Evaluation of Labor Agency Strategy: The Case of a Strike at a South African Opencast Mine in 2012

Introduction

Labor-related strikes in South Africa have a long history stretching back to the country’s colonial and apartheid periods, and they have frequently been very violent, resulting in deaths and massive destruction of property. Noticeably, workers have won some of these struggles and lost others. This, therefore, shows that workers have agency regardless of the outcome. The continuity of strike action on various scales of intensity and violence in the democratic era highlights a labor tradition that can be traced back to the embryonic stages of revolutionary struggles to challenge oppression and racial divide in South Africa’s history. The wildcat strikes ¹ of 2012 left the country in a state of shock not only due to the massive corporate losses caused by production stoppages, but also because many lives were lost (Harvey 2012; Reuters 2012). Having started at the platinum rich Rustenburg and Marikana belt, wildcat strike actions soon spread to other platinum, gold, and iron ore mines (Reuters 2012). The wildcat strikes left a bitter legacy that will continue to haunt the country (Alexander et al. 2013; Harvey 2012).

To be specific, the “unprotected” strike at the Huntington open-pit iron ore mine is of specific interest because of its nature and how it was executed by close to three hundred mine workers from two shifts out of a total workforce of over eight thousand. It was a spectacular strike action in which few workers from two shifts initiated unprotected strike action. However, the strike action was not successful because their demands were not met, and the majority of the strikers lost their jobs, bank-financed motor vehicles, and houses, among other benefits. Given this, I show how mine workers at the Huntington mine ² drew upon different power resources and made use of various forms of agency in articulating their demands using space. The Huntington incident and its associated violence demonstrate the inability of workers to combine and exercise power in certain ways on space during the unprotected strike ³ action in 2012. Thus, the analysis of this strike action seeks to contribute toward enhanced theorization of labor agency through power and how it operates on space and offer a unique case where striking workers seemed to have an upper hand but failed to have their demands met. In what follows, the article first provides the context of the wildcat strike followed by the causes of the strike action. The next section discusses South Africa’s labor studies on mining and the industrial relations system. After that, the article presents and appraises labor geography together with power resources approach, worker agency, and space as analytic lenses to understand the strike action. This is followed by a summary on methods used to gather data. Finally, the article draws together the various loose ends scattered in the study and makes an overall conclusion.

Context of the Strike

The strike action at Huntington was triggered by an interplay of dynamics at the mine, the organized labor, Marikana strike wave, and national politics. To start with, Huntington mine is one of the biggest open-pit iron ore mines in the world and it started operations in early 1950s. It has two sister mines involved in the extraction of iron ore. Despite being old, it is a highly mechanized. In 2012, a new leadership had been elected to lead the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) branch at Huntington. The new leadership, however, proved to be inexperienced as most of them were in leadership positions for the first time. They lacked negotiating experience and basic labor relations procedures in the workplace. NUM leadership was divided along factions in the African National Congress (ANC) whose political dynamics played out at the national level (Buhlungu et al. 2013). The ANC was to hold its leadership elective congress, and thus, NUM got entangled through its affiliation with the Congress of South African Trade Unions—an alliance partner with South African Communist Party and the ANC. Between April 2 and August 10, the branch leadership had written two memorandums with the following grievances to Huntington mine management: shortage of housing and transport, the role of the absenteeism office, unfair medical panels for appointment purposes, and de-recognition of union leadership by management (Buhlungu et al. 2013). The second memorandum had additional grievances on disagreement on the amount of tax on employee share scheme payouts and discrepancies on payslips on those offered by Huntington mine and the head office in Pretoria. The NUM branch leadership and its constituency were not satisfied with the General Manager’s (GM) responses to their grievances and, therefore, lodged a dispute.

The standout grievance is the employee share scheme payouts. It had been established in 2006 and became problematic in 2011 when the South African Revenue Authority introduced taxes on dividend payouts. The new taxes accounted for instance R200,000 from a R500,000 dividend pay-out, and this did not sit well with qualifying workers (Buhlungu et al. 2013; Mashayamombe 2014). This led to distrust and rumors that Huntington was working with South African Revenue Service (SARS) and had stolen workers’ money. Thus, the new trade union leadership vowed to visit SARS offices and help workers recover their stolen money. Consequently, Huntington mine invited SARS officials to provide explanations on the new tax system on dividend payout and how it was calculated to the workers. Organized labor and its constituency were not convinced. In addition, an internal dispute resolution (September 11, 2012) organized by Huntington mine’s Industrial Relations division, which was attended by organized labor and management to discuss contents and response of the memorandum, did not yield desired outcomes for the unions. The union’s branch leadership lodged a dispute with the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) to conciliate on October 16, 2012, without having exhausted internal dispute resolution processes (Buhlungu et al. 2013).

Furthermore, an employee claimed to have been offered a seemingly different payslip at the head office in comparison with the one he gets at Huntington. These discrepancies were clarified by the mine as concluded in the report and this led to further agitation that the mine was deliberately undermining the new union leadership because it was still inexperienced (Buhlungu et al. 2013). The failure by the union to get back the workers’ stolen money and get concessions in earlier memorandum of demands led to breakdown in trust between the NUM branch leadership and workers and the management. Unresolved misunderstandings, discontent, and poor communication created a space for political opportunism (Buhlungu et al. 2013). As a precaution in light of events at Marikana and to find solutions at Huntington between the mine and labor, the mine organized a workshop on lessons that can be learnt from the Marikana tragedy from September 26 to 27. On the eve of their departure to the conference venue, an individual employee from the mining section delivered a memorandum to the GM demanding an increase on every employee’s basic salary of R15,000.00 across board. The memorandum demanded a response by October 3, 2012. Upon strong advice by trade unions at the workshop not to negotiate with workers outside normal collective bargaining procedures, the GM advised workers to raise their grievances through agreed channels.

Another memorandum with similar wording was sent again on September 30, 2012, and the GM responded encouraging the workers to follow recognized channels. The GM sensing that unprotected strike action was imminent, sent out a flyer on October 1, warning workers that industrial action would be un-procedural given the visibility of a go-slow. On October 2, the GM wrote another brief, informing workers that industrial action without following proper procedure would be un-procedural. Mine management distributed flyers across the workplace and mining section workers took offense and labeled the mine’s behavior as arrogant, aggressive, and yet owed them money (Buhlungu et al. 2013; Mashayamombe 2014). Night-shift mining section workers discussed the contents of the flyers before starting their shift and were not happy. They went to work and around 3:00 a.m. on October 3 assembled all the trucks and equipment on a single parking area and blocked entrance into the mining area at the dumps. Consequently, Huntington management closed down the entire mine for safety reasons as they negotiated with the striking workers at the mountain top.

Causes of the Wildcat Strike Action

The strike action at Huntington mine was caused by internal and external factors. At Huntington mine, informalization of industrial relations procedures evidenced by juniorization and marginalization of industrial relations function, the non-application of formal industrial relations procedures, trade union weakness, and employee perspectives on remuneration played a part in causing the wildcat strike action (Buhlungu et al. 2013; Mashayamombe 2014). This can be evidenced by the GM’s open-door policy that saw memorandums being sent directly bypassing agreed-upon procedures. Furthermore, workplace legacy of a racialized labor market fuelled allegations of discrimination of black Africans in terms of recruitment, promotions, and remuneration. In addition, trade union weaknesses, particularly NUM due to ANCs national politics, created a vacuum exploited by workers. Unintended consequences of employee share scheme payouts in terms of change of lifestyles and failure to sustain them, queries on amount taxed by SARS, accommodation, and transport problems constituted internal factors that led to the motivation to undertake the wildcat strike.

Externally, the ANC was to have its elective conference at Mangaung later in the year and played a part given the fact that NUM is an affiliate of Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), an alliance partner with the ANC. The influence of strike wave at Marikana that had started at Anglo American Platinum earlier in the year culminating in the death of forty-four people also played an indirect role (Alexander et al. 2013; Chinguno 2015; Stewart 2013). This is evidenced by the repertoire of gathering at the mountain top, demanding R15,000.00 as entry-level salary, which was slightly higher to the R12,500.00 that workers had demanded at the platinum belt (Sinwell 2013). What is evident is that the wildcat strike did not happen in a vacuum, but rather, it was influenced by a combination of factors. It is not the focus of this article to engage survey data, but rather to evaluate workers actions before, during, and after the wildcat strike at Huntington mine using power, space, and agency. This section has provided context and conditions that led to the strike action. Are there any parallels that can be drawn between labor process of surface iron ore mining and deep-level underground platinum mining in South Africa given the fact that the strike action happened just after?

South Africa’s Iron Ore Opencast and Platinum’s Deep-Level Mining Landscape

South Africa’s broader industrial relations system through the Constitution of the republic and Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995 makes the provision for the right to strike by workers through agreed-upon rules and procedures. The current industrial relations system and related institutions came through protracted struggles during the colonial and apartheid periods (Allen 2005; Bendix 2010; Gumede 2015; Johnstone 1969). Worker and employee rights are now entrenched through the South African Constitution 1996, LRA 1995, Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997, and other numerous related pieces of legislation. It has also given opportunity for organized labor to actively organize and represent workers and negotiate wages in the workplace (Bendix 2010; Chinguno 2015). The right to strike is an important weapon and source of power for labor in the democratic South Africa (Maree 1985; Republic of South Africa 1995; Webster 2017). Large-scale strikes have shaped political, economic, and social change, and often turned violent in South Africa (Moodie 2009; Webster 2017).

Furthermore, through trade unions, workers have been able to draw from various power resources that include structural, associational, institutional, societal, and market-place bargaining power to realize their demands and interests (Brookes 2013; Silver 2003; Webster 2017; Wright 2000). Over the last fifteen years, there has been a spike in unprotected strikes by workers (work stoppages that do not follow set rules and procedures) especially in the mining sector (Buhlungu 2009; Chinguno 2013, 2015; Stewart 2016). These strikes have been led by dissatisfied workers accusing trade unions of failing them and often characterized by violence (Buhlungu et al. 2013; Chinguno 2015; Gumede 2015; von Holdt 2010). This has led scholars point toward loss of touch of trade unions with its rank and file and rejection of the broader industrial relations framework and its related institutions, rules, and norms (Buhlungu 2009; Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout 2008; Chinguno 2013, 2015; Moodie 2015; Sinwell 2015). This requires a sharp focus on the shifts taking place within the South African labor and mining landscape.

The mining industry remains a key contributor on South Africa’s economy (Wilson 2001). Gold, platinum group metals (PGMs), iron ore, copper, chrome, manganese, diamonds, coal, and sand are some of the major commodities within the mining industry. The excavation of minerals in South African mines is mainly through underground and surface mineral excavation. The ore body of minerals including increasing depth, reef width, reef grade and ore type influence the choice of mining methods (Stewart 2015). Most of the factors mentioned above mainly speak to gold and platinum extraction in South Africa. Mining has gone ultra-deep due to ore bodies for gold, PGMs, diamonds, chrome, and coal (Phakathi 2010; Stewart 2015). Of interest in this discussion is deep-underground Platinum mining to provide a brief background to platinum mines strike wave in comparison with opencast iron ore mining at which Huntington mine wildcat strike took place.

Underground mineral extraction in South Africa is dominated by conventional mining methods, which is labor-intensive and deploys hand-held mechanical rock drill technologies operated by human rock drill operators (RDOs) at the rock face (Stewart 2015). Migrant labor constitutes the greater portion of labor workforce at underground platinum mines dotted along the Bushveld Igneous Complex’s eastern and western limbs (Stewart 2013, 2015). The labor process of a majority of South African platinum mines just like gold are less mechanized, hence constituted by a huge workforce often characterized by low wages, excluding RDOs (Mashayamombe 2018; Moodie and Ndatshe 1994; Stewart 2013, 2015). In contrast, the labor process of iron ore extraction at South African opencast is mechanized and semi-automated to automated given the homogenous and shallow distribution of iron ore deposits (Mashayamombe 2018). Most iron ore mining operations are located in the Northern Cape province in South Africa. Opencast mining involves drilling, blasting, loading, hauling, and dumping. All the operations are mechanized and operated by trained operators with Grade 12 National Senior Certificate (NSC) in the case of Huntington mine (Mashayamombe 2018). In other words, Huntington mine and its sister operations recruitment process require NSC at entry level as compared with platinum and other commodity mines like gold that are less mechanized and require physique and not NSC at the entry level (Mashayamombe 2018). In fact, NSC certificate with a pass is a requirement for entry-level jobs at some new iron ore and coal mines in South Africa (Mashayamombe 2018). Remuneration levels tend to be higher within the collective bargaining units at iron ore mines in comparison with deep-level platinum and gold mines in South Africa (Minerals Council South Africa 2018). Major opencast mines remuneration levels tend to be high due to mechanization and intensive use of technology and educational levels and thought they were safe from 2012 platinum wildcat strikes.

Underground deep-level mines are characterized by discomfort, deafening noise increasing heat, unstable ground, seismic events, machinery, water logging, dust and ventilation challenges, cramped space, and to look out for potential hazard (Benya 2016; see also Moodie and Ndatshe 1994; Stewart 2015). On the other hand, on surface mining, machinery and equipment, dust, high weather temperatures, rain, thunder and lightning, slippery roads, slope failure, and aquifer bursts create challenges to health and safety and production. These various factors create different dynamics to labor process on underground and surface mining, and hence different reactions by mine workers including mining occupational culture and working conditions (Benya 2016). Mine workers, both on surface and underground mining that occupy the low hierarchy, bear the brunt including RDO and other operators. RDOs at platinum mines were at the heart of triggering and leading wildcat strikes in 2012 (Chinguno 2013, 2015; Stewart 2013) and a comparison with operators from Huntington iron ore mine is important to establish parallels or differences if any. The above sought to establish similarities and differences at surface iron ore mining and underground platinum mining and the role of different sets of operators in the mining labor process.

Workers, Capital, and Geography

Labor geography is a subdiscipline of economic geography that re-centers worker or labor agency in the examination of economic geographies of capitalism (Herod 1997). Labor geography scholars are interested on issues that concern workers and include (1) worker agency, that is, collective, individual, what counts as agency and how it can be evaluated; (2) conflicts over spatial scale at which certain activities take place, local, regional, national, or transnational between labor and capital; and (3) the role of the state in regulating labor and the impact of this on how the construction and functioning of a landscape intersects with legislation, policy, and ideology (Bergene, Endresen, and Knutsen 2010; Castree 2007; Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011; Lier 2007). Below is an outline of some of the concepts used in labor geography debates that I engage with on the analysis of the strike action.

Agency, Power, and Space

The core of labor geography is the assertion that workers are not passive recipients to actions of capital, but active geographic agents that are spatially embedded and this opens possibilities for social action (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011; Herod 2010). Workers have agency to move across space or shape space through differentiated class struggles in the quest to realize their own spatial vision that may conflict with that of capital (Herod 2012). What is agency then? Worker agency is the ability of workers to create their own economic geographies through pursuing their own spatial fixes and scalar strategies (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011; Herod 2001). Workers seek to shape space to “. . . secure their own social and biological reproduction on a daily and generational basis . . . jobs, homes, shops, schools, recreation facilities” (Herod 2010, 19). It has also been shown that agency can be collective or individual (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011; see also Bergene, Endresen, and Knutsen 2010; Hastings and MacKinnon 2017; Kiil and Knutsen 2016). Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2010, 257) summarize agency as being “. . . informal or formal, individual or collective, spontaneous or goal directed, sporadic or sustained, and can operate at different scales.” In light of the above, the meaning of agency has to be broad to reflect different worker formations and affiliations. Therefore, worker agency is action that is calculated or not calculated, formal or informal, organized or unorganized, collective or individual, spontaneous or goal-directed on landscapes at various scale as part of social actors’ praxis drawing power from different sources.

Linking agency with the theory of power assists to systematically evaluate success or failure of labor agency and its objectives. I draw from Power Resources Approach, which holds that workers can execute their class struggles through effective collective mobilization of power resources when they contest capital (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018, 115). Drawing from various labor experiences (see Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018), PRA is an approach that examines ability of organized labor to strategically tap from different power resources and articulate workers’ interests and resist capital and the state in the context of debates on trade union renewal. Drawing from Wright’s (2000) and Silver’s (2003) structural power and associational power, Schmalz, Ludwig and Webster (2018) add on institutional power and societal power and show the relationship of these power resources and instances that they can be used by workers, the stte and capital (Brookes 2013). These sources of power enable workers to have capacity to do something, but at the same time, this power is relational because employers can also deploy it to exert their interests (Levesque and Murray 2010). This is because both labor and capital are embedded in power relations and social relationships and hence tap from these sources depending on context and resource (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). Therefore, it is important for workers and capital to understand that power is not permanent; it constantly shifts and has to be strategically deployed.

Associational power refers to “. . . various forms of power that result from the formation of collective organizations of workers . . .” and these would include trade unions, works councils, community organizations (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018; Wright 2000, 962). It requires actors who are able to mobilize and execute strategies, tactics, and follow organizational processes (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). Another power resource is structural power that is derived from workers position as wage earners within an economic system or labor markets, hence the ability to disrupt production (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018; Silver 2003; Wright 2000). Under structural power, Silver (2003) further identifies market-place bargaining power (one’s position in the labor market in terms of skills level) and workplace bargaining power (strategic location within the production process; Brookes 2013; Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). The location of workers in the production process is a locus of power as it enables them to strike, do sit-ins, refuse to work, or sabotage a company as part of the bargaining process. Furthermore, workers can exert logistical power by blockading roads, access into workstations and the workplace itself as part of their political praxis (Lambert, Webster, and Bezuidenhout 2012; Webster 2015). Social actors manipulate geography to exert pressure and exploit capital’s points of vulnerability (Webster 2015).

Institutional power is a secondary form of power, which is an outcome of structural power and associational power struggles and negotiations (Brinkmann and Nachtwey 2010, 21; Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018, 121). It is an attempt to reconcile differences between labor and capital through agreed-upon legal and social frameworks and mechanisms. In South Africa, this includes bargaining councils, CCMA, National Economic Development and Labor Council, the Constitution of the Republic, and LRA 1995. The idea is to enable competing parties to find each other, make concessions, co-operate, and contest each through agreed rules and procedures. Thus, trade unions have to be careful not to sell out their constituency into the hands of capital. The dual nature of institutional power requires trade unions to represent grassroots interests, and negotiate and mediate with employers and the state without being co-opted (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). Thus, institutional power is a source of power for both labor and capital to find each other and resolve conflict. It can also result in the weakening of labor’s interests.

Coalition and solidarity between organized labor and the society is important. Societal power is “the latitudes for action that arises from viable cooperation contexts with other social actors and broader society’s engagement and solidarity with workers’ demands” (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018, 122). Trade unions have to horizontally intensify their struggles the same way they vertically up-scale pressure on capital out of the workplace into the society creating a new battlefield (Levesque and Murray 2010). These are the power resources that are linked to societal power: coalitional power and discursive/moral power (Brookes 2013; Chun 2009; Fine 2006; Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). Coalitional power boosts associational power by tapping into existing societal resources, location and mobilization with assistance of churches, the unemployed, social movements, students, churches and the civil society (Brookes 2013; Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). Discursive or moral power enables workers to tap into society’s moral narratives and insert worker struggles and gain sympathy (Chun 2009; Fine 2006; Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). The point is workers have to frame their struggles and sell them to the society in terms of good or bad and erode an organization’s credibility and exert pressure. The outcome is social movement unionism that enables creation of a discourse that speaks to needs of workers and society through cooperation (Fairbrother and Webster 2008). Workers have to use power strategically if their actions are to be effective and bear positive results.

Worker agency and power cannot be understood without space. It is therefore imperative to focus on how we can understand space and what it offers to workers and capital. Labor geographers aver that space is not innocent and a lifeless stage but “. . . is by its very nature full of power and symbolism, a complex web of relations of domination and subordination, of solidarity and co-operation” (Massey 1993, 156). It can assist to understand the power geometry between capital and labor. Harvey (2006) submits that space can be classified into a “tripartite division” as absolute, relative, and relational or as a combination of these categories, depending upon context. Harvey (1973, 13) considers absolute space as “. . . a thing in itself with an existence independent of matter.” Space is fixed, preexisting, immovable and individuals record or plan events within its frame, that is, Huntington mine in South Africa (Harvey 2006, 121). This includes physical objects like private and public buildings, nature, and other things that we can see and touch. In other words, a spatial fix, for instance, is absolute space.

Using the lenses of Einstein and Euclidean geometries, Harvey (2006, 121) states that relative space is the relationship existing between objects, which exists only because objects exist and relate to each other. In the Euclidean sense, distance between two points remains the same, that is, Huntington mine offices and mining pits, while for Einstein, forms of measurement depend on the observer’s frame of reference (Harvey 2006, 121). For instance, a short distance from home to work that would take twenty minutes driving can sound far when it takes more time due to traffic congestion. In the same vein, distance between Pretoria and Cape Town could be 1,200 kilometers by road and far; however, distance gets annihilated through improved modes of transport, hence short traveling time, or through other modes of telecommunication. Space is, therefore, relative in a double sense because there are multiple geometries to choose from the spatial frame (Harvey 2006; Herod 2012).

Relational space is an outcome of processes and actions of the past and the present like colonialism and apartheid in South Africa and how spatial engineering for social engineering shaped social relations. Relationality of space-time implies that social actors’ collective memories about absolute or relative space cannot be framed in on maps or grids (absolute space) or through various circulation laws (relative space) but are experienced through social relations (Harvey 2006). Thus, through lived space, external things are internalized, thereby producing fantasies, frustration, and desires that workers have about absolute or relative space. In addition, they may also mobilize and coalesce into a group and articulate their demands on landscapes as in the case of some Huntington mine workers. Given the above, power, space, and agency are deployed as analytic tools to evaluate Huntington mine workers’ 2012 strike action.

Method

The data for this discussion were collected during a commissioned study for the above-mentioned mine where I was a researcher in a research team of seven. The commissioned study investigated the reasons for a strike action at Huntington mine that started on October 3 and came to an end after two weeks. In addition, the study investigated levels of satisfaction/discontent within the workforce in terms of working conditions, employee benefits, remuneration, management style, and trade unions representatives. Also, questions on the role of indebtedness, family, employee share scheme payouts, politics, and union conflict to the strike action were asked. Huntington mine had been taken by surprise by this strike action because they had just concluded a two-year wage agreement with recognized organized labor for the collective bargaining category.

Data were generated through survey of two hundred forty-eight Huntington permanent employees within the collective bargaining category: in-depth interviews with key informants that include shop stewards, selected employees, foremen, representatives of middle to top management, community leaders and observations. On the survey, workers were randomly selected, and we personally administered the survey questionnaires to elicit levels of jobs satisfaction in the workplace, reasons for the strike action, and how it was handled. Questionnaires were personally administered on selected respondents at convenient locations within the mine. The survey data were analyzed using Social Sciences Statistical Package using descriptive statistics. Follow-up in-depth interviews were conducted with selected participants. We also spent two months in the community talking to workers and community members as well as observing their daily activities when off-duty to understand issues surrounding the strike action and analyzed qualitative data and corroborated it with survey data and compiled the report for Huntington mine.

Power, Space, and Agency: Successes and Failures

The strike action undertaken by two hundred plus workers at Huntington, involving the capture of mine trucks and some equipment and later joined by few fellow workers without official labor union support, can be categorized as “sporadic, informal and goal directed collective agency” (Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 2010). It was informal because it was organized without following the proper labor relations procedures and workplace rules prescribed in section 64 of the LRA of 1995 of the republic of South Africa and without official trade union approval. The wildcat action was goal-directed because the strikers wanted management’s attention, which they got although their demands on the memorandum were not met. It was undertaken by a group of workers from two shifts from the mining section and there was some level of collective agency to “. . . materially improve their conditions of existence . . .” (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011, 216).

The wildcat strike action by Huntington mine workers demonstrates a number of points in terms of low trust levels between trade unions and membership and inexperience: relations between mine management and labor and indirect rejection of the current industrial relations system and inability of striking workers to effectively utilize power resources. Trade unions play an important role in protecting workers’ interests and articulating demands to the employer on behalf of the workers. The events leading to the outbreak of the unprotected strike action show that mine workers decided to take issues into their own hands after the recognized trade unions had supposedly failed to convince the mine to address their grievances. The NUM Huntington branch leadership had promised the workers that they would help them get back their “stolen” money from the employee share scheme by the mine but did not succeed. These promises, based on allegations that had not been proven, raised expectations amongst the workers whose payouts were running out and feeling the pressure to sustain expensive lifestyles they had gotten accustomed to. Unmet expectations can result in frustration and anger as shown in this case. This demonstrates questionable union leadership as it resulted in workers taking their own course of action that proved detrimental on their livelihoods (see Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 2010). Furthermore, the NUM Huntington branch skipped procedures and approached CCMA for dispute resolution without exhausting internal processes within the mine as set in workplace agreements and the LRA 1995.

Linked to the above, the paternalistic management style adopted by the mine management created fertile conditions for mine workers to periodically make demands outside formally agreed procedures (Buhlungu et al. 2013; see also Moodie and Ndatshe 1994). The GM’s open-door policy informalized industrial relations and mine workers could walk into his office with grievances and requests without observing first-line and middle management. This resulted in first-line and middle management like Foremen and Mine Captains being undermined because the chain of command had been blurred. Lines of communication became disrupted and at the same time ignored. The idea to institutionalize workplace relations through a system of agreed-upon rules and procedures enables labor and capital to interact effectively and settle disputes and grievances amicably (Gumede 2015). In the case of Huntington, informalization of communication channels resulted in poor communication, especially on employee share scheme taxes and other grievances, undermining of mine management, and an already weak trade union leadership (Buhlungu et al. 2013). The outcome was poor handling of worker demands as depicted by flyers that threatened workers not to engage in unprotected strike action. These unresolved internal dynamics and events at Marikana convinced workers to initiate the wildcat strike without trade unions support and following procedures. Although the move was spectacular, it did not yield the desired results.

Huntington mine wildcat strike action by mining section workers was an indirect rejection of the corporatist-inspired industrial relations system set up in South Africa (Chinguno 2015). This is evidenced by workers’ attempts to directly negotiate with mine management without trade unions, introducing new wage demands with an existing and valid two-year wage agreement still in place. Gumede (2015, 328) argues that the events at the platinum belt wave strikes broadly depict rejection of South Africa’s democratic institutions established through a negotiated social contract. These institutions make up structures and socially embedded rules and procedures that help regulate, for instance, workplace and social relations. Labor as depicted by mine workers at Huntington rejected existing industrial relations system, that is, workplace procedures when communicating grievances and disputes and wage agreements as they felt that the system failed them. Chinguno (2015) makes a similar argument that the strike action at Impala Platinum mine as part of the Marikana strike wave also demonstrates rejection of South Africa’s industrial relations system as RDOs rejected NUM and negotiated directly with mine management during the strike. Consequently, at Huntington mine, the unprotected strike action by workers made them vulnerable to dismissal as stated in the LRA 1995, hence failure of the strike action. Focus on the constellation and configuration power resources by the striking workers can shed more light on this conclusion.

The strike action failed to yield desired results, despite workers having used space strategically because power was not used effectively. Events leading to the start of the strike action show workers making use of associational and institutional power (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018; Silver 2003). They channeled their grievances and demands through their trade unions and their members (associational power) within set workplace procedures (institutional power) as social actors with an interest on space. Due to distrust and pressure to sustain lifestyles ushered by employee share scheme payouts, workers abandoned these power resources without exhausting them and opted to negotiate directly with management (see Buhlungu 2009). In this instance, recalibration of relational space can be observed; however, the tactic fails to materialize as workers were advised through the two memorandums to follow formal channels. By abandoning associational power, they deprived themselves of human resources via trade union members and organizational efficiency through trade union–aligned workplace structures (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). At the same time, the shift from institutional power and abandonment of associational power demonstrate the constraints of capital on labor.

Striking workers invoked the reworking strategy to “. . . recalibrate power relations and or redistribute . . .” resources in the workplace was aided by structural power (workers location on the point of production) at Huntington mine (Cumbers, Helms, and Swanson 2010; Katz 2004, 247; Lambert, Webster, and Bezuidenhout 2012; Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018; Wright 2000). They disrupted and stopped production for two weeks using their capacity to disrupt and refused to work until the GM had addressed them. They enforced both workplace bargaining power by stopping production, market-place bargaining power using their position in the production process as operators central to iron ore extraction in primary production together with logistical power where they assembled over 90 percent of mining production (blasting, load, and haul process) equipment and machinery into one place. In terms of relational space, their experience and knowledge of working in the pits enabled them to capture and control space. They also blocked access into all mining areas (into the open pits). This was spectacular and effective for a while, given the effort operators invested in assembling all the equipment and machinery. For a moment, they had the momentum; however, tables turned when Huntington mine stopped all production at the plant, engineering, and support services and instructed workers not to report for duty. The pendulum swung because power is relational as capital can draw from the same power resources (Brookes 2018; Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). The striking workers became isolated and fellow workers could not join them as the mine had been cordoned off, hence weakening their associational power due to limited number of striking workers.

Furthermore, although the workers’ spatial strategy in terms of choice of location, that is, mine dumps, gave them a vantage point to monitor the movements of mine’s private security and the South African Police Services (SAPS) officers in making attempts to re-capture mine property, the workers made use of relative and absolute space as they are responsible for the construction of landscapes. They understood the power of absolute space and harnessed through logistical power in articulating their class struggles as a locus of control. The mobile space (trucks, machinery, and equipment) and the parking space constitute a landscape in which workers are embedded and thus used it as a choking point (Castree et al. 2004). Also, the location was strategic because striking workers could exit without being noticed into a nearby residential settlement to get supplies. Paradoxically, the same space that empowered them also constrained their political praxis as they were geographically isolated from fellow workmates and the society. Although capture of mine property and articulation of class struggles demonstrate worker agency, the unprotected strike lacked planning, organization, and leadership. The striking workers acted out of anger, detached themselves from worker structures and their respective trade unions depriving themselves of associational power and important ingredient that unites workers into a collective unit (Brinkmann and Nachtwey 2010; Silver 2003; Wright 2000). Although it could be argued that it was a strategy to take the employer by surprise as it was an unprotected strike action, it weakened their power base. Strike action is an art of war that requires resources, leadership, planning, and organization and these were absent at the Huntington strike.

Given the fragmented nature of the strike action, workers could not unite with those locked out from the mine including the society. Societal power plays a fundamental role in forging solidarities between workers and the society and intensifies worker struggles (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). Societal power through coalitional power and discursive power would have enabled striking workers scale their struggles horizontally into the community and use it as battlefield that the mine does not control (Brookes 2013; Levesque and Murray 2010; Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). A few community members and workers made attempts to stage protests near the mine, but Huntington was granted a court interdict. As days progressed without signs of the GM coming to address striking workers, frustration and disunity creeped in and some workers went back home. Out of desperation, the remaining workers threatened to run down company trucks and destroy them if their demands were not met. Attempts to destroy company property and other forms of sabotage depict inadequacy of limited forms of power and hence resort to acts of violence (see von Holdt 2010). Furthermore, lack of adequate power through various configurations and political suppression can constrain worker agency (Webster, Lambert, and Bezuidenhout 2008). Huntington mine gave workers an ultimatum to exit the property and avoid criminal charges or loss of jobs, but they did not yield. Evidently, in response to threats to destroy Huntington mine’s machinery and equipment, the mine’s private security and SAPS on the dawn of October 16, after fourteen days of impasse, moved in and forcefully arrested striking workers and repossessed company property (Buhlungu et al. 2013). The arrested workers were criminally charged, and others faced disciplinary action. The strike action came to an end without any victory for the workers.

After the strike action, workers were called for disciplinary hearings. Some attended while others did not and one-hundred twenty lost their jobs and income. This was a big blow because they no longer had income to service their bank-financed houses, cars, and other accounts. Banks repossessed their motor vehicles and houses. Their demands were not met and instead lost their jobs. This case depicts unsuccessful worker action. Having considered the above, it is also reasonable to look at platinum belt strikes and draw some comparisons. Wildcat strikes initiated and led by RDOs on the platinum belt were successful because RDOs carry social power and historical residue to galvanize the rest of the workforce while operators at Huntington mine did not possess such (Stewart 2013, 2016). Furthermore, the game of numbers, machines, and equipment and technology constrained operators who at any point during a shift are around three hundred in the mining area in comparison with platinum mine’s thousands of workers at any point underground (see Chinguno 2015; Sinwell 2015). Wildcat strike action on the platinum belt was well organized with proper planning through worker committees (associational power in the form of grassroot structure), something that was absent at Huntington mine strike (see Sinwell 2015). Also, the striking workers staged their struggles outside the mine property tapping into various forms of power resources including societal power in the communities. However, both strikes share similarities in terms of dissatisfaction and rejection of the corporatist-inspired industrial relations system, its related structures, and the minimum wage at entry level (Sinwell 2013).

Conclusion

Considering the above analysis, this case study of Huntington mine’s wildcat strike in 2012 shows that workers are place-based and the actions they take in articulating their vision on social and economic landscapes are spatially embedded (Castree et al. 2004; Herod 2012). In addition, workers have agency, and depending on geographical conditions and workplace relations, contest with capital to control space. Ability to control space is a source of power (Herod 2001). In this case study, it has also been shown that workers draw their power from different power resources (Brookes 2013; Lambert, Webster, and Bezuidenhout 2012; Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018; Silver 2003; Webster, Lambert, and Bezuidenhout 2008; Wright 2000). It is also important to note that for power to be effective, it has to be used effectively through various combinations and configurations including structural power, associational power, institutional power, and societal power (Schmalz, Ludwig, and Webster 2018). The Huntington wildcat strike was a failure because workers failed to strategically use different sets of power at different times depending on the situation. Workers’ exclusion of associational power and societal power left them vulnerable to failure because they lacked leadership, organization, human resources from fellow workers, and the broader community.

Although their location was strategic through logistical power aided by their knowledge and understanding of production space, they isolated themselves from fellow workers who were not aware of the strike action because it was a wildcat strike and hence fragmented them and became devoid of solidarity. As a result, the strike action was a failure because their demands were not met by Huntington mine; they got arrested and criminally charged, lost their jobs and properties that were bank financed. Thus, for worker agency to be successful, labor has to use space and deploy power effectively and consolidate it strategically at different intervals because power is relational and not permanent. Finally, the study also suggests that although space is important, it can be isolating as well as empowering.