Union Democracy: A European Perspective

Introduction

What is union democracy and why does it matter? This is the question set by Steven Ashby in his article for this journal, ‘Union Democracy in Today's Labor Movement’. This is an inspiring and thought-provoking piece, and I agree with most of the author's main points and recommendations. But it is written from a narrowly American perspective (which is not surprising, given the review and its audience) and the concept and practice of union democracy are too important for the analysis to be restricted to one country. We learn and understand more by looking at the same phenomenon, in this case, union democracy, in a range of very different national contexts. In many ways, the American labor movement is distinct – with one of the lowest union densities in the world (currently at 10.3%; see ICTWSS database, Visser 2019) and with a largely voluntaristic system combined with a highly adversarial relationship with employers (and in some cases, the state). But there are many similarities in the problems Ashby describes between U.S. unions and those in the United Kingdom and other European countries. This is not necessarily a good thing, but it is also good to know that trade unionists everywhere are striving to maintain or increase internal democracy in their unions. And perhaps some of the European perspectives and solutions to the problems would be useful for American unions. In this short article, I will first consider the definition of union democracy, and the difficult question of whether and why it matters. I will then present some of the main dimensions of the national models of the main western European unions and how they affect the practice of union democracy, including some comparisons with points made by Ashby, before concluding on a possibly hopeful note.

What Is Union Democracy?

Perhaps the first scholars and labor activists to write about union democracy were Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in their seminal work ‘Industrial Democracy’. They wrote (1897, xix) that ‘trade unions are democracies: that is to say, their internal constitutions are all based on the principle of government of the people, by the people, for the people. As Ashby points out in his introduction, most trade unions insist, with reason, that they are democratic organizations, and democracy is seen as one of their core values. Further, they are the largest democratic organizations in the world and have been at the forefront of struggles for democratization and decolonization since their foundation. Sadly, as he adds, they do not always practice what they preach. But does this matter, and if so why?

First, a word about the definition of union democracy. Ashby helpfully clarifies that it is not the same as industrial democracy or democracy at the workplace (although the two are often related). It refers to democracy within the trade union structures in their rules and the extent that they are followed, as well as in their informal ‘culture’. The most widespread forms of internal union democracy are akin to the political form of ‘passive’ or ‘representative’ democracy, whereby members have mechanisms through which to assent to (or dissent from) decisions taken in their name, rather than ‘active’ or ‘direct’ democracy, whereby they can actually initiate policy collectively. As in political systems, ‘active’ and ‘direct’ democracy are rare in practice, although not unheard of, especially in smaller unions, and especially in the course of disputes, for example, with factory occupations and other forms of protest that involve the whole membership (and often their families and communities as well, as with the British miners’ strike of 1984). For the Webbs, the best model for union democracy was a parliamentary form, in which the members elected representatives who shaped overall policy and who oversaw a cadre of specialist officers who undertook the day-to-day management of union business. But as they go on to point out, and as we all know, an elected leadership can wield too much power and become self-perpetuating. Ashby quotes Lord Acton (accurately, unlike many authors): ‘power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. But most modern unions have ways of preventing or at least discouraging officers and officials from wielding ‘absolute’ power: there are checks and balances, as with political democracy. Some of these are covered by Ashby and are crucial to the conditions whereby union democracy can be a reality and not just an aspiration: the selection of officers and (sometimes) union officials, the holding of meetings in an open and democratic manner, transparency in decision-making and in financial matters, member involvement in collective bargaining, strike ballots, and other related matters.

Why Does Union Democracy Matter?

But why does union democracy matter? Is it even desirable? Around ten years ago, my frequent co-author Richard Hyman and I asked this question to a group of European researchers and trade union colleagues and met with a bemused response. They were sceptical about the possibility of union democracy, but would never have said this in public … Indeed only minorities of activists and scholars have questioned the need for union democracy. But many believe that there may be an incompatibility between democracy and effectiveness. Some of the union leaders Ashby cites take this view. In the case of the progressive union leader (Ron Varey of the Teamsters) who used members’ dues without their knowledge or approval to fund otherwise worthy causes, we ask the question: Is it not more important to win gains for the members, and for society as a whole, than to do so in a democratic manner?

Undeniably, effective trade union action requires some degree of overall coordination together with the definition of strategic priorities which unite the membership, so that energies are not dissipated in a multiplicity of disparate and perhaps mutually contradictory initiatives. Certainly, any large, complex trade union requires professional leadership competencies. But in any context, the ethos of ‘managerial unionism’ contradicts the appeal of trade unionism as a ‘sword of justice’ (Flanders 1970) directed to the self-emancipation of the weak, vulnerable and oppressed. When the traditional structural and associational power resources of trade unions are almost everywhere diminished, and their institutional power resources are increasingly precarious, effectiveness requires active commitment and openness to mobilization among the members (and potential members), together with a capacity to inspire broader societal support through a social vision. ‘The managerial emphasis on administrative rationality risks diminishing the representative rationality of trade unionism, which is grounded in multiple spaces of representation and participation, as well as in exchange opportunities between different organizational levels’ (Thomas 2013, 33). In Britain, Flynn et al. (2004, 328) note a similar trend towards centralization, meaning that ‘union branch, group and regional committees have become dependent on the centre for resources, significantly curtailing their autonomy’. Hence ‘the redefinition of union democracy around centralized decision making conceived as answers to the decline of activist participation and membership losses, in turn, may feed these very phenomena’ (Thomas 2017, 667).

Allen (1954, 15) insisted (in an argument he later disavowed) that ‘trade-union organization is not based on theoretical concepts prior to it, that is on some concept of democracy, but on the end it serves’. In other words, the end of the trade-union activity is to protect and improve the general living standards of its members and not to provide workers with an exercise in self-government. Further back in time, Michels (1915) argued that trade unions and socialist parties were subject to an ‘iron law of oligarchy’. Most members lacked the knowledge or motivation to engage actively in the democratic processes of policy-making; officials had the skills and the personal interests to dominate the decision-making and electoral processes; creating a vicious circle. Ashby echoes this in his re-statement of the old argument of democracy versus efficiency, but he is sceptical of such arguments, and so am I.

Even if many of these arguments were one-sided and exaggerated, they contain a core of truth. Unions from Michels’ time to our own struggle to attract a significant attendance at membership meetings. The trend towards ‘mega-unions’ increases internal heterogeneity and the distance between leadership and rank and file. Workers have many more exciting ways of spending their leisure time than attending union meetings. Those who do participate tend to possess strong ideological commitments which may incline them to lines of policy that most members fail to endorse. However, ‘over the years trade unionists have developed a variety of institutional practices designed to counteract the tendency to oligarchic rule, and where formal structures have failed to guarantee democracy, informal practices have been used to considerable effect to ensure that rank and file members maintained some control over their own destiny’ (Carew 1976, 21).

Why therefore is union democracy not inevitably opposed to efficiency? As I wrote in an earlier paper, one counter-argument is that union advocacy of ‘democracy at work’ lacks legitimacy unless unions themselves can demonstrate their democratic credentials (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2019). Another is that to be effective, trade unions must be able to mobilize collective action, which implies a ‘willingness to act’ among the members (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985). Case studies of U.S. unions have demonstrated that active participation and deliberation can be a source of strength. An analysis of the Longshoremen by Levi et al. (2009, 223) concluded that ‘democracy may sustain and facilitate hard bargaining [and] it may even facilitate organizing’; while in his account of the successful strike by the Teamsters against UPS, Parker (1998, 57) insisted that ‘democracy, it turned out, was not just the icing on the cake, but the very foundation of union power in a critical struggle against a corporation’. As Lévesque and Murray suggest (2003, 16), organizational power requires effective processes of internal democracy, together with ‘a culture favouring discussion between rank and file and officials and educational work to ensure that policies are well understood and reflect the conditions experienced on the ground’; and we may regard modern information and communications technologies as potentially valuable instruments to this end – even if this potential is often unfulfilled (Geelan and Hodder 2017). But perhaps the best counter-argument is stated by one of Ashby's sources, the Chicago trade union leader Karen Lewis: ‘We do take democracy seriously. And I know that's frustrating for people, but in the end, it is ultimately a better way to govern a union because it is not top-down leadership. We have encouraged healthy debate and we have encouraged analysis. It was something that was never encouraged by union leadership before. It's a better way to move the union’.

Union Democracy in Europe: Diverse Models but the Same Old Problems

Having presented some of the arguments around the meaning of union democracy, it is time to move on to the question of its practice. As I wrote at the beginning of this piece, despite the many differences between trade unions in the United States and western Europe, I was struck by the similarities in the practice, or lack of practice, of union democracy. It was not always clear to me, as an American but one who has lived in Europe for most of her working life, if all American unions have the same structures and processes, regarding the election of representatives, payment of dues (local or national), local versus national or regional control etc. These certainly vary a great deal in different European countries, and these differences matter a great deal (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2020). There is great diversity in formal decision-making structures, both within and between national union movements. Unions need both membership involvement and strategic leadership, and the tension between these two requirements creates an enduring dilemma for trade union democracy. How can unions be actively democratic, not only relying on the passive consent of members who have other priorities? Answers to this question, embedded in the prevailing constitutional arrangements, differ greatly between countries; these differences are linked to historical traditions, which also shape variations in the practical understanding of union democracy and the structures adopted to achieve it, across and often also within countries (Carew 1976; Martin 1989; von Beyme 1980).

The relative powers of national officers, executive committees and conferences, the degree to which middle-range officials are elected from below or appointed from above, all vary. Though the mechanics of its implementation differ widely across (and to a lesser extent, within) countries, trade union movements tend to embrace a two-way conception of democratic policy-making. Members at the grassroots level meet to discuss policy questions, not least in respect of collective bargaining, elect their own local officers and also choose representatives to participate in higher-level structures (district, regional and ultimately national). In most unions, organizational structures exist at the workplace level (but not, e.g., in the Netherlands) but patterns of authority between such structures and the national, regional or local union are complex and shifting; an added complexity in most European countries is the relationship between workplace union representation and works councils (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2018).

While cross-national differences reflect diverse understandings of the meaning of union democracy, they also derive from relatively contingent decisions made a century or more ago (e.g., unions subject to state repression often adopted highly centralized, almost military methods) which have persisted despite changed circumstances. Unions in some countries (such as Germany) have a high ratio of paid officials to members, others depend heavily on ‘lay’ activists (as in Britain and France); such differences have evident implications for the internal distribution of power. There is also a problematic relationship between formal decision-making structures and the complex and elusive dynamics of real intra-union politics.

It is often suggested that where unions emerged in semi-legality, often under the tutelage of a social-democratic party, they tended to adopt centralized structures – as in Germany over a century ago (Crouch 1993; Marks 1989; Taylor 1989). Conversely, where unions originated within a laissez-faire political framework, as in Britain, their development was more spontaneous and fragmented and principles of ‘primitive democracy’ could more easily take root. I wonder if the traditional adversarial model of U.S. unionism, which in the early 1900s was much more violent than the same period in most of Europe, has led to the domineering top-down orientation that Ashby describes in many of the unions he covers.

Another dimension is the unions’ size and composition. Turner (1964) argued that active rank-and-file involvement tended to be greatest in unions with a relatively skilled and homogeneous membership. In more heterogeneous unions, there were often serious problems of interest aggregation, and stronger centralized leadership was necessary to sustain internal cohesion; Turner characterized such unions as ‘popular bossdoms’, with strong and at times authoritarian leaders retaining control through the largely passive consent of their members.

How are paid officials selected? While there is a general principle that top officials are either directly elected or are chosen by a representative conference or congress, these two mechanisms have very different implications. In some countries, there is a strong tradition of election of lower-level paid officials as well. In the other direction, the democratic credentials of top leaders and executive committees give them the authority to prescribe a policy framework for the lower levels of the union. Declining membership participation is a widespread problem, and the trend in many countries to create conglomerate ‘super-unions’ through mergers can generate ‘crises of interest aggregation and representation’ and a weakening of internal democracy (Thomas 2017).

While this did not apply until recently in the United States, with the split between the AFL-CIO and Change to Win, many European countries have multiple trade union confederations, based either on ideology (France, Spain, Italy), religion (Belgium, the Netherlands), or industrial sector (Sweden, Denmark) (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2018). There are major differences in the balance of authority between national confederations and their affiliated unions. Where confederations were created ‘from below’ by autonomously functioning craft or sectoral unions, their powers and resources are normally limited; where they were created ‘from above’, typically as part of a social-democratic project, the relative powers of confederation and affiliates are very different. Here we should note that in most countries, individual trade union members typically join, and pay their dues to, the affiliated unions rather than the confederation. In some cases, the dues go to the local or workplace level, as used to be the case in the predecessor to my union, the Association of University Teachers, now part of the University and College Union. This can make a big difference in where the power within the union is to be found.

So far, this section has mainly presented some of the complexity of European trade union structures and practices. What does this mean for the practice of union democracy, and how does this compare to the American model? First, as Ashby mentions, different unions (and hence different national models of unionism) have a different locus of power. Even within the United States, power may be located at the level of the local, the region, the state or the national level. I have shown that this varies a great deal within Europe, and even within countries. In France, the former-communist union confederation CGT has moved from a highly centralized, top-down model to a much more de-centralized one, with greater power at the hand of individual unions and to some extent, regions, while the social-democratic CFDT has become highly centralized with a tight control over dissent (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2018). As Ashby points out, the level of democracy and participation within a union is not just a left–right dimension, and the results are sometimes surprising. More important than centralization versus decentralization may be the articulation between levels: the effective use of information exchange between levels and of consultation and decision making at each level. The Swedish unions, perhaps one of the best models of union democracy in Europe, are known for this effective articulation. Control over finances is one of the most important dimensions of the extent of union democracy, and as I noted, this varies between and even within countries. Scandals evoked by Ashby such as the misuse of union funds are not unknown in Europe, as we can see with the BAWAG case in Austria (although the national confederation ÖGB was not directly responsible). But the more important matter is who determines and controls the budget, and who sets the priorities for expenditure? In some cases, this is at the level of the individual union, in others at the level of the national confederation, and the actual decision is often made, even if formally as a recommendation, by a small, select committee. The extent to which its deliberations are transparent also varies.

On the whole, to my knowledge, some of the problems Ashby refers to, such as financial corruption, over-high salaries, and flashy cars are less important dangers to union democracy in Europe. Yes, union leaders probably do have high salaries, particularly in northern Europe. And there have been a number of scandals, whether the expensive refurbishment of the CGT general secretary's flat or the involvement of the top leader of the largest German union, IG Metall, in insider dealing within a German company on whose supervisory board he sat as a workers’ representative. This latter case hints at a deeper and less obvious problem: the embeddedness of unions in many European countries in political and social institutions, the phenomenon referred to by Hassel (2007) as ‘the curse of institutional security’. In Germany in general, there is no need for bribery or other inducements to cooperate with management, because the union's position within the system and the importance of being ‘social partners’ with the employers means that a bribe from the employers is not needed. This ‘institutional security’ is typical of some countries, mainly Germany, Austria and others with works council systems and a high degree of regulation of employment relations. In itself, institutional security is a good thing, one that unions in the United States and many other countries can only dream of. But it has risks, as Hassel points out. Her main concern is that the institutional supports trade unions benefit from in these countries may lead to an over-dependence, whereby they do not need to organize and represent workers. Most European unions, responding to the recent shocks of globalization, neo-liberalism, and the 2008 crisis, have long since realized that they cannot rely on this level of institutional support. But this dependency is still a serious risk to union democracy. It becomes more important to worry about what the employers think than what the members think.

The same could be said, although much less so than in the past, of the relationship between unions and political parties (Hyman and Gunbrell-McCormick 2010). This is something that Ashby does not cover in detail, but the relationship and often formal affiliation to political parties in many European countries has also often stifled debate and frozen out minority factions within unions. This is a problem that affects both southern and northern Europe, unlike the problem of institutional security, which is primarily a northern European problem. Unions in southern Europe, such as France and Italy, are less likely to pay high salaries and benefit from perks from the employers, but they are not immune to scandals of other types. It may well be that the unions that provide the best setting for union democracy, and for successful unionism more generally, are those in the Benelux countries, Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium, there is a genuine but not crippling competition between two national confederations, ABBV/FGTB and ACV/CSC, who compete in workplace elections but largely cooperate at national and international levels. The right sort of (limited) competition, combined with a high level of union density and internal debate, may be the best setting for internal democracy. In the Netherlands, the recent re-vamp of the largest confederation, FNV, has created innovative new structures, such as the elected parliament, which includes lay members along with elected officials. This may show a way forward in representing the members in a more democratic, but still organized, structure.

Conclusion

I have tried to show above some of the ways that union democracy can be protected and encouraged to flourish. Ashby has also identified many of these, all of which are excellent points. But in the end, it is a matter of will, as well as vision. As Aronowitz noted (1998, 92), the ‘means and ends are not separate’. Their relationship ‘goes to the core of whether the labor movement should be an advocate of organizational change, and questions whether the labor movement can survive, let alone prosper, without transforming itself into a broadly democratic movement that prefigures the kind of society it seeks’. This clearly connects very closely to the whole issue of union democracy. If it is impossible to involve and empower workers within their own trade unions, it is scarcely plausible that they can successfully defend the interests of workers, and their legitimacy as a voice for democratization is itself undermined. This is the challenge facing unions around the world, and one hopes that we can all learn from each other and move forward together.