Egypt in Transition

Brief Background

During Mubarak’s era the government was able to increase foreign investment yet ignored the widening wealth distribution gap, corruption, and political and human rights grievances. Healthcare and education collapsed. Economic deprivation attracted labor union strikes such as the Mahalla district strike in 2008. The Mahalla strike was significant in that not only was it widespread through the whole city and neighboring areas, but that there were calls against Mubarak, and the pulling down of his images. State media revealed nothing of the latter. It was only through social media that such images were displayed, as several bloggers posted photographs of the protesters pulling down Mubarak posters, a very brave action at the time (Bassiouni, 2012; Radsch, 2011). Furthermore, human rights and political grievances drew several social movements such as ‘Kefaya’ (Enough), ‘April 6th’ and ‘Kolona Khaled Saied’ (We are all Khaled Saied). The ‘Kefaya movement opposed the inheritance plan of presidency and corruption, while the April 6th movement rose after the labor strikes in Mahalla district, and [the] We are all Khaled Saied movement rose to oppose police brutality’ (Kinninmont, 2012).

‘In Egypt, unlike Tunisia where the uprising sparked from the rural areas, it was an urban uprising from the major cities. Both had a common cause: personal dignity and responsive government’ (Andersen, 2011). What started off on 25 January as a mere demonstration against police brutality soon became recognized as a contending force, an uprising of the Egyptian people against a dictatorship regime. Thereafter, 25 January bore economic and political demands bringing together people from different religious, economic and social classes; all united for one purpose, a representative and responsive government. The numbers in the streets were unprecedented. Million-man marches swarmed the streets and squares of Egypt. In 18 days, ‘Tahrir’ or Liberation Square and other squares around Egypt managed to break the line of fear, and topple down a dictatorship regime that had lasted for more than 30 years. However, one must recognize that the surprise was not that the people were dissatisfied, since for the past decade several movements and protests had been organized against corruption and government failure; the real surprise was that many believed that the dictatorship regime was immune, and managed to defeat all signs of revolt (Darwish, 2012; Lynch, 2011).

During the 18 days of the 25 January uprising, all operations were unexpectedly interrupted. The communications blackout and the imposed curfew began on 28 January 2011, a Friday, which is a weekend day in Egypt. Life came to a halt. GAPP Executive Education, which had only begun operations in May 2010 had to abruptly abort one of its long-term programs, Advanced Public Policy Management in collaboration with the Ministry of State for Administrative Development (MSAD). On 28 January the Egyptian authorities cut all internet and mobile phone communication, since Hatem Dweidar, a senior executive in one of the two major operating cell phone services in Egypt, reported to the news that they had received orders on 23 January that they should comply with any order to cut communications in the next few days (Bassiouni, 2012). Reaching trainees and trainers for adjustment arrangements with no cell phone service or internet was quite a challenge, and depended on the now rarely used landlines.

GAPP Executive Education, as with most institutions at the time, incurred due losses and faced uncertainty. Today, more than two years since the uprising, Egypt is still facing a state of uncertainty and instability. Two parliamentary elections, two referendums and one presidential election have been held. New forces came into power. The cabinet was changed three times, with prospects of changing yet another time. The anticipation for change and political ambiguity brings its implications to bear on the economy and on public policy issues, and in turn on public management and public policy education and training.

During the transition, schools responded to the high demand for knowledge and enthusiasm expressed by students and the general public by introducing new initiatives. These initiatives ranged from public dialogues of debate to courses specifically responsive to current needs. Departments of the American University in Cairo offered courses on various topics: the public policy and administration department offered Islam and Good Governance; the political science department offered Revolutions in the Arab World; the history department offered Al Shaab Youreed Iskat El Nizam (the people want to oust the regime); the rhetoric English department offered Writing the Revolution (Building a Better Egypt, 2011; Provost, 2011, personal communication to the American University in Cairo community). Additionally other institutions such as Cairo University offered a wide range of academic courses, dialogues and conferences including a course on the transformation of Euro-Arab world relations post the Arab Spring (El Khawaga O director EuroMed Center, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 2013, personal communication). Students were eager to learn and to become active citizens.

The Role of Educational Institutes as Partners in Change

The unveiling of events as Egypt transitions to democracy will certainly bring its implications to bear on public policy and public management education. Not only this, it will also extend to other specializations, as is now the norm in interdisciplinary education, to include changes in media and journalism education, law and human rights, sociology, political science, economics and history. Educational institutes are expected to play a key role in economic, social and political change, and development. In several instances, according to studies, their role, at least initially, would be reactive ‘to external pressures rather than initiating or driving transformation’ (Brennan et al., 2004).

At the current time of uncertainty in Egypt, educational institutes may play a role as partners in change through facilitating debate, and posing alternative solutions and studies. One of the political objectives of the 25 January revolution was to ensure that citizens made their political choices through free and fair elections, and that political stakeholders competed rigorously on a level playing field. Most of the political parties in the arena are quite young, and the process of campaigning for democratic elections is novel. To compete they need to acquire the skills of and understand the concepts behind professional campaigning. Free and fair election programs are necessary to assist in the process. Since training units are sufficiently flexible to respond quickly, the GAPP Executive Education training unit at AUC was one among several institutions that were quick to cater to these urgent needs (GAPP Execed, 2010). The topics were geared toward monitoring elections, advocacy, effective media and tools for campaigning; all of which were relatively new to the majority of participants, since for more than 60 years Egyptians were passive when it came to elections. The target participants were mainly young media professionals, emerging leaders of civil society and political parties.

Delivering such programs, which are considered an opportunity to play an active role in Egypt’s transition to democracy, had its many challenges. Most of the challenges were structural: safety; identifying funding sources; Arabizing curricula to meet the needs of youth; and identifying partners.

Impact of Challenging Times on Structure

This section will examine the impact of the 25 January uprising and the challenges of the following transition period on the structure of public executive education programs. Structural issues examined mainly focus on four challenges: access, safety, equity and choice of language. GAPP Executive Education operates in the two American university campuses: one located in New Cairo on the outskirts of Cairo; the other overlooking the Tahrir Square. The Tahrir campus is usually preferred by most participants for its proximity as a central location in Cairo. However, during the past couple of years the continuous million-man marches have resulted in several interruptions to operations, particularly at the American University in Cairo Tahrir campus. With the general decline in security in the nation, safety was at stake. Operations in a turbulent environment required extensive measures to ensure the safety of participants, trainers and staff. Incurring additional costs due to sudden changes in venue became the norm, so much so that they became a regular line in expenses. Searching for alternative solutions whether by shifting dates or by changing venues was part of the planning routine.

The frequent interruptions to programs, forced by the inaccessibility of the Tahrir campus, had usually been spontaneous during the past couple of years and only a few were anticipated. Safety was an issue. Though Egypt witnessed several peaceful protests, yet there were those that witnessed bloodshed and serious injuries, for example: on 28 June 2011 between security forces and the protestors, at the Maspero (the state television building, located near Tahrir Square); clashes with Coptic demonstrators on 9 October 2011; Tahrir Square clashes between protestors and security forces during 19–22 November 2011 and on 16 December 2011; Defense Ministry clashes between protestors and security forces 28–29 April 2012; clashes between demonstrators and security forces at the Itehadeya Palace (presidential palace) on 28 November 2012; and the anniversaries of 25 January, which usually brought several street clashes. In addition to the protests, programs were rescheduled due to sudden announcements or changes to significant occasions, which were expected to spur on violence, such as the parliamentary elections, presidential elections or both referendums.

The Free and Fair elections program posed other forms of challenge in addition to safety. Equal opportunity and access were vital. Maintaining an educational environment to enhance skills through debate and active participation in a classroom of participants from opposing parties required tactfulness. Equal opportunity institution programs encouraged all participants without discrimination. When offering campaign management to political parties, GAPP Executive Education was keen to engage participants from all active political parties: Islamists, leftist socialists, center, and liberals all in one classroom.

In addition to the Free and Fair Elections programs, the general public had a thirst for knowledge and understanding. In response to public interest, GAPP opened up its Tahrir campus for what was called the Tahrir dialogues. The Tahrir dialogues were initially offered weekly, and later became bi-weekly. Members of the media, civil society, academia, political parties and the general public were invited. The topics for discussion pivoted around fundamental issues through a moderated panel debate of different viewpoints from renowned Egyptian analysts and leading public figures (Building a Better Egypt, 2011; Provost, AUC, 2011, personal communication to the AUC community).

Both the Free and Fair Elections programs and the Tahrir dialogues were delivered in Arabic. The choice of language was necessary to maintain accessibility. However, this represented an added cost, since it requires translation of material, and simultaneous interpretation when sharing international expertise. Nevertheless, Arabizing the programs was necessary to ensure the inclusiveness of marginalized groups and effectiveness; and enhancing the skills necessary for development and overcoming the barrier for most participants who had not mastered the English language.

Impact of Economic Changes on Pedagogy and Funding of Programs

Although the economy during the last years of the Mubarak era had been improving, nothing seemed to trickle down to the masses of Egyptians. Foreign investment increased, the wealthy elite became wealthier, yet the wealth distribution gap widened, healthcare and education collapsed. Several strikes occurred, either for economic conditions or human rights. Many of these strikes received hardly any public attention, except perhaps the 2008 labor union strike in the Mahalla district, the ‘Kefaya’ movement, which opposed the inheritance plan of presidency and corruption, and the ‘Kolona Khaled Saied’ movement which rose to oppose police brutality. On 25 January, in addition to the political demands to remove the state of emergency and the minister of the interior, and limiting presidential terms to only two (Mubarak was then on his fifth term), there were also economic demands regarding poverty and equity (Kinninmont, 2012).

Two years on after the uprising, Egyptians do not feel any improvement in their living conditions. Worse yet, with the rise of new political forces there is uncertainty and debate over the future of economic policies. The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists seem to favor charity and goodwill as a solution to achieving social justice, while focusing on increasing investments (Kinninmont, 2012). On the other hand the leftist socialist movements and youth movements support achieving social justice through government policy and applying minimum and maximum wages to public office. Furthermore, an important influence is the military, which holds a monopoly on major businesses and is unlikely to support any threat of greater competition to its own interests.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which comprises the ruling majority through the Freedom and Justice party, along with the Salafists through the Noor party, seems to be adopting neoliberal policies, similar to those of the previous regime. ‘Faculty members [at the American University in Cairo] anticipate that, rather than focusing on the productive sectors, economic policies will continue to emphasize free trade, retail, commercial goods and brokerage’ (News@AUC, 2013). Egypt’s revenue continues to depend on tourism, the Suez Canal, workers’ remittances and foreign aid, with no signs of increasing productive capacity.

The current regime has not yet clearly identified its economic course. Yet there is a readiness and public officials’ statements are indicators for speculation and have led to much controversy. The effect of incorporating more regional donors like Qatar is worth studying. El Morsi Hegazy, Minister of Finance, claimed: ‘The new Islamic Bonds (Sukuk) law is expected to generate $10 billion for the Egyptian government’ (Ahram Online, 2013). Studying the effect of the sukuk or Islamic bonds and asset ownership in general, which had caused much public debate, creates a ground for more informed debate. The failure to address economic aspects has led to much debate and anticipation for the future for a nation that demanded social equity, better government performance, and responsiveness through million-man marches throughout the cities of Egypt.

Unemployment increased from 9% in 2010 to 11.9% in 2011, while more than 90% of the unemployed are young people (ILO and Ministry of Manpower and Migration, 2010; World Bank, 2012). In a nation that demanded social equity on 25 January 2011, and whose population is expected to grow from 83 million to 100 million by 2020, more than half live below the poverty line, 86% feel that it’s the government’s responsibility, while 70% feel that the government was not successful in fulfilling social equity aspirations (Gallup, 2012; Radwan, 2012; Reske, 2011). There is an urgent need to create a vision; one that encompasses employment and equity, the key factors leading to popular unrest in Egypt. More important is linking education to employment, and market demand.

‘Ultimately, the economy will have the final [word and] is bound to bring about nationwide political change’ (News@AUC, 2013). Economic changes impacting on politics and ultimately on education, such as that witnessed in the 2007 economic crises in Europe and North America, is bound to happen (Diamond and Liddle, 2012). Current speculation of alternatives and inspection of suggestions by the political forces are urgent for the march of economic development in Egypt. Alternative means of overcoming the economic challenges are in demand. Creating a national project to overcome unemployment is one widely discussed option (Qassim, 2012). Labor market policies and programs need to be addressed to raise youth employability and create more job opportunities resolving the mismatch between demand and supply (ILO and Ministry of Manpower and Migration, 2010).

Egyptians have laid claim to their rights of ownership. Young people went out into the streets and set forth an example of active citizenship. By 29 January, not only the demonstrators in Tahrir were claiming their citizenship, volunteer residents were helping protect their districts and organizing traffic with the withdrawal of the internal security forces. Others were organizing task forces to help clean the streets, and to provide medical and food supplies to those who needed them. In Egypt there are more than 2.5 million students in higher education institutions, of which the vast majority attend public universities or public vocational colleges. Yet higher education spending is only 1% of GDP, which is quite low given the bulging number of students. As a result, spending on research is quite limited – 0.2% of GDP – limiting the ability of Egypt’s 18 state-run universities to generate and disseminate knowledge (Lindsey 2012; Loveluck 2012b).

Harnessing the new found outbursts of ownership, sense of pride and belonging, which were thought to have perished among the long years of corruption and dictatorship, is necessary for providing creative solutions to emerge from the crises. Improving education to raise the potential of citizens’ work toward citizen empowerment is vital, as is creating a responsive accountable government. Higher education and training have a vital role to play. Yet several institutions were facing challenges due to the uncertain economic situation in Egypt post-25 January uprising. GAPP Executive Education, an income-generating unit whose programs are mainly tailored to mid- to senior-level officials in the government, public sector and non-profit organizations, faced further challenges. Identifying suitable candidates was difficult, with an unstable cabinet and continuous changes taking place in the senior management of organizations.

The Egyptian cabinet had changed three times, with the prospect of yet further change. Furthermore, funding was difficult, with organizations facing a decline in their autonomy to apply their discretion in how funds should be utilized in a period of continuous reorganization and with an unstable cabinet. Several organizations faced budget cuts. Since ‘training to support the individual career development of employees is more often embraced when budgets are flush’ (El Baradei and Newcomer, 2008), budget cuts usually meant that the training sector would be among the first to be affected. Prospects of further cuts are looming as Egypt faces economic uncertainty.

In February 2013 foreign reserves declined to $13.5 billion, from $24 billion in September 2011 and $36 billion in 2010; and there is an expected budget deficit of 12.5% in June 2013 compared to 9.5% in 2011 and 8.1% in 2010. By October 2011, Standard & Poor (S&P) had downgraded Egypt’s credit rating to BB-, due to political unrest, further lowered to C in March 2013; a sign according to Moody’s that there is only ‘a 10 percent chance of Egypt defaulting on its debt over the next year, and slightly less than a 40 percent chance of a default within five years’ (Africa Research Bulletin, 2011a, 2011b; Reuters, 2013). By March 2012 the budget deficit in Egypt reflected a shortfall of GBP144 billion (Africa Research Bulletin, 2012a, 2012b).

An additional, significant challenge to the deteriorating economic and safety situation was that urgent training needs changed. Working in an environment where Egypt witnessed a referendum, upper and lower houses of parliament elections, and presidential elections in less than a year and a half required a quick shift of focus to free and fair elections programs. The topics were geared toward monitoring elections, advocacy and tools for campaigning, all of which were relatively new to the majority of participants, since for more than 60 years Egyptians were passive when it came to elections. The target participants were mainly young media professionals, emerging leaders of civil society and political parties who were not likely to have access to funds for the required training. Furthermore, the reach of programs stretched out across the Egyptian governorates and countries in the region. Therefore, alternative means of funding were sought through funding agencies, which were eager to partner in change.

Yet the Egyptian government was quick to campaign over conspiracy theories and rumors of foreign spying agencies. Without hesitation, the government denounced foreign agencies’ eagerness as an interference with sovereignty through official statements from the minister of planning and international cooperation and the supreme council of armed forces (Ahram Online 2012; Feifer, 2011; Trofimov, 2011). The denouncement of foreign agencies in Egypt was further reinforced through the detention of 43 foreign and Egyptian funding agencies staff, and members of civil society organizations (Ahram Online, 2012; Loveluck, 2012a). This was a time for quick analysis and action toward pro-activity; composing a portfolio of diverse sources of funding was necessary to uphold programs and maintain credibility.

The Impact of Social and Political Changes

The 25 January uprising led to the emergence of new forces such as the Salafists and youth movements. Both, though representing two extremes, the secular and the fundamentalist, were not quite visible in the Mubarak era. The shifting of forces is yet to reveal where the road to democracy will lead. Democracy challenges in developing nations are usually linked to the very basis of the prerequisite characteristics of active participation of citizens, protection of human rights, and a consensus of the basics of socioeconomic systems (Sarquis, 2012). Democratic elections in Egypt brought an elected president from the Muslim Brotherhood, Freedom and Justice party; and an elected parliament of majority Islamists, mainly from the Freedom and Justice party and the Salafist Al-Nour party.

The rising powers of Islamist groups in Egypt brings forth the question, will Egypt then follow the Pakistani or the Turkish model with regard to education? Pakistan adopted a restrictive interpretation of Shari’a in education, social areas and the economy. Article 33 of Pakistan’s 1973 constitution sets an education policy ‘to ensure the preservation, practice and promotion of Islamic ideology and principles’; and the National Education Policy sets Islamic studies as ‘the code of life incorporated in all education’ (Nordic Recognition Information Centres, 2006). Turkey followed a more moderate example of Islamization limited to increasing Islamist officials in public office and some educational reform (Pupcenoks, 2012). However, there remain struggles from religious movements such as the Fethullah Gulen network for the return of the imam hatip religious schooling for younger children. Yet the Islamist Justice and Development ruling party in Turkey was re-elected for its citizen responsiveness and downplaying of religious issues.

In the two scenarios there were varying degrees of impact on education. Therefore, in Egypt, we may see the changes in public administration programs and in the education system in general. The question would be, will it be as restrictive as Pakistan, or more moderate as in Turkey? This will depend on the struggle between political forces.

Changes in political power have had their impact on education in Egypt in the past. National schools’ curricula reflected the transition in leadership from the Nasser socialist era to Sadat’s open market economy and to Mubarak’s globalized capitalist outlook. Nasser introduced free education for all and offered guaranteed public sector employment to university graduates, which created a bulging increase in university enrollment, and eventually a strain on public resources. The Egyptian centralized national school’s curriculum encouraged memorization rather than critical thinking, from Nasser’s socialist secular ideology, which was modeled in the region, to Sadat’s entrepreneurial, open-door policy. This policy also introduced religious classes in schools and gave way to the spread of several private schools; and thereafter to Mubarak’s focus on globalization and diversity (Baraka 2008; Graham, 2004).

The changes reflected a centralized government policy where citizen participation was not encouraged. The politicization of the curriculum was utilized as a tool ‘to inculcate students with specific cultural values and understandings’ (Loveluck, 2012a). Currently, there have been no major changes in national school textbooks, save that the Ministry of Education removed approximately 20% of the curriculum dedicated to praising Mubarak and the previous ruling National Democratic Party achievements (Loveluck, 2012a). The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice ruling party higher education reform program seems quite positive, advocating the independence of universities, and linking the curriculum with market demand. Furthermore, the program plans increased spending on research to reach 2.5% of GDP, and to increase faculty salaries. Yet the Salafist ultraconservative Al Nour party, the second largest in number of seats in the previous parliament, calls for linking the curriculum to Islamic values and taking into account ‘the particular nature of women’ (Lindsey, 2012).

At university level discussions in general are more open to debate and there is increased interest in participation among students. Some of the significant improvements at public universities level include free elections for student unions, visibly decreased appearances of police and intelligence services, and elections for senior administrative positions as opposed to previous appointments (Lindsey, 2012). However, several faculty members seem to share the general public’s pessimistic view that policy issues haven't really changed since the revolution. ‘“There is general discontent when it comes to socioeconomic policies,” said Ashraf El Sherif, assistant professor of political science’ (News@AUC, 2013).

In principle, one would hope that it would be easier to do policy research, but, depressingly, there seems to be no change. There seems to be a more active freedom of information movement, but it is not really making any noticeable progress. ‘Revolutions need to invoke major transformations’, stressed Emad Shahin, professor of public policy and administration. (News@AUC, 2013)

Amr Hamzawy, professor of public policy and administration and former PM, claimed that the current regime’s shortcomings were manifest in an undemocratic constitutional amendment process. A revolution would naturally bring its own constitution. In Egypt the case was quite different. A partnership to ensure transparent legislation for freedom and equity is a cornerstone of the coming period. Setting the constitution to ensure proper representation for all is in fact the most important step in the making of a revolution. Liberal groups and marginalized groups demanded participation in setting the criteria for constitutional panel members’ selection, to ensure that it was not dominated by any one group, and was representative of society. Yet the ruling political parties continued to strive to secure a constitution in the hope of a more stable environment. It is yet unclear whether Egypt will follow the Turkish or the Pakistani model, or rather a sub-Saharan model where ‘restructuring did not occur, newly elected regimes often practiced old forms of repression or manipulated democratic formalities to their benefit’ (Miller and Martini, 2012).

Conclusion

The impact of economic, social and political changes on executive education training, and on public administration and research to be felt in Egypt is inevitable. Educational institutes are expected to play a key role in economic, social and political change, and development. At the current phase of transition in Egypt, the challenges between emerging political forces of power that have not yet stabilized, continued social unrest and inequity, and a deteriorating economy are all factors for consideration. The initial impact is mainly structural: access, safety, funding, equity and choice of language. However, the outcomes of the current struggle are expected eventually to lead to more pedagogical changes.

The bases for development courses are already in place; from reforming social services, leadership, NGO management, policy for sustainable cities, local economic development, accountability, democratic institutions, etc. The debate is on when, and if, policy issue changes do occur and how they will be significant for education. The quick and more significant changes can be seen more clearly in training and executive education, which offers more flexibility and responsiveness. Further research is necessary to study the transformational impact on education, including reforming curricula, extending access, diversification, and linkage with societal and economic needs.