Culture,Corruption,and Anticorruption Struggles in Nigeria

Introduction

There are two major obstacles to Nigeria’s economic recovery: the lingering money laundering and the ongoing culture of corruption. Combating these problems has been further complicated by the large number of the unemployed, easily available weaponry, a quickly widening gap between the rich and the poor, and a largely impotent government. Persuasive violence and a deteriorating economy have created a vicious circle that has further undermined the government’s ability to tackle the economy’s four basic problems: the security of oil supply, high level of unemployment, deficiencies in infrastructure, and the government’s failure to introduce much-needed economic reforms. In turn, these four problems have contributed to the development of a large underground economy reinforced by pervasive corruption, at all levels of the government. The reduction in violence in recent years has led to changes in the underground economy, which is evolving. However, as the shadow economy’s size is largely controlled by the level of corruption, it is the composition, rather than the absolute size, that has changed.

In Nigeria, similar types of vicious circles are often set in motion through a process whereby relative developments are reinforced overtime. These cycles will often continue in the same direction, until an exogenous factor intervenes and stops, or reverses the cycle. Research suggests that this is what is happening to the Nigerian economy in the post-Obasanjo period (Akanbi, 2001; Asaolu, 2013; Ogundiya, 2012). Any efforts to reconstruct and restore a functioning Nigerian economy will be constrained by the government’s ability to set in motion a virtuous circle of economic expansion and improved security. In turn, this means constructing a strategy that positively addresses a number of interrelated factors, including the growth and dynamics of the shadow or informal economy; the deterioration of social capital; and in particular, the near absence of trust between the different regions, religious groups, tribes and even local neighborhoods; and the evolving relationship between tribes, gangs and the insurgency.

As Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iwealaas, quoted by Waziri (2010), suggests, corruption is the common element that ties these diverse forces together and the dynamic that drives the vicious circle of violence and economic stagnation that Nigeria has experienced. Unfortunately, international media attention on corruption in Nigeria has tended to focus exclusively on high-profile cases of fraud, waste and abuse by the US contracting authorities and private foreign firms (Waziri, 2010), or the fallout from the oil-for-food program of the 1990s without denying the importance of these forms of corruption; the analysis that follows is more focused on the future, in particular, on the rampant and growing domestic Nigerian corruption that is draining the country’s public finance, chocking reconstruction efforts, and undermining the fragile support for the new transition (Aluko, 2002).

As the article illustrates, the ongoing insurgence and lack of trust, together with unique factors, such as, oil revenues, have combined to create an environment in which the extent and effect of corruption are even more pronounced than that observed by Asaolu (2013). In Nigerian societies (corruption’s) impact is potentially still more serious: it can undercut the emergence of stable expectations and the processes by which they are legitimated; it can maintain or further exacerbate situations in which outcomes lack legitimacy, making it difficult for any serious form of authority to emerge; it can lead to the squandering of aid and external political will; and it can make the weak weaker, the poor poorer and the venerable still less secure. All of this has occurred in Nigeria, perhaps even to an unprecedented degree, certainly to an extent not envisaged by even the most vocal critics of the invasion and subsequent reconstruction efforts of Nigeria.

The establishment of anticorruption agencies like the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC), which are seen as probably the most ambitious anti-corruption approach in contemporary developmental transformation contexts, has at best underperformed, considering the rampant cases of graft. In Nigeria, the ICPC and EFCC could not solve Nigeria’s massive corruption problem. During the Obasanjo administration, some high-profile convictions were recorded, such as, the cases of TafaBalogun (IGP), D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha, Bode George, and Chimaroke Nnamani. Despite this landmark effort, the judgment and conviction were laughable. In some extreme cases, anti-graft agencies are nothing more than another layer of corrupt bureaucracy (Aluko, 2002), and in the context of the seeming failure of convicting the “big fishes,” the public see them as toothless bulldogs incapable of fighting the endemic corruption that has undermined the national development agenda in Nigeria.

There is a robust literature on the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria. Different interpretations have been rendered on the causes of corruption and the challenges facing its extermination. However, a holistic analysis of corruption in Nigeria will benefit from looking at the cultural dimension to the menace, because there is an ethical dimension to the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria (Jason, 2007; Olaniyan, 2009, p. 123). Specifically, Nigeria’s situation exemplifies the flight of morality and ethics in public life. It is a country where government officials divert public resources for private benefit in utter disregard for existing moral and political codes of behavior, and where anticorruption reforms are often stymied by ethnic, kinship and even religious sentiments (Babalola, 1995). Moreover, the social norms that are expected to contain corruption tend to be weak or nonexistent, and divisions within societies affected by political and economic instability weaken shared conceptions of public good (Akindele, 1990). Thus, since the inauguration of Economic and Financial Crime Commission Act (EFCC), 2004 and Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Establishment Act, 2000 as anti-graft agencies by the Act 2000 and Act 2004 respectively, they are yet to record considerable success in reducing the incidence of corruption in the country. This article, on the one hand, situates the concept of corruption within the praxis of national development agenda, and on the other, interrogates the cultural pressure on corruption, both in its manifestation, and in the attempts to address it.

Explaining the Concept of Corruption

Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon that has been a part of societies throughout history. It has caused political and economic instability in societies, and depending on the scale, it has led to social conflict and violence, as competing groups vied for state power, which is the source of distribution of resources and other amenities in society (Odunuga, 2000). According to Asaolu (2013), Larewaju (2011), and Mike (2002), the word corruption cannot easily be defined. Similarly, Waziri (2010) and Akindele (1990) confirm that corruption is not an easy task to define. Indeed, defining corruption is a daunting and challenging venture. However, Epele (2006) and Ibrahim (2003) view corruption as a “complex and multifaceted phenomenon with multiple causes and effects, as it takes on various forms and contexts.” According to them, one of the major difficulties in conceptualizing corruption is that, while it is difficult to eradicate, it has a capacity to take on new forms (Eme, 2010). Some of the most popular and widely used definitions of corruption can appear tantalizingly simple and clear; it sometimes masks a more complex and contested reality. Thus, both the World Bank’s (2006) classic definition of corruption as “the abuse of public power for private gain” and Transparency International’s concept of “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain” have been popular with many scholars, not only because they are relatively broad definitions that capture a wide range of corrupt practices but possibly also because they suggest that corrupt behavior can easily be identified, classified, and addressed through neat institutional solutions. The analyses, however, suggest that such broad understandings of corruption not only undermine the analytical usefulness of the term but also make the development of effective national development policies more difficult. While the many different social problems often subsumed under the label “corruption” could challenge a peaceful and prosperous order, each one requires a distinct response and cannot be understood through the same conceptual lens and addressed using the same instrument.

According to Osoba (1996), in nearly all the states of the federation in Nigeria, there has always been a culture of corruption. Public office means prerequisites (Ogundiya, 2012). In addition, Ogundiya (2009) observed that corruption in Nigeria has with the passage of time, become a convention, a psychological need, and a necessity. According to Lawal and Oladunjoye (2010), “there is stealing and corruption everywhere … but in Nigeria we think there is more stealing and corruption than in any other state.” Within Nigeria, the country is the home of amoral familism – including the propensity to offer and accept bribes – and Nigeria is home to amuguismo, the use of contacts and intermediaries in dealing with the bureaucracy, and influence trafficking in political life” (Mauro, 1998; Mike, 2002; Onyeoziri, 2004). Onyeoziri (2004) further asserts that “corruption in Nigeria is not merely a social deviation, it is a way of life.”

Epele (2006) and Ibrahim (2003) argue more broadly that a culture of distrust and private spiritedness foster high rates of venality than it occur in communities where generalized trust and civic engagement are strong. Distrust and suspicion boosts the demand for corrupt services on the part of private agents. Therefore, there is perceived uncertainty of entering into partnerships with strangers, which may impede legitimate private business activity. The suspicion that competitors are getting ahead through corrupt acts, and that regulatory officials will impose predatory sanctions if not paid off, may make a business strategy of keeping one’s hands clean seem counterproductive (Obadan, 2002).

At the same time, the lack of trust and civic engagement may increase the supply of corrupt services by reducing the danger to officials of being exposed and punished. Societal organizations to monitor and protest abuses will be weaker (Ogundiya, 2012). A related argument links corruption to ethnic polarization. According to Ogundiya (2012), the demand for corrupt services may be higher at any given price. For one thing, generalized trust is likely to be lower. Members of ethnic groups may feel that demanding favors from co-ethnics in office is the only effective way to obtain government services.

At the same time, the supply of concept services may be increased by the social leverage that ethnic leaders have over officials of their ethnicity; fear of social ostracism may make them reluctant to refuse their co-ethnic demands (Aluko, 2002). Babalola and Osoba (2011) also argued that competition between different ethnic groups within the same state could also foster patronage politics and bureaucratic predation. In view of this, Babalola and Osoba (2011) maintain that a relationship between ethnic fragmentation and growth retards public policies.

According to the preceding argument, therefore, the Nigerian state, which came into being in 1914 following the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates, could be said to be built on a tripod, that is, North, East, and West Nigeria. This tripod, which of course represents the major ethnic groups, notably, Hausa and Fulani, Yoruba, and the Igbo, respectively, virtually dominates every facet of the Nigerian society. Therefore, it was this division and domination of the minorities by the dominant ethnic groups that brought about competition, anxiety, and mutual distrust for one another by the groups that make up the country.

Therefore, corruption in Nigeria is endemic with cultural phenomena. Moreover, the Nigerian society is bedeviled with corrupt practices, such that once a person is appointed into any political office, the expectations from his people will be extremely high in terms of what the office will offer. Therefore, the people they represent are ready to teach them how to steal. Hence, corruption in Nigeria knows no bound, irrespective of tribes or cultural affiliations.

Even though other theories, such as, economic development theory, political institutions theory and public policy theory, could have been used to analyze these studies, none was sufficient in explaining the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria better than the historical and cultural theories used in this context.

In the Nigerian state, it is generally believed that the police and justice system are weak and often perceived to be among the most corrupt institutions. Corruption in these sectors is practically problematic as they create the (often justified) perception that some group or individuals can act with impunity. This limiting trust in some of these institutions creates a sense of insecurity, thereby undermining and feeding into a large-scale national development effort. In the aftermath of the military rule in Nigeria, for example, Nigerian judges and prosecutors display a strong bias in favor of a few rich political elites, as opposed to the common or less privilege citizens, where the less privileged citizens could barely get a fair trial (sometimes even facing detention without charges; Onuogu, 2002).

To sum up, one can distinguish between different practices classified as corruption. Babatope distinguishes between eight different forms of corruption: fraud, illegal political bargains, embezzlement, bribery, favoritism, extortion, the abuse of discretion, and conflict of interest (Babatope, 2008). Ochulor, Iheanacho, and Okpokamfor (2011) limit themselves to five main forms of corruption, such as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, and favoritism, while Asaolu identifies seven basic forms of corruption from a study of corruption in Nigeria (Asaolu, 2013). This includes commission for illicit services, unwarranted payment for public services, gratuities, string-pulling, levies and tolls sidelining, and misappropriation. Broadly, these different lists agree on the kinds of practices that constitute corruption, but importantly many of them, such as favoritism, the abuse of discretion, or string-pulling can only be meaningfully examined and judged in their specific social context. Therefore, focusing on different forms of corruption does not avoid the pitfall of specific societal understandings of the concept.

Anti-graft Agencies in Nigeria ICPC and EFCC

The most focused and far-reaching war against corruption in Nigeria could be said to have started during the regime of the erstwhile president of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, especially with the establishment of the two anti-graft bodies: The ICPC and the EFCC. On assumption of office, Obasanjo (2000) noted that the impact of corruption is rampant and has earned Nigeria an extremely bad image. The new dispensation offered by his election gave President Obasanjo an opportunity that was required to relaunch Nigeria to her rightful place in the comity of nations. Thus, the first bill of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, and thus the first bill he presented to the national parliament for consideration was the ICPC Act, which was signed into law in June 2000. On September 29, 2000, the ICPC was established. The new ICPC, designed to reflect relevant public and private experience was mandated to employ all available legal means to rid Nigeria of all vestiges of corruption, and to promote transparency and integrity in the public and private lives of all Nigerians. It is mandated to receive and investigate any report of the conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit or the commission of such offence, and in appropriate cases, to prosecute the offenders (Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission [ICPC], 2000). It also has the mandate to review, examine, and enforce the modification of such structures and systems that are vulnerable to corruption, as well as to criminalize a wide range of direct and indirect corrupt practices in public and private institutions (Federal Republic of Nigeria [FRN], ICPC, 2002).

In 2003, the EFCC was founded in furtherance of the anticorruption campaign and also to complement the work of the ICPC. Its first establishment Act of 2002 was repealed by a bill of the national assembly and reenacted as the EFCC Establishment Act, 2004. Its establishment was meant to satisfy one of the conditions of the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to remove Nigeria from the list of recalcitrant countries in international financial transactions. Its mandate, among others, was to cause investigation to be conducted into the properties of any person if it appears to the commission that the person’s lifestyle and the extent of their properties are not justified by their source of income (Economic and Financial Crime Commission Act [EFCC], 2004). That broad mandate would cover such areas as corruption in public office, terrorist financing, oil bunkering, and 419 scams. 419 is a section of chapter 38 of Nigerian Criminal Code (obtaining property by false pretences, cheating) that deals with fraud. The scam, also known as advance-fee fraud, is a confidence trick where letters or e-mails are sent to different recipients, proposing profitable offers that will pay the intended targets substantially. The scammers use false official documents like government letter-headed papers, seals, and stamps to make it look real. After some time, the target is convinced to advance sums of money to inform about their taxes, fees, and/or handling charges for the release of the funds. Its first chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, was seconded to head the commission from the police force when the agency was created. In 2005, EFCC scored its first break when Tafa Balogun, former inspector general of police was sentenced to a 6-month jail term for corruption (EFCC, 2004). The establishment of the anti-graft commissions was in line with the relevant section of Nigerian constitution which empowered the national legislature to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it (Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria [CFRN], 2004).

In the federal government’s war against corruption, the EFCC was set up to combat the threats posed by money launderers and other organized transborder criminals operating in Nigeria. The author included statistics of prosecutions, convictions, and funds recovered to show that the EFCC was more effective than the ICPC during the period under review. However, the data relied upon apparently did take into account the fact that the ICPC focuses on public sector crimes, while the EFCC mandate embraces both the public and private sectors. Without disaggregated data, it would be impossible to determine the relative effectiveness of the two agencies using prosecutions, convictions, and recoveries as parameters.

Accordingly, it is believed that any unbiased comparison of the achievements of the EFCC and the ICPC in the areas of prosecution and recovery of proceeds of corruption has to take into account the differences in their mandates and their operational jurisdictions. It will also not be fair to conclude that it was only the activities of the EFCC that resulted in positive changes in the perception of corruption in Nigeria by Transparency International and the Paris Club; other anti-graft agencies should partake in the glory and credit for the contributions, however insignificant they may appear. It must, however, be observed that instead of creating the EFCC, ICPC’s enabling law ought to have been amended to broaden the agency’s mandate to include corruption in the private sector. Even if there was an overriding need to create another agency, the jurisdiction of the new agency should have been limited to corruption in the private sector, thereby leaving public sector corruption to the ICPC. With the creation of the EFCC, we now have two main anti-graft agencies dealing with public sector corruption, with ill-defined jurisdictional boundaries and operational limits.

The result is a collateral turf war and struggle for supremacy among the agencies, stepping on one another’s toes, sabotaging and undermining one another, seeking credit and applause, self-aggrandizement by leadership of the agencies, and playing to the gallery instead of getting the job done. The establishment of the two bodies provided great impetus for the press to perform the constitutionally ordained role of effectively watching over the activities of the government, so as to ensure efficient delivery. Despite the strident criticism that the war was biased and the agencies were being used to witch-hunt enemies of the government, it still provided great support to the anti-graft agencies in its activities. The ICPC Act 21 vests in the officers of the Commission all the powers and immunities of a police officer under the Police Act, as well as other laws conferring power on the police, or empowering and protecting law enforcement agents. Section 6 of the ICPC Act confers three main responsibilities on the commission. They include receiving and investigating reports of corruption and, in appropriate cases, prosecuting the offenders; examining, reviewing, and enforcing the correction of corruption prone systems and procedures of public bodies, with a view to eliminate corruption in public life. The mandate also involves educating and enlightening the public on and against corruption and related offences, with a view to enlist and foster public support for the fight against corruption. Section 61 of the Act states that, any prosecution for an offence under the Act is deemed to be undertaken with the consent of the Attorney-General. Under section 13 (2) (a) of the EFCC Act 22, the Legal and Prosecution Unit of the Commission is charged with the responsibility of prosecuting offenders under the Act. There has been a longstanding controversy over the independence of the ICPC, EFCC, and the Code of Conduct Tribunal, regarding seeking permission and approval of the attorney-general and minister of justice before initiating prosecutions. Late President UmaruYar’Adua had directed that all agencies involved in the prosecution of criminal cases should seek the consent of the attorney-general. In addition, the agencies are also to report to the attorney-general of the federation, in accordance with relevant laws.

And, recently, the attorney-general of the federation and minister of justice, Mohammed Bello Adoke, advocated the merger of the nation’s anticorruption agencies, the EFCC and the ICPC (Akanbi, 2001). Adoke alleged that as a result of incompetence, inadequate capacity to thoroughly investigate and prosecute economic crimes, many high-profile corruption cases, such as, the $180 million Halliburton bribe scandal, the alleged N50 billion Police Equipment Fund fraud and the $3 billion Vaswani Brothers rice importation scandal failed as the agencies lack capacity to collate evidences to sustain charges and secure conviction in court (Eme, 2010). The attorney-general of the federation further argued that the two anti-graft agencies seemed not to understand their roles and statutory mandates as they to disagree more than agree over jurisdictional issues when “the Act establishing the ICPC mandates it to fight official corruption while the Act setting up EFCC mandates it to fight economic crimes and money laundering.” In addition, he also posited that the mandates of the two commissions overlap (Aiyede, 2008). Similarly, a former attorney-general of the federation and minister of justice announced while in office that the federal government was considering merging the EFCC and ICPC because of overlapping functions (Daily Trust, 2007).

However, in spite of the adequacy of the laws and the political support given to the anti-graft agencies, particularly by the Obasanjo government, not much was recorded as achievements. Only a few prosecutions were recorded. A number of reasons have been advanced as responsible. In the first instance, the anti-graft agencies were referred to as “white elephant security agencies” (Collins, 2013). In addition, the argument has always been that, the proliferation of crime-busting agencies has undermined the effectiveness of the police, culminating in frequent friction among the agencies over issues of mandate and jurisdiction. To compound the situation, the current attorney-general recently promulgated a controversial statutory instrument, pursuant to his powers, under section 43 of the EFCC Act of 2004 to the effect that, all cases under the purview of EFCC must be cleared with the attorney-general before prosecution (Waziri, 2010). The instrument attracted much public criticism, but it has not been revoked. It must be mentioned that the position taken by the abovementioned public officers is not popular with the public. Indeed, failure of the police to investigate and successfully prosecute corruption and allied cases was the main catalyst for the establishment of these agencies at various times.

As the article shows, anticorruption efforts in Nigeria have focused on strengthening state capacity; on increasing transparency in decision-making, especially in spending decisions; and on the accountability of public actors, through both formal and informal monitoring processes. However, despite the substantial resources dedicated to these efforts, its impacts on corruption have been limited, with most Nigerian states lingering at the bottom of national corruption and governance indices. Looking at the emergence of Nigerian leaders and their anti-corruption efforts in strategic operations, which boils down to recycling of old leaders at the helm of affairs, it shows the reasons why corruption has remained such a problem. Three issues stand out: nationalizing governance functions, an emphasis on formal institutions, and a focus on state institutions.

First, a substantial number of strategic operations have witnessed the nationalization of governance functions, either comprehensively, as with democratic administrations in Nigeria (Falana, 2006), or more selectively, with nationals controlling the budgetary powers, or the justice system. Examples of the latter include ICPC in Nigeria that introduced local experts with co-signature authority into key ministries and public enterprise to enhance transparency and accountability, especially with regard to revenue collection, procurement, and spending decisions (Waziri, 2010). While aiming to enhance transparency and accountability, such nationalized set-ups also aim to strengthen the capacity of these institutions and train local officials. In some respects, such mechanisms have been quite successful: ICPC contributed to a tripling in Nigerian revenues, while EFCC has begun to investigate a senior government minister and popular former governors for corruption associated with different cases or issues. However, all such mechanisms face obvious problems of sustainability, for if they fail to address the underlying organization of corruption and the social and economic structures that fuel it, corrupt officials can simply choose to wait out the national presence. Because of the fact that these types of intrusive anticorruption mechanisms compromise norms of sovereignty and self-governance, they can be politically costly to maintain and may fuel local resistance to the wider national strategic effort.

Second, in EFCC and ICPC anticorruption efforts, strategic operations have focused on building and strengthening formal anticorruption institutions, such as anticorruption commissions, the judiciary, and procurement systems based on federal/or national best practices. However, these efforts often fall short as anticorruption institutions are insufficiently resourced and insulated from political influence. As highlighted, they can only be effective if they have strong political support, have adequate financial resources, and are given a strong official mandate. However, it is rarely in the interests of political elites to establish independent and well-resourced institutions that threaten the networks that sustain their power. In Nigeria, for example, the anticorruption agencies have lacked substantial political support, have been starved of funds, and with a small staff, they have no capacity to investigate corruption allegations (Tony, 2008). In addition, the focus on strengthening anticorruption institutions is rooted in the idea that weak formal institutions in Nigeria fuel corruption. However, corruption in Nigeria is also the consequence of a concomitant informal power structure that fuels and shapes relationships of corruption. Such efforts to strengthen formal institutions are rarely accompanied by similar efforts to weaken or co-opt these informal structures, limiting the impact of anticorruption reforms, as highlighted.

Lastly, federal governments tend to focus their anticorruption efforts predominantly on the actions and institutions of the state, rather than on the practices of public and private international institutions, such as businesses, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or international organizations. In Nigerian states, one cannot really understand, let alone successfully fight corruption without attending to the role of international actors/or institutions and structures because the scale of aid, and the way in which it is disbursed, has important consequences for corruption. Similarly, the exploitation of natural resources and the networks of corruption that accompany it are inextricably linked to international markets. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, federal government anticorruption efforts have focused predominantly on the role of the Nigerian state, despite the fact that external actors and structures play an important role.

A recent assessment by the Save Nigeria Group (SNG) notes a glaring lack of primary data that would allow for comparisons between programs on how and where donors have allocated funds (Daily Trust, 2002). While civil society has undertaken similar efforts through campaigns to encourage transparency and accountability in the natural resources sector, Ribadu (2006) argues that with the growing national competition for national resources, the desire of federal government to put pressure on mining companies has declined. Instead, the emphasis has shifted to encouraging recipient developing governments to be more transparent about their natural resource income under the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. However, as a consequence of an effective campaign by anticorruption NGOs in Nigeria, the 2013 financial reform bill included provisions requiring resource extraction companies to disclose all payments made to federal governments for oil, gas, or minerals. As the bill takes effect, it will become clearer whether these efforts to enhance transparency will have the desired effect on corruption.

But beyond the foregoing reasons lies the sociocultural cum religious factors, which have not been totally captured in the extant literature about corruption in Nigeria. This shall be the focus of the present study.

Socio-cultural Basis of Corruption and Anticorruption Failures in Nigeria

The cultural explanation of the high incidence of corruption in Nigeria has generated a heated debate. One of the most direct references to the culpability of culture in the growing level of sleaze in Africa was once given by John Kuffuor, the former Ghanaian president, when he averred that the prevalence of corruption in Africa derives essentially from the culture of Africa, which, according to him, encourages corruption. In his words, “corruption is basically enshrined in our (i.e, African) culture” (Kuffuor, 2009). However, no sooner did he make this statement in a public lecture that he came under serious criticism. Chidi Odikalu, in a major response, argues that

President Kuffuor turned Cassius on his head, arguing, in effect, that the problem is in our stars and ancestors and not in ourselves (sic). In doing so, he implausibly caricatures culture, incredibly generalizes about corruption as a social pathology; racialises it as a governance problem in a manner that would have caused severe hackles if it had been done by a Caucasian; and ultimately trivializes a rather serious issue. (Odinkalu, 2010, p. 23)

The refutation of Odinkalu is anchored to the presence of anticorruption in virtually all cultures in Africa, and in such a way, Kuffuor’s statement was grossly unfair to African cultures. Implied here therefore is the notion that African culture does not condone corruption. In his words,

Whatever the model of Nigerian or African social organization that we examine, there were in fact firm prohibitions against stealing, conversion or plunder of public resources for private gain, all elements implicit in the modern manifestations of corruption in governance. There were also quite profound social and political consequences for those involved in such conduct. (Odinkalu, 2010, pp. 23–24)

The foregoing assertion of Odinkalu suggests that corruption has never been part and parcel of African culture. To a large extent, the position of Odinkalu is quite valid. An integral part of African culture is uprightness and promotion of honesty, as evident in such concepts of omoluabi (the upright one in Yoruba culture) and mutum kirki (honest person in Hausa culture). In the traditional African setting, punishment for conversion of public resources for private gains could range from banishment, excommunication, exiling, expulsion, or outright extermination. However, if these are contained in the culture of the people, then, as asked by Oladele (2013), why should a convicted corrupt individual be offered a chieftaincy title by traditional rulers? Why do governors, some of whom have been fingered in corruption be given awards, or be elected into the senate? Why would religious institutions ordain corrupt public officials, and sometimes organized thanksgiving services for corrupt ex-convicts who are just being released from prisons? (Oladele, 2013). Generally, why would the society recognize public officials who have corruptly enriched himself or herself in the course of serving the country?

In two separate works, Peter Ekeh has attempted to explain the conundrum of corruption and culture in Africa. The first is through his introduction of the concepts of two publics to the literature on political sociology. In the first work, Ekeh (1975) alluded to corruption in African society via the presence of two publics in Africa, particularly, the dichotomy between them. According to him, the operation of colonial suzerainty has created primordial and civic publics, where the former represents the traditional life that is undergirded by moral values, and the latter represents the civil life of modern bureaucracy that is bereft of moral underpinnings. The tragedy was that the same person occupies the two publics at a time. For example, the same person occupying a public office is expected to use the proceeds from the civic realm to meet demands coming from the traditional base. And because legitimate earnings from the civic public cannot meet the high demands from the traditional front, the person has to look toward the public cover to meet the demand. That is why when an a public official is appointed, the people back home expect such a person to take resources and enrich himself and benefit his/her people at home. Such a person is often rewarded with chieftaincy and religious titles as the case may be.

In his inaugural lecture delivered at the University of Ibadan, Ekeh also identified social structures consequent on colonial rule as one of the courses of issues like corruption in Africa. According to him, colonialism brought about the formation of three types of structures: migrated, transformed and emergent, with the first standing for some structures that were brought whole-scale from the metropole; the second for some institutions that got transformed as a result of colonialism, and the third as structures that emerged as a result of colonial encounter. An example in the first category is the modern bureaucracy that was brought whole-scale to Africa. However, according to him, in the course of the migration of these institutions, the undergirding cultures and values were left behind. What obtains then was the planting of structures that were bereft of values underpinning their efficiency. This explains the presence of bureaucratic corruption. The analysis of Ekeh, therefore, is that the metropole bureaucracy was bereft of corruption because of the presence of values guiding it; but the same cannot be said of the bureaucracy of Africa (Ekeh, 1980).

Three issues are discernible from Ekeh’s prognosis. The first is that there is a breakdown in the values underpinning African culture. Odinkalu was in support of this line of thought, but blames it on the external imposition of states in Africa, which did not derive from the rich culture of Africa (Odinkalu, 2010, p. 24). The second is that the people aid official corruption by making demands on public officials well beyond what their official remuneration can support. The last is that the institutions brought by colonialism were bereft of soul and this explains why they are often bastions of corruption.

In Nigeria, the impact of erosion of cultural values is evident in the attitudes to corruption. In the first instance, corruption has almost become a way of life in Nigeria to the extent that not to be corrupt tends to be regarded as an aberration. This is reflected in the celebration of the corrupt officials. For example, when Chief Bode George was released from prison after serving on charges of corruption, he organized a lavish thanksgiving party in his church, and the party was attended by de la crème of the society. We can now cite some instances to explain the theoretical explanations above (Larewaju, 2011). In the same vein, Dipreye Alameiseigha was sentenced to prison for corruptly enriching himself when he served as the governor of Bayelsa state. Upon his release, he organized a colorful party that was attended by a large number of people, and in speeches after speeches, he was eulogized and declared noncorrupt, and it was said that he was framed by his political enemies (Egbejumi-David, 2007).

It is often the practice to see prosecution of corrupt office holders from an ethnicity angle. For example, when James Ibori, the former governor of Delta state was arrested by the EFCC under Nuhu Ribadu, his town’s people organized protest marches, with some women going nude, for his release (Amaize & Ige, 2010). They upheld the concepts of witch hunt and ethnic persecution responsible for his ordeal. He was later released and acquitted by the Nigerian court, until he was later arrested in London and jailed by the British court. Added to this is the influence of religion in the whole discourse of corruption in Nigeria. Religious institutions and leaders are known to recognize the wealth without asking questions on the sources of their wealth. Public officials are given recognition and often invited to donate money to the religious course, and as theorized by Ekeh, these people have to look beyond their legitimate remuneration to meet the expectations from these institutions.

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that breakdown in cultural values has negatively impacted the prevalence of corruption in Nigerian society. It has contributed to the promotion of the wealthy, which, most of the time, are public officials. It has also percolated to the religious institutions. In a way, a linkage between culture and corruption is a very strong one.

Can Corruption be Overcome?

The integrated model sketched above suggests that any attempt to reduce corruption in Nigeria needs to place the problem in a broader political, social, and economic context. Rather than focusing on trust-building and institutional reform, the current strategy has emphasized market reforms, infrastructure development, and private foreign investment. It is not producing tangible economic gains, and in fact, has created an environment in which corruption flourishes. As a result, the massive expenditures in infrastructure have not produced the significant follow-on investment that Ogundiya’s (2012) unbalanced growth strategy might have anticipated. Instead, infrastructure projects have been an easy target for the insurgent and a financial drain for the Nigerian government. The top-down nature of post-developmental transformation strategy might have contributed for its limited impact. Rather than focusing on grassroots community development and trust building, there has only been limited Nigerian input and participation. Consequently many of the investments undertaken have not been indigenous designed to respond to domestic demand within Nigerian markets. Further, bureaucratic fear of the anticorruption measures that are in effect has brought needed capital developmental plans to a halt.

The critical question is what can be done to break out of the current evil circle of corruption, federal government inefficiency, and pervasive unemployment which is trapping the Nigerian economy in a low growth path? Ochulor et al. (2011), for instance, have argued that the country’s current needs are so pressing that a significant share of oil revenues should be disbursed to the population immediately. Their tentative figure was that 32 percent of revenues is to be distributed. The logical argument against disbursing a large share of oil revenues directly to the public is whether the country can afford such a program, while a counter argument is that these projects have been a major source of corruption. Taking the money out of the hands of a corrupt political elite and giving it to the population is probably the most powerful anticorruption policy available today (Ochulor et al., 2011) – the policy of simply going after the bad guys has clearly failed. In contrast, a distribution scheme would help undermine two key elements contributing to the country’s massive corruption problem – the shadow economy and deficient social capital. With regard to the latter, currently one of the main stumbling blocks in uniting Nigeria is the ongoing controversy over the distribution of oil revenues, with each region not trusting the others to agree to a fair allocation. The direct distribution oil revenues would assist in overcoming this impediment, while eliminating one of the major impediments to improved trust.

Such a policy would provide an incentive to ordinary Nigerians to protect the country’s oil facilities by providing intelligence on insurgent groups attempting to disrupt the production and flow of oil (Ochulor et al., 2011). It might further help to quell the insurgency by allaying the fears of the Sunnis that they will suffer financially from the fact that most oil reserves are in the Niger Delta territories. Without an equitable distribution of oil revenues, the competition among various groups for oil money could turn ugly, and even erupt into conflict in Nigeria. Rift over oil revenues already run deep as Nigerians struggle for the control of the oil-rich Niger Delta region (Eme, 2010).

Distributing oil revenues directly to the public could also contribute to the formalization of a range of economic activities by creating an irrevocable personal identity under the law, and thus establishing the conditions for, inter alia, property rights and the registration for taxation, and could expand banking and credit access for small businesses. While not a panacea, the impact of such policy is likely to contribute to reducing the impact of corruption and stabilizing the economic environment in Nigeria. Unfortunately, as of early 2013, the Nigerian government has shown no interest in such a program – the country’s new oil law that will govern most aspects of the oil industry and is progressive in many key aspects surrounding the treatment of oil royalties, is completely silent on this issue (Babatope, 2008).

Conclusion

The role of culture in the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria has been documented in the foregoing discussion. It was argued that changes in the cultural values of the people contributed to the way and manner corruption is viewed in the country. Specifically, we argue that, against the cultural prescriptions, corruption has become something to be condoned and accommodated, and that this explains why corrupt people are no longer ashamed of themselves. If we argue that the menace of corruption has been heightened due to changes in the cultural behavior of the Nigerian people, then it follows logically that culture must also play a role in the solution to the scourge. A suggestion for cultural reorientation that will incorporate religious and traditional bodies in the country has been suggested. This will be a radical departure from the past official attempts that was soaked in politics and regime perpetuation.

In addition to cultural reorientation, it is pertinent to know that there is a lot of pessimism in the land on the prospects of corruption reduction and/or eradication. People tend to see corruption as something that can never end in Nigeria, due largely to its endemic nature in the Nigerian society. There is enough room for pessimism because corruption is supported by social structures and attitudes that are embedded in local ways of life and sentiments. While this is true, the truth, however, remains that the problem of corruption is surmountable. A demonstration of such concerted effort at eradication was the establishment of EFCC and ICPC. Although the successes of these anti-graft bodies have been limited, particularly in the last few years when the activities of EFCC have been slowed down, it is important to know that reasons for the failures of these bodies are located in the realm of politics, specifically, the lack of political will on the part of Nigerian leaders. By this logic, the successes recorded by the EFCC in the first 5 years of its existence ought to have given the people the hope that corruption is surmountable in the country.

The last point is the need for a strong and purposive leadership. The case of Nigeria is not really a dearth of anticorruption legislation. What is missing is the support of the political leadership. The argument here is that the emergence of a strong and transparent leader will take a new turn in the war against corruption. This is because when the right leaders merge, the anti-graft bodies will have a free hand to operate, and will be effective. Such a leader will also embark on cultural reorientation. This argument flows from the fact that earlier it had been crippled by official meddling, and the EFCC had become a most feared institution in Nigeria. Indeed, the fear of the EFCC was the beginning of wisdom in official circles in the country. But the exit of President Obasanjo marked the descent of the anti-graft body. Such a scenario was indeed possible with the right leaders.

Much has been made of the importance of moral leadership from the top, but this not sufficient. Too much moralizing risks degenerating into empty rhetoric or worse, witch hunts against political opponents. Policy must address the underlying conditions that create corrupt incentives, or it will have no long-lasting effects. Some scholars argue that the main cure for corruption in Nigeria is economic growth, and that economic growth is furthered by good policies in the hand of good government, especially the promotion of education (The Punch, 2008). However, that claim reflects an overly simple view of the roots of both economic growth and corruption. Particularly in Nigerian situations, policy recommendations that concentrate only on macroeconomic aggregates are pointless. No growth can occur unless institutions are restored to at least a minimal level of competency. Corruption is a symptom indicating that state–society relations are dysfunctional so that they undermine the legitimacy of the state and lead to wasteful public policies. Good policies are unlikely to be chosen or to be carried out effectively without honest institutions. The ordinary options for institutional reform fall into several broad categories: program redesign, policies that increase transparency and accountability, and, in severe cases, constitutional change. These will be needed in national development and progress in Nigeria, but sometimes they will not be sufficient, or even possible, because of the remaining levels of political instability and the weakness of institutions. I conclude with some recommendations that are more directly targeted at areas of development.

The first line of policy response is the redesign of programs to limit the underlying incentives for payoffs. This might mean eliminating highly corrupt programs, but, of course, the state cannot abandon its responsibilities in many areas where corruption is pervasive. One response is to limit official discretion by, for example, streamlining and simplifying regulations, expanding the supply of benefits, making eligibility criteria clear, introducing legal payments for services, giving officials overlapping jurisdictions to give citizens choices, or redesigning systems to limit delays. Political reformers should consider if cleanups in one area will just shift corruption to another part of the government. Programs may need to be comprehensive to have any impact. In addition, service delivery can be improved by civil service reforms that provide better salaries, improved monitoring, and the use of incentives.

The second collection of reform strategies focuses on the accountability and transparency of government actions. For example, a freedom-of-information law can give citizens access to government information, and many government decision-making processes should be open to public scrutiny and participation. Other options to improve accountability are the creation of independent oversight agencies and the use of external and internal benchmarks. Ongoing experiments with grassroots democracy need more study to determine their impact and their transferability to other contexts (Transparency International, 2013). Open government also depends upon rigorous and free media that can perform a watchdog function. Institutions, such as, Transparency International, can help create an environment in which multinationals limit their corrupt activities.

Third, Nigeria may need to consider more radical economic and political reforms in the government structure. Democracy is valuable for many reasons, but by itself, is hardly a cure for corruption. Some evidence suggests that presidential systems, above all those using proportional representation in the legislature, may be especially corrupt (Asaolu, 2013). Furthermore, elections are not sufficient. The state must protect civil liberties and establish the rule of law. Rules must be clear and fair and be administered competently and fairly. This implies an honest, professional and independent judiciary, and police and prosecutors who have integrity and competence. With these more conventional reform options as a background, what are the particular factors that must be considered in Nigeria polities? What can international bodies do beyond providing the Nigerian government options for creating a window of opportunity for reform? Each case is different, but here are some quite general suggestions.

Anticorruption and government reform efforts can either set the stage for more reforms or destabilize a fragile equilibrium (Sorkaa, 2002; The Punch, 2011). Thus, policymakers may be needed to create a space in which reform can occur. They can only do this, however, if they have the resources to operate effectively. They should pick their fights carefully to achieve some early and visible victories and to fit reform programs to the capacities of the country. Starting simple would benefit them a lot. For example, they should make sure that the primary systems of financial control inside the agencies are in place before creating secondary bodies, such as anticorruption commissions (Akinbi, 1999; Epele, 2006). Funds should not be simply poured without clear checks on their use. One option for experts is to use trust funds administer aid programs, with the ultimate goal of turning over the programs to the government.

Bodies both inside government agencies and independent of the executive for the administration of a freedom of information law, to audit and monitor government spending, etc should be created. The independence of prosecutors and courts should be strengthened. International technical assistance can aid programs, such as the creation of internal financial controls and independent agencies, the development of methods to incorporate public input, or the training of government personnel or media. Stress should be laid on the creation of systems to monitor public spending and policymaking in general, not just to control the disbursement of aid funds. These institutions are especially important in states, such as Nigeria, where the competition between political parties is weak. A case study of the country points out how the overlap of the state and political parties limits accountability and undermines both the nominally independent public bodies, such as, the judiciary and the institutions for the control of corruption (Adelekan, 2012; Akindele, 1990). Another example is the control of fuel subsidies in Nigeria. Losses of 53 percent of the total were controlled by hiring an independent auditor to deliver the funds to local marketers. This apparently cut loses but was itself expensive, costing the ministry 14 percent of the funds dispersed (Agbonifo, 1985).

More systematic study of interventions by the federal government is needed to see what works and what does not, including the gathering of baseline data, so that donors can track programs as they develop, as well as document progress and setbacks. At the state level, the federal government should work to develop stronger anticorruption controls on money laundering to make it more difficult for corrupt officials to export their gains. In addition, the focus on strengthening anticorruption institutions is rooted in the idea that weak formal institutions fuel corruption. However, as the case studies show, corruption in Nigeria is also the consequence of concomitant informal power structures that fuel and shape relationships of corruption. Such efforts to strengthen formal institutions are rarely accompanied by similar efforts to weaken or co-opt these informal structures, limiting the impact of anticorruption reforms, as highlighted in Nigeria.