Abstract
This study investigates the legal and social background of Paul's adoption metaphor in its historical context (particularly, in terms of Roman social practices and legal rules), and applies it to an interpretation of Paul's adoption metaphor. Firstly, adopting complete strangers was rare in Roman society, and adoptees were usually chosen from among close relatives and friends' children. Secondly, adopting slaves should be distinguished from adopting freeborn children in Roman social practice and law. Thirdly, adoption in the presence of a legitimate heir was also regarded as unusual in Roman society. Therefore, it should be noted that Paul's adoption metaphor was unusual, because the metaphor refers to adopting slaves in the presence of a legitimate heir, and that this metaphor functions to stress God's unusual and extraordinary favour and love to the believers in the context of Rom 8:15.
Keywords
The background of adoption (νíoθ∊σíα; Romans 8:15, 23; 9:4; Gal 4:3; Eph 1:5) is still unclear, and scholars diverge into two categories in their interpretation of the background of Paul's adoption metaphor: Jewish (Rossell: 232–33; Jewett: 498; Moo: 501; Schreiner: 425), Greek or Roman (Dunn: 452; Lyall 1984: 95–97; Burke 2006: 46–71; Walters, 42–76; Wilckens: 136; cf. Cranfield: 397–98, who allows for both Greco-Roman and Jewish background). Furthermore, scholars fail to understand that adoption in the Greco-Roman era is radically different from the modern Western understanding of adoption, and that it is in some respects an unfamiliar institution to modern readers. Therefore, they miss some significant social and legal aspects of adoption, as follows.
Adopting complete strangers was rare, and adoptees were usually chosen from among close relatives and friends' children. In Romans 8:15, adoption indicates that the believers who were enslaved to another master, namely sin, were given in adoption by God. Thus, adoption in Romans 8 should be understood as adopting complete strangers. How can we interpret this unusual case in the historical context?
Adopting slaves should be distinguished from adopting freeborn children in Roman social practice and law. This point is significant, because the metaphors of adoption in Romans 8 and Galatians 4 relate to adopting slaves, not freeborn children. What did adopting slaves in Roman and social pracitice and law imply? Why does Paul employ the metaphors of adopting slaves?
Adoption in the presence of a legitimate heir was also regarded as abnormal in Roman society. It should be noted that adoption in Romans 8:15 and Galatians 4:3 is not given in the absence of a legitimate heir (Christ as the firstborn son in Rom 8:29). Why does Paul use unusual metaphors (adoption of slaves in the context of the continued existence of a legitimate heir)? Furthermore, the adoptees become joint-heirs with the legitimate heir—Christ—in Rom 8:17. What does the joint-inheritance mean in the context of adoption?
This study will investigate the legal and social background of adoption in its historical context and will apply it to interpretation of Paul's adoption metaphor in Romans 8:15. Although we do not need to presume that Paul and his letter-recipients had extensive legal knowledge, nevertheless we should note that Roman legal documents reflect Roman society and customs. Therefore, we will consider the Roman writings and legal documents that reveal the actual Roman practices of adoption.
Adoption in Paul's Letters: Jewish, Greek or Roman?
First, we will examine the background of adoption in Paul's letters. Paul is the sole NT author who employs the metaphor of adoption. What was the source of Paul's adoption metaphor: was it Jewish or Greco-Roman? James M. Scott vigorously supports the Jewish backdrop with the most detailed and lengthy arguments in his doctoral thesis, and connects the background of νíoθ∊σíα to divine adoption, particularly in 2 Samuel 7:14 and Romans 1:3–4. That is, Christ as the Son of God in Romans 1:3–4 is linked to Christ as the Messiah of Israel. Scott applies this idea to Romans 8 and concludes that adoption has the implication of royal sovereignty such as Davidic kingship in the OT and the Jewish literature. He observes the idea of divine adoption in the OT and Jewish literature (Scott: 88) and considers 2 Samuel 7:14 in terms of the adoption formula as in Exodus 2:10 (Scott: 102). Scott also finds the adoption formula of 2 Samuel 7:14 in 4QFlor 1:11; Jub 1:24; TJud 24:3, which occur in the context of the exile and the eschatological restoration of Israel (Scott: 115). Scott, therefore, claims that adoption in Galatians 4 and Romans 8 should be understood as the concept of divine adoption that is related to messianic salvation in the context of the exile and eschatological restoration (Scott: 269), and that adoption (νíoθ∊σíα) is the concept relating to royal messianic sovereignty. Thus, Scott understands adoption in Romans 8:15 and Galatians 4:3 in terms of participating in the messianic rulership and entering into the inheritance of universal sovereignty.
It seems apparent that Romans 8 contains implications of universal sovereignty, but the notion of adoption must be examined in a wider context. Critiquing Scott's arguments, the idea of divine adoption in the OT and the Jewish literature does not always have messianic connotations that relate to royal sovereignty. Scott connects the notion of adoption and inheritance to messianic sovereignty in the light of 2 Samuel 7:14, but it should be noted that the theme of corporate adoption also occurs in Exodus 4:22 before 2 Samuel 7:14 (cf. Isa 64:8).
Divine adoption in Exodus 4:22 offers a clearer context for the adoption of Israel in Jub 1:24 and TJud 24:3. Scott also maintains that Jub 1:24 evokes the Davidic adoption formula in 2 Samuel 7:14, but it is more likely that the sonship of Israel and the Sinai institution in Jub 1:24–25 alludes to the corporate adoption in Exodus 4:22 and Jeremiah 31:9. In TJud 24:3, the sons do not refer to the messiah. The given context of TJud 24:3, depicts that Israel will be addressed as the son through the actions of the messiah, but the conceptual link between the inauguration of the messiah and the sonship of Israel is unclear. In the OT, the fatherhood of God and the sonship of Israel occur regardless of the messianic implication (e.g., Jer 31:9; Exod 4:22; Isa 64:8). In Jewish literature, the sonship of Israel does not always have a messianic implication. It is, therefore, more appropriate for the adoption in Jub 1:24 and TJud 24:3 to be understood in the light of Israel's corporate sonship as in Exodus 4:22. Scott is correct to perceive that the adoption theme in Jewish literature occurs in the context of Exodus and the eschatological restoration of Israel. However, this co-relationship with Exodus and the restoration of Israel shows that the adoption motif derives from the divine declaration in Exodus 4:22, not from the messianic designation in 2 Samuel 7:14. Therefore, the entire background of Paul's adoption narrative cannot fall on the single text of 2 Samuel 7:14.
Thus, the idea of sonship in Romans 8 and Galatians 4 originates in the OT, but Paul explains the sonship of the believers using the metaphor of the well-known legal institution—adoption in Romans 8:15, 23 and Gal 4:5 (cf. Wilckens: 136; Dunn: 452). Adoption was a widespread institution in the Greco-Roman world; so Paul may have adopted his metaphor mindful that he could not rely on an unknown Jewish institution to enlighten the Roman recipients of his teaching.
Israel is the son of God in the OT, but it is tenuous to consider the sonship of Israel in Exodus 4:22 and Hosea11:1 in the light of adoption. The sonship is not elucidated in terms of adoption in the OT and Jewish literature (Burke 2006: 48–51), and explicating Israel's sonship in terms of divine adoption is unfamiliar in the OT and Jewish literature. Jewett insists that the idea of God adopting his people existed in ancient Israel. Indeed, the idea of the sonship of Israel existed, but as Jewett concedes (Jewett: 498), sonship was not expressed as a legal term in the OT and Jewish literature. Furthermore, νíoθ∊σíα and its cognate words are missing in the LXX. So, “adoption” is an unfamiliar concept in the LXX. Accordingly, the idea of the sonship of Israel was hardly expressed in terms of adoption in the OT and Jewish literature, and it is more persuasive that Paul employs the well-known Greco-Roman institution of adoption in order to portray the believers' sonship and the route by which they are joining the family of God.
Ancient Jewish authors frequently employ adoption terminologies. For instance, in Ant. I. 154, Josephus explains the relationship between Abraham and Lot in terms of adoption: “Abraham, who had no legitimate son, adopted Lot, his brother Aran's son and the brother of his wife Sara.” In Ant. III.287 Josephus also states that Jacob adopted Manasseh and Ephraim, Joseph's sons, although the MT and LXX are silent on adoption terminology:
In place of Levi he enrolled among the tribal leaders Manasseh, son of Joseph, and Ephraim instead of Joseph, in accordance with the request which Jacob had made to Joseph to give up his children to be adopted by their grandfather….
Interestingly, it is probable that the process of the adoption was written in terms of Roman law. Particularly, Joseph gave up his children for adoption in Ant. III. 287. It is highly likely that Josephus' depiction indicated giving up the father's authority over his natural children—i.e., emancipation—as part of the process of Roman adoption (cf. Philo, Agr. 238; Congr. 23; Mut. 145; Abr. 250; Vit. Mos. I. 18, 33, 149; Flac. 8; Leg. 23).
In general, many scholars do not distinguish the Greek and Roman notions of adoption (e.g., Wilckens: 136), but Francis Lyall maintains that adoption in Paul's letters should be viewed specifically in the context of Roman law (Lyall: 98–99). However, his view warrants criticism.
It is dubious that adoption in Roman law denotes a more radical break from the past life as a slave than in Greek law because, as we will discuss below, adoption of slaves does not indicate a total legal change in their status.
It was rare in Greek practice to adopt someone from outside the family, namely, someone who is not a blood relative or somebody unrelated to the family. However, contrary to Lyall, it was also unusual to adopt someone who was not a blood or family relation in the Roman custom, because adopters usually chose their adoptees from among their close relatives' or friends' children (Lindsay 2009: 103). Therefore, some of Lyall's arguments remain unpersuasive.
Nonetheless, the concept of adoption in Paul's Letters seems to be closer to the Roman institution than the Greek.
Paul mentions adoption in his letters to the cities under the rule of Roman law (Rome, Galatia (either south or north Galatia), Ephesus), where the Christian communities might be aware of the Roman legal rules (Burke 2006: 61).
The Pauline adoption metaphor is closer to the process of the Roman adoption than the Greek (cf. Gaius, Inst. 1.134). For example, the break between the adoptee and his former family in Roman law is more complete than in Greek law (cf. Inst. 3.1.11). Adoption was an issue for inheritance in Roman society, but also implied that an adoptee was emancipated from his father's power and that he entered under the power of another father, as Aulus Gellius, N.A. 5.19.4–5 states: “The process is called adrogatio, when persons who are their own masters deliver themselves into the power of another, and are themselves responsible for the act” (cf. Inst. 1.11.2; Inst. 1.12.6). That is, one of the features in Roman adoption was transferring from one father's power to another father's power, and these processes of emancipation and adoption are more aligned to the context of adoption in Paul's letters. Josephus (Ant. III. 287) may also reflect this process of adoption. The stress on emancipation is not found in Greek adoption.
In Greek practice, adoptions were mainly performed for an infertile family, and if legitimate heirs already existed, the adoption was sometimes decried (Lindsay: 38, 56). For example, in On the Estate of Pyrrhus 72–3, Isaeus states that, although his uncle left a legitimate daughter, his uncle adopted his brother as an heir, and Isaeus blames his uncle as most shameless. Isaeus' oration provides an example showing that adopting someone else with the continued existence of a legitimate heir was censurable in Greek society (On the other hand, in the Gortyn code, column X. 40 (the ancient Greek civil law in Crete) we find more flexible principles; e.g., “If there should be legitimate children of the adopter, the adopted son shall receive with the males just as females receive from their brothers”). However, adoption with the existence of other legitimate heirs was possible in Roman society, although rare, as we will discuss below. For instance, Valerius Maximus reports that Terentius adopted one child even though he already had seven children (Valerius Maximus: 7.7.5). Therefore, it is more plausible that Paul envisages Roman adoption—in which adoption alongside the continued existence of legitimate heirs was possible—in contrast to Greek adoption.
Joint-inheritance in 8:17 fits with Roman social and legal practices of adoption. Paul elaborates, in Romans 8:17, that adoptees are not merely heirs, but particularly joint-heirs of Christ. Joint-inheritance implies shared destiny with Christ (particularly concerning suffering and glorification with Christ in 8:17), but simultaneously may evoke that the freedmen as adoptees could be a beneficiary of a trust (fideicommissum), although they could not inherit directly as heirs or legatees under their adoptive fathers' testament. As evidence, Gaius, Inst. 1.24 writes, “their [the freedmen's] incapacity to inherit under a will must only be understood as an incapacity to take directly as heirs or legatees, not to inherit indirectly as beneficiaries of a trust” (Cf. Digest 37.4.8.12; Inst. 2.23).
Otherwise, the joint-inheritance in 8:17 could refer to Roman joint-inheritance (consortium). The joint-family is rarely found in the Jewish convention. We detect the cognate words of σνγκληρoνóμoσ (inheritance) at least twice in Jewish literature. Sirach 22:23 reads, “Gain the trust of your neighbor in his poverty, so that you may rejoice with him in his prosperity. Stand by him in time of distress, so that you may share with him in his inheritance (σνγκληρoνóμoσ).” However, Sirach 22:23 does not mean the joint-inheritance with brothers, but participation in division of the inheritance. Vita Dan 17 states, “The king named the prophet Baltasar because he wished to make him a joint heir with his children,” but the meaning of the joint-heirship is unclear in this verse. On the basis of extant evidence, the joint-family relationship between brothers was unfamiliar in Jewish culture, so joint-inheritance in the sense of shared inheritance or shared destiny for suffering and glory should be interpreted in terms of Greco-Roman practice, not Jewish practice. Further, the joint-inheritance in Romans 8:17 refers to sharing in the indivisible inheritance with Christ, and this enables readers to read the joint-heirship in Romans 8:17 against the Greco-Roman backdrop.
For examples of Roman consortium, Aelius Tubero is said, in Valerius Maximus 4.4.8, to have lived with his sixteen joint family members in a small house. Pliny (Ep. 8.18.4) mentions the joint-heir (consor). He records that two adopted sons inherited their adoptive fathers' property in the form of a joint-inheritance. The joint-inheritance (consortium) provided the legal framework for members of the family jointly to run the family farm and to share the resources in Roman law, and it forms the basis on which to negotiate an inheritance. In the later Roman era, the flexible and equal distribution of inheritance was developed, but joint-inheritance (consortium) was still found in the Roman world until the second century
The institution of joint-inheritance also existed in ancient Greece (e.g., Plutarch, Crassus 1.1). However, as shown above, it was unfamiliar to adopt others alongside the existence of a legitimate heir in Greece, and furthermore, joint-inheritance between a legitimate heir and adoptees was not traced in Greek practices. On the other hand, adoptees could share in the joint-inheritance in Roman society (Cf. Gaius, Inst. 1.24). Therefore, on the basis of extant historical documents, it is more probable that Paul envisaged the Roman practice of adoption and joint-inheritance (fideicommissum or consortium).
Finally, in Greece, adoption was not necessarily essential in relation to inheritance, because the heads of the family could choose their heirs without adoption. Rather, adoption was generally practiced in order to make the inheritance process smoother (Lindsay 2009: 61). However, Roman adoption and inheritance was more complex than the Greek. There were three types of heirs in Roman law: compulsory heirs, immediate and compulsory heirs and outside heirs (Inst. 2.19). A slave appointee was a compulsory heir (Inst. 2.19.1). The immediate and compulsory heirs were the sons and daughters, also grandchildren through a son and those down the line, who were under the power of the deceased (Inst. 2.19.2). All other heirs, who were not under the power of the deceased, were outsiders (Inst, 2.19.3).
Nevertheless, in situations of conflict surrounding an inheritance, the family member had a priority to possess the inheritance, and adoption was also needed to take part in bonorum possessio (the right of possession of the property of a deceased person established by an order issued by the praetor) for certain. If legatees were not adopted, there was a certain risk that they would not participate in bonorum possessio: “To be admitted to bonorum possessio they must rank as children,” in Digest, 37.4.8 (Ulpian, Edict, 40); “In bonorum possessio contrary to the terms of a will, we should include children whether natural or adopted, provided that they have been neither to the terms of a will by the same right and in the same order as they are called to succession at civil law,” in Digest, 37.4.1 (Ulpian, Edict, 39). In other words, adoption made the heir's position more definite, as Digest, 37.4.13 states, “But possessio contrary to the terms of a will is given to one who is in adoptive family, if he has been appointed heir in that degree against which bonorum possessio contrary to will.”
It is unlikely that Paul envisioned this sort of complicated legal situation for his metaphors (Rom 8:15, 23; 9:4; Gal 4:3; Eph 1:5), but it is clear that, in some respects, the connection between adoption and inheritance in Roman society is stronger than in Greek practice because adoption was not necessarily essential in order to become an automatic heir in Greek society. On the other hand, in a complex legal situation, adoption could be an effective route to underpin the heirs' position and status in the Roman world. Therefore, the idea of Roman adoption and inheritance is more fitting for the nature of Paul's adoption metaphor than Greek adoption, because Paul closely links adoption with inheritance in Romans 8:17a: “If children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ.”
Due to the local variations and the lack of extant documents, Greek adoption practices are not entirely clear to us, compared to Roman practices. Yet, on the basis of our present knowledge of Greek and Roman practices, we conclude that the idea of sonship in Paul's letters is basically Jewish, but Paul explains the meaning of the sonship in terms of the well-known practice of adoption in Roman society. Therefore, we will examine the implications of adoption in Paul's letters against Roman social and legal backdrops.
Adoption in Roman Social Practice and Law
We will explore four points in this section:
Were complete strangers given in adoption in Roman social practice?
What is the difference in status between adoptive and biological children in Roman society?
What social and legal status did ex-slaves as adoptees have? Is adopting slaves frequently found in Roman adoption practice?
How was it perceived to adopt other adoptees in the presence of a natural heir in Roman society?
What, then, did an adoption mean? Adoption enabled the testator to select the heir from outside the family and created a new legal heir. In the Roman era, it was also possible to designate the heir, but adoption was one of the main vehicles to determine inheritance for the infertile family (Pomeroy: 122). In Roman law, adoption was expounded as follows (cf. Aulus Gellius, N.A. 5.19.1–6):
Adoptions can be done in two ways, by writ from the emperor or application to a magistrate. The imperial procedure is used where the man or woman being adopted is already an independent person. That kind of adoption is called adrogatio. Adoption before a magistrate is used for persons of both sexes still within paternal authority [Inst. I. 11.1].
There were two kinds of adoption in Roman society: adrogatio and adoptio. Adrogatio was practiced by a legally independent person (sui iuris), and adoptio was practiced by the legally dependent person (alienis iuris), namely, by a son still under his father's power. However, adoptio sometimes covers both terminologies (e.g., Digest, 1.7).
The adoptees could be the members of the family of the adopters (Pomeroy: 122), and a sentimental relationship like that between biological parents and children was also found between the adopter and the adoptee. It was possible to adopt a grandson through the son's agreement (Digest 1.7.6; Inst. 1.11.7), but it was not permitted to adopt multiple adoptees without proper reasons (Digest 1.7.15.3; cf. Suetonius, Aug. 64; Tacitus, Ann. 1.3). All the legitimate children could equally share in the intestate inheritance from their paterfamilias. Adoption made adoptive children legal heirs (Gaius. Inst. 3.2: “By sui heredes are meant descendants who are in the dying man's potestas—for example, a son or daughter, grandson or granddaughter through a son, (or) a great-grandson or great-granddaughter through a grandson born of a son”).
However, it should be noted that ancient adoption was radically different from the modern institution.
It was different in purpose. In most cases, adoption was practiced to designate an heir, especially with regard to the inheritance of an infertile family in Roman society (cf. Lindsay 2009: 102–03): “The thing which both modes of adoption [adoptio and adrogatio] have in common is that even those who cannot have children of their own, for example, eunuchs, can adopt,” in Digest 1.7.2. Thus, adoption in Roman society was usually practiced out of the need to designate an heir. Tacitus, Annale 15.19 states that, around
Adopting close agnates or friends' children as heirs is the most common form of adoption: “At any rate, when the legal authorities are consulted there is little sign of adoption of complete strangers in provisions relating to aspects of adoption and inheritance” (Lindsay 2009: 103). Some Roman literature states that complete strangers were adopted, but these adoptions were generally for purposes other than succession or inheritance. Adoptions outside the common practice were sometimes treated with suspicion in Roman society. For example, in Seneca the Elder, Controv. 2.1, a rich man disowned his biological sons and proposed to adopt another from a poor man's family. However, the rich man's intention was not out of the need to find an heir, and his behavior was criticized as a mental disorder or the disease of luxury (Seneca the elder, Controv. 2.1.10–12). Cicero, in Dom. 34–36, pointed out that a young man's adoption of the senator caused problems. Sometimes, some children were commodified or exchanged to some rich Roman families as gift-children (Bernstein). However, these practices did not purport to install an heir, and were also treated with suspicion or contempt by Roman authors (e.g., Seneca the elder, Controv. 9.3).
According to Roman law, adoptive rights were weaker than natural rights. However, most NT scholars presume that adoptees were in the same legal position as natural sons (Dunn: 460; Burke: 2006, 63; Walters: 53). This is generally true (Gaius, Inst. 2.136; Gellius, N.A. 5.19.9; Inst. 1.11.8), and adoption entailed emancipation from a previous family and the power of that father and enabled the adopted to acquire “the same agnatic inheritance rights as a natural child in the new familia” (Gardner 1998: 117), in so far as adoptees remained in the adopters' power.
Yet, the status of adoptees was different from that of biological children at specific points. Adopted sons became brothers of the adopter’ real sons, but the adopters' wife could not become the mother of the adoptees (Digest, 1.7.23). Some legal rules also imply that adoptive children were not legally considered to be the adopters' children:
People can be excused acting as guardian or supervisor for a variety of reasons. Frequently it is on account of their children, whether within their authority or emancipated. Someone who has three surviving children in Rome, four in Italy, or five in the provinces can be excused from these duties as from other public duties. It is accepted that the office of guardian or supervisor is a public duty. Adoptive children do not count for this purpose, though their real father can count them (Inst. 1.25).
This quotation shows that adoptees were not legally considered for public duties such as guardianship, although they could be included in the family by their adoptive father. Digest, 37.4.8.11 also states that “they [adoptees] are not entirely strangers [italic mine] (nec enim in totum extranei sunt) to the family,” and this nuanced sentence implies that adoptees were not treated in totally the same way as the natural sons.
In addition, if the father died intestate, the status of adopted sons was different from that of the real sons in terms of bonorum possessio (the right of possession of the property of a deceased person established by an order of a praetor). Digest 37.4.8.11–2 maintains that, where adoptees were designated as heirs when the fathers were alive, they were eligible for bonorum possessio contrary to the terms of a will: Digest 37.4.8.12 (Ulpian), “To be admitted to bonorum possessio they must rank as children. However, if I have given my adoptive son in adoption and have appointed him heir and others initiate the edictal procedure, he will not be given bonorum possessio contrary to will.” Yet, if they were designated as a beneficiary of a trust (fideicommissum), they could not inherit bonorum possessio in contrast to biological sons (cf. Digest 31.77.12; 31.77.21). Therefore, we cannot conclude that adoptive children held the same position and status in their adoptive family.
Furthermore, it should be noted that ex-slaves given in adoption held far lower status than biological children. Slaves were not always excluded from the testator's inheritance: e.g., “A slave appointee is a compulsory heir, so called because the testator's death automatically makes him free and compels him to be heir whether he likes it or not,” (Inst. 2.19.1). Slaves were occasionally adopted, particularly in the lower classes of the Roman world. One advantage of adopting ex-slaves was to take over properties of the freedmen under the adopter's control (Lindsay 2009: 134). But the freedman as the adoptee has a limited status compared to the freeborn adoptee (Inst. 1.11.12; Livy, 10.8.10; Digest 1.5.27). As Gaius mentions in Inst. 1.11.12: “We too have learned from that and have laid down in our pronouncement that a slave whom an owner names as his son in proper documents becomes free. However, that is not enough to give him the full status of a son.” In other words, the freedmen could not legally have the full status of natural sons (Livy, 39.19.5; Digest 1.5.27; Lindsay 2009: 132, 137; Gardner 1989: 252; Gardner 1998: 120).
These discriminations to adopted freedmen may reflect Augustus' legislative program to institutionalize the social demarcation according to wealth and birth (Cf. Digest 1.7.15.2–3). Augustus enacted law that encouraged marriage and childbirth, because high class people tended to avoid marriage (so called, Lex Iulia de maritandis Ordinibus; in AD 9, modified by Lex Papia Poppaea; Suetonius, Aug. 34; Dio Cassius, History of Rome 54.16.1; Inst. 4.18.2–3). However, Augustus' marriage law also consolidated the social demarcation against the freedmen. The next quotation reflects Augustus' marriage law: “Senators and their descendants are forbidden to marry freedwomen, or women who have themselves followed the profession of the stage, or whose father or mother has done so” (Ulpian, Epitome 13–14). By the same token, Lindsay observes, “The Augustan prohibition on marriages between freedwomen and senators perhaps only hardened the rules in an area already subject to social or customary sanction” (Lindsay 2009: 135).
In addition, Aulus Gellius writes, “Freedmen, however, may legally be adopted in that way by freeborn citizens, according to Masurius Sabinus. But he adds that it is not allowed, and he thinks it never ought to be allowed, that men in the condition of freedmen should by process of adoption usurp the privileges of the freeborn” (Aulus Gellius, N.A. 5.19.11–13). Thus, adopting slaves was allowed in Roman law and custom, but according to Masurius Sabinus, a Roman jurist in the first century AD, the adoption should not invade (invadant) the privileges of the freeborn. This comment reveals a social barrier against adopted ex-slaves, and further, the emphatic double negation (it is not allowed…. never ought to be allowed; Sed id neque permitti dicit, neque permittendum esse umquam [Italic mine]) in N.A. 5.19.12 implicitly shows Masurius Sabinus' unhappy attitude toward adopting slaves. N.A. 5.19.13 also denotes that, if adopting slaves usurped freeborn children, the adoption could not be allowed. Thus, adopting slaves was not a preferred option for adopters in the Roman world, and it was not allowed for a freed adoptee to inherit the adopter's property together with freeborn heirs, if it invaded the natural rights of the adopter's biological children, as implied by N.A. 5.19.13.
There were several restrictions on adopted ex-slaves.
Adopted freedmen were restricted to certain relationships concerning marriage, and upgrading their status through marriage with high class women was impossible in some cases (Digest 23.2.17, 44; Gaius, Inst. 1.61). For example, freedmen could not marry daughters of senators (Digest 23.2.32, 44). Augustus' marriage law was a tacit obstacle for freedmen to be married with freeborn women (Rawson: 72).
Adopted freedmen were restricted in their right to political engagement. Plebeians and freedmen had limited access to political office in contrast to those of patrician birth (De Viris Illustribus 72; cf. Treggiari: 37–52, 52–68). In de Oratore 1.38, Cicero states that the father of Tiberius and Gaius Sempronius delivered a speech in support of transferring a freedman into the city tribes, and this reflects disputes on the status of freedmen within the Roman republic (Sempronius Gracchus, a censor, restricted ex-slaves to the city tribes in 169
Adoption did not remove ex-slaves' obligations to their ex-master. Ex-slaves could enjoy his property in his lifetime, but patrons could repossess property of their ex-slaves after their ex-slaves' death (Gaius, Inst. 3.56. Cf. Pliny, Ep. 10.104: “Valerius Paulinus, lord, has left a will which passes over his son Paulinus and committed to me his rights over his Latin freedmen”). In Twelve Tables, automatic heirs of a freedman had rights to inherit the property of the freedman. However, if the freedman died intestate and if there was no automatic heir, his patron could take over the inheritance. Additionally, if the automatic heirs were not natural children, but adoptees, the patron could claim the property of the freedman (Gaius, Inst. 3.40). On the other hand, in Lex Papia (AD 9), patrons could also claim the inheritance of the freedman if he left fewer than three children, whether testate or intestate (Gaius, Inst. 3.42). Thus, in Roman law, the property of ex-slaves was still connected to their patrons in inheritance, and adoption could not remove this connection: “Where a man confesses himself to be a freedman, his patron cannot make him a freeborn even by adoption” (Digest 1.5.27).
Gaius states in Inst. 2.14.1, “It is possible to appoint as heir either a free man or a slave, one's own or another's.” However, ex-slaves were not allowed to make a will or to inherit under the will of another, or be appointed testamentary guardians in spite of their adoption (Gaius, Inst. 1.23). Gaius explained this rule in his Inst. 1.24: ex-slaves' incapacity to take under a will must be understood only as an incapacity to inherit directly as heirs or legatees. They could be only a beneficiary of a trust (fideicommisum). Gaius states that ex-slaves could have only the lowest grade of freedom, in Gaius, Inst. 1.26).
Ex-slaves did not have freedom of residence. They were not allowed to live in the city of Rome according to the Lex Aelia Sentia enacted in the reign of Augustus (Gaius, Inst. 1.27).
Therefore, adopting freeborn children was preferable to adopting slaves in Roman society because of the social obstacles and prejudices discussed above (cf. Gardner 1989: 249). Ex-slaves continued to experience constraints even after their adoption, and they were legally distinguished from freeborn children. It was rare for childless men of high status to adopt slaves (Gardner 1989: 253). By the same token, Lindsay writes,
It seems unlikely that adoption of a freedmen was a common resort for childless of high status as a method of providing themselves with heirs…. Adoptions aimed solely at providing heirs would normally occur within close degrees of relationship or from amongst family friends of suitable standing [2009: 134].
Thus, it is hardly credible that Roman nobles who took a serious view of their fame and status would consider adopting slaves and installing them as heirs. In addition, designating adopted freedmen as co-heirs along with freeborn natural children was rarely allowed by the Roman authorities (Aulus Gellius, N.A. 5.19.12–13).
Finally, we should note that in Roman socienty it was also rare to adopt other adoptees in the presence of a legitimate heir. Roman civil law also exhorted citizens not to adopt others, if the adopter already had natural children, because the adoption could endanger the financial security of the family (Digest 1.7.2.1–2 [Gaius]; Digest, 1.7.17.3 [Ulpian]). As discussed above, adoption was connected to issues of inheritance, and the adoptee became a legal heir after adoption. Thus, adoption created another heir within the family, and so it could cause some conflict in the family with any existing heirs. So, it was something of a rarity to adopt others alongside existing legitimate heirs (Gardner 1998: 203; Lindsay 2009: 56).
In conclusion, Roman adoption differentiates from modern adoption at many points.
Adoption in the Roman world was different from the modern institution in terms of the purpose. Roman adoption was usually related to succession and inheritance.
Adopters generally found their adoptees among close relatives or friends' children. Adopting complete strangers was rare in the Roman society.
Adoptive children had a different (or lower) status than natural children in the family and in the legal perspective. Adopted slaves could not obtain the same privileges and status as biological children. For this reason, adopting slaves was not the preferred option in Roman society.
It was neither common nor widely accepted to adopt others alongside existing heirs. We will apply these points to Paul's metaphor of adopting slaves in Romans 8:15.
Implications of Adoption in Romans 8:15
We need to observe the flow of Paul's ideas in Romans 7 and 8 in order to examine the implications of adoption in Romans 8:15. In Romans 7:14, Paul states, “For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under sin.” So, “we” are enslaved to sin, but in Romans 8:1, Paul also points out that “the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and of death.” He explains the meaning of redemption (cf. Rom 7:24) in terms of freedom from slavery in Romans 8:1, and this allusion is connected to the metaphor of νíoθ∊σíα from slavery in Romans 8:15 (cf. Rom 7:14: “For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under sin”). In Romans 8:14, Paul argues that those led by the Spirit of God are sons of God, and he explains how believers become sons of God through the adoption metaphor in 8:15. That is, they become sons of God in the way they receive the spirit of adoption, not the spirit of slavery. We find double contrasts in 8:15:
Adoption in 8:15 is contrasted with slavery. In other words, adoption in 8:15 is not the metaphor of adopting freeborn children, but of adopting slaves.
Slavery gives fear, but adoption enables the adoptees to cry out “Abba, father.” Thus, adoption in Romans 8:15 is clearly demonstrated as the metaphor of adopting slaves with double contrasts between slavery and adoption. Therefore, we should understand this adoption metaphor in the historical context and ancient presupposition of adopting slaves, not in the context of adopting freeborn children, and we would see that adopting slaves had different implications in Roman society, as discussed in the previous section.
In this context, Paul's metaphor of adoption in 8:15 is truly extraordinary. As discussed above, adopting complete strangers was unusual in Roman society, but the adoption metaphor in Romans 8:15 illustrates adopting slaves who belonged to another master, namely, sin. The believers, moreover, used to be slaves of sin (6:14, 16, 20; 7:14), but Christ Jesus set them free from the law of sin and death (8:2). In other words, Paul's adoption metaphor depicts God as adopting complete strangers in 8:15; as we have shown, this was unusual in Roman society.
It was not a common or widely accepted practice to adopt slaves in the Roman social and legal contexts. Ex-slaves given in adoption could not hold the same status as biological children, and they were not preferred as adoptees. Therefore, in contrast to modern readers' perceptions or sensibilities, it rarely happened that slaves were adopted and enjoyed the same status as natural children, particularly in families of high status. Being adopted by freemen did not offer slaves a ladder to an individual status upgrade. Additionally, adopting other adoptees alongside an existing legitimate heir was not in keeping with societal mores or conventions. Accordingly, the metaphor of adopting slaves in Romans 8 where a legitimate son (the firstborn son in Rom 8:29) exists must be seen as exceptional and unusual by the Roman recipients.
What, then, does Paul's exceptional metaphor imply? We need to consider that God's adoption was an act of love. In Romans 8:31–35, Paul says:
He who did not withhold his own Son, but gave him up for all of us, will he not with him also give us everything else? Who will bring any charge against God's elect? It is God who justifies. Who is to condemn? It is Christ Jesus, who died, yes, who was raised, who is at the right hand of God, who indeed intercedes for us. Who will separate us from the love of Christ?
Paul continued to write (in Rom 8:39) that no cosmic power or enemy of God will be able to separate “us” from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord. The train of Paul's argument denotes that God's act of redemption (8:32) and preservation for “us” was motivated by God's love (8:35 and 8:39). In Roman custom, adoptive sons could be disinherited anytime, and dissolutions of adoption were common. Practices of adoption in the Roman world sometimes led to unhappy conclusions and resulted in conflict (Kunst 2005: 195–214). However, Paul stresses the motive of redemption through the love of God, and argues that in this love of God, the relationship with God will not be broken up, but preserved. Furthermore, in Romans 5:7–8, Paul writes,
Indeed, rarely will anyone die for a righteous person—though perhaps for a good person someone might actually dare to die. But God proves his love for us in that while we still were sinners Christ died for us.
In other words, in Romans 5:7–8 Paul presents the image of God's extraordinary love beyond Paul's contemporary moral and cultural norm. Accordingly, it is possible to interpret his adoption metaphor in Romans 8:15 in the context of his presentation of God's extraordinary love.
Thus, adoption in 8:15 about receiving slaves (complete strangers) in adoption alongside the continued existence of God's legitimate heir is an unusual and exceptional metaphor, and Paul's employment of the adoption metaphors in Romans 8 must be seen in the context of God's meaningful and extraordinary act of love to Roman recipients.
As shown above, adopting slaves was the least preferred option with negative societal and social connotations, particularly for families of high class. Rather, adoptive sons—particularly ex-slaves—were to some degree discriminated against in both family and society. Adoption did not remove these legal restrictions and social discriminations. Accordingly, adopting slaves was not preferred, especially in the presence of a legitimate heir. Therefore, it is highly probable that the Roman recipients regarded God's act of adoption as an extraordinary favor and courtesy. Furthermore, Paul's statement in 8:17 most certainly would have sounded innovative—that ex-slaves as adoptees become beneficiaries of the joint-inheritance with Christ as legitimate heirs without discrimination. This also leads us to conclude that God's act of adopting slaves in the presence of a legitimate heir had a rhetorical function to highlight the unusual nature or aspect of the love of God.
Adoption in Romans 9:4 can also be explained in this context. Israel still held to adoptive sonship, and the adoption in Romans 9:4 is enumerated among the list of Israel's privileges (Byrne: 216). At the same time, νíoθ∊σíα in 9:4 implies that Israel was not a natural son of God as the Gentile believers were. That is, Israel and the Gentile believers alike were adopted by God. Furthermore, Paul maintains, in Romans 11:1–2. that Israel was also adopted by God and this adoption will not be cancelled—that God will not forsake Israel. The adoptive relationship between God and Israel is also perserved by God (cf. Rom 8:31–39). Therefore, adoption (νíoθ∊σíα) in 9:4 reveals that Jews are under God's favour and love just as the Gentile believers.
Do, then, these implications in Romans 8 and 9 fit with Paul's use of νíoθ∊σíα in Galatians and Ephesians? The context of Galatians, in contrast to Romans 8, does not mention the joint-inheritance and the firstborn son. However, adoption in Galatians 4:5 occurs in the context of slavery: “when you were infants, you were enslaved to elements of the world” (Gal 4:3) and “you are not slaves, but sons. If sons, then heirs through God” (Gal 4:7). Gal 4:6 depicts God sending the spirit of “the son” into “our” mind, and that we cry out, “Abba, father,” as in Romans 8:15. That is, the believers take part in adoption through receiving the spirit of Christ. In other words, participating in Christ entails sharing in the inheritance as in Rom 8:17. God also redeemed those who were under the law. Thus, it should be noted that adoption in Galatians 4:5 was given in the context of slavery, and that adoption was also given to complete strangers who were enslaved to another master (the elements of the world or the Law). Galatians 3:16 also implies that Christ is an heir (the seed is Christ). Therefore, in the historical context, adoption in Galatians 4:5 is depicted as God's extraordinary and gracious act for the complete strangers who were enslaved to another master (the elements of the world) with existence of a legitimate heir (cf. Gal 3:16).
Among the disputed Pauline letters, Ephesians 1:5 makes similar points in the context of adoption The context of Ephesians does not state that the believers were enslaved to another master (sin or the elements of the world), and that a legitimate heir or the firstborn son already existed before adopting Gentile believers. However, “you” (Gentile believers) were children of wrath (Eph 2:3) and alienated from the polity of Israel and the covenant of the promise (Eph 2:12). Gentile recipients of Ephesians were regarded as complete strangers, but now they are not strangers but members of the household of God (Eph 2:19). The Gentile believers are also the joint-heirs in Christ through the promise (Eph 3:6). As in Rom 8 and Gal 4, the method to share in the inheritance is to participate in Christ Jesus. This implies that Christ in Ephesians is an heir as in Romans 8 and Galatians 4. Thus, adoption in Ephesians 1:5 occurs in the similar context with Romans and Galatians in spite of some differences shown above. Therefore, although adoption in Ephesians 1:5 is not stated in the context of slavery, God's act of adoption in Ephesians1:5 indicates adopting a complete stranger (particularly, as in Ephesians 2:19). This adoption in Ephesians 1:5 reveals an unusual case, and shares in the similar idea of adoption in Romans 8:15. This also enables us to conclude that adoption in Ephesians 1:5 highlights the unusually generous favor and grace in the historical context.
In short, adoption is an extraordinary legal metaphor in Paul's letters. This uniqueness stresses that God's act of adoption is a special, meaningful, and generous gift to the believers who were complete strangers (Eph 1:5), and who were enslaved to other masters (Rom 8:15 and Gal 4:5). The context of adoption in Romans 8:15 shows that God adopted slaves who were complete “others” and slaves alongside the existence of a legitimate heir (Christ). Despite some differences, adoption and Eph 1:5, which stress God's gracious act of adoption for complete strangers or ex-slaves alongside the continued existence of a legitimate heir. Finally, we should also notice that, in the Greco-Roman milieu, grace is given in “expectations of reciprocity along the lines of gift exchange” (Crook: 135). Grace was “a part of the social system of patronage and benefaction” (Crook: 133). In this sense, God is a gracious benefactor in Paul's letters.
Conclusion
We should consider the differences between modern and ancient Roman adoption practices. In Roman practices and legal rules, adoption was usually practiced to designate heirs. Adoptive sons had a clear difference in actual legal and social status, and furthermore, if the adoptees were slaves, the social discriminations and legal restrictions that they encountered were greater than freeborn adoptees. So slaves were not desired or considered appropriate as adoptees, and moreover, it was not common or socially accepted in Roman conventions and law to adopt others in the situation where a legitimate heir already existed. Therefore, it should be noted that Paul's adoption metaphor was unusual, because the metaphor alludes to adopting slaves in the presence of a legitimate heir, and this metaphor functions to stress God's unusual and extraordinary favour and love to the believers in Romans 8:15. Grace in Paul's letters is also interpreted as divine benefaction.