Abstract
In the past two decades, trade unions have sought to counter membership decline, initially through a focus on organizing. More recently the union renewal project has prompted a re-examination of whether unions can use different types of inter-union collaboration to build power for workers and the movement. This article examines two examples of such inter-union collaboration, the Transport Unions Federation and the Australian Workers’ Union–Maritime Union of Australia Offshore Alliance. The development of these organizational relationships is important to the trade union movement in Australia and internationally as examples of new forms of external solidarity.
Introduction
Within the now extensive union revitalization literature, much emphasis has been placed on examining and analysing the nature and efficacy of different strategies, in particular (workplace) organizing and union–community coalitions. Both of these strategies have been argued as necessary inclusions in the armoury of unions to turn around their fortunes. Organizing has in many cases had an internal focus on the workplace (though there are some notable industry-based campaigns, such as Justice for Janitors and its international variants, such as the United Kingdom Justice for Cleaners and Australian Cleanstart campaigns). Union–community coalitions have been portrayed as the type of external relationships that need to be fostered, but many accounts emphasize the pressures experienced in first creating and then sustaining durable and mutually rewarding relationships (Muir, 2008; Tattersall, 2010). Another strategy, ‘partnership’, has sought to reconfigure union–management relations and arguably power dynamics (Johnstone et al., 2009). All of these, as Simms (2012: 102) reminds us, remain ‘contested’ strategies and ideas and continue to provoke much debate within unions and the academy. In addition, unions have also questioned, re-examined and reassessed the relationships they have with each other. Inter-union relationships formally structured through peak unions have been longstanding features of trade union movements from their earliest development, at a variety of scales. 1 Within multi-union workplaces, these relationships took the form of shop and combine committees.
In a number of countries over the past two decades there has been increasing interest in unions creating, building, rebuilding and cementing collaborative inter-union relationships through formal alliances or federations. Some of these efforts have involved ruptures within existing peak unions and the creation of often competing bodies (see for example Connolly, 2012; Serdar, 2012), others have focused on reviving and rebuilding old structures (Union Cities in the United States, regional trades councils in the UK and the Global Union Federations), as well as the initiation of new inter-union groups (Australia). These have occurred at different geographical scales, including the local, industry, national and international, and reflect the diversity of strategies adopted by unions to address and redress the crisis that continues to confront organized labour with declining density and membership, industrial and political power.
In Australia, inter-union collaborations are nearly as old as the union movement itself, initially formed to pursue shorter hours, in the form of the eight-hour day. Many of these peak unions sought to formalize these relationships, with the development of rules covering affiliation and representation, decision-making structures and dispute resolution processes. Historical examples of industry peak unions include the Building Trades Council in New South Wales (NSW) (Coolican, 1988) and the Printing Trades Federation Council (Hagan, 1966), while the Metal Trades Federation of Unions (MTFU) is a more contemporary example, having been formed in the 1940s. These industry groupings can also be found within a number of Australian peak unions, as part of their internal structure, for example, the industry groups in the Labor Council of NSW (Markey, 1994) and the national peak union, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) (Hagan, 1981). In the case of the ACTU, the inclusion of the industry groups in its decision-making structures, coupled with factional control between affiliates in those groups, shaped and continues to shape the ideological direction of the ACTU.
Despite the ongoing presence and role of industry peak unions, by the end of the 1990s, they had received little academic attention. When canvassing the limited research on peak unions, Ellem and Shields (1996: 378) noted in particular ‘[w]e know even less about industry-level peak bodies’ and this still remains the case. Set against this background, the resurgence of interest among trade unions for more industry-based collaborations is significant both because of the scale at which these relationships were formed and their connection to the union renewal project. The Australian Workers’ Union (AWU) formed an Offshore Alliance with the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) in 2003, and the Manufacturing Alliance with the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) in 2007. Three unions in the transport sector – the Maritime Union of Australia, Transport Workers Union (TWU) and the Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Union (RTBU) – formed the Transport Unions Federation (TUF) in 2009. Two more alliances followed: the Aviation Unions Federation (AUF) in 2010 and the Qantas Engineers Alliance (QEA) in 2011. The Manufacturing Alliance was born out of a political imperative by the AWU and the AMWU to influence industry policy at the Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) National Conference. It does not seek to replicate the MTFU and is deliberately less formalized than the Offshore Alliance (interview, National Secretary, 2010). The AUF, involving the Flight Attendants Association of Australia – Domestic/Regional Division, 2 the Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association, the Australian and International Pilots Association and the TWU, mirrors the industry structure of TUF. The QEA’s company focus distinguishes it, but again brings together the AMWU and AWU, this time with the Electrical Trades Union. A number of unions figure in more than one alliance. The unions involved vary in size from very large to relatively small and include what would be described in the Australian context as ‘industry’ unions as well as occupational unions. They are also primarily male-dominated unions in both their leadership profile and membership base, with one notable exception. Their creation has not been universally welcome having, in some respects, an unsettling effect among other unions. This has played out among affiliates in forums of the ACTU.
This article focuses on the AWU–MUA Offshore Alliance and TUF. They were selected because these alliances are examples of both continuity and discontinuity. Continuity can be seen in the desire for unions to form inter-union bodies or peak unions. Certainly they fit within Ellem and Shields’ definition of peak unions, being ‘permanent inter-union organizations directed at furthering defined or assumed common interests or objectives by means of jointly determined strategies’, coming together voluntarily with each union affiliate retaining organizational autonomy (Ellem and Shields, 1996: 377). There are two points of difference, however, with their historical counterparts. One is their scope. Commonly including two or three unions, at least initially, these ‘new’ bodies do not have the scope of coverage traditionally sought by many peak unions (which seek to be broadly representative and speak on behalf of unions at the scale at which they organize). In both cases there is a specific desire for a narrower scope, in terms of how and why they formed. Two is the current crop of inter-union bodies involve a handful of unions whose contrary factional allegiance would have previously impeded such cooperation without the offsetting influence of other affiliates.
These two alliances were initiated in times of significant change, including industrial, economic, sectoral, regulatory and political change, threatening the very existence of some of these individual unions and prompting the others to reconsider the effectiveness of their organizing and bargaining strategies. The birth of these alliances also reflected the loosening of factional ties traditionally constraining such cooperation, or at least reconsideration of the unions’ industrial strategies representing the discontinuity referred to earlier. It is important to understand the impact and role of factionalism within the Australian labour movement, including its peak unions. A faction can be described as ‘a formally organised group within a party, with its own power structure, that attempts to influence policy and promotion within the wider party. The existence of one faction almost inevitably results in the creation of opposed faction/s so that internal party competition is conducted between clearly recognisable and organised teams’ (Hogan, 2009: 79). Although the reality is often more complex (see Leigh, 2000), the factions are broadly divided between the ‘Left’ and the ‘Right’, and these are identifiable within the ALP with which unions are affiliated, individual unions and peak unions. Union leaders frequently play key factional roles in the ALP, and struggles over power in unions and peak unions reflect factional allegiances (Brigden, 2007). As Leigh explains, while organized power groupings are found in all organizations and political parties, ‘within the ALP, however, [factions] are far more structured than in any other Australian political party or indeed any other social democratic party in the Western world’ (Leigh, 2000: 427).
In this study we argue that, while the impetus to inter-union collaboration is a familiar one, the factional context in which it takes place is less so. We distinguish between what we call ‘multi-factional’ collaboration, traditionally seen in peak unions and ‘cross-factional’ collaboration, which is a feature of these newly formed alliances. By cross-factional, we mean the conscious and deliberate association of unions with different factional allegiances. These unions come together because of these differences, rather than seeking to advance the interests of one faction over another through peak union affiliation where multi-factionalism involves often uneasy or conflictual relationships between factionally opposed unions (Brigden, 2007). In the two cases we examine, cross-factional industrial alliances were forged whereby left and right aligned unions consciously use the political differences of each faction to achieve both industrial and political ends.
Through analysis of existing literature, union documents, publications, websites and interviews with union leaders, this article explores such forms of union collaboration in the Australian trade union movement. It does so in the context of a ‘deregulated’ and decentralized industrial relations system. 3 Understanding changing forms of worker representation is important in a country such as Australia whose industrial and political history is inextricably linked to the activities of organized labour. Drawing on Lévesque and Murray’s (2002) power resources framework, the cases illustrate new approaches to and forms of external solidarity. Our interest in the institutional relationships between the constituent unions means this article focuses on ‘why’ these alliances came into being (rather than the process of ‘how’) and the broader question of how this links to various approaches to union revitalization, in particular the role of strategic choices made by union leaders.
With a focus on ‘why’ the alliances were formed, the context in which they originated and the structure they took, the analysis contributes to the scholarship on union renewal, in particular the role of leadership, debates about different strategies to build union power and how context shapes those strategies. Three factors emerge as critical to the creation of these alliances – external (political and managerial) threats, union leadership and factional arrangements – while their ongoing viability is affected by leadership commitment and perceived benefits of formalized relationships. We ask the following questions: why has there been a move by certain union leaders to create new forms of ‘connectedness’ and how do they explain the strategic importance of inter-union collaborations? What are the contextual factors shaping the form and nature of the alliances? What impact are the alliances having on the internal power dynamics of the Australian trade union movement?
The next section outlines the key threads of debate in the revitalization literature. The constituent unions and alliances are then examined, followed by discussion of the features of these contemporary collaborations, with consideration given to the effect on relationships with the ACTU. The conclusion points to the role of such alliances as part of union renewal.
Union revitalization
The past two decades have seen much debate within the labour movement about the potential for union revitalization and the forms such a renewal might take. In Australia, the union debate was prompted by the realization in the early 1990s that, although the macro-level strategy of amalgamation initiated by the ACTU had provided some rationalization of union coverage and consolidation of union resources, it had not stemmed the steep decline in membership numbers. A number of factors have been identified as having precipitated the union crisis. Changes in the economy and labour market, the legislative and regulatory environment, job characteristics, worker attitudes, employer strategies or any combination of these have been considered important in explaining the situation in which Australian unions find themselves today (Peetz, 1998). The crisis in membership, with obvious implications for union power, prompted unions to consider future strategies to ensure their survival (Peetz, 2006). Such debates were heard in union movements in numerous other countries as they too grappled with similar environmental changes and declining union density and power. These debates in turn have shaped research agendas and there has developed a considerable body of empirical and conceptual scholarly work analysing the resulting union strategies and campaigns, their form and impact. Strategies garnering the most academic attention have been organizing, union–management partnership and union–community coalitions (see for example, Johnstone et al., 2009; Simms and Holgate, 2010; Tattersall, 2010).
Surveying the renewal literature, Hickey et al. (2010) note the ambiguities in the use of the term ‘union renewal’ and identify three main approaches by researchers. The first views union renewal as ‘a process of member re-engagement and increased commitment and participation’; the second focuses on the ‘strategic choices of union leaders’. The third view argues that union renewal requires ‘a combination of top-down and bottom-up strategies’ (Hickey et al., 2010: 56). Top-down strategies imply those that are leadership driven, whereas bottom-up strategies are those which are membership driven. When examining the degree to which bottom-up strategies lay at the heart of renewal, Voss (2010: 376) found that ‘change is often driven by strong coordination and centralism rather than by bottom-up pressure’. Crisis triggered transformation, as it ‘opened the door to greater intervention by change-oriented national leaders’ (Voss, 2010: 376). The centrality of leadership is also articulated by Lévesque and Murray (2006). In their introduction to the 2006 special issue of the Labor Studies Journal on union renewal, Lévesque and Murray (2006: 9) highlight collective identities, networks and external expertise and leadership as key union resources. As they recognize, leadership is ‘embedded in particular contexts in which individuals and groups have to make particular choices’. With particular resonance for the cases examined here, is their observation that ‘past trajectories and generational cohorts’ can shape these choices (Lévesque and Murray, 2006: 11).
The importance of networks reflects Lévesque and Murray’s earlier work in which they argue that union revitalization strategies depend on development and mobilization of power resources (Lévesque and Murray, 2002). They identify ‘three levers of union power: agenda, internal solidarity and external solidarity’ (2002: 40). Building ‘horizontal and vertical coordination’ (including alliances with other unions and the community) is a key element of external solidarity (2002: 46). Transnational campaigns, for example, illustrate ‘new forms of “connectedness” ’ (2002: 54). While Lévesque and Murray build their analysis on Canadian research, their argument that ‘the challenge for union action, therefore, is how to construct enduring forms of external solidarity for it is this effort that is likely to enhance local union power’ (2002: 58) is relevant to the pursuit of inter-union collaboration by the unions in the cases analysed below. 4
The alliances
This section begins with an overview of the four unions involved in these two alliances: the AWU, MUA, RTBU and TWU. They vary in size from the MUA with about 15,000 members to the very large AWU with in excess of 121,000 members. The RTBU has more than 35,000 members while TWU membership is over 87,000 (as of December 2011; all other figures as of 31 December 2012, taken from annual return data provided to Fair Work Australia by the union in question). All are national unions with state/territory branches, with the AWU also including state/region and industry- based branches, and each reflects the influence of amalgamations and mergers.
Scope of coverage varies from the MUA’s maritime industry focus on stevedoring, seafarers, divers and port employees to the AWU’s more diverse industry spread beyond its pastoral and mining base into manufacturing, steel, aluminium, glass, oil and gas, aviation, construction, plastics, food, paper, racing and aquaculture. In transport, the RTBU covers workers in the rail, light rail, tram and government bus sectors while the TWU organizes in aviation, oil, waste, gas, road transport, passenger vehicles and freight logistics.
Due to the classifications used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics it is difficult to isolate density by sector because of the overlapping coverage by industry (see for example ABS, 2010). Furthermore, aggregate data do not provide insight into the changing industry dynamics and the impact of these on union membership and density. Analysis of membership trends between 2005 and 2009 (covering the ‘WorkChoices’ period of the conservative federal coalition government and early years of the subsequent federal Labor government) shows increases for the MUA, TWU and RTBU, with all three unions recording greater increases between 2007 and 2009. The AWU, in contrast, had a significant loss of members in 2005–2007 before recovering strongly in 2008 and 2009 (Davis, 2010).
Each of the unions has been confronted by significant change. For example, both the AWU and MUA encountered challenges in retaining existing members as well as identifying new areas for membership expansion. The offshore oil and gas industry was one such area. Between 1995–1996 and 2002–2003, employment in offshore oil and gas increased by an average of 3.7% per year (above the all-industry average) (Allen Consulting Group, 2004). Other issues for the maritime industry included increasing participation by foreign flag vessels, the shift from roster-based to company employment in 1998 accompanied by the reduction in average crew numbers per vessel from over 30 in the early 1980s to around 16, together with a decline in seafarer numbers (AWU, 2008).
The RTBU and the TWU were also each confronted with a changing environment. For the RTBU, the privatization of rail freight in NSW and the public transport system in Victoria in the 1990s, and the subsequent entry of large companies like Toll Holdings, exposed the union and its members to private sector labour management practices. These external changes had internal ramifications with the union moving to operate as a national union (RTBU, 2006). In the Australian road transport sector, the past 20 years have seen a variety of economic and political pressures cause an intensification of competition within the sector. Continued fragmentation of the sector resulted from the increased outsourcing of transport by manufacturers contributing to the growth of precarious employment (largely in the form of independent contracting) (Mayhew and Quinlan, 2006). This has led the TWU to focus much of its political and industrial campaigning on establishing regulations for the pay and conditions of this category of driver (Kaine and Rawling, 2010).
AWU–MUA Offshore Alliance
Among the oldest unions in Australia, the AWU and the MUA (through its predecessor unions, the Seamen’s Union and Waterside Workers Federation [WWF]) had long come into conflict due to coverage disputes between the unions. They were ideologically opposed, with the AWU aligned with the right-wing of the labour movement and the Seamen/WWF/MUA with the left (Beasley, 1996; Fitzpatrick and Cahill, 1981; Hearn and Knowles, 1996). A fight over coverage of offshore drilling rigs and a shift in employer strategy to avoid MUA coverage were among the issues that brought the unions again into conflict in the 1990s (interview, MUA, 2010). For both unions, the Howard federal government (1996–2007) was a key precipitating reason for a reconsideration of the unions’ relationships. Longstanding employer–union alliances were broken during this period and all unions came under varying degrees of threat, with the Patrick’s dispute involving the MUA in the most dramatic of attacks. This dispute saw the Patrick Corporation lock out its unionized workforce and, with the support of the conservative federal government, attempt to replace them with ex-military personnel trained in offshore ports such as Dubai (Dabscheck, 2000). With the Patrick’s dispute pivotal for the MUA, for the AWU, it was the experience in the Pilbara (the mining region in northwest Western Australia) (Ellem, 1999, 2010). While the Patrick’s dispute fostered and strengthened inter-union relationships, these were strained in the Pilbara where multi-union attempts to reorganize mine workers were undermined by the AWU’s competing vision of how to rebuild union power and historical lines of demarcation.
Leadership changes ushered in a new phase for each union with these longstanding divisions beginning to be broken down by overtures made at the national level. Paddy Crumlin was elected National Secretary of the MUA in 2000 and Bill Shorten became National Secretary of the AWU in 2001. In the midst of serious political and industrial challenges, the timing of these leadership changes created an opportunity for the pursuit of different strategies including consideration of engagement with factional opponents hitherto unpalatable. Critical to this were the personal relationships forged by Paddy Crumlin, in particular with Shorten and other key AWU officials. 5 Out of these developed a level of trust that proved to be integral to the origins of the alliance.
The evolving relationship between the two unions was prefigured in a 2002 dispute between the MUA and CSL (a large provider of bulk shipping transport) over the attempted crewing of vessels with Ukrainian sailors. During this dispute the AWU took the uncommon decision to support the MUA: I also think we demonstrated our bona fides that we were a different AWU. That today’s AWU is not the old AWU and that, I think, came from the CSL dispute where we copped a whopping big fine by black-banning … ships ... and that’s a big call for any union to take trade practices action – a bigger call for us because it’s not our style. (Interview, AWU, 2010).
The two unions were by now willing to consider developing a different relationship in which industrial interests prevailed. It was the first formal cross-factional alliance of unions which were traditionally opposed.
When it announced its formation in 2003, the Offshore Alliance outlined the joint organizing campaign it would pursue across the offshore oil and gas industry, including Woodside, Exxon/Mobil and BHP Billiton among others. The emphasis was on building union power, rather than just building membership numbers (Offshore Alliance, 2007). This would take the alliance to the major offshore regions including the Timor Sea, North West Shelf and Bass Strait (AWU, 2003).
The original Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) formalized the unions’ relationship and identified key aims as increasing union membership and collective agreement coverage, together with maintenance and improvement of wages and conditions. Recognition was given to the need for control over demarcations with a ‘key element’ being ‘no demarcation disputes’ (Offshore Alliance, 2003). After this relationship building stage, the need for a strategic plan was identified. A second MOU focused more on implementation, highlighting the need for greater specificity regarding the campaign structure. A third MOU, signed in 2010, updated the membership of the Campaign Leadership Team, committed the Offshore Alliance Campaign Group (previously the Offshore Hydro Carbon Campaign Group) to meet twice a year rather than ‘as required’ plus an annual conference and instituted a membership communication strategy.
Transport Unions Federation
TUF was formed by the TWU, RTBU and the MUA in 2009. In contrast to the two-union relationship of the Offshore Alliance, the involvement of three unions adds complexity to the analysis of the TUF formation. In addition to the three current union relationships, there were also historical relationships with the WWF and the Australian Railways Union (ARU), which became part of the RTBU (Beasley, 1996). There was also a long history of the ARU and the TWU working together. For example, enforcing union membership through ‘union badge shows’ at rail-heads, where workers had to present their union membership badge (Bowden, 1993; Bray and Rimmer, 1987).
Employer-initiated changes, which saw multinationals like TNT, Virgin, FedEx and UPS become more significant players in the Australian market, led the TWU to greater involvement in the International Transport Federation (ITF), in which the MUA, especially Paddy Crumlin, was active. The entry of logistics company Toll affected all three unions, with an estimated combined membership of 7000 in 2006. Toll has been described as ‘one of the driving forces for the unions to start working closer together’. ‘[P]robably the first … serious initiative we did is that we, the three unions, took rank and file and representatives and officials over to New Zealand to talk to Tolls [senior management]’ (interview 2, TWU, 2010). The unions also undertook joint mapping of Toll across Australasia to identify supply chain patterns and corporate activities, resulting in a more comprehensive understanding of the company’s strategic intent. As Bob Hayden, then RTBU National Secretary observed: ‘Companies now have seamless modes of transport. We have to move on from past divisions and develop ways to work together on issues that affect us all’ (RTBU, 2006: 10).
The Patrick’s dispute was equally critical to the development of relationships among the TUF unions. Putting aside traditional rivalries, the union movement was ‘indivisible’ in a way rarely seen before (Ellem, 1999). This dispute reverberated throughout the movement, prompting unions to re-evaluate how they could continue to work together. As a consequence, the Victorian branches of the TWU and MUA and the rail division of the RTBU formed an ITF Working Group in 2004 (Barton and Fairbrother, 2009: 688). A particular focus of the group was the organization of the Port of Melbourne into ‘a trade union Precinct’. The individual Victorian union leaders ‘expressed the view that [the Patrick’s] dispute laid the foundation for trust between them’ (Barton and Fairbrother, 2009: 692). Indeed, beyond developing relations at the state level, national leadership was pivotal, first in bringing the MUA and TWU together and then in drawing in the RTBU. The 18-month Pacific National dispute saw MUA and TWU members joining RTBU picket lines. For the RTBU, this solidarity symbolized ‘moving away from the demarcations of generations to work with all transport unions through the TUF initiative’ (RTBU, 2006: 4).
Designed to create ‘A strategic alliance ... for growth and power in the Australian transport industry’, an MOU was signed in 2009 formalizing those relationships between the TWU, RTBU and MUA. The unions committed to joint campaigning, resource sharing and strategy development; bargaining and campaigning and transport policy development, and internal dispute settlement procedures. Decision-making structures were based on equal representation with ‘[d]ecisions about [TUF] campaigns and policy [to] be made by consensus’. A steering committee, with each national leader as a Joint President, had ‘responsibility for deciding the organising, campaigning and policy program’ (TUF, 2009). This industry focus was critical for the unions that would create TUF, with their obvious complementarities of air, sea, road and rail transport modes as well as inter-modal operations (ports, airports, rail-heads). For the TWU in particular, TUF represented formal recognition of the critical importance of both the MUA and RTBU to supply chain organizing and bargaining which had become a key component of TWU renewal efforts (Kaine and Rawling, 2010). For all three members of TUF, equal representation not proportional representation was a fundamental component of the federation’s creation. It was essential in gaining endorsement from the two numerically smaller unions, the RTBU and MUA, and marks a key difference between the structure of TUF and that of other traditional peak unions (see Brigden, 2007).
Understanding contemporary collaboration
Understanding the prehistory of the current cooperation is important. An adverse political environment and landmark industrial disputes combined to create a situation in which individual unions more frequently sought the support of other unions to fight issues at local, national and international levels. These threats also necessitated a reconsideration of traditional political tactics employed by unions inside and outside the labour movement.
The Australian union movement had engaged with the US-led debate about organizing in the 1990s, and the advocacy of a return to grassroots organizing methods by devolving power to activists in the workplace and concentrating on local issues. The approach was certainly not met with universal acceptance or approval (Costa, 1997) but the interest it generated around its ability or otherwise to regenerate the union movement from the ground up sparked a period of debate between and within unions (Peetz et al., 2007). The union movement’s enthusiasm for ‘organizing’ being able to deliver change was dealt a major blow when the conservative federal government won control of the Senate in 2005. The consequent anti-union labour laws did not mean that change and the development of organizing techniques and skills within unions stopped completely; but it did shift the debate. In response to the political and legislative hostility, the union movement focused on political change. In some cases this was married to grassroots organizing, most notably the ‘Your Rights at Work’ (YR@W) campaign (Ellem, 2013). YR@W was an ACTU campaign run at both a national level, through advertising, and at a local level through community activities targeting sitting and potential members of parliament. It sought to highlight the perceived inequalities at the workplace promoted by the legislative regime of the conservative Howard government. This campaign was successful in maintaining industrial relations close to the top of the national political agenda and is credited with significantly contributing to the election of a Labor government in 2007 (Wilson and Spies-Butcher, 2011).
The following section explores the external threats and discusses inter-union collaboration as a response to them. Specifically the following discussion begins with an analysis of the significance and impact of the Howard government, the Patrick’s and CSL disputes, the YR@W campaign, before looking at particular examples of collaboration. This is then followed by the issue of factional power and leadership.
The external threats: Political and managerial
The hostile climate created by the Howard government prompted unions to look for ways to counter the attacks from both the federal government and employers emboldened by the changed political landscape. Unifying campaigns around the Patrick’s dispute and the collapse of Ansett, a domestic airline, in the late 1990s are examples of cooperative union actions. As seen earlier, the CSL dispute also provided other opportunities for unions to demonstrate solidarity in the same spirit as witnessed in those larger disputes. The results of this were captured in the words of the MUA’s Bob Coombs, commenting on the actions of AWU and TWU members which meant that cement and cargo were not unloaded: I have no doubt that the support of the AWU, TWU, the ACTU and the broader union movement was pivotal in sending CSL the message that it would not be ‘business as usual’ if they sacked their crew. (Workers Online, 2002)
Those disputes demonstrated how close cooperation could work in response to employer and government hostility and prompted further consideration of the opportunities created by more proactive strategic collaborations. Moreover, these exemplify the type of external threats and opportunities identified by Ellem and Shields (1996) as part of the impetus to peak union formation. As one national union official put it: ‘If we didn’t cooperate it would have decreased density to a point from which we can’t recover’ (interview, MUA, 2010). Part of this thinking arose from the leaders’ perceptions of the limitations of existing peak unions. These limitations ranged from under-resourcing, to lack of engagement, and in some circumstances, a lack of trust. The ACTU and state labour councils were not seen to be avenues through which industry-based campaigns could be pursued. Even within the ACTU structure, the industry groups did not provide this targeted campaigning (interviews, AWU, MUA, TWU, 2010).
The YR@W campaign demonstrated what could be achieved by a focused campaign. However, while YR@W was a unifying force, it also narrowed the union movement’s focus to a particular political outcome and did not result in any new inter-union alliances, instead drawing on the resources of existing cooperative structures. The National Secretary of the TWU explicitly acknowledged this reduced scope as a concern for union capacity into the future: Before the last federal election there appeared to be a strategy, there was a strategy of trying to win the election. It was a question about what strategy there was afterwards … there was certainly not a strategy if we lost the election. (Interview 2, TWU, 2010)
In this context, the motivation for pursuing TUF was influenced by concerns over the strategic directions and consistency within the ACTU and broader labour movement: It became absolutely clear in my mind that we should be getting friends as quickly as we can ... to be ready for [the] vagaries of the ACTU or the labour movement or politicians. (Interview 2, TWU, 2010)
This sentiment was echoed by the National Organizer with responsibility for TUF within the RTBU who noted that combining, ‘the might of three strategically important unions together … [meant] you get a much better hearing from respective stakeholders’ (interview, RTBU, 2010).
So while the YR@W campaign is credited with contributing to electing a Labor government in 2007, undoubtedly a positive development for unions, it also highlights the overarching nature of the campaigns being prioritized by the ACTU, in contrast to the industry-specific campaigns desired by some of its affiliates. The industry focus was designed to underpin a strategy for membership growth and engagement, with the unions seeking to engage members often working in the same workplaces and workspaces. Both the Offshore Alliance and TUF embarked on creating organizational structures, with the funding provided by the affiliates. They created an identifiable presence through officials with dual union accreditation, jointly employing officials, developing websites and publications (like the Rig Worker) and embarking on campaigns.
At the local level, joint activities included the sharing of officials between the unions. This has been particularly successful in the northwest of Western Australia in both the Offshore Alliance and TUF where the geography of the offshore oil and gas industry and the bulk transport sector lend themselves to the sharing of resources. In Newcastle, the Newcastle Coal Infrastructure Group’s (NCIG) non-union agreement (signed in the final days of WorkChoices) galvanized the TUF unions’ commitment to working together at the Newcastle coal loader. The NCIG example epitomizes the degree to which cooperation was overcoming previous union divisions through the matching of membership fees and the establishment of the NCIG Workers’ Union. There had been a: … long history of fighting it out between the two unions, and literally fighting it out with the two unions ... we’ve come to a demarcation agreement up there and we’re joining them up to one organization. (Interview 2, TWU, 2010)
Nationally, in addition to the sharing of officials, TUF has employed a director with responsibility for campaign organization and implementation. The National Director’s role focuses on strategic planning for membership growth, the allocation of resources and the timetabling of campaign activities. Importantly, the National Director is the link between national and local activities ‘identifying opportunities to support existing branch campaigns’ (TUF, 2009). These examples illustrate some of the industrial activities undertaken by the Offshore Alliance and TUF.
Factional power
As emphasized earlier, different configurations of traditional factional relationships was a key factor in the initiation of these alliances. In practice this meant each union advocating within its own faction of the labour movement and ALP for industrial outcomes benefiting the alliances overall not just the factionally affiliated union. A significant feature of the TUF engagement was the view that each alliance partner should ‘work more coherently inside the factions to pursue the interests of workers’ (interview, MUA, 2010). Moreover there were perceived advantages to joint support of issues in broader forums such as Labor Party conferences and committees. The TWU National Secretary highlighted that the factional differences were a source of strength, noting that the new collaborations do not dissolve factional allegiances but use them as additional political and industrial leverage (interview 1, TWU, 2010). By leverage, we mean the ability to exert influence on policy development and implementation beyond what could be achieved independently of the alliances. These unions have decided that, whilst they retain their factional allegiances, their shared interests in building bargaining power in an industry enables cooperation across the factional divide. This strategy reflects the interests of these alliances in ‘building power’ for members and for the union movement rather than for a faction within the movement. It involves a renewed focus on the common industrial issues across unions at an industry and sectoral scale, and is another way of expressing how external solidarity may advance union power.
The factional arrangements evident in these collaborations contrast with those of traditional peak union bodies, such as the ACTU and regional labour councils. These peak bodies have sought to moderate the power of competing factions, each of which tries to dominate decision-making (Brigden, 2007). In contrast, in the Offshore Alliance and TUF there is a shared understanding that factional difference is where these alliances draw their political strength. Thus these contrasting approaches can be characterized as ‘multi-factional’ (in the case of traditional peak bodies where different factional interests have to be accommodated) vs ‘cross-factional’ (in the case of the Offshore Alliance and TUF where factional differences are exploited).
The contrast in power structures is significant because it means a different type of equilibrium is sought by these alliances: not factional equilibrium but a joint understanding of opportunities and threats. If this is lost, then the strength and cohesion of the alliance is potentially undermined. For example, TUF was tested by the rail privatization debate in Queensland. Divisions between the state branches of the RTBU and the TWU arose when the Queensland branch of the TWU supported the privatization. With the MUA supporting the RTBU, a fracture in the alliance was a real possibility. However protection of TUF remained paramount: … regardless of our differences on this issue we’re not going to have this hurt what is important to our membership, which is [TUF]. We have got fundamental difference[s] and it is one of deep concern and causing deep problems but … the issue of [TUF] growing into something more than it even is now is more important than dealing with what is a major challenge that the RTBU and MUA are facing. (Interview 2, TWU, 2010)
Consequently, the cross-factional activity is significant in these union renewal attempts – built as they are on strategic activity by the leadership and supplemented by workplace organizing. What is of particular interest is that unions across the ideological spectrum have reached a similar conclusion about the contribution of inter-union collaboration to union revitalization. Here, the main goal of the campaign is about building power across an industry rather than organizing single workplaces, illustrating how external solidarity is seen as a power resource.
This is consistent with Hickey et al.’s argument (2010: 76) that the ‘fundamental issue for renewal is not activism but bargaining power’. These examples of inter-union collaboration provide further support for this position in the debate over bottom-up and top-down strategies; they reinforce that a plurality of strategies is necessary. The alliances also confirm Voss’s link between crisis, transformation and the role of change-oriented national leaders (2010: 376). While the unions in these examples would argue that their strategies include both bottom-up and top-down strategies, the formation of the alliances clearly arose from strategic leadership choices and commitment, without which they would be very fragile. This is not to imply that there is no accountability to the rank-and-file membership though periodic union elections. 6 However, criticism of such initiatives as not being rank-and-file driven unduly narrows the focus of union renewal to organizing and does not acknowledge the ambiguities in practice that Hickey et al. (2010) identify in theory. The unions arguably have adopted a labour movement perspective rather than an individual union perspective. In this way, they can be seen to be acting as peak unions by pursuing ‘collective movement power’ to harness the power of the affiliated unions (Brigden, 2007).
Central to this strategy were the leadership changes in the MUA and AWU. As indicated earlier, some leadership choices are affected by ‘past trajectories and generational cohorts’ (Lévesque and Murray, 2006: 11). Here there was generational change and emergence of a new generational cohort. This created opportunities for a break with previous trajectories, and set up different choices and directions. Together with this leadership change were personal relationships within these new cohorts that also influenced alliance building. These personal relationships were especially important in creating trust in forging and sustaining cross-factional relationships.
While the leaders assert the importance of the alliances to their respective memberships, the collaborations have not met with unconditional support within the union movement. The emergence and increasing profile of these cross-factional collaborations have prompted action by the ACTU, following concerns raised by affiliates outside these alliances. The ACTU executive has developed principles for future alliances in what could be interpreted as an attempt to control their membership and activity. These principles particularly emphasize that new alliances should be consistent with existing arrangements organized by peak bodies and avoid exacerbating ‘demarcation disputes or conflicts in relation to membership or existing membership coverage’ (ACTU, 2010). Negotiating such tension between affiliates is a common requirement for peak unions. This should not be regarded as antipathy on behalf of the ACTU itself to these emergent alliances but a reflection of internal peak union dynamics (Ellem, 2013). However, this may mean that when traditional peak bodies develop frameworks for such alliances they will do so predicated on the basis of multi-factionalism. The cross-factionalism, which has been the innovative hallmark of these alliances, potentially challenges the factional status quo that has traditionally underpinned decision-making (Brigden, 2007).
Why were existing peak unions regarded as inadequate for the types of campaigns these unions wanted to develop? Essentially, these union leaders perceived a lack of interest by state and national peak unions in industry-wide campaigns. There was a sense that the existing peak bodies (the ACTU in particular) were urging affiliates to prioritize workplace-based organizing while the peak unions themselves concentrated on national and political campaigns. While both of these activities were seen as essential they left a void at the industry level which these alliances sought to fill, and justified (in the opinions of the leaders of the union involved in the alliance) the tensions created within the ACTU between affiliates included within the alliances and those excluded. For the unions involved, operating outside of existing peak unions also meant they could control what the alliance looked like – who was in the alliance and who was not, with such decisions reflecting strategies regarding the development of a particular type of external solidarity. These alliances represent deliberate attempts by the constituent unions to develop ‘horizontal’ solidarity, that is, solidarity with other unions within the same sector. Lévesque and Murray (2002) argue that horizontal solidarity of this kind prevents the development of ‘productivity alliances’ between employers and workers in which other workplaces and consequently other workers are seen as the enemy of job security. The unions within the Offshore Alliance and TUF were susceptible to such ‘productivity alliances’ with employers in both sectors displaying a tendency to exploit historical tensions and lines of demarcation between the unions (interview, MUA, 2010). Recognition of this susceptibility led to a conclusion that action at an industry scale was required. Industry-based alliances were seen, like industry unions, as providing resistance to ‘productivity alliances’ while protecting organizational autonomy and to be pursued even in the absence of explicit peak union endorsement.
Conclusion
TUF and the Offshore Alliance represent an attempt by the constituent unions to deal with the political and managerial threats they faced throughout the late 1990s and into the 2000s. The circumstances and timing of their creation also illustrates the importance of union leadership in developing and exploiting personal and political networks to initiate a top-down renewal (or survival) strategy. However, the nature of these alliances is politically distinct from historical examples in Australia. For the unions involved in these alliances, the overriding focus is on building worker power within an industry regardless of traditional political barriers.
In some regards, these alliances can be seen to be ‘new’ configurations consistent with the experience of industry peak unionism that was a feature of the pre-1990s Australian trade union movement. Although the 1990s wave of amalgamations failed in many cases to meet the objective of industry(-based) unionism desired by the ACTU and chief architects, for many unions the relationships they had forged in industry peak unions now shaped internal dynamics in merged union structures. In the absence of another push for industry unionism through a further stage of amalgamations, what we might be seeing is unions filling a void at the industry level. Finding commonalities – along the transport supply chain, to challenge a management offensive – and constructing solidarity across workplaces and occupations are all articulated as strategies for building union power. There are some signs of increased bargaining power through these formalized relationships. For instance, the Offshore Alliance negotiated their first collective agreement with the Dutch shipping company Maersk, following two years of negotiations and a period in which the company had favoured individual contracts. 7 However, it is difficult to quantify overall increases in bargaining power as changing patterns of bargaining and alliance–employer relations will need to be assessed over time and given that union power in any context is circumscribed by economic and structural conditions and not determined by union agency alone.
What is different is not only the cross-factional nature of this cooperation but also the industry/sector scale of these collaborations. Simms (2012: 108) argues that, in the British case, as a consequence of the prevailing focus on workplace organizing ‘unions have created a context within which the solidarities between workers in different workplaces, sectors and occupations are sidelined’. This in turn compromises ‘a wider conceptualisation of interests and solidarities’. In contrast, these alliances bring the sector or industry into sharper focus. In the case of the Offshore Alliance, where workplaces have been divided by traditional demarcations between the AWU and MUA, this alliance seeks also to forge new workplace relationships. For TUF, the challenge was to exert control along the supply chain – passage of goods on sea and land, by road and rail. The importance of external solidarity, as Lévesque and Murray (2002, 2010) argue, as a critical power resource is underlined. For the unions involved, this then feeds back into workplace power.
Limitations of the current research lie in the reliance on leader perceptions and interpretations of the significance and potential of the alliances. Missing from the story so far are rank-and-file perceptions of the value of these alliances and an exposition of the internal complexities of union democracy. Ongoing leadership commitment remains critical. These gaps suggest a direction for future research. The alliances also currently involve only a small number of unions, primarily in transport. Durability cannot be forecast as the alliances, especially TUF, are still relatively new. Nevertheless, even though it is too early to speculate on the extent of their transformative effect, their growing significance has led traditional peak bodies such as the ACTU to respond. Furthermore, these alliances have broadened the strategic scope of unions to think beyond historical structures and relationships in their continuing efforts to build industrial and political power. These alliances provide a space wherein solidarities beyond the workplace can be imagined and given voice. For the unions involved, they are part of a broader revisioning of how union power can be (re)built and embedded. It has brought together unions with conflict-marked histories and deep philosophical differences. Traditional cleavages have been overcome in part through generational change as well as an articulate leadership vision.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Notes
Interviews
National Organizer, Rail, Tram and Bus Union, 14 July 2010, Sydney.
National Secretary, Australian Workers’ Union, 16 April 2010, Sydney.
National Secretary, Maritime Union of Australia, 7 July 2010, Sydney.
National Secretary, Transport Workers Union, 16 April 2010 and 7 July 2010, Sydney.
