Voice,regulation and memory in a voiceless environment: Case studies of informal legacies of collectivism,voice and regulation in non-union SMEs in the United Kingdom

Defining and interpreting employee voice

Employee voice as a topic of research is ambiguous and contested in nature, largely a result of different academic disciplines adopting differing theoretical foundations (Dundon et al., 2004; Wilkinson et al., 2020). While organisational behaviour literatures on voice have centred in part on the individual dimensions of voice, research aligned with the employment relations field of literature is generally typified by a focus on formal structures for collective voice, where the interests of management and workers may be divergent (Wilkinson et al., 2020). Such an approach is rooted in the legacies of trade unionism and collective bargaining. Wilkinson et al. (2020: 5) developed a broad and inclusive definition of employee voice as: ‘the ways and means through which employees attempt to have a say, formally and/or informally, collectively and/or individually, potentially to influence organizational affairs relating to issues that affect their work, their interests and the interests of managers and owners’.

Alongside union forms of bargaining, other collective forms of employee voice can include institutions such as works councils and joint consultative committees (Wilkinson et al., 2020). According to Ingvaldsen et al. (2020), many forms of voice cannot be easily categorised as either collective or individual, but tend to dovetail with a more complex web of union and non-union, individual and collective or semi-collective group mechanisms including the likes of task involvement and teamworking, workplace partnership, mutual gains voice and non-union employee representation. Indeed, many practices, including those outlined above, typically reflect the history of an organisation and consist of ad hoc adjustments to problems rather than being the outcome of a fine-tuned employee voice strategy (Wilkinson et al., 2020). Thus, a broader approach to the study of voice in a specific context is recommended, and this article will illustrate the subtleties, and complexities, derived from contextual determinants on employee voice within SMEs that draw on key insights into the way the form and degree of engagement in decision-making varies (De Spegelaere et al., 2019; Marchington et al., 1992).

The changing landscape of British industrial relations

The decline and fragmentation of traditional single channel trade union representation, especially in liberal market economies like the United Kingdom, has left a representation gap which is visible in various national contexts (Alsos and Trygstad, 2019). In many circumstances, employers have sought to individualise their relationship with labour and this has been aided by the influence of governments to pass laws to restrict trade union power since the 1980s (Standing, 1999). All the while trade unions have historically been geared towards achieving the needs of a mass and stable core workforce (Howell, 2005). Consequently, collective voice and similar forms of employee involvement have gradually, and to an extent, been replaced or supplemented within many organisations by more direct forms of employee voice that often circumvent trade unions (Wilkinson et al., 2007). By the early 2000s, for example, only 5% of workplaces in the United Kingdom had a union (Willman et al., 2009). Moreover, the fragmentation of work, with developments such as the platform economy and the types of jobs associated with it, has weakened the reach of organised and established forms of worker representation and provides an argument for the locating of voice within the wider political economy and the social structures that constitute its context (Martínez Lucio et al., 2022).

The decline of union voice may in part also be seen as a result of competition between union and non-union voice regimes, with employers investing in HRM that complements non-union voice systems (Bryson et al., 2012). Albeit, a challenge to the success of non-union voice mechanisms is that they can be seen as more susceptible to managerial prerogative, influence and control (Gollan et al., 2015), which could in turn negate the benefits of direct voice, especially if employees determine the relationship is one that is built upon rhetoric and not a genuine relationship (Parry et al., 2019). Thus, forms of non-union employee representation (NER) may be adopted as a union avoidance or ‘suppression’ tactic (Dobbins and Dundon, 2020).

Conversely, different forms of NER may provide a mechanism for employers to deliver positive mutual gains for both employees and employers. Albeit, contextual factors affecting NER mutuality are thought to be crucial, including external macro pressures such as regulatory conditions alongside internal micro-organisational dimensions (Dundon and Gollan, 2007). Direct voice represents an opportunity for management to replace union voice, thus management attitudes, style and context become critical in determining the nature, characteristics and effectiveness of non-union voice at the level of the firm (Holland, 2020). Although, as Dobbins and Dundon (2020) attest, employee behaviour and actions may also influence the characteristics and outcomes of consultation, particularly when occupational identities and work legacies lead to strong workforce solidarity.

Industrial relations and the SME

Despite different potential modes of voice (direct versus indirect, formal versus informal, individual verses collective) available to SMEs, when deliberating industrial relations and the SME, it is normally understood that they are characteristically non-unionised (Matlay, 2002), with smaller businesses often favouring more direct and informal consultation arrangements and individualised labour relations. Such a position has arguably been aided by legislation introduced since the 1970s in the UK which has limited the ability of trade unions to engage with SMEs due to complex recognition laws and anti-trade union bias (McIlroy, 1991). In the UK there is no automatic universal legal obligation to have a trade union represented; however, legally, employers can voluntarily allow a trade union to represent its workforce and if they are reticent a union must prove that the majority of workers desire to have a trade union and the trade union has exceeded the specified minimum legal threshold for membership, although this can be a drawn-out process that absorbs a wide range of trade union resources (Perrett, 2007).

Specific idiosyncrasies linked to the historical, governance and regulatory contexts of organisations may shape their approach to employee voice whereas broader sector or occupational effects may occur based upon the history or level of unionisation within the broader human capital pools from which organisations source labour. When considering industrial relations and the SME, the influence and perspective of the owner/manager is deemed to be of significance, with their experiences shaping their current work-related attitudes, expectations and relationships including the likelihood they will engage with a union (Matlay, 2002). Gunnigle and Brady (1984: 22–23) suggest owner/managers may perceive any trade union presence as a ‘curbing of the management prerogative’ and ‘superfluous’ as ‘smallness facilitates better communication’. Owner/managers ultimately perceive the firm very much as ‘their organisation’ and will often only formalise relations as a way of legitimising authority and behaviour.

In this sense, a ‘power culture’ may occur (Handy, 1976) where employment relations are shaped by the centralisation of power among an owner(s) and integration achieved through informal rather than formal voice methods. Handy’s (1976) model of organisational culture can be used to analyse power cultures in small businesses, key dimensions to culture being the centralisation of power (low versus high) and integration (informal versus formal). For example, a bureaucratic role culture has high centralisation of power in senior management but high formalisation in that the organisation is integrated in terms of formal roles, rules and procedures. Small businesses in contrast typically have high centralisation but lower formalisation (there are fewer bureaucratic rules, roles are more poorly defined, and they lack HR policies). However, as our second case will show, counter-power mechanisms may be apparent due to various cultural or historical factors.

Unionisation may therefore be seen by employers as a challenge to such arrangements. Blanchflower and Bryson (2022) state many small business owners may dismiss labour unionisation as unmotivated employees attempting to negotiate for undeserved compensation and benefit. Gomez et al. (2019) found many small business owners believe industrial relations remain simple matters of lower-level negotiations between themselves and their employees. Owner/manager prerogative may also be important in influencing how the external influences are interpreted or managed within the business (Wapshott and Mallett, 2015). Family-owned SMEs are also seen as being a significant barrier to unionism (see Holten and Crouch, 2014). The 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey found union membership to be less common among those working in family-owned firms (5%) than among those working in small firms where a single individual or family does not own a majority of the business (15%) (Forth et al., 2006).

(In)formality in employment relations: Dimensions of voice in the SME

Employment relations change and fragmentation – albeit contested and uneven as a development – has been paralleled by a debate on new forms of direct employee engagement and participation of a more individual nature. Compared to large organisations such as corporate bureaucracies, the organisational integration problems differ in SMEs. Close social and spatial proximity facilitates more direct and informal communication whereas the levels of organisational hierarchy and functional silos within larger bureaucracies require more formalised integrative mechanisms (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Small firms provide a distinctive ‘fertile environment for the persistence and dominance of informal employment relations’ (Marlow et al., 2010: 956). SME-focused research relating to employment relations has traditionally been positioned at the boundaries of the ‘small is beautiful’ (Schumacher, 1973) vs ‘bleak house’ (Sisson, 1993) debate. Either position of the debate can be understood to recognise aspects of voice and participation opportunities in contrasting ways: the more positive view can be characterised as heavily favouring the use of informal communication flows between owner/manager and employees as a means to generate commitment and loyalty (Dundon and Wilkinson, 2004), which contrasts a directive or authoritarian management where employees have little or no involvement in decision-making (Wilkinson et al., 2007).

Existing literature which takes as its focus voice and SMEs acknowledges how SMEs tend to favour individual oriented forms of employee involvement and participation (EIP) that are informal and direct in their approach (Wilkinson et al., 2007). Informality could allow opportunity for owner/managers to ‘develop networks of personal allegiance’ (Scase, 2005: 71). Similar to ‘bleak house’ principles, it was traditionally posited that employment relations in the small firm, in the absence of worker collective voice and formalised procedures such as collective bargaining, were largely autocratic in nature, making an employee’s ability to participate in decision-making heavily constrained (Forth et al., 2006). Contrastingly, informality within SMEs may be indicative of individualised voice arrangements which can maintain and legitimise non-union status (Dundon and Gollan, 2007). Forth et al. (2006) concluded SME managers were more likely to subscribe to the ethos of ‘top-down’ management, but they were actually more likely to involve employees in the decision-making process than large-firm managers. Albeit, such an explanation does not account for the role of context or indirect effects but is seen as a purely organisational or cultural matter. Hence, even within a wider context of de-collectivisation, we still see curious informal collective processes in employment relations and obscure references to the role of external regulatory expectations and legacies – and this leads us to the question of memory.

Finally, a transition from informality to formality through a process of formalisation is not a simple progression through which growing organisations must inevitably pass (Ram and Edwards, 2010). Degrees of informality remain a requirement for their effective functioning, and embedding formality is neither simple nor straightforward (Ram and Edwards, 2010). Different degrees of (in)formality may be deployed in response to particular internal and external demands, and informality and formality could therefore be considered as coexistent (Mallett and Wapshott, 2014; Marlow et al., 2010).

Context and memory as factors in contributing to the nature of voice in SMEs

Furthermore, the role of regulatory context as an influencing factor on employee voice is important. Regulatory space (Hancher and Moran, 1989) is an analytical construct designed to move beyond the command-based view of employment regulation, which is seen as being limited to government regulators. Regulation has become dispersed and fragmented; extending beyond legal systems it is now recognised as the sum of numerous intersecting and conflicting interests and value systems. A multiplicity of sites, spaces and actors, both formal and informal in origin, can be seen to exert influence in a particular area of interest to them, a highly political process; boundaries between these spaces may be constantly renegotiated and regulatory jurisdictions may overlap (MacKenzie and Martínez Lucio, 2005). There is also competition between actors and tensions as they vie for critical positions and try to colonise specific points, thus indicating a more political process and set of tensions within regulatory spaces (MacKenzie and Martínez Lucio, 2014). Only through a comprehensive understanding of the complexities of these relations, of the multiple roles and diverse spaces in which they operate, can we truly understand the indirect and subtle role and impact of regulation, as we cannot simply locate it in the relation between workers and managers in isolation of the regulatory context and previous experiences of them. In particular, how these actors evoke and reference their previous experiences and memories of engagement is also important as they pursue their interests and objectives, as we will discuss further on. This tallies with the emerging demand to look beyond formal organisational structures and look at the reflections and actions of workers themselves (see Alberti and Però, 2018).

Secondly, and more specifically: to what extent are aspects of voice shaped by attributes of the micro-organisational dynamics and macro-environmental factors? This question is firmly aligned with the perspective of Whittington (1988) concerning deep social structures, agency and strategic choice. Arguing that the character of key organisational actors needs to be explored, not only in terms of the internal hierarchy, but also in terms of their positions within, and relations to, external structures stretching beyond the organisation itself, Whittington (1990: 201) points out: ‘rarely. . . do these accounts trace the roots of such organisational phenomena out to their origins in society at large’. Thus, Whittington proposes an account of agency that also considers the organisations’ engagement with plural and overlapping social systems. In application to SME debates, and accounting for the fact that small firms are often saturated with the ideology and culture of the owner/manager (Ram and Holliday, 1993), Whittington’s framework represents an important construct when attempting to understand EIP and voice in the differing sectoral and occupational contexts.

Thirdly, adopting an alternative and flexible understanding of collectivism, McBride and Martínez Lucio (2011) argue that regardless of the extensive literature on the decline of collectivism, it is a much more flexible and richer concept due to diverse social influences and experiences. In addition, there are also reflections and memories of previous employment experiences and collective endeavours. The question of memory has begun to surface within organisational and employment studies. In some senses it links to the current interest in ideational power that is being developed in debates on trade unions and worker representation (Refslund and Arnholtz, 2022). Moreover, generational factors can shape the way experiences of work are developed and recalled. Historical experiences may be important in providing a level of understanding and comprehension that adapts and shapes the experiences of workers to new contexts (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). According to Rowlinson et al. (2010), this historical context is important for appreciating how actors develop actions and the way they may legitimate them: it may also contribute and shape internal struggles. How different workers and managers – and other actors – engage with previous experiences needs to be central to the narrative (Huber, 1991). As stated by Gardiner et al. (2009), the importance of broader occupational and sector cultures must be recognised and appreciated in how they shape questions of voice at work – as must also the memories of a particular work group and how it is recalled (MacKenzie et al., 2006). This dimension, the article will show, plays a curious role in differentiating the cases studies we present. One could argue that industrial relations as a discipline has on occasions concerned itself with memory and action especially in relation to trade unions. Concerns with the actual recording and archiving of union actions and how this varies (Bell et al., 2005) and the way activists within trade unions recall previous actions such as strikes and their impact (Cohen, 2014; Seeliger, 2016) are common. There is an emergent stream of debate which draws from insights on organisational memory and learning, such as that of Huber’s (1991), and which places union innovation and strategy within a broader context of organisational reflection (Hyman, 2007) and debates on modernisation (Stuart et al., 2010). This has become increasingly integral as a feature of union organising debates, but it also needs to be linked into debates on employee involvement and participation more clearly even in non-union environments. It is our view that this was an emerging issue from the research on the cases in this article and that it involves the role of various actors, including the workers themselves and even broader state bodies who can play a role in sustaining the memory of regulation and rights (Stuart and Martínez Lucio, 2008).

The cases below will therefore develop a sensitivity to these various factors in the way that they shape forms of collectivism and understandings of representation. They will try to show how external influences are mediated through internal workplace factors, and interact to contribute to a more dynamic and diverse set of voice mechanisms within these firms. The article contributes to the debates by looking how the gap on organisational memory can be included in terms of an array of informal relations within the workforce and management as well as the management and owners. The study thus attempts to widen the way we see these relations and their relevance for understanding SME industrial relations and questions of voice,

The case study companies: The diversity and complexity of the SME context

Case 1: Aero-Wheels Co. – Formalising EIP mechanisms through an informal approach or an ‘empty shell’?

Aero-Wheels Co. is a non-unionised organisation. In the absence of such forms of indirect representation, informal mechanisms of EIP have taken precedence, favouring more direct, face-to-face communications, achievable within the confines of the smaller organisation, given that close physical proximity encourages closer interactions between management and employees, which is conducive in the creation of discussions between parties across an informal medium:

You’ll probably hear about it in word-of-mouth first, because of how small the company is.

This position is historically tenable given the close-knit ‘family’, with an employee voice culture reflecting internal integration needs, which can be met informally in small organisations via face-to-face communications. However, in line with the rapid expansion and the resulting increase in employee numbers, senior management appear to have logically sought to counter any possible deterioration in communication and participation, more generally speaking, through the adoption of formal departmental and management meetings, the distribution of bulletins alongside a suggestion box to aid upward participation. However, shortly after the inception of regular scheduled meetings, line managers reported how they gradually diminished in frequency as they directed their time and attention towards activities directly linked with the completion of the end product and meeting service-level agreements with the customer:

Sometimes we’re very active. . . [the] first six months we are very proactive, we have managers’ meetings every month, we were talking to each other and everybody knew what’s going on, and then all of a sudden it fell down, and we haven’t had any meetings since the end of summer, maybe one in [the] last four, five months.

A further and more instrumental reason for why such meetings became less frequent is thought to be aligned to a desired continuity of expectations on the part of the line managers, who were accustomed to a more informal approach, particularly the informal dialogue and ‘chats’ with senior management. Line managers interviewed had reservations about the more quasi-formal employee voice methods adopted by Aero-Wheels Co., illustrated by the following comment made about notices issued by senior management and distributed to the workforce:

I generally don’t think they work. Every now and then, something changes, the managers will print it out and get everyone’s name on the back and get everyone to sign it. Everyone signs that and not one single person out there reads what is written on the front, because it’s a full A4 piece of paper and it’s full of words that are far too long. We’re not taking on university graduates; we’re taking on people that were out of work just looking for temporary labour jobs. Management’s happy, they have a sheet full of signed names saying they understand. I don’t believe for one minute they understood.

This serves as an example to illustrate the organisation’s preference towards maintaining outward appearances, specifically in the eyes of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) – the aerospace sector’s regulatory body – or their customers, of professionalism and formalisation for quality assurance purposes. At the same time, the informality present within a power culture is bounded by the sector-specific regulatory context. Some aspects of activities require more formal procedures and practices to meet regulatory requirements, such as concerning standards or health and safety. Close similarities can also be drawn to notions of an ‘empty shell’ (Hoque and Noon, 2004), that which illustrates the lack of substantive worth or value underlying the practice or policy although symbolically there is an attempt to mimic certain voice mechanisms.

A further attempt was made to involve employees through the use of a more formalised voice mechanism. Aero-Wheels Co. introduced a ‘Company Reporting Scheme’ (CoRS) whereby employees were given the opportunity to put forward any problems, comments or suggestions in a formal manner. This suggestion box was aligned with CAA regulations and expectations, albeit, and quite importantly, the system was not mandatory. Accordingly, employees found the CoRS system, which is supposed to guarantee a response from management within 48 hours, unsatisfactory, with one employee claiming he waited ‘a month’ for a response and other respondents having never received a response. Drawing similarities with the use of bulletins within the organisation, this suggestion box system appears to be another ‘empty shell’ and is in place for purely presentational purposes – to be perceived, in the eyes of the CAA and their customers (probably the most coercive or demanding of actors), as a professional organisation with robust feedback processes.

Continuing with examples of informal attributes of EIP at Aero-Wheels Co., praise and feedback are given through informal channels, including Facebook. However, there were suggestions that praise is lacking from senior management:

I don’t think it carries a lot of weight from me, it’s just a mate saying cheers, in their eyes.

The line manager referring to himself as ‘just a mate’ perhaps provides an insight into the informality of the relationship between line managers (who were promoted primarily upon a time-served basis) and their staff. One senior manager with vast experience across several organisations suggested that attempts to develop formal feedback mechanisms did not diminish the role of rumour or gossip:

You will find that people will say ‘don’t say anything’, but. . . and all of a sudden it gets out. You could say well, doesn’t that happen in most organisations? I suggest it does. But I think it happens more so here. And things tend to get a little bit twisted and people can get a little bit frustrated and irate or emotional over things that really. . . putting it very crudely, are not a big deal.

Ironically, one line manager even spoke of holding meetings – a formal dialogue – specifically to quash rumours circulating amongst the workforce.

This informal dimension could be viewed as being a consequence of size, facilitative of a culture or tradition that ensures that informal channels of communication exist and that gossip can flourish. However, it can also be seen to be a reaction to the growing levels of formalisation around feedback mechanisms and growing emphasis on procedure. Thus, despite the introduction of various changes that have sought to introduce a more formalised (albeit non-union) dynamic to EIP, a strong informal culture remains, apparently being developed in a specific way through management actors.

In some senses this case represents an ideal typical case of how direct forms of representation or communication have been developed by management in an attempt to avoid a systematic approach to formalising voice by using diverse and informal mechanisms of communication. Yet, the role of external regulatory expectations and standards was important in terms of industry sector regulatory bodies and agencies (including industrial relations related state bodies related to conciliation and employer support), but these generated an interesting dualism between formal attempts to communicate and facilitate participation and informal ones. Whilst a non-union case, it did consist of a curious tension around upward participation and communication, especially in the light of informal and social forms of communication such as gossip and rumour within the workforce, although this aspect was more subliminal and fragmented. To some extent the second case we turn to now is similar; however in this second case the interaction between supposed external, albeit weak, operational regulatory processes and internal workplace cultures was influenced by questions of organisational memory and greater awareness of external collective cultures of an industrial relations nature within the workforce that brought forth a more concerted set of interventions by management to control the general realm of worker participation.

Case 2: Fly-High Engineering and the curious nature of collectivism

Similar to Aero-Wheels Co., the second case organisation was also non-unionised. However, this position was nuanced by attributes identified that appear to echo a traditional, collectivist industrial relations structure, thought to be attributable to the nature of the workforce and various historical factors. Options varied, as the following suggests.

On the one hand, there seemed to be a top-down culture: in Fly-High Engineering, the company’s Finance Director – and non-family member – suggested the role of the family inhibited the flow of employee communication, involvement and participation to the workforce:

Board meetings are very few and far between, the ones I get involved with anyway. They tend to be, you know, it’s the family thing, they have meetings whenever they want a bloody meeting, it’s up to them when they get together. Is that a board meeting, well, who’s to say?. . . They will come to me if it’s finance things generally speaking, not always, which bugs the life out of you, but it’s just something you’ve got to put up with. . . but again there’s no formality about it, occasionally we’ll have proper what you might call board meetings. . . but it tends to be a family thing which goes back to the double standards issue again.

Moreover, the owner/founder and Managing Director, father and son respectively, appear to inhibit a participatory environment, exhibiting a reluctance to delegate. The actions of the two directors are indicative of attempts to maintain control and the degree of power they were used to holding when the organisation was much smaller, and potentially retain control within the family (Ram and Holliday, 1993). This is also in alignment with the characteristics of a ‘power culture’ (Handy, 1976), whereby the power of the owner in the SME provides direct control on the discourse and culture of the organisation through control of communication and information.

On the other hand, this approach contrasted with that of another Director – and also a family member – who saw part of their role as a ‘HR champion’ (Ulrich, 1996) driving a more formalised HR agenda. While the owner/founder and Managing Director are not advocates of the HR function, the ‘HR champion’ is the daughter of the owner/founder. With the ‘HR champion’ holding familial membership, it creates an interesting dynamic: ultimately, her efforts to attain a more formalised HR function are aided by her familial status, allowing her to place pressure on her father, who does not see the need for a formal HR role within the firm. The ‘HR champion’ thus exerted a degree of pressure that likely exceeds what another employee (or director) could conceivably place upon the owner/founder of a firm. Yet beyond these ties and social relations, of interest in relation to the ‘HR champion’ was their ability to connect to anticipated external regulatory expectations and changes in terms of legislation and advisory state bodies, interpreting them and representing them as developments that required attention and more formalised responses. So, the role of key individuals and their informal work was important in questions of communication and engagement. What is more, the ‘HR champion’ drew on the organisational memory and external capacities of the state advisory bodies and other external bodies to secure a different and (rhetorically at least) a more inclusive approach.

Furthermore, within Fly-High Engineering, individual networks were identified as being a fundamental factor for change, with evidence of apparent game playing by the ‘HR champion’ and her ‘generals’, in close alignment with the work conducted by Scase (2005) relating to ‘networks of personal allegiance’, which to some extent represented an organisational subculture. ‘Generals’ include an employee who is an ex-trade union convenor, with vast experience in participation mechanisms. Other members include a new HR assistant and a receptionist/HR assistant, who were both recruited by the ‘HR champion’ under the guise of office admin workers in a bid to justify their hiring to the other directors, namely her brother (Managing Director) and father (owner/founder), who appear to resist formalisation in respect of any form of HR presence within the firm. That being said, the ‘HR champion’ appeared to know full well they would be undertaking HR related activities; she informed the employees of as much upon their hiring, but to get the ‘green light’ from the other directors she needed to modify their job roles to appease other members of the senior management team. This example serves to provide a curious insight into how questions of (anticipated or potential) regulation on voice develop (de Kok et al., 2006; Matlay, 2002; Ram and Holliday, 1993) by drawing attention to the idiosyncratic features and changes amongst sets of managers and their interrelationships (and their reliance on expert advice of regulatory environments amongst some of them which provided informed insights and a broader organisational memory of industrial relations).

In comparison to Aero-Wheels Co., there appeared to be a greater development and complexity of participation and voice mechanisms, even if they remained generally informal, within this second case, driven by the workforce and thought to be a consequence of more internal actors, while also potentially attributable to the overall increase in skill level, as theorised by Goss (1991), and the subsequent demands of the workforce to be kept abreast of developments, given a voice and see their knowledge or expertise fully utilised. More recently, ‘morning prayers’ were introduced: whereby all departments had brief daily meetings to discuss pressing issues and workload, provide updates and communicate up and down the organisational hierarchy:

The guys on the shop floor felt it was management and shop floor personnel, it was them and us, they felt like they weren’t being kept in the loop.

Perhaps a development of this nature has coincided with, and was motivated by, the recent expansion into another region and the coordination and integration issues such changes can represent; integration issues change through expansion requiring more formal integrative mechanisms and voice. Moreover, one line manager appears to have astutely recognised the need to adapt how communication occurs in line with organisational growth:

A smaller business, you’re just all-round the same coffee table, discussing what you’re doing. The next thing you know, it can’t be like that anymore because we’ve got to disseminate the information in a different way and extract the information back again in different ways. We’re doing more and more classrooms, more and more group sessions, and that kind of stuff. We have a group meeting every day now, so we’re feeding back to a bigger group and giving them a chance to speak.

Despite the apparent recent introduction of more regimented and formalised channels for communication within the firm, there were widespread and historic forms of dissatisfaction from members of the workforce, believing communication or even informal types of participation had not as yet improved:

Sometimes I do feel that we don’t get told information in terms of projects. . . there’s a lack of communication. You’re finding things out second hand or when it’s too late.

Others were critical of who would be chosen to participate, suggesting it might not be associated with tenure, position or skill level, but simply if one is ‘flavour of the month’. One further interesting observation was made by a supervisor who believed the poor participation opportunities favoured bigger personalities, being a by-product of scale and a consequent lack of structure:

I do think the downside to a small company is that whoever is deemed most relevant, it’s almost, big fish in a little pond syndrome. You’re always going to have big attitudes wherever you go, but I do think in bigger companies, you tend to get a bit less of that, because of how it’s a bigger place, and you need to be doing your role and it’s more structured as a result. So that lack of structure allows people to maybe take it upon themselves to decide who receives what.

Participation, and voice related issues more generally, ultimately appears more contested in respect of Fly-High Engineering; this is determined to be influenced by, in part, the dynamic of contractors who have been employed to work alongside those holding ‘employee’ status, with contractors in positions of authority appearing to stifle opportunities for employee participation. Furthermore, with reference to the nature of the workforce, Fly-High Engineering’s current position, and influences, in respect of participation and voice conditions, is something we can attempt to better understand. In addition to skill level and its associated influences on one’s ability to participate, a distinguishing feature of Fly-High Engineering’s participatory agenda, and a reason for dissatisfaction with current mechanisms, is linked to a greater awareness of collectivist processes and trade unionism within employees, which accordingly heightened expectations in relation to participation and voice opportunities, even if only informal ones. The greater presence of conflict within this case study and level of voice demanded by the workforce are greater than that present in Aero-Wheels Co., a feature that can interestingly be traced back to the memory of the trade union and the voice mechanisms held by engineers working in the firm who had experienced trade unions in the 1970s and 1980s at large unionised aerospace firms such as British Aerospace. This aligns with the argument developed by Dundon et al. (1999), who identify the impact of trade union-derived pressures upon participative voice mechanisms. Memories of unionism accordingly evoke powerful connotations:

BAE Systems had in the ’80s lots of strikes. They were very, very proactive at striking. . . But, the days of Red Robbo [the nickname of a well-known workplace trade unionist] are gone. . . I think it’s possibly a little bit like religion, I suppose, people have just moved on. They don’t have the power that they used to have. And it’s almost a bit of a flea in the ear now rather than a threat of all-out action. . . I think it’s probably the capitalist involvement evolution that we’re all in now. It’s not the same world as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. And the employee now has got more say and has got more rights, backed up by the whole of society, including the law, the government, than what you would have had in the ’50s, ’60s and ’70s.

I used to be a convenor at Dan-Air; I’ve seen both sides of the fence.

Such expectations – no matter how contradictory – appeared to influence proceedings in a manner that is not apparent in Aero-Wheels Co., born out of the workforce composition of those employed by Fly-High Engineering and their past experiences. Many of the workers held deep-seated memories regarding trade unionism and worker rights. The presence of such individuals in Fly-High Engineering seemed also to provide a link through the workforce to the external sector and regional traditions of unionism which were some of the more advanced in the UK.

The sector’s historical culture reflected in the older workers and their collective memory of a unionised industry, the perceived ‘power culture’ of the owners and the HR culture promoted by a ‘HR champion’ steering through sets of regulatory expectations made for a curious combination of factors that configured a very different set of discussions about voice. It generated a form of micro-political environment where the need to be seen to partially formalise voice without unionising was apparent. The play of participatory politics was more nuanced and wider than the first case in part due to these internal anticipations of external legacies and regulatory actors.