pressing danger of Japanese aggression drew intense criticisms from students. In 1933, a Shanghai student wrote to Shiritan to complain about the government’s reduction of military training sessions shortly after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, scorning the GMD’s foreign policy as “a doctrine of non-resistance” (Luowu, 1933: 4). The GMD’s focus on the “militarization” of everyday habits, attitudes, and demeanor was often treated with ridicule by pro-war students. In Xuesheng husheng, A Ying accused the GMD of reducing the youth militarization scheme to a mere training of daily military etiquette, as if a troop could scare away the enemy simply by walking in unison. “What can these centralized training sessions achieve other than training thousands of student-patriots to become tractable slaves of Japanese imperialists?” (A Ying, 1936: 19–20).

Ultimately, the GMD’s seeming disregard for the necessity of military preparation, along with its suppression of anti-Japanese expressions in the camps, resulted in a missed opportunity for the regime to convert students’ anti-Japanese militancy into sources of domestic political support. ¹⁴ Patriotic students did not believe that the GMD shared their animosity toward Japan and even perceived Nanjing’s military education program as a “deceitful” and “oppressive” attempt to forbid the genuine pursuit of anti-Japanese resistance by Chinese students (Li, 1936: 17; A Ying, 1936: 20; Erwei, 1936: 444). Writing in Xuesheng husheng, student trainee Li Zhenwei portrayed centralized training camps as a form of torture and enslavement. He demanded “authentic” military training in which all students received real guns and bullets to perform field maneuvers with live ammunition. To abolish the “formalistic” training run by GMD bureaucrats, Li urged all progressive students to unite and revolt against the party line by staging strikes and protests in the summer training camps (Li, 1936: 16–18).

Conclusion

This article highlights the ideological tensions and diplomatic predicaments underlying the Nanjing regime’s student militarization program. While fetishizing a regimented, homogenous, and collectivist national body, the training program incorporated a disparate set of tactics and ideals as the party-state sought to mobilize and discipline the patriotic activism of Chinese students. The program’s peculiar mix of externalized discipline, Confucian-style moral cultivation, and liberal models of voluntarism and competition stemmed from the longstanding strands of bodily training and citizenship education that exemplified the paradoxical social visions deeply rooted in GMD youth mobilization efforts. More significantly, Nanjing’s rigorous implementation of the 1934 Revised Military Education Scheme became intertwined with an inclination to obscure the military nature of the training program, which was necessitated by Japanese pressure, treaty obligations, and the regime’s own diplomatic stance. The scheme portrayed “militarization” not as immediate armament or direct military action but as a gradual process of personal reform that centered on the refinement of bodily habits and moral character. This tendency contrasted sharply with student trainees’ fascination with rifles, bullets, mock battles, and the idea of total war with Japan. As a result, the GMD’s appeasement policy severely limited the party-state’s mobilizational capacity among Chinese youths.

Fundamentally, the militarization project envisioned a radical reordering of everyday culture. Instead of celebrating military violence, Chiang’s avowed ambition of “total militarization” emphasized vigor and perseverance in everyday life, which reflected the regime’s continuing aspiration to cultivate forms of citizenship that were distanced from antagonistic politics, committed to a lifestyle of orderliness and industriousness, and actively served the interests of a national collective directed by the GMD state. In other words, the training program sought to inculcate Chinese students with martial virtues that were defined in political and cultural, rather than military, terms.

The GMD’s sustained efforts to militarize the bodies and minds of young citizens have often been cited as a quintessential example of the regime’s fascist leanings. Lloyd Eastman and Arif Dirlik associated Nanjing’s social militarization project with the “Blue Shirts,” the fascist-inspired GMD faction often equated with the Lixingshe. ¹⁵ They both identified Nanjing’s quest for a militarized society—the reorganization of Chinese social life based on the military principles of discipline, order, precision, and unity—as the defining feature of the regime’s fascist ambitions (Eastman, 1972: 20; Dirlik, 1975: 973). The question of whether, or to what extent, the Nanjing regime should be characterized as fascist has continued to pique the interest of China historians and political scientists, who have debated the similarities and differences between the GMD and fascist states in interwar Italy, Germany, and Japan (Kirby, 1984; Chang, 1985; Gregor, 2000; Chung, 2000; Wakeman, 1997; Clinton, 2017; Tsui, 2018). By focusing on Nanjing’s student military training program, this study contributes to the “GMD fascism” debate in two important ways: first, it prompts us to reconsider the role of the Lixingshe in Nanjing’s youth militarization scheme; and second, it sheds new light on the nature and limitations of the GMD’s militaristic aspirations, allowing us to pinpoint one of the key differences between the Nanjing government and interwar fascist regimes—their attitudes toward war and military violence.

Contrary to previous scholarship that portrayed Nanjing’s “total militarization” of Chinese youth as a scheme hatched and executed by the Lixingshe fascists (Eastman, 1972: 17; Wakeman, 2003: 120), this article shows how the implementation of the program was shaped by the divergent ideals and interests of students, educators, and various state actors. In fact, while Lixingshe members were heavily involved in the training of school military instructors and the operation of the National Military Training Commissions, their institutional power within the program was constrained by the GMD’s civil bureaucracy and local school administrations. Specifically, it was the school principals—rather than the National Military Training Commissions controlled by the Lixingshe—that had direct supervisory power over school military instructors. Furthermore, this article illuminates how GMD leaders, especially Chiang Kai-shek, translated the political vision of “total militarization” into notions of personal reform and moral cultivation, conveying an idea of “war” centering on the perfection of everyday morality instead of violent struggles on the battlefield. I argue that Nanjing’s paradoxical tendency to demilitarize military training was partially attributable to the regime’s diplomatic acquiescence to Japanese intrusion in the mid-1930s.

More importantly, the peculiar dynamics of GMD youth mobilization evinced a conception of war and military violence drastically different from the militaristic cultures of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Previous studies of interwar fascism in Europe have demonstrated the centrality of the cult of war in fascist movements. In particular, fascist military expansion was undergirded by an aestheticization and glorification of military violence. Rooted in a social Darwinist understanding of historical progress, the European fascists that emerged in the aftermath of the First World War celebrated a notion of war that underscored direct action, perpetual struggles against racial enemies, and the regenerative power of violence and destruction (Payne, 1995: 10–11; Griffin, 1993: 44–45; Paxton, 2007: 32). Despite its militaristic rhetoric, an expansionist ideology was absent from Nanjing’s military and political vision. Prior to 1937, the regime’s militarization of society and culture was not buttressed by a quest for territorial expansion by means of warfare. In the case of prewar student military training, Nanjing’s militarization of everyday life aimed to divert anti-Japanese fervor into nonviolent activities so as to forestall, rather than promote, actual military confrontation with an external enemy. Nevertheless, this prompts us to ask further questions about how different GMD thinkers conceived, sanctioned, and debated notions of military violence during the encirclement campaigns against the communists, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Chinese Civil War—for which more inquiries are needed.