The Concept of διαθήκη in Hebrews 9.16-17

Introduction

The meaning of διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 has been one of the key areas of dispute in Hebrews scholarship. Traditionally, interpreters render the term διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 in the sense of last will or testament, ² but a challenging view has been emerging since Brooke F. Westcott: i.e., the author of Hebrews employs the Septuagint term διαθήκη ³ as an equivalent for ברית (‘covenant’) without the sense of last will in Heb. 9.16-17 (Westcott 1889: 300-302). This interpretation has recently gathered widespread support. ⁴ For instance, James Swetnam asserts, ‘There is no evidence in Classical or papyrological sources to substantiate the claim that a testament was valid only when the testator died’ (Swetnam 2016: 198). He views διαθήκη in 9.16-17 as the Sinai covenant and contends that, according to 9.16-17, Christ removed the curse of the covenant through his crucifixion (Swetnam 1965: 380). ⁵ John J. Hughes also argues that ‘It is simply untrue and completely lacking in classical and papyrological support to maintain that … a will or testament was only legally valid when the testator died’ (Hughes 1979: 61). He maintains that, in the Graeco-Roman era, ‘They [wills] were of immediate effect, transferring unrestricted ownership during the lifetime of the parents’ (Hughes 1979: 62) and that in 9.16, the concept of διαθήκη on the condition of the death of the testator cannot refer to ‘last will’ (Hughes 1979: 59-66). Scott W. Hahn writes that 9.11-14, 9.15, 9.16-17 and 9.18-22 constitute a logically progressing argument and that it is inappropriate that a different sense from the adjacent usage be imposed upon the concept of διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 (Hahn 2004: 419-21). He maintains that διαθήκη in 9.16-17 refers to the Sinai covenant, and he interprets ‘death’ in 9.16 as curse-bearing death according to the Sinai covenant. ⁶

However, I believe that these scholars misunderstood some important characteristics of ancient wills. The most significant question regarding this issue can be summarized as follows: did a testament immediately take effect when it was written regardless of the testator’s death? In this study, I will attempt to answer this query through the lens of ancient papyri, which remains unexplored by NT scholars. Recent papyrologists concur that Graeco-Egyptian papyri do not merely reflect Egyptian indigenous customs but contain legal rules and social practices which were prevalent in other provinces of the Graeco-Roman world. ⁷ In this vein, as Peter Arzt-Grabner writes, ‘Due to the work of papyrologists, the long lasting theory of a “Sonderfall Ägypten” is a matter of the past and no longer valid’ (Arzt-Grabner 2010: 21-32). As the problem lies in the historical usage of διαθήκη, we will explore the uses of διαθήκη in tandem with Graeco-Egyptian documentary papyri (inter alia, testament papyri) written in the period spanning 300 bce to 300 ce as well as Jewish sources. In particular, we will focus on the association of a testator’s death with the efficacy of διαθήκη in the next section.

The Death of a Testator and the Efficacy of the Testament ⁸

The term διαθήκη (‘will or testament’) can be defined as a sort of inheritance contract, which appoints heirs and apportions estates. For example, in P.Mich. 8.475 (100–125 ce): γνῶθι οὖν τίς αὐτοῦ κληρονόμος ἐστὶ καὶ πότε ἡ διαθήκη αὐτοῦ ἀνύγεται (‘So, know who his heir is, when the testament is opened’), the term διαθήκη refers to a legal declaration with regard to inheritance. ⁹

In Classical Athens, it was common for parents to allot their properties to their heirs before their sixtieth birthdays (Huebner 2013: 131). However, in contrast to some NT scholars’ opinion, recent classicists observe that Graeco-Roman inheritance practices differed from Attic customs. For instance, as Sabine Huebner writes, ‘Property transmission to the next generation during one’s lifetime took place in Roman Egypt only rarely’ (Huebner 2013: 132). Transfer of patrimony during the lifetime of a testator is seldom found in census returns and tax lists, once in Ptolemaic Egypt and once in Roman Egypt (in total twice), respectively. ¹⁰ Thus, ownership transmission was generally practised after the testator’s death in Ptolemaic and Graeco-Roman Egypt, and we can find the specific examples from testament papyri, as follows. ¹¹

Firstly, in donatio mortis causa (testament in contemplation of death), a testament clearly comes into force after the death of the testator, as follows (P.Mich. 18.785a (47 or 61 ce)):

ἔτους ὀγδόου Τιβερίου Κλαυδίου Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ Γερμανικοῦ Αὐτοκράτορος … ἐν Πτολεμαίδι Εὐεργέτιδι τοῦ Ἀρσινοίτου νομοῦ. ὁμολογεῖ Τιθουῆς πρεσβ̣ύτερος Πεταῦτος ὡς ἐτῶν τεσσεράκοντα τριῶν οὐλὴ ἀντικνημίωι δεξιῶι μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τέκνοις Πεταῦτι καὶ Θαήσι καὶ Ταμύσθᾳ τοῖς τρισὶ γεγονόσι αὐτῶι …

Emperor Tiberius Claudius Caesar Sebastus Germanicus eighth year … To Ptolemais Euergetis of Arsinoitos village. Titoues the elder, son of Petaus, approximately 43 years old declares that it is valid to divide [his property] after his death (μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτήν) to his three children, Petaus, Taesis and Tamusta whom he has begotten …

In the sentences above, division of property takes place after the death of the testator (δεξιῶι μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτήν). ¹² Thus, according to this papyrus, ownership transmission was not possible until the testator’s death. A similar case is found in the following papyrus (P. Mich. 5.321 (42 ce)).

ἔτους τρίτου Τιβερίου Κλαυδίου Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ Γερμανικοῦ Αὐτοκράτορος μηνὸς Ἰουλιέως Χοιὰχ πέμπτηι ἐν Τεβτύνι τῆς Πολέμωνος μερίδος τοῦ Ἀρσινοείτου νομοῦ. ὁμολογεῖ Ὀρσεῦς ὃς καὶ Ἡρώδης Νεστνήφιος ὡς ἐτῶν ἑξήκοντα πέντε … δεξιῶι … μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν τοῖς γεγωινώσι αὐτῶι ἐξ ἧς σύνεστιν γυναικὸς Ταορσεῦτος τῆς Πάτρωνος ὑειοῖς Νεστνήφι τῷ καὶ Ἰσχυρίωνι καὶ Παποντῶτι καὶ Ἐσούρι καὶ Τααπολλῶτι τοῖς τεσσαρεσι …

Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus Emperor third year. Ioulios, Koiach month, fifth day in Tebtunis of Polemon district of Arsinoitos village. Orseos, Herodes, son of Nestnefios, about 65 years old … that it is valid … to divide [his property] after his death (μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν) to his four sons, Ischurion and Papontos and Esouris and Taapollos, whom his wife Taorseus, daughter of Patron, gave birth to …

The papyrus above is also donatio mortis causa, in which Orseos, the testator, declares that the transfer of his property is deserved only after his death (ὁμολογεῖ … δεξιῶι … μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν). ¹³ Thus, in donatio mortis causa, transfer of estates did not take place as long as the testators were alive. The testament was not in force before their death, and the estates could be apportioned to heirs after the testators’ death.

Secondly, the efficacy of ownership transmission accrued after the death of a testator in the case of donatio inter vivos (testament during the testator’s lifetime). For example, in P.Oxy. 3.492 (130 ce):

τάδε διέθετο νοοῦσα καὶ φρονοῦσα … ἐφʼ ὃν μὲν περίειμι χρόνον ἔχειν με τὴν τῶν ἰδίων ἐξουσίαν πᾶν ὃ ἐὰν βούλωμαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ μεταδιατίθεσθαι καὶ πρὸς ἀκύρωσιν ἄγειν τήνδε τὴν διαθήκην ὃ δʼ ἂν ἐπιτελέσω κύριον ὑπάρχειν. ἐὰν δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ διαθήκῃ τελευτήσω μηδὲν ἐπιτελέσασα καταλείπω κληρονόμους Πτολλίωνα Θέωνος τοῦ Πτολλίωνος μητρὸς Ἰσαρεῦτος τῆς Θέωνος καὶ τὸν τούτου ὁμομήτριον ἀδελφὸν Θέωνα Θέωνος τοῦ Θέωνος τοῦ καὶ Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Θέωνος ἀμφοτέρους ἀπʼ Ὀξυρύγχων πόλεως κατὰ φιλοστοργίαν κοινῶς ἐξ ἴσου ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐὰν ζῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ τούτου τέκνα, τῆς ὑπαρχούσης μοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ Ὀξυρύγχων πόλει ἐπʼ ἀμφόδου Ἱππέων Παρενβολῆς οἰκίας καὶ αἰθρίου καὶ αὐλῆς καὶ χρηστηρίων καὶ ὧν ἐὰν ἀπολίπω δούλων σωμάτων καὶ ἄλλων καθʼ ὁνδηποτοῦν τρόπον παντοίων πάντων …

Here I made a testament when I am in sound mind … So long as I am alive, I have power over my property, to make any further provisions or new dispositions I choose and to revoke this will (πρὸς ἀκύρωσιν), and any such provisions shall be valid. But if I die with this will unaltered and no further provisions made I leave on account of their affection towards me Ptollion son of Theon son of Ptollion, his mother being Isareus daughter of Theon, and his brother on the mother’s side, Theon son of Theon, Son of Theon also called Apollonius son of Theon, both Oxyrhynchus, if they live, and if not, their children, as joint and equal heirs of the house, court, yard and fixtures belonging to me at Oxyrhynchus in the Knight’s camp quarter, and any slaves which I may leave and all other property of any kind whatever.

In this papyrus, when the testator is healthy and can think properly (τάδε διέθετο νοοῦσα καὶ φρονοῦσα), he makes a will, in which proprietorship of his property is still possessed by him (ἐφʼ ὃν μὲν περίειμι χρόνον ἔχειν με τὴν τῶν ἰδίων ἐξουσίαν πᾶν ὃ ἐὰν βούλωμαι περὶ αὐτῶν). In other words, the provisions of the testament do not become operative and the ownership is not conveyed to his heirs until the testator dies (ἐὰν δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ διαθήκῃ τελευτήσω μηδὲν ἐπιτελέσασα καταλείπω κληρονόμους). Thus, in this case, the death of the testator is a significant prerequisite for the implementation of the will.

A similar formula (donatio inter vivos) is attested in various testament papyri, as follows: ¹⁴

SB 18.13308 (82–96 ce): εἴη μέν μοι ὑγιαίνοντι τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ κύριον εἶναι πωλεῖν καὶ ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ μεταδιατίθεσθαι καὶ οἰκονομεῖν τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς ἐὰν αἱρῶμαι … ἐὰν δὲ τελευτήσω καταλείψομαι κληρονόμους τοὺς γεναμένους μοι ἐκ Θερμούθεως υἱοὺς δύο …

If I am healthy, I have the right to sell, to mortgage, to cede, to manage my own whatever I choose … But if I die, I leave inheritance to two sons as heirs, begotten to me from Hermoutheos.

CPR 6.1 (125 ce): εἴη μέν μοι ὑγιαίνοντι τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ κύριον εἶναι πωλοῦντα ὑπότιθέμενον μ̣εταδιατιθέμενον οἰκονομοῦντα τὰ ἐμ̣αυτοῦ ὡς ἐὰν αἱρῶμαι. ἐὰν δὲ τελευτήσω … τὰ τέκνα μ̣ου ἐκ τῆς … γυναικὸς Ἀφροδειτοῦτος τῆς Νείλου

If I am healthy, I have the power to sell, to cede, to mortgage and to manage my own whatever I choose. But if I die, [I leave] … to my children from … my wife, Aprodeitoute, daughter of Neilos.

P.Petr. 2.22 (235–234 bce ): εἴη μέν μοι ὑγιαίνοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ οἰκονομεῖν. ἐὰν δέ τι ἀνθρώπινον πάθω, καταλείπω τὰ ὑπάρχοντά μου πάντα καὶ ὃν ἔχω σταθμὸν ἐκ βασιλικοῦ …

If I am healthy, I will manage my own. But if I suffer something human, I leave all my property and a portion from the royal yard.

P.Oxy. 3.489 (117 ce): ἐφʼ ὃν μὲν περίειμι χρόνον τῶν ἰδίων κύριον εἶναι καὶ χρᾶσθαι καὶ οἰκονομεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μεταδιατίθεσθαι καθʼ ὃν ἐὰν αἱρῶμαι τρόπον. μετὰ δὲ τελευτὴν μου συνχωρῶ ἔχειν τὴν συνοῦσάν μοι γυναῖκα Διογενίδα Πτολεμαίου ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως

As far as I am present, I have the power to use, and to manage about them and to mortgage according to whichever way I choose. But after my death, I give my belongings to my wife Diogenes, daughter of Ptolemaios from the same city.

As shown in the variations above, we observe the uses of the formula of donatio inter vivos (‘If I am alive, I have the right over my property. But if I die, I will leave it to …’), which denote that the proprietorship of the estate is retained by the testator as long as he/she is alive and is transferred to heirs only after his/her death. By donatio inter vivos, the testators assigned only the usufruct (usus fructus; a legal right to use and to derive profit from someone else’s property), not the whole proprietorship, as long as they are alive (Huebner 2013: 133).

Thirdly, similar inheritance patterns are found in ancient Jewish society. There are similarities and dissimilarities between Jewish and Graeco-Egyptian inheritance practices. For an example of dissimilarities, primogeniture was rarely practised in Graeco-Egyptian society, but, in Jewish society, the firstborn son of the father (לנחלה ‎ בכור (the firstborn son with respect to inheritance)) was given a double share from the father’s estate according to Deut. 21.15-17, and Jews generally complied with this ordinance in the Graeco-Roman and the Talmudic era. ¹⁵

Nevertheless, as in Graeco-Roman society, some testamentary conventions were similarly practised in Jewish society. For example, under the Talmudic law, the transfer of patrimony is categorized into two kinds, as in Graeco-Roman society: (1) בריא ‎ מתנת (donatio inter vivos) (Yaron 1960: 46-60); and (2) מרע שכיב ‎ מתנת ‎ (donatio mortis causa), as follows (Yaron 1960: 61-78):

Baba Batra chapter 8 mishnah 9: One who writes his properties over to his sons must write: ‘from today and after my death’, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Joseph said, it is unnecessary. If one writes his properties over to his son for the time after his death, the father cannot sell them because they are written over to the son; the son cannot sell because they are in the father’s possession. If the father sold, they are sold until he dies. If the son sold, the buyer has no claim until the father dies. The father harvests and feeds anybody he pleases; what becomes part of his estate belongs to the heirs. ¹⁶

The contradictory adverbial phrase ‘from today and after my death’ in the above quotation means that the heir acquires the usufruct ‘from today’ but will gain the full ownership to sell the property ‘after the death of the testator’. As long as the testator is alive, the proprietorship over the estate still belongs to him. We detect similar inheritance patterns in the Babatha archive discovered in the Judean desert (P.Yadin 7; 120 ce), and here the full ownership is also transferred after the father’s death through the testament: ¹⁷

Lines 4-5: All that I possess in Mahoza … whatever else I possess that is not described, together with all that I may acquire and will become my possession from this time – I have given to you as a gift forever.

Ostensibly, it seems that the patrimony is immediately conveyed to the heirs ‘from this time’ (i.e., from now on), but, in lines 14 and 17-18, it is declared that the full ownership is still retained by the testator until his death.

Line 14: I have given to you, Miryam, my wife, as a gift forever, on the binding agreement that I may enjoy the usufruct, and retain possession, and remit possession, and remit payment of their property taxes; And reside and install (others) as residents, in the courtyards and houses, all the days of my life. And when I go to my eternal home, you shall become the rightful possessor of the sites of this gift, or of what [I shall] leave of them behind …

Lines 17-18: I will possess from this time forth [and forever]. That is described in this document of gift, to buy and to sell, and to inherit and to bequeath, and to pledge (as security) and to grant as gift, and to sow and to plant, and to build, and to remit their payments, and to do with them all that you wish; You and your sons and your heirs, and whoever may gain possession from your hand from the day on which I will go to my eternal home and forever.

In the sentences above, it is apparent that the right for the property is assigned to heirs ‘when I go to my eternal home’ (i.e., ‘when I die’), ¹⁸ and what is bestowed upon the heirs ‘from this time’ is only the usufructuary right, not the proprietorship which includes the right to sell and to manage. ¹⁹ We should note that the deed of gift is strictly distinguished from property transmission according to a testament in Jewish society (Yaron 1960: 53). Thus, in this papyrus, property transmission took place after the death of the testator as observed in other papyri. Therefore, these testamentary phenomena in the Babatha archive and some Talmudic sources show that our evidence is not confined to Graeco-Egyptian papyri, but our argument can also be substantiated from Jewish sources. ²⁰

In brief, the term διαθήκη (‘testament’) can be defined as an inheritance contract to identify heirs or a legal declaration in respect of inheritance, and the declaration of property transmission took effect after the testator’s death. In Graeco-Roman and Jewish society, the transfer of the patrimony during the lifetime of a testator was something of a rarity. In donatio mortis causa, the hereditary estate was allotted after the death of the testator. In donatio inter vivos, the usufruct could be conveyed to the heirs, but the proprietorship was retained by the testator as long as he lived. Therefore, a testator’s death intrinsically has a close association with the effectiveness of the testament, contrary to many scholars’ assumptions.

The Concept of διαθήκη in Hebrews 9.16-17

In this section, we will consider that the author of Hebrews adopts the secular sense of διαθήκη as testament in Heb. 9.16-17 in order to elucidate the meaning of covenant for the audience who lived in the Graeco-Roman world. ²¹ The concept of διαθήκη in the sense of testament in Heb. 9.16-17 fits well with the context of Hebrews, as explained below.

Firstly, the term διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 is juxtaposed with κληρονομία in Heb. 9.15. If so, we can interpret διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 in light of κληρονομία. The conjunction γάρ in Heb. 9.16 indicates a close connection between 9.15 and 9.16-17. In terms of the contents, 9.16-17 is also coherent with Heb. 9.15 (κληρονομία, θάνατος in Heb. 9.15 and διαθήκη, διαθέμενος, θάνατος (and also νεκρός) in Heb. 9.16-17). Furthermore, it is probable that Heb. 9.16-17 functions as a parenthesis, ²² which explains what ‘obtaining κληρονομία through διαθήκη’ means in Heb. 9.15. ²³ In Heb. 9.15b, the author of Hebrews states that the death of Christ results in the accomplishment of the promise for the eternal inheritance, and so the author may have felt the need to give an additional account of this aspect through inserting a parenthesis. Thus, the concept of διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 can be considered within the context of the terms κληρονομία and θάνατος in Heb. 9.15, and this leads us to translate διαθήκη as ‘testament’, i.e., a legal declaration with regard to inheritance which takes effect at the death of the testator. ²⁴

Secondly, the term βεβαία in Heb. 9.17 can be interpreted as contract language (a legal term), which indicates the effectiveness of the testator’s testament. ²⁵ For instance:

P.Yadin 19 (128 ce): ὥστε ἔχειν τὴν προγεγρ̣αμ̣μένην Σελαμψιοῦς … τὸ ἄλλο ἥμισυ μετὰ τὲ τελευτῆσαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰούδα κυρίως καὶ βεβ̣αίως …

So, aforesaid Selampsion will possess … the other half will be secure and valid (κυρίως καὶ βεβ̣αίως) after the death of Judah his father (μετὰ τὲ τελευτῆσαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰούδα) …

In this papyrus, discovered in the Judean desert, Judah, Babatha’s husband, grants his estate in Ein Gedi to Selampsion, his daughter, in the form of testament (διέθετο Ἰούδας; line 11), and the ownership of the property would be valid after Judah’s death. Similar patterns are also detected in Graeco-Egyptian papyri (e.g., P.Mich. 5.321; P.Mich. 18.785a): δεξιῶι μεμερικέναι μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν (‘The division [of the property] is valid after his death’). In these patterns, the implementation of property transmission is directly linked with the death of the testator. For instance:

P.Hamb. 1.73 (second century ce): εἰ δέ τι ἐγὼ μετὰ ταῦτα γεγραμμένον καταλείπω τῇ ἐμῇ χιρὶ γραφόμενον οἵῳ δήποτε τρόπῳ, βέβαιόν μοι εἶναι θέλω …

And if I leave some writing [i.e., testament] by my hand after these in any manner, I wish that it will be valid (βέβαιόν) to me.

PSI 13.1325 (176–180 ce): εἰ δέ τι ἐγὼ μετὰ ταῦτα γεγραμμένον καταλείπω τῇ ἐμῇ χειρὶ γεγραμμένον οἵῳ δήποτε τρόπῳ, βέβαιον … ἐμοὶ εἶναι θέλω.

And if I leave some writing [i.e., testament] by my hand after these in any manner, I wish that it will be … valid (βέβαιον) to me.

In these papyri, the effectiveness of the testaments accrues after a testator’s death or funeral. The testators’ wish is that their funerals be held in prudence and piety by their heirs (ἐκκομισθῆναι ἐμ̣αυτὴν θέλω τῇ φροντίδι καὶ εὐσεβείᾳ τῶν κληρονόμων μου), and their testaments will come into force (βέβαιον) after their funerals (μετὰ ταῦτα).

In Chr.Mitt. 316 (189 or 194 ce), the same term βέβαια is also observed. Gaius Longinus Castor, a retired Roman soldier, apportions his estate in the Arsinoite Nome through his testament. This testament was opened after Castor’s death (ἠνύγησαν καὶ ἀνεγνώσθησαν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν ᾗ καὶ ἡ διαθήκη ἐλύθη). Castor makes his will as follows: εἰ δέ τι περισσὰ γράμματα τῇ χειρί μου γεγραμμένα καταλίπω βέβαια εἶναι θέλω (‘If I leave some writing [his will] by my hand, I wish that it will be valid (βέβαια)’). Thus, his will is operative (βέβαια) after their death, specifically after their burial service. Similarly, the sentence διαθήκη γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία in Heb. 9.17 can be interpreted as follows: διαθήκη takes effect (βέβαια) when the testator dies.

Thirdly, the terms διαθέμενος and διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 can reflect a testament formula (διατίθημι διαθήκην). ²⁶ Hughes contends that διαθέμενος in Heb. 9.16 refers to a ratifier and διατίθημι διαθήκην could be meant as ‘ratify a compact’ (Hughes 1979: 39-40). Yet Hughes does not provide evidence that when the verb διατίθημι is used with κληρονομία it conveys a sense of ‘ratify a compact’. We should also notice that the phrase διατίθημι διαθήκην generally refers to ‘make a will’ (e.g., κατὰ διαθήκην ἣν διέθετο ἡ μήτηρ (P.Col. 10.275; 201–225 ce)). ²⁷ The aorist verb διέθετο is also a typical testament formula in Graeco-Roman society. ²⁸ As Friedrich Preisigke observes, διαθήκη refers only to a testament or a will in Ptolemaic and Roman-Egyptian papyri. ²⁹ Thus, the phrase διατίθημι διαθήκην should be rendered in the sense of ‘make a will’ as a testament formula, not ‘ratify a compact’, if it is used with the term κληρονομία.

Fourthly, as for the phrase μεσίτης διαθήκης in Heb. 9.15, Hughes asserts, ‘The office of μεσίτης is unknown in connection with wills and testaments’ (Hughes 1979: 64). Jörg Frey writes that it is a ‘logische Inkonsistenz’ to regard Jesus Christ as μεσίτης (‘mediator’) and testator simultaneously. ³⁰ However, μεσίτης (‘arbitrator or mediator’) could play a certain role with regard to testament, and the testator could also be μεσίτης. The following papyrus (P.Diog. 11 (213 ce)) may be potentially significant in understanding Heb. 9.15-17:

Ἰσιδώρα Πτολεμαίου … μεσιτίας μου γεναμένης καὶ διέταξα τῷ υἱῷ μου Ἰσιδώρῳ πρὸ μιᾶς ἡμέρας μου τοῦ θανάτου εἴ τί μ̣οι ὑπάρχει ἀγρῶν τε καὶ οἰκοπέδων καὶ χρυσία καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ … ετωε … ὅσα ἔχω κατὰ συνγραφὴν πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα μου Λουκρήτιον Διογένην χωρὶς τῶν παιδαρείων μου δύο καὶ ἀργυρίου δραχμὰς φεντακοσίας … καὶ Αὐρηλίω Ἰγνατίω Ἀπολιναρίω καὶ ὁ προγεγραμενος μου κυριος καὶ ἀνὴρ Λουκρητίου Διογένους καὶ Μάρκου Αὐρηλίου Σερ̣ήνου. κυρία ἡ μεσιτία Ἰσιδώρα Πτολεμαίου διέταξα τῷ υἱῷ μου τὰ προκίμενα διὰ τῶν προκιμένων μεσιτῶν ὡς πρ̣όκιται.

Isidora, daughter of Ptolemaios, after becoming my mediator (μεσιτίας μου γεναμένης), appointed (διέταξα) my son, Isidoros one day before my death if I have some estates and buildings, gold and clothes … As long as I have according to the contract towards my husband Loukretios, besides two of my young slaves and 500 silver drachmas … Aurelios Ignatios Apolinarios and aforesaid my lord and husband Loukretios Diogenes and Markos Aurelios Serenos. The lady of the house Isidora, daughter of Ptolemaios, the mediator (ἡ μεσιτία), appointed my son for the aforesaid things through the aforesaid mediator as already written.

This is Isidora’s testament (donatio mortis causa), written by her husband for the sake of Isidora who was illiterate (ἔγραψα ὑπὲρ τῆς γυναικός μου Ἰσιδώρας ἀγραμμάτου), in which Isidora allots her property to her husband and son, Isidoros, and calls herself μεσιτία (‘testator’) (= μεσιτεία; ‘arbitrator or mediator’). This testament was written in an idiosyncratic form, and it seems that it was not composed by an official secretary (i.e., grapheion office). ³¹ This idiosyncratic format implies that Isidora may have had some urgent reasons to make her will in a rush, but at least this testament signals that a testator could be legally a mediator or an arbitrator for himself/herself.

A similar pattern is also substantiated in P.Strasb. 4.284 (176–180 ce): μεσιτεύουσαν παραχωροῦσαν μεταδιατιθεμένην οἰκονομοῦσαν τὰ κατʼ ἐμαυτὴν ὡς ἀνῄρωμαι ἐὰν δὲ τελευτήσω … (‘If I die, the right to arbitrate, to mortgage, to allot and to manage my property …’). This sentence also indicates that the right to arbitrate the estate belonged to the testator in this case. These examples (P.Diog. 11 and P.Strasb. 4.284) may connote that, in some situations, a testator could arbitrate his/her hereditary estates for himself/herself. Accordingly, it is not inconsistent that the testator is simultaneously a μεσίτης in Heb. 9.15-17. ³²

Fifthly, some scholars read the Greek νεκρός in Heb. 9.17 in the sense of a cultic sacrifice or a dead body, not as the testator’s death. ³³ However, if the author of Hebrews intended to convey a sense of ‘a sacrifice’, he would have chosen the term θυσία ³⁴ or αἷμα ³⁵ for this meaning. Furthermore, νεκρός is an inappropriate term to express the sense of cultic sacrifice. David Moffitt writes that the concept of cultic sacrifice refers to life, not merely to death, in Leviticus ³⁶ and Jewish literature. ³⁷ For example, ‘For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you for making atonement for your lives on the altar; for, as life, it is the blood that makes atonement’ (NRSV) in Lev. 17.11. Thus, offering a sacrifice can mean offering life, not merely offering death, and so it is highly likely that the term νεκρός in Heb. 9.17 does not refer to a cultic sacrifice. ³⁸

Sixthly, the mentions of inheritance (κληρονομία) in Heb. 9.15 and testament (διαθήκη) in Heb. 9.16 match well with the whole context of Hebrews. The significance of wilderness and pilgrimage motifs in Hebrews has already been noted by interpreters. ³⁹ In Hebrews, the situation of the readers is likened to Israel’s wilderness experience before entering the promised land (e.g., 4.1). The readers are also exhorted not to forsake the promise given to them, but to hold onto it (e.g., 3.14; 10.36; 12.16, etc). Likewise, the motif of inheritance is also prevalent in Hebrews. For instance: ⁴⁰

Heb. 1.2: ὃν ἔθηκεν κληρονόμον πάντων …

Heb. 1.14: ἀποστελλόμενα διὰ τοὺς μέλλοντας κληρονομεῖν σωτηρίαν …

Heb. 6.12: ἵνα μὴ νωθροὶ γένησθε, μιμηταὶ δὲ τῶν διὰ πίστεως καὶ μακροθυμίας κληρονομούντων τὰς ἐπαγγελίας.

Heb. 12.17: μετέπειτα θέλων κληρονομῆσαι τὴν εὐλογίαν …

The motif of inheritance symbolizes ‘entering the promised land’ in Hebrews. ⁴¹ The author of Hebrews evokes that the readers have the promise of inheritance (i.e., entering the promised land). ⁴² In the rhetorical climax of Hebrews, the people of God in Heavenly Zion are receiving a kingdom that cannot be shaken (Διὸ βασιλείαν ἀσάλευτον παραλαμβάνοντες ἔχωμεν χάριν (12.28)), which may remind the readers of the inheritance motif. As discussed above, διαθήκη refers to a kind of inheritance contract, and this notion of διαθήκη in 9.16-17 fits with the whole context of Hebrews with regard to inheritance.

Lastly, the death of Christ in Heb. 9.11-15 can be understood as the event through which the people of God are enabled to take part in the inheritance promised according to διαθήκη. The significance of Christ’s death is one of the major issues in Hebrews. One may maintain that the death of Jesus is merely a preparatory act for the atonement in the heavenly temple, and it does not have a significance other than as the prerequisite for the atoning offering in heaven. ⁴³ Whilst I would agree that the atonement in Hebrews includes some multi-stage act, I also propose that Christ’s death is more than a preparatory act for his heavenly offering of atonement; the inheritance takes effect for the believers due to the death of Christ, because the death of the testator is a premise for the efficacy of the testament. ⁴⁴ In Heb. 9.16-17, the author of Hebrews conveys that, through his atoning death, Christ brings the effectiveness of the promise, and ultimately accomplished the promise of the inheritance. ⁴⁵ Thus, the death of Christ is causa sine qua non for participation in the promised inheritance according to διαθήκη, and the death of Christ as well as his resurrection opened a new and living way through which his people can have access to the heavenly inheritance (cf. 10.19-20). As a result, the process of the inheritance can also be sequential: the testament (διαθήκη) was made effective through the crucifixion of Christ (9.16-17), and then Christ was resurrected and entered the heavenly promised land (i.e., his eternal inheritance; cf. εἰσαγάγῃ τὸν πρωτότοκον εἰς τὴν οἰκουμένην in Heb 1.6). ⁴⁶

To sum up, Heb. 9.16-17 serves as a parenthesis, which explains how the people of God are enabled to participate in ‘the promised eternal inheritance’ in 9.15. Christ is simultaneously a μεσίτης (9.15) and a testator (9.16), and this can be explained by examining Graeco-Roman social conventions, as seen above. Hebrews 9.16-17 is not isolated from the adjacent context but can be located within the whole context with regard to the eschatological inheritance and the pilgrimage to the promised land. Thus, when the author of Hebrews says in Heb. 9.17, ‘a will is valid only at death, since it is not in force as long as the one who made it is alive’, it exactly reflects the contemporaneous notion of διαθήκη as testament.

Conclusion

I began this work with a survey of testaments in Graeco-Roman documentary papyri. Many exegetes assume that διαθήκη was immediately effective when it was written and that it was common to transfer the unrestricted ownership of property to heirs regardless of the testators’ death in Graeco-Roman society. However, these assumptions are not sustainable when we explore actual testamentary practices in ancient society. In documentary papyri, whereas it was possible for testators to assign a usufructuary right to their children in their lifetime (i.e., donatio inter vivos), transfer of patrimonum rarely took place during the lifetime of the testator, and the death of the testator was conditio sine qua non for the efficacy of the testament. That is, διαθήκη takes effect after the death of the testator. In this context, the term διαθήκη in Heb. 9.16-17 should be construed as ‘testament’. Thus, in 9.16-17, the author of Hebrews suggests that, through his crucifixion, Christ realized the promise of the inheritance and enabled believers to participate in ‘the promised eternal inheritance’ according to διαθήκη.