Abstract
In spite of the existence of an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in the Kingdom of Swaziland, corruption persists as a major problem in the country which brings with it significant negative consequences on the economy and society. Among its major consequences, it hinders service delivery, leads to increased and more serious crimes and vandalism, results in moral degeneration, affects the collection of government revenue, results in a few individuals enjoying economic benefits, hinders the effectiveness of the administration of justice, results in the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer, and damages the country’s reputation and investment potential. This work discusses corruption in Swaziland and summarizes its consequences and the role and impact of the ACC. It then offers, from an analytical perspective, a set of policy measures to combat said corruption, taking into consideration best international practice and the country-context culture vis-à-vis corruption.
Keywords
Introduction
As this work and others in this volume make clear, combating corruption must entail a holistic reforms approach that also takes into consideration the country-specific cultural environment that influences the nature and extent of corruption. This work therefore also provides recommendations that include a set of social policy measures that can lead to the un-capturing of the societal culture itself that has become captive, and therefore a major contributing factor to corruption in the Kingdom. Studies have shown that, in most societies, culture influences institutions and social norms, dictates the interactions of agents within a society, and affects the type of corruption that becomes prevalent (Banuri & Eckel, 2012). In these studies, culture sometimes is used to refer to concrete factors, such as trust, religiosity, or institutional arrangements, and sometimes to less tangible elements, such as a system of values, norms, and techniques, that a society has developed and that link it to future generations (Banuri & Eckel, 2012; Hooker, 2009; Seleim & Bontis, 2009; Sylla, 2014).
The relationship between culture and corruption can therefore be regarded as country specific. As noted by Hooker (2009, p. 251), “because cultures operate in very different ways, different activities are corrupting in different parts of the world.” Consequently, practices, such as bribery, that are often corrupting across cultures are nonetheless corrupting for very different reasons. For many societies in Africa, for example, gift giving is not corruption, and it never leads to bribery or embezzlement. It is simply a way to maintain peace and harmony in the society (Sylla, 2014). Therefore, and as observed by Husted (1999), effective approaches for fighting corruption depend on societal culture. Policy makers can therefore use the country-specific cultural aspects of corruption as a guide for adopting a strategic perspective to fight corruption, when implementing anticorruption policy reforms (Seleim & Bontis, 2009).
Hence, policy reforms advocated for tackling corruption must consider the cultural connection to corruption in their design. In that regard, as this work proposes and as Egbue (2006) also correctly notes, responsibility for corruption in society does not reside only with governments. It is not just the outcome of uncontrolled greed among government officials and others. Society as a whole shares in the responsibility for corruption. In other words, collective actions that can complement the principal–agent approach (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). The media, education system, politicians, as well as civil society organizations therefore need to contribute to the eradication of this social ill, as this work proposes.
The Corruption Problem in Swaziland
Corruption is a crime, plain and simple, in any form that it occurs, and a significant problem in Swaziland. Corruption is a crime committed by officials (public or private) to procure gain for themselves or others. Corruption in Swaziland is now regarded as persistent, permeating the society as a whole. In fact, the Swazi media, civil society organizations, and even government officials are now frequently engaged in pointing out the corruption crime problem in their country. “Corruption cuts across all sectors of society and it affects everybody in one way or another” (Observer Reporter, 2012, p. 1; Times of Swaziland, 2012, p. 1). Quantifying this corruption problem, the revised methodology Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2012 ranked Swaziland at 88 out of 176 countries with a score of 37 (where a score of 100 is very clean and 0 is highly corrupt) (Transparency International, 2012). In addition, there have been local surveys conducted among a wide sample of Swazis that show similar results. For example, based on the most recent “National Corruption Perception Survey Report” (Anti-Corruption Commission [ACC], 2010) commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), the major findings with respect to the views of Swazi citizens about the level of corruption, reasons for corruption, experience with corruption, consequences of corruption, and what constitutes corruption, are summarized in Table 1.
Swazi Perception of Corruption, 2010
Source: ACC (2010).
These perception surveys are further supported by the evidence provided by the most recent crime statistics available. For example, The Royal Swaziland Police Service reports that “white-collar crime continues to cause a great concern in our society” (The Royal Swaziland Police Service, 2011, p. 24). They estimated that during the period 2009–2011, the total cost of fraud and commercial crimes to the government and the business community was E59.2 million (approximately US$ 6 million), at an annual average of approximately US$ 2 million (The Royal Swaziland Police Service, 2011). However, as will be seen below, these police statistics only reflect fraud and commercial crimes reported to, and investigated by, them (the police). Other government estimates reveal a much greater magnitude of corruption.
Nonetheless, these corruption crime statistics and national surveys and international rankings are critical official indicators to which the government needs to urgently respond and commit, to put in place inclusive mitigation measures that aim at preventing corruption at all levels, including the strengthening of governance mechanisms in the country. The government’s own “Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Programme” (PRASP) had also found it necessary to observe that “Corruption and misappropriation of public funds has been widely reported in public institutions” (Government of Swaziland, 2006). More vividly, in February 2011, the minister of finance revealed that the Kingdom’s loss to corruption crime had doubled from his previous estimate of E40 million (approximately US$ 5.6 million) per month (Mavuso, 2011). This means that the revenue leakage due to corruption was approximately US$ 11.2 million monthly by 2011. That was equivalent to US$ 134.4 million annually, which was 3 percent of GDP and 14 percent of government revenues. To put it in further perspective, it was equivalent to almost one and a half times the FY2012/13 recurrent budget for health, and more than one half of the FY2012/13 recurrent budget for education. However, most observers believe that the revenue leakage due to corruption is much greater than that estimated by the minister of finance. In fact, the prime minister, Dr Sibusiso Dlamini, confirmed that it was impossible to quantify the amount lost through corruption in any month, contrary to the recent revelation by the minister of finance (Dhladhla, 2011).
One type of significant corruption gaining in currency in the Kingdom is that of nepotism/favoritism. This may not be surprising, given the homogeneous nature of Swazi society and cultural norms. However, its magnitude has become a matter of concern in recent times. For example, in September 2012, the minister of public works and transport became so alarmed that he halted a recruitment process where four vacant posts for inspectors in an anti-abuse unit were to be filled. He had discovered a number of anomalies that he felt were in contravention of the spirit of the recruitment process. The minister suspected foul play and ordered that the recruitment process be put on hold. He said that he did not approve of the way the process was being conducted and would prefer that an independent body be tasked with the recruitment process. It was determined that two of the four potential recruits were related to some of the people heading the unit and according to the minister, that could not be allowed to continue (Masuku, 2012).
Indeed, the Government of Swaziland now seems concerned about this increased prevalence of corruption and would also like to reverse the widely held view that there is a lack of commitment to fight corruption in the country. In fact, dealing with corruption is now regarded as a collective responsibility of everyone by not allowing anyone to put their personal interest above that of the nation. As observed in a speech by the Head of State, His Majesty King Mswati III, when he officially opened the fourth session of the Ninth Parliament and pronounced zero tolerance towards corruption, he said:
As we move forward in rebuilding this country amidst all these challenges, one must express serious disappointment at some individuals who continue to plunder state resources for personal benefit. We have seen these individuals divert national funds intended for important projects for their own benefit. We can no longer allow these people to place their personal interest above that of the country. It is time serious action is taken against such selfish people and it should be action that truly serves as a very effective deterrent if this country is to make any progress economically from this day forth. (His Majesty King Mswati III, 2012, p. 16)
Consequences of Corruption in Swaziland
As noted in the empirical literature as well as from observed evidence and the perception surveys, corruption is a very serious problem in Swaziland and other African countries, and has a wide range of negative consequences. Daniel (2011, p. 10), for example, has stated that “the politico-economic environment in Swaziland is conducive to extensive corruption. The result is a level of corruption which is both endemic and pervasive.” Among other things, this level of corruption undermines the rule of law, weakens governance, leads to violations of human rights, inhibits political stability, hinders economic development, reduces social policies, diverts investments in infrastructure and public services, and erodes the quality of life. Moreover, it fosters an antidemocratic environment characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability, and declining moral values and disrespect for constitutional institutions and authority. It therefore reflects a democracy, human rights, and governance deficit that negatively impacts human development and human security (Hope, 2008; Mbaku, 2007).
Corruption hurts all, but the evidence suggests it hurts the poor disproportionately, resulting in further impoverishment as well as the perpetuation and increase in inequality (Government of Swaziland, 2006). Corruption is therefore a crime committed against the poor and the most vulnerable in society. When money is diverted into private pockets, society suffers. People lose confidence in public institutions, foreign investment and official development assistance stay away, and poverty and crime flourish. Development then stagnates as people and capital take flight (Lucas, 2007).
In Swaziland, as in other African countries, corruption is also perceived as a key constraint and deterrent to investment and donor funding. The revenue leakage of 3 percent of GDP and 14 percent of the annual revenues being lost to corruption, in addition to shrinking the funding available for socioeconomic development projects, reduces donors’ and investors’ confidence in the system of governance and hinders the country’s efforts to enhance socioeconomic and political development. This is even more important in the context of the crippling fiscal crisis that the country has been experiencing in the past few years. That fiscal crisis emerged primarily due to the collapse of revenue transfers (now recovering but still unsustainable) from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), as well as the historically high level of expenditures (and wages) and the dried up access of the government to domestic and foreign borrowing (Basdevant, Forrest, & Mircheva, 2013). The ensuing liquidity squeeze has hampered growth and employment and impacted households mainly through: (i) reduced social service delivery—both due to cuts in social expenditures and the weakening delivery systems, compounded by the lack of predictability and unclear prioritizing of government resources; and (ii) the weakened labor market, that is, layoffs, firm closures and wage cuts (African Development Bank [AfDB], Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] & United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA], 2012; United Nations, 2012). In addition, as far back as 2006, as quoted in Simelane (2012, p. 5), His Majesty King Mswati III said in a speech to the Parliament that:
While we might be able to put a lot of effort in fast-tracking our economy, we must be alert to the fact that corruption is yet another factor that cripples the nation’s development efforts. If left unchecked, corruption will certainly destroy our economy and reverse the gains of the past.
In that regard, the government’s position in recent times is also quite significant as stated, for example, in the Prime Minister’s statement on the “Government’s Programme of Action 2008–2013”:
Corruption is crime. Those who engage in corrupt activities are criminals. Over the past few years, corruption has become increasingly deep-rooted in our society. There is now widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of Government’s institutional arrangements to deal with, and deter, corruption. This Administration is building the necessary capacity in our Anti-Corruption Commission and other institutions across Government, at the same time as setting targets for the speedy resolution of all outstanding cases and future corruption allegations. Whether corruption allegations give rise to prosecution or are dismissed for lack of evidence, they must be brought to swift and fair resolution. (Government of Swaziland, 2008, p. 15)
More recently, it was noted in the Kingdom’s “Economic Recovery Strategy for Accelerated, Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth,” released in September 2011, that:
Corruption is common, particularly in the procurement of public goods and services and the tendering and implementation of capital projects. It takes place over the entire cycle, from the acquisition of goods and services to the payment of such, and results in Government paying considerably above the market price for goods and services. (Government of Swaziland, 2011, p. 69)
Moreover, in a follow-up to the findings in its 2010 report that there is much fraud, embezzlement and misappropriation of government funds by both the public and private sectors, and this kind of corruption coming in the form of collusion and commission paid when procurement is conducted between the public and private sectors (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2011), the Office of the Auditor-General also observed in its 2011 report that:
Government created and funded various development programs for its citizens, to uplift their standard of living. But moneys are often abused, defrauded and diverted from their primary purposes. Thus the poverty line is worsening and adversely contributes to the rising crime rate. Therefore the desired results are not achieved. (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2012, p. 12)
Further reflecting those views, the Minister of Finance, in his “2012 Budget Speech,” noted:
Despite the noise I have made almost every year on issues of wastage, corruption and mismanagement, it seems my words have fallen on deaf ears. We have not kept pace with global efforts to reduce corruption. I would like to echo the stance taken by His Majesty in His speech from the throne on zero tolerance on corruption. I appeal for the support, co-operation and commitment of all Swazi Citizens to partner with Government in this fight to do everything possible to eradicate the cancer of corruption that is causing moral decay in our society. I would also like to request for a change in attitude, particularly from the “Swazis” who do not report corruption.... A person who sees corruption taking place and does not report it is as guilty as the perpetrator. At the same time I implore those in positions of authority to decisively deal with corruption once it is identified and reported. The fight against corruption can only be won if we all work together and we all take responsibility as citizens. (Government of Swaziland, 2012, pp. 14–15)
Nonetheless, the fight against unnecessary loss of public funds is still far from over, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the Ninth Parliament, and the Parliament as a whole, in their attempt to deal with the consequences of corruption, have managed to recover almost E30 million (approximately US$ 4 million) in unnecessary expenditure, three dairy cows out of nine, and is awaiting additional money and items to be returned as orders have been sent to the appropriate persons demanding that they return the items (Parliament of Swaziland, 2012). In addition to that, the Committee has also made recommendations, such as implementing performance audits, referring matters to the ACC, the Royal Swaziland Police, and recommending that some people never be responsible for public funds again (Parliament of Swaziland, 2011).
The Anti-Corruption Commission
The primary institution charged with combating corruption in Swaziland and mitigating its consequences is the ACC. The ACC was officially launched in February 1998 pursuant to “The Prevention of Corruption Order No. 19 of 1993” (read as one with “The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 1997”) that created it. The ACC was then relaunched in 2008, as per the “Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA), 2006” that replaced “The Prevention of Corruption Order No. 19 of 1993.” The ACC is headed by a Commissioner and assisted by two Deputy Commissioners (administration and operations, respectively) and other staff appointed under the relevant provision of “The POCA, 2006.” The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners are appointed by the King on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission and shall hold office for a period not exceeding 5 years and may be reappointed for a further single term, on such terms and conditions as may be determined. The Commission has two departments, namely, the Administration Department and the Operations Department, each headed by a Deputy Commissioner (Anti-Corruption Commission [ACC], 2012).
According to the “POCA 2006,” the ACC is established as an independent body and its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners are also to be independent, with respect to their duties. The “POCA 2006” states: “In the performance of their functions and in the carrying out of their duties the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioners shall be independent and shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority” (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2006, p. 8).
The mandate of the Commission is to prevent, investigate, and educate (PIE) with respect to corruption. The prevention component tasks the ACC with taking the necessary measures to prevent all forms of corruption in the country, with particular emphasis on public and private bodies. In particular, the “POCA 2006” gives the Commission the mandate to examine the practices and procedures of public and private bodies in order to facilitate the discovery of corrupt practices and secure the revision of their methods of work or procedures which, in the opinion of the commissioner, may be prone or conducive to corrupt practices. The Commission is also mandated to advise public and private bodies on the ways and means of preventing corrupt practices, and on changes in the practices (ACC, 2012).
The ACC recognizes that a clean and honest civil service is important to Swaziland’s success. In that regard, it intends to render assistance to the government departments in formulating departmental guidelines governing civil service integrity and mapping out tailor-made preventative educational programs for their staff. The ACC also conducts studies of operational and financial processes in the different government departments and public bodies and makes recommendations on preventative measures and follows-up with monitoring reviews. The Commission also endeavors to promote ethics in the private sector and encourage organizations of various trades to take preventative measures against corruption. The ACC also undertakes the organization and running of training seminars and conferences for different sectors like banking, construction, customs and excise, immigration, and so on (ACC, 2012).
The investigation component of the mandate tasks the ACC with the responsibility of receiving and investigating complaints of alleged or suspected corrupt practices that are made against any person. The aim is to enforce the law vigilantly and professionally in order to seek out and eradicate corruption, wherever it exists. In that regard, all complaints are referred to the Complaints Review Committee (CRC), which examines them to determine whether the Commission has the mandate, in terms of law, seriousness of the complaint, and financial implications of the complaint. After taking into account all factors, the CRC advises the Deputy Commissioner (operations) who, in turn, advises the Commissioner whether or not the Commission should investigate the complaint or refer it to other relevant bodies, such as, the Police. The Commissioner then gives the necessary directions and authorizes what action is to be taken. According to the ACC’s “2011 Annual Report,” from March 2008 to March 2012, the Commission received 604 complaints of corruption. The majority (68 percent) of these complaint offences were for bribery (23 percent), fraud (22 percent), cheating of public revenue (12 percent), and abuse of power (11 percent). As of March 2012, a total of only 12 cases were pending in court, and there have also been only 2 convictions recorded (ACC, 2012).
The education component tasks the ACC with disseminating information on the evil and dangerous effects of corrupt practices on the society and to enlist and foster public support against corrupt practices. It is aimed at promoting better public understanding of corruption and for encouraging society as a whole to take positive action against such practices. In the government’s programs of action for 2008–2013 and 2013–2018, special emphasis on dealing with fraud and corruption has been prioritized as one of the top priorities of the government, with the subject to be incorporated into the curriculum of primary schools. This is to ensure that children learn at the earliest possible age of the evil and perils of a corrupt and fraudulent way of life (Government of Swaziland, 2008, 2013).
Despite its laudable mandate, the ACC has not been able to undertake the necessary processes to implement its mandate, and faces a number of challenges regarding its functioning. It lacks leadership; its administrative and management techniques are sloppy and archaic at best; its budget is inadequate; it lacks general capacity and the appropriate staff skills sets to undertake its mandate; and its independence has neither been observed nor encouraged. As noted by Simelane (2012), by 2009, the Swaziland ACC had failed to have a significant impact in fighting corruption, and is visibly failing to fight corruption at all levels of Swazi society in spite of being empowered with a sound legal framework.
Other Swazis with influence, such as members of parliament (MPs), have also previously been critical of the ACC. Among other things, the MPs have accused the ACC of failing to do its job. According to the Times of Swaziland (2010), they have likened the graft-busting unit to a fly whisk set-up just to scare people with no definite function or purpose.They have also expressed concern that corruption has allegedly intensified since its inception, with one MP stating that the ACC operated as if it had no vision and sense of direction and further said,
I do not see where we are going with this. How can it be that out of 77 cases that were brought to the Commission, only two were taken to the DPP (Director of Public Prosecutions)? How do you expect this to encourage people to report corruption? (Times of Swaziland, 2010, p. 1)
Another MP said that the delay in finalizing the current cases that have been brought before court is a cause for concern. “Corruption is increasing even though we have this body. Nobody can tell me that it is working because we should be experiencing a decrease in corruption but instead it has shot up” (Times of Swaziland, 2010, p. 1).
The Swaziland country report in the “African Economic Outlook 2012” has also noted that the ACC “has been facing numerous challenges in its operations, including underfunding and lengthy procedures in the prosecution offices where the corruption cases are submitted” (AfDB et al., 2012, p. 11). Clearly then, to move forward and combat corruption in the Kingdom, it would require, among other things, significant changes at the ACC and in the manner in which it functions and implements its mandate.
Combating Corruption in Swaziland: Some Suggested Policy Measures
Given the current state of affairs with respect to corruption in Swaziland, as discussed above, and bearing in mind the best international practices in anticorruption policy, the following are some key policy measures that are being suggested, with accompanying rationale, for combating the problem of corruption in the country. These policy measures are categorized as legal, institutional, and social.
Legal Measures
First, a Whistleblowers Protection Act and a Witness Protection Act need to be passed into law. Whistleblowers perform an important role. They are uniquely placed to expose serious problems within the management and operations of public, private, and civil society bodies. The best source of information concerning inappropriate conduct within those bodies is often people who work for, or have dealings with such bodies (Wheeler, 2004; Whitton, 2008). In order to be a protected disclosure, and for the protections under the Act to be available, the conduct must also be serious enough that, if proven, it would constitute a criminal offence or have reasonable grounds for dismissal. The Act should also make it a criminal offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment to take detrimental action against a person for making a protected disclosure.
The purposes of the Act should include: (i) To encourage and facilitate disclosures of improper conduct by public, private sector, and civil society officers and their bodies; (ii) to provide protection for individuals who make those disclosures, and individuals who may suffer reprisals relating to those disclosures; (iii) to provide for the matters disclosed to be properly investigated and dealt with; and (iv) to protect individuals who are victims of disclosure that are maliciously false, or based on unsubstantiated rumor (Wheeler, 2004; Whitton, 2008).
A Witness Protection Act allows for the promotion of law enforcement by facilitating the protection of persons who are involved directly or indirectly in providing assistance to the investigating authorities. It goes beyond just whistleblowers. The detection, investigation, and prosecution of corruption can be a difficult and challenging task. Corruption often involves powerful government officials, business leaders, and others of influence who have various means at their disposal to hide their corruption. To effectively combat corruption, it is important that citizens and employees who become aware of corrupt practices, be encouraged to report such practices, and to act as witnesses where necessary. Needless to say, such persons must be protected from all forms of reprisal for their cooperation.
Witness Protection Acts generally contain elements that address the following: (i) the making of arrangements necessary to allow a witness to establish a new identity or otherwise to protect the witness; (ii) the relocation of the witness; (iii) the provision of accommodation for the witness; (iv) the provision of transport for the property of the witness; (v) the provision of reasonable financial assistance to the witness; (vi) the provision to the witness of services in the nature of counseling and vocational training; and (vii) doing anything else the authorities consider necessary to ensure the witness’s safety and welfare (Ferguson, 2007; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2008).
Second, the declaration of assets, property, and liabilities, as required under the Leadership Code of Conduct in the Constitution, should be regarded as a public matter, rather than a private one, and those declarations should be made accessible for public scrutiny upon demand. Asset declaration, sometimes referred to as financial disclosure for public officials, is a significant tool for preventing corruption. The principles underlying these declarations, in international best practice, are (i) to increase transparency and the trust of citizens in public administration by disclosing information about assets of politicians and other public servants that shows they have nothing to hide; (ii) to help heads of public institutions prevent conflicts of interest among their employees, and to resolve such situations when they arise, in order to promote integrity within their institutions; and (iii) to monitor wealth variations of individual politicians and other public servants, in order to dissuade them from misconduct and protect them from false accusations, and to help clarify the full scope of illicit enrichment or other illegal activity by providing additional evidence (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2011).
Corruption thrives on a lack of reliable information. Governments should therefore guarantee the right of everyone to have access, on request, to official non-state secret documents held by public authorities. This principle should be applied without discrimination on any ground. Moreover, the greater the information made publicly available and the more certain its accuracy, the higher the chances for a transparent and truly accountable government. Without such access, confidence in public institutions is placed in jeopardy and democracy suffers. In addition, serving the public interest is the fundamental mission of a government and its public institutions. Citizens are entitled to expect that individual officials will perform their duties with integrity, and in a fair and unbiased way. Public officials who maintain private interests during their time in office can present a threat to this fundamental right. Such conflicts of interest have the potential to weaken the trust of the citizens in public institutions (Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], 2004).
Third, a law governing the functioning of the public service needs to be enacted. This law should cover a number of areas related to public service values; code of conduct; appointments; performance agreements, assessment, and management; discipline; rules relating to gifts; and penalties, for example. It is a very comprehensive piece of legislation that mirrors similar best practice legislation across the globe. This bill is necessary and should not only be passed but it must also be vigorously observed and enforced by the Civil Service Commission particularly as it applies to nepotism and disciplinary procedures—two areas in which that Commission’s performance has been found wanting.
A significant part of the bill should be a Code of Conduct. The usual purpose of such Codes is to specify the standards of integrity and conduct to be observed by public officials, to help them meet those standards, and to inform the public of the conduct it is entitled to expect of public officials. It is an important element of the arsenal of best practices used to curb corruption and build or improve ethical competence and accountable behavior. The objective is to enhance public confidence in the integrity of public office holders and the decision-making processes of government. As a result, Codes of Conduct can be used to build trust in government institutions. Or, their absence can undermine it.
Finally, under the legal measures, The PAC Order, 1974, and/or The Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1967, need to be amended to provide for larger fines for contempt. The maximum fine currently applicable under these two instruments ranges from 100 to 400 Emalangeni (approximately US$ 13–52) and/or imprisonment for a period of six months to two years. These are now outdated penalties, and the fines pose no risk to public servants since they are easily payable. Consequently, there is no worry about going to prison for corrupt activities, as determined by the PAC. In other words, this is not a deterrent punishment by any means. Consequently, these two instruments need to be amended to provide for more severe penalties. These amendments will, in turn, strengthen the role of the Parliament in the fight against corruption. Undoubtedly, a strong parliamentary role is required for exercising its oversight and financial control roles, and for exhibiting political leadership.
Institutional Measures
The first institutional measure pertains to the independence of the ACC. Undoubtedly, the independence of the ACC needs to be observed, as per the “POCA 2006.” The role of the ACC as an independent entity in the fight against corruption, with full political support, needs to be reinforced. The establishment of ACCs, agencies, institutions, or bodies has been widely heralded to be one of the key solutions to tackling corruption at the national level. However, such bodies have been most successful when they have strong political backing at the highest levels of government, appropriate budgets, and relevant management systems.
Appropriate and predictable budgetary levels for the functioning of the ACC needs to be provided, and the Commission should be allowed to raise funds from external sources in support of some of its programing activities. However, the ACC would only benefit from proper funding if it puts its house in order. Management practices and processes need to be streamlined, job descriptions and person specifications for all positions are required and should be followed, methods for the safe and secure storage of information must be implemented and information should only be shared on a need to know basis to prevent leaks and to be able to determine the source of leaks more readily, staff members need to be vetted and then their performance evaluated on an annual basis, and there has to be an improvement in the physical security arrangements at the Commission’s office and the instilling of better staff awareness to security for and around their office environment.
Second, a program of capacity building for the key institutions responsible for corruption investigations (the ACC and the Royal Swaziland Police) should be developed, and the prosecuting institution—the Chambers of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) with appropriate sourcing and partnerships—should be built for covering the costs. Significant capacity deficits have been acknowledged in the institutions charged with investigating corruption. This can only lead to further bottlenecks and work backlogs over the longer term. It is imperative that a program of capacity building be developed for these institutions to enable them to undertake their mandate more expeditiously and effectively as well as to build capacity in the DPP office to process corruption dockets and prosecute the cases more efficiently and effectively. This capacity building program must be related to (i) hiring the appropriate numbers of staff with the appropriate skills; (ii) the provision of technical skills training and improving professionalism, including pay and benefits; and (iii) the acquisition of the necessary and appropriate office space, equipment, and materials for the fulfillment of mandates. Here capacity building or capacity development is therefore not a stand-alone training intervention, but a strategically coordinated set of activities aimed at individuals, institutions, and sectors. It is much more than improving the abilities and skills of individuals. Far too often it is simplistically regarded as just training, mentoring, or organization restructuring. It is also about strengthening the performance capabilities of individuals, organizations, and societies (Hope, 2009).
Third, all public, private, and civil society sector organizations should adopt, adhere to, and publicize service charters. A service charter is a short statement describing the level of service the public can expect from an organization and its staff. It represents a demonstration of an organization’s commitment to the public, and a reflection of its dedication to excellence and fairness in the execution of its mandate. These charters are therefore written statements that indicate the nature, quality, and quantity of service that citizens should expect from a respective institution. They provide information on (i) what services are provided; (ii) the standard of the services to be provided; (iii) the sequencing of the processing of services and paperwork; (iv) the time frame within which services will be provided; (v) any user charges; and (vi) the manner in which the public may seek redressal if they are not satisfied with the services received, or if they are of the view that an institution is not living up to the commitments in its service charter (Löffler, Parrado, & Zmeškal, 2007; Post & Agarwal, nd). All service charters should be advertised in the media, on organization websites, and placed prominently in all entrances to an organization and/or its departments. There should be a service charter covering the entire organization and one for each department or division.
Fourth, tender and other procurement processes must be allowed to proceed based on the technical and financial assessments as per the terms specified and advertised and not be influenced through political or other interference. The Procurement Act must be completely observed and a brief document outlining the tender process should be made available by the Tender Board to all public institutions as well as to the public on demand. This recommendation is self-explanatory. Nonetheless, it can be noted that the ultimate goal of public procurement is to satisfy the public interest like any government action should be. In this sense, good procurement should satisfy the needs of the people, should be fair to businesses, should save and avoid wastage of public funds. Good public procurement is a good tool to implement public policy in all areas, and should be an instrument for good governance, and therefore good government. In that context, good procurement will contribute to the government’s legitimacy and credibility.
There needs to be workshops on the procurement process, conducted at regular intervals for all those dealing with procurement in every government ministry, department, and agency. These workshops should, among other things, provide training on the Procurement Act and the entry points for, and impact of, corruption in the public procurement process in Swaziland. Of course, they must also stress and contain an ethics component to influence public servants to resist attempts to directly or indirectly engage in corrupt procurement practices. This is to be a responsibility of the Tender Board, whose members need to become much more informed about their role and functions.
Generally, in countries like Swaziland, where corruption is rampant, the demand side for anticorruption measures tends to be low. This can be attributed to citizens not being used to the idea of enforcing their rights, as well as a political environment where the mechanisms for democratic expression of rights may or may not exist. In such contexts, the media can play two important roles, assuming it has the capacity to be informed on the causes, effects, and magnitude of corruption as well as on international anticorruption norms and standards: It can (i) expose acts of corruption and thus act as a deterrent as well as a monitoring and combating tool, and (ii) raise citizen awareness of the direct impact of corruption and weak integrity systems on the economy and people’s lives, and thereby change social attitudes and empower citizens to demand accountable and transparent democratic, economic, and corporate governance. However, it must also be pointed out that the media can also be corrupt; it is subject to the same social and political pressures as the others. The media, therefore, needs to be accountable and have oversight mechanisms, including enforcing integrity through introduction and monitoring of codes of conduct for its members and encouraging owners/editors to allow balanced reporting.
Another critical challenge facing the Kingdom of Swaziland is the requirement to restore confidence in the independence of the judiciary. The perception surveys mention that the independence of the judiciary has been compromised, and this results in another form of corruption. It is therefore important that the government set up clear guidelines and provide adequate resources to ensure that the Judicial Service Commission’s operations are in accordance with the Constitution and laws pertaining to the judicial services and the justice system. Affirming judicial independence and accountability could be strengthened by, among other things, laying down suitable rules and procedures for making judicial appointments, and increasing the number of judges in order to expedite and settle the pending corruption cases and deal with future case-loads.
In every national integrity system, the judiciary usually represents the last wall of defense against corruption and impunity in the society. However, where there is no confidence in the judicial system, or where the judiciary personnel (those on the bench as well as the staff that enable their work) may be regarded as susceptible to corruption, it then creates a pernicious multiplier effect on the rest of society. Even where those on the bench are honest and of the highest integrity and professionalism, but if their supporting staff are regarded or known to be corrupt, then the entire judiciary becomes tainted. One could consider the corruption of the judicial system as a “corruption of corruptions,” in which those who are responsible for interpreting and enforcing the rules to counteract corrupt practices are themselves deemed to be corrupt.
The ability of the judicial branch to enhance integrity within its own ranks depends on best practice reforms and some common sense actions as well. These include having clear rules applied to personnel management and budget-related issues. Weak governance in these areas can reduce the level of effectiveness among judicial and administrative personnel. In addition, it is important to institute quality control methods to monitor and correct deviations from expected procedural times and caseloads that result from law-related corruption (such as case fixing), and procedural judicial corruption (such as paying court employees to delay or even accelerate cases or to process or not process court orders, or where court employees collect proceeds as per a court order and pocket them, rather than deposit said proceeds with the court for delivery to the rightful owner as per the court order).
Next, each government ministry or agency should institute an Integrity Committee that will be responsible for internal corruption prevention. Integrity Committees can be useful tools for ensuring that individual organizations are responsible for corruption prevention in their respective organizations. Such committees provide the first line of defense against corruption in the organization, and they also act as a built-in oversight mechanism for corruption control. Integrity Committees are internal institutional committees established and charged with the mandate to spearhead the prevention of corruption within their sphere of control, and hence the institutionalization of corruption prevention. The rationale for this institutionalization of corruption prevention is that public institutions exist to serve the public. It is in their interest, therefore, to ensure that they deliver on their respective mandates in an efficient and effective manner free of corruption. Assistance for the establishment of these Committees in Swaziland should be provided and facilitated by the ACC. This would also institutionally and programmatically recognize and reinforce the ACC’s role and responsibility in the fight against corruption.
Social Measures
First, the ACC needs to develop and implement a much more robust media campaign for greater public sensitization and awareness to the existence and work of the Commission and for enhanced prevention and education programing. Undoubtedly, much has been done in terms of media outreach on the workings and activities of the ACC. However, the perception surveys and consultations indicate that too many people are still not aware of the existence of the ACC, and what it is intended to accomplish. Many others have indicated that they do not know where to complain about corruption and how to get in touch with the ACC. Clearly, this situation is untenable and not conducive to the reporting of corruption and prompt investigations thereof. In addition, the ACC must improve the look and feel of its website to make it more user-friendly, and place on there its annual reports and other documents that should be available to the public.
A comprehensive awareness campaign, that is supported with education and training, needs to be established at two levels: (i) The raising of awareness and education of employees, and (ii) targeted public communication campaigns. The first level entails, among other things, (i) promotion of the guidelines for professional ethics, along with training on the practice of professional ethics; (ii) sensitization to the current legislative framework as it relates to corruption; and (iii) encouragement of employees to blow the whistle on corruption within their work environments. For the second level, it should contain elements that (i) promote the benefits of anticorruption and good governance; and (ii) render messages that are positive with respect to the duty of employees not to tolerate corruption, and negative messages of the consequences of corruption to the country and the perpetrators.
In addition, training and education on corruption and anticorruption behavior, in the wider context of good governance, now needs to be a compulsory part of the learning curricula in all schools and centers of learning and training, from primary through to university, teacher colleges, and vocational and other training institutes. The ACC must be at the forefront of developing such curricula in concert with the management, administrative, and pedagogical staff of these various types of institutions. It is clear that corrupt and unethical practices have become a way of life in Swaziland and are tolerated by the communities. Consequently, influencing the hearts and minds of the young will probably do much more to change the socialization process that promotes corrupt behavior, than all other measures combined. Therefore, the fight against corruption through sensitization of the young must be given priority. Once people are aware of the danger of corruption and its consequences on them, their families and relatives as well as on their own businesses, corruption can be reduced (Sylla, 2014).
Second, the Kingdom’s leadership (political, business, civil society) is called upon to demonstrate their leadership status in the society and steadfastly take every opportunity to influence their fellow citizens to change their behavior with respect to corruption. One of the popular refrains about corruption in Swaziland is that, it is part of the cultural and social norms to engage in such behavior. This has also been confirmed by the perception surveys previously discussed. However, there is also much fatigue emerging about the rampant corruption that now exists in the country as its corrosive effects and impact on development are being recognized and felt. Speeches and exhortations that have been made by His Majesty King Mswati III, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Finance, for example, denouncing corruption in the Kingdom, are most welcome and must continue to be made. In addition, there has been much discussion about corruption at the People’s Parliament held in August 2012, and this is very encouraging, pointing to the fact that the people of Swaziland are fed up with the persistent corruption that they are experiencing in the country.
However, much more needs to be done, and by all levels of the nation’s political, business, and civil society leadership. What is required is leadership for change, or in other words, transformational leadership. Such leaders must also be regarded as champions of ideas—good ideas for curbing corruption in this case—who lead and maintain commitment to change ideas and transform toward a better governance environment, influencing others into accepting the changes, and coordinating with disparate actors to overcome resistance to change and transformation. These leadership actions are intended to ultimately enhance the acceptance and institutionalization of transformational change for the better (Hope, 1999, 2012).
Transformational leadership can be regarded as a process by which a person influences others to accomplish an objective—to transform behavior. In particular, the nation’s traditional and religious leaders also need to step up and use their influential positions and platforms to drive the message home that corruption is everybody’s business, and that it is, therefore, bad for the entire nation. The traditional leaders are very influential, given the homogeneity of the Swazi society. Religious leaders are urged to preach the message in their sermons. Business leaders must also frequently make references to the need to disengage from corrupt activities, both to their employees and in appropriate public settings. The private sector has a strong moral duty to support the fight against corruption as they are often the supply side of corruption opportunities. Civil society leaders, generally, need not be encouraged to take up a civil cause, but are urged to put much more focus on curbing corruption.
Where corruption is systemic or persistent, like in Swaziland, the societal culture itself has become captive. The norm is corruption, and penetrating that culture requires building coalitions, mobilizing and coordinating a variety of actors to transform the environment and to sustain the benefits that will be derived. Unless the war against corruption is led by leaders at the top who embody transformation rather than the “status quo,” it will not be won at the middle or lower levels of the society in general. All of the global evidence reminds us that the war against corruption has had a positive impact only in countries where the top leaders actually led it; but the war failed in all the countries where the top leaders themselves were either corrupt and/or fought corruption only with empty words. There must be a zero tolerance policy from the top, representing ethical standard setting through both words and deeds that demonstrate values and commitment to ethical governance (Hope, 1999, 2012).
Third, corruption in Swaziland must be made a high-risk activity – a high risk that the perpetrators will be caught and severely punished, in line with existing law, irrespective of their status or standing in society. In other words, punishment should be used as a deterrent. Those who would be found guilty of having engaged in corrupt activities, from all sectors, should receive the harshest available punishment, with their loot tracked down and confiscated. As reported in the press, this recommendation is also consistent with the view of His Majesty King Mswati III who told the nation at the People’s Parliament in August 2012 that “Swazis should not be afraid to name and shame corrupt people.” He further said that
People should not only end up being suspects of corruption but be prosecuted so that the nation could know that there was something being done about corruption.... The non-finalization of corruption cases does not put the country in good light. People should not get away with corruption. (Ngozo, 2012, p. 1)
However, it must also be pointed out that punitive measures, including adequate capability for enforcement, only work in tandem with preventive measures that reduce opportunities for corrupt practices (Hope, 2000). Nonetheless, punishment—particularly of prominent, high-level corrupt officials—sends the right signal, throughout a nation, that the country’s leadership is indeed very serious about the campaign against corruption. In fact, there should be a zero-tolerance policy (in words and actions) toward corruption, and it should be ensured that offenders do not escape legal punishment. This is the area where Swaziland needs to step up and decisively demonstrate visible results in tackling the culture of impunity that has too long been associated with corruption in the country.
To implement a policy of punishment as deterrent also requires the strict enforcement of the various punishment policies, both at the administrative and judicial levels. Those involved in corruption must be dealt with severely, but transparently. The courts in particular must dispense justice under the rule of law to the fullest extent possible. Those found guilty of corruption, especially grand corruption, must face an appropriate level of punishment to emphasize society’s disapproval and abhorrence of their actions, and to clearly demonstrate that there is no room for corruption in the country. But, as a first order, investigations and prosecutions of those accused of corruption must be allowed to proceed without interference or undue influence from any quarter, especially the highest levels of the executive branch.
Conclusion
There is an emerging vocal consensus that combating corruption is one of Swaziland’s most critical governance and developmental challenges. As noted by one group of analysts: “One of the main reasons why Swaziland is ranked so low in terms of comparative competitiveness is corruption. This is prevalent in the economy from the top down, both within the bureaucracy and within the political system” (Vandome, Vines, & Weimer, 2013, p. 21). In that regard, the foregoing policy measures represent one approach to the anticorruption toolkit for the Kingdom. In addition to being anticorruption specific, these measures are also intended to contribute to an improvement in the overall governance situation in Swaziland. An environment where, for example, ethical standards for public officials are enforced; where there is efficient public sector delivery; where there is public service transparency and accountability; where there is non-wasteful public resource management; where the media plays an effective role in demanding clean government and highlights cases of corruption with objectivity and evidence; where the private sector does not pay bribes to secure public or private contracts; where there is a robust civil society creating social revulsion and resistance to corruption; and where, as convincingly argued elsewhere, corruption is regarded as a collective action problem (Hope & Chikulo, 2000; Persson et al., 2013).
It must be noted, however, that corruption cannot be eradicated quickly and permanently. But, left unchecked, it will increase and make the poorest and least-educated poorer. Where personal risk and punishment are minimal, as is now the case in the Kingdom, acts of corruption are likely to naturally increase. Therefore, raising awareness without adequate and visible enforcement will only lead to continued cynicism among Swazis, and possibly increase the incidence of corruption as no “Big Fish” are being punished. Implementing the policy measures suggested here will not only deal with the problem of impunity but also demonstrate the government’s resolve to combat and control corruption.
In that respect, it must also be observed that Transparency International has reported significant improvement in the Kingdom’s CPI over the period of 2012–2014. By 2014, Swaziland was ranked at 69 out of 175 countries, with a score of 43 out of 100, just behind South Africa, ranked at 67 with a score of 44 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2014). Swaziland’s 2014 CPI score was equivalent to the global average CPI score, and much higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average score of 33 (Transparency International, 2014). This improved CPI performance suggests that Swazis are becoming somewhat satisfied with their government’s plans and actions to control corruption, which was identified as one of eight focal areas of the Swaziland Development Index for 2013–2018, as outlined in Government of Swaziland (2013, p. 20). It expressed that the
government’s commitment to rooting out corruption will be sustained with the continuation of the life-style investigation program combined with a renewed public education program and the introduction of anti-corruption policies and strategies in more Government Ministries and other agencies.
This approach, as commended by the Kingdom’s Auditor-General (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2014), along with the policies suggested in this work, will certainly go a long way to rid the Kingdom of its current reputation vis-à-vis corruption.