Incentivizing Narcotics Control Through China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South and Southeast Asia

Abstract

The production and distribution of narcotics in many states in South and Southeast Asia present significant challenges for China. Several of these states receive foreign investments and assistance through China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including a division of the BRI called the Health Silk Road (HSR). China has an opportunity to motivate these states to strengthen their narcotics control measures by adding conditionality clauses in the BRI/HSR investment agreements with these states. The suggested clauses could mandate measures such as improving drug enforcement, decommissioning production sites and distributors, increasing harm reduction and rehabilitation services, and establishing citizen complaint systems for narcotics issues. To ensure compliance, disincentives should be activated for states failing to meet narcotics control conditions.

Keywords

Belt and Road Initiative Health Silk Road China South Asia Southeast Asia narcotics control narcoterrorism

Introduction

Foreign investment can have a significant impact on the production, distribution, use, and control of narcotics. On the one hand, foreign investment in a state’s pharmaceutical sector can enhance its ability to provide drug overdose reversal antidotes such as naloxone, opioid substitution therapy (OST), rapid testing services, and fentanyl test strips to individuals who overdose or are dependent on opioids. Additionally, foreign investment can improve a state’s capacity to enforce its narcotics control by providing narcotics control enforcement technology, equipment, education, and training. On the other hand, foreign investment in narcotics manufacturing and trafficking can exacerbate existing public health crises and expand user markets. In South and Southeast Asia, Chinese investors are involved in both forms of investment, creating a need for the Chinese government to prioritize the former and minimize the latter’s adverse effects.

The issue of narcotics in South and Southeast Asia is a growing concern for China. It impacts public health, contributes to terrorism financing, and undermines the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Most of the methamphetamine and heroin entering China originates from Southeast Asia, posing a substantial and harmful impact on the health of Chinese citizens (Felbab-Brown, 2022a; Zhang & Chin, 2016). Narcoterrorism has long been a problem in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Myanmar (Sen, 2016; Wani, 2022), and China needs to defend against this crossing its borders. Additionally, Belt and Road investments in South and Southeast Asian transportation have provided new avenues for narcotraffickers to distribute drugs regionally and internationally. China needs to combat reputational damage to the BRI derived from expanded narcotrafficking.

Chinese transportation development investments in South and Southeast Asia have become a magnet for criminal organizations, including cartels, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), militias, and other bad actors, who exploit them to traffic narcotics (International Crisis Group, 2020). If left unchecked, this could undermine China’s efforts to combat drug trafficking and damage the reputation of the BRI. Narcotraffickers may continue to prosper by exploiting BRI transportation infrastructure, which could lead to negative perceptions of China, the BRI, and its foreign development projects. Such perceptions could unfairly label China and the BRI as only concerned with profits, while overlooking the public health costs of drug trafficking. To combat this, China needs to take proactive measures to disrupt the nefarious use of BRI transportation infrastructure, which would enhance its antinarcotics diplomacy efforts (Felbab-Brown, 2022a).

China needs to take active measures to combat the production and distribution of chemical precursors used to make drugs such as methamphetamine and fentanyl. Most of these precursors are produced in China and then distributed by Chinese TCOs, including the Sam Gor cartel and other triads (Allard, 2019a; Pollard, 2022; The Asian Post, 2019a), to regional drug manufacturing hubs (Felbab-Brown, 2022b; Wang & Lassi, 2022; Wang et al., 2022). This illicit activity has been ongoing for decades, with Chinese chemical factories supplying significant amounts of methamphetamine precursors to cartels and militias in Southeast Asia. The precursors are typically transported to ports in Thailand and Myanmar before being taken overland to drug production sites in northeast Myanmar, Northern Thailand, and Western Laos (Allard, 2019b; Duangdee, 2021). In addition, China is also the primary source of fentanyl precursors used by Indian chemists and Mexican cartels to manufacture the drug responsible for the opioid overdose epidemic in the United States (CDC, 2022; Felbab-Brown, 2022a).

China needs to prioritize the control of regional narcotics production and use it to augment the influence of its BRI projects. One effective strategy could be to leverage the Health Silk Road (HSR) development projects. China should institute mandatory conditions for HSR investments in South and Southeast Asian countries grappling with significant narcotics-related issues. This requirement would ensure that these nations take concrete measures to enhance drug enforcement, dismantle drug manufacturing sites and distribution networks, expand harm reduction and rehabilitation initiatives, and establish effective systems for citizens to report narcotics-related activities. These requirements need to be detailed in HSR agreements/contracts between China and its partner states, with specific targets and benchmarks that must be met. Moreover, China should impose disincentives if these benchmarks are unmet, such as eliminating or reducing Chinese government-provided interest rate subsidies, accelerating interest/principal repayment, terminating projects during pre-lending stages, and prohibiting bids on future projects.

This article is composed of four parts: the introduction, resources and methods, the main body, and the conclusion. The main body consists of eight sections: narcotics production and distribution in South and Southeast Asia; the BRI and the HSR; foreign development banks and debtor reform; International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending conditionality as a guiding policy; feasibility studies, prior actions, and post-dispersal actions; BRI telecommunications development and online narcotics distribution; foreign drug enforcement assistance to fulfill narcotics conditions; and criticism of narcotics conditions in foreign development projects.

Resources and Materials

This article explores the challenges and potential benefits of incorporating narcotics control clauses into foreign development agreements. Specifically, it examines the use of such clauses in China’s HSR projects for South and Southeast Asian countries affected by the narcotics trade. The article also provides a detailed analysis of the impact of conditional lending in foreign development projects and reevaluates its efficacy when applied to narcotics conditionality in HSR projects. The materials and data examined were collected from PubMed, Google Scholar, LexisNexis, international organizations, legislative documents, and media reports.

The lending practices of numerous foreign development banks and related institutions were analyzed, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank), China Development Bank (CDB), China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure), IMF, and the World Bank Group (WBG). Reports from a variety of official regulatory bodies were reviewed, such as those from China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), National Supervisory Commission (NSC), State Council, Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), People’s Bank of China (PBOC), and the Belt and Road Portal; the European Parliament, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, The Gazette of Pakistan, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

Media reports were analyzed from news outlets such as the Xinhua News Agency, CGTN, Global Times, and Reuters. Economic, environmental, and social conditionality within foreign development lending was examined through reports provided by the World Wildlife Federation (WWF), Boston University Global Development Policy (GDP) Center, U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), ASEAN-China Centre, and the International Crisis Group (ICG). These resources were chosen according to their importance, reliability, publication date, and suitability in providing information on conditional lending for foreign development projects.

Narcotics Production and Distribution in South and Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is besieged by methamphetamine production. According to the UNODC (2022a), 2021 was a record year for meth seizures in East and Southeast Asia, with 172 tons of meth and over 1 billion meth tablets confiscated. This marks a nearly sevenfold increase in meth seized from a decade ago, wherein around 148 million tablets were confiscated (UNODC, 2022a). Much of this production occurs in Myanmar, but Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia increasingly produce and distribute substantial quantities of meth. For example, there were seizures of 200 million meth tablets in Myanmar’s Shan State in May 2020 (The Guardian, 2020), 33 million meth tablets and 500 kg of crystal meth in Laos in September 2022 (Bangkok Post, 2022), 300 kg of meth in Vietnam in 2019 (The Asian Post, 2019b), over 2 tons of ketamine, a potent illicit anesthetic, in Cambodia in 2021 (VOA, 2021), the list continues. Fentanyl is also being illicitly manufactured in Myanmar and mixed with more traditional drugs for distribution in Southeast Asia (Beech & Nang, 2020; Berlinger, 2019; DEA, 2020; Murray, 2020; UNODC, 2020). Massive meth busts and steady and falling market prices for meth in tablet and crystal form indicate that Southeast Asian production has skyrocketed (Parpart, 2022; The Economist, 2021). Falling prices expand the user market as more people find the drugs affordable, further threatening public health and straining medical and mental health systems.

South Asia, particularly Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran (the Golden Crescent region), are opium poppy cultivation and methamphetamine-producing powerhouses. Around 80% of the opium and heroin distributed globally is cultivated in Afghanistan (Kermani, 2021). Most exported Afghan opioids first stop in neighboring Pakistan and Iran, where it is redistributed to international destinations or broken up for domestic sales (UNODC, 2015). Hundreds of meth labs operate out of Afghanistan, primarily producing for global distribution (Kermani, 2021). Meth production is overtaking opium poppy cultivation in many areas of Afghanistan, mainly because Ephedra sinica, which contains vital ingredients for crystal meth, grows wild throughout about one-third of Afghanistan and is easily and freely harvested (Latifi, 2021).

In 2018, 200 kg of Afghani meth was confiscated; in 2019, 1.2 tons were seized (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2021a). Much like Afghan opioid distribution, most of this meth first stops in Pakistan and Iran, where it is bifurcated for international distribution or earmarked for domestic use (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2021a). Pakistan is the main transit point for Afghan narcotics (UNODC, 2015), wherein Pakistani officials confiscate approximately 29% of the total heroin and morphine seized worldwide (UNODC, 2022b).

Rounding out the Golden Crescent region is Iran, a country with a long history as a transit point for Afghan opium and heroin distribution (UNODC, 2015). Iran also manufactures and distributes significant quantities of meth for global distribution and domestic consumption. Approximately 111 Iranian meth labs were decommissioned in 2019 and 2020 (Klein, 2021). The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2021b) estimates that 761 tons of opium, 22 tons of heroin, and 17 tons of meth were seized in Iran between March 2019 and March 2020.

The Belt and Road Initiative and the Health Silk Road

China’s BRI, formally called “The Silk Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” is an amalgamation of Chinese foreign development projects designed to stimulate investment, international trade, and commercial cooperation. The 2015 BRI charter explains, “The Initiative is an ambitious vision of the opening-up and cooperation among countries along the Belt and Road…to improve the region’s infrastructure and put in place a secure and efficient network of land, sea and air passages, lifting their connectivity to a higher level” (Belt and Road Portal, 2015, s. III). The transportation sector of the BRI operates through two primary branches: the Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt. The former expands China’s reach to South and Southeast Asia and the wider maritime world by enhancing the capacity of ports and oceanic transportation. The latter focuses on improving highway and railroad infrastructure to boost overland trade. These transportation projects not only serve economic purposes but also have political and geostrategic implications, including securing allies and advancing soft power.

China is proactively forwarding medical and public health cooperation through a key component of the BRI—the HSR. By leveraging the HSR, China is fostering greater collaboration and assistance among partner nations, with a focus on bolstering medical aid, promoting infrastructure development such as hospitals and research centers, enhancing health systems and information technology, advancing pharmaceutical research and development, improving global health security, preventing diseases, facilitating information sharing, and promoting medical education. Two events culminated in the inception of the HSR. First, in December 2015, China’s National Health and Family Planning Commission released a formal 3-year plan for the BRI to establish or strengthen cooperative mechanisms with Belt and Road partner states in infectious disease prevention and control, medical infrastructure development, cultivating medical professionals, medical aid assistance in emergencies, the study of traditional medicine, and health systems development (NHFPC, 2015).

Then, on June 2016, China’s President Xi Jinping referred to the HSR during a diplomatic speech in Uzbekistan, pledging to “deepen cooperation in medical care and health, strengthen win-win cooperation in the alert of communicable diseases, disease prevention and control, medical assistance and traditional medicine, and build a Silk Road for health” (The State Council Information Office, 2016, para. 9). China has since concluded numerous health cooperation agreements with South and Southeast Asian HSR partner states, such as Myanmar, Iran, Indonesia, and Afghanistan (Gupta & Singh, 2020; Kyaw, 2021). In January 2017, China, operating under the umbrella of the BRI, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the WHO on health cooperation to “improve both the health level and health industries of China and other countries along the Belt and Road” (Guoxiu, 2018, para. 2). Also, in 2017, China concluded communiqués advancing cooperation with The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (NHC, 2017). Based on these agreements and others, dozens of significant health exchange and cooperation projects have been implemented under the HSR. For example, China and Iran established the China–Iran Innovation Center to advance frontier medical technologies (Financial Tribune, 2019), and China provided the Iranian military medical materials to protect against COVID-19 (Xinhua, 2020).

Among the three central Chinese policy banks: the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank), CDB, and the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), the China Exim Bank and CDB are the principal lenders for BRI and HSR development projects (the ADBC primarily lends for domestic agricultural purposes). China Exim Bank and CDB have been authorized to facilitate international investment and trade through low- or no-interest loans on foreign development projects, covering a broad range of sectors such as transportation (including roads, railways, and ports), energy (such as oil and gas pipelines), mining (including cobalt, copper, uranium, iron ore, gold, and coal), medical infrastructure, and technology development (Khan & Khan, 2019). The AIIB, a Chinese-steered multilateral foreign development bank, is also involved in Chinese foreign development lending. The AIIB operates under the management policy of several other multilateral development banks, wherein the most significant contributor, in this case, China, makes many of the critical policy and lending decisions. These banks are vital to HSR development lending and other assistance.

China’s foreign development investments, primarily within the BRI, are comparable to those of the WBG. According to data from Ray and Simmons (2020), the WBG offered $467 billion in foreign development loans between 2008 and 2019. China’s major policy lenders, the China Exim Bank and the CDB, issued $462 billion in foreign development loans during the same period.

The China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) is vital in facilitating BRI investment projects. As China’s primary state-funded export credit agency, Sinosure ensures many foreign development projects. Chinese foreign development banks and companies investing in foreign equity and debt rely on Sinosure for insurance services. Sinosure has an impressive track record, having provided insurance to over 240,000 entities from 2001 to 2021, with payouts totaling around US $17.85 billion (Sinosure, 2022). It is worth noting that Sinosure has a risk threshold for foreign development projects, and if this threshold is exceeded, they will not insure the project. In such cases, banks usually discontinue lending and project planning. As such, Sinosure acts as an indispensable pre-lending governing arm for BRI investments.

Foreign Development Banks and Debtor Reform

Foreign development banks significantly shape recipient countries’ economic, social, and environmental formation in exchange for low-interest-rate loans and other foreign assistance. In addition to standard conditions for loan repayment, such as interest rates and penalties for default, foreign development banks frequently require phased policy reforms that are evaluated over a long period. These reforms are initiated before loan disbursement and continue throughout the loan’s life. While economic reforms are the primary concern for major foreign development banks due to their profit-oriented nature, they prioritize interests beyond profit acquisition. Development banks often work collaboratively with lending states, intergovernmental institutions, and NGOs and may condition foreign development loans on a range of social and environmental issues, such as economic liberalization, privatization, education improvement, social safety programs for vulnerable populations, pollution control, and biodiversity preservation.

The WBG, primarily through its freestanding lenders, the International Development Association and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, frequently requires loan recipients to improve transparency and accountability in public finance, strengthen social safeguards, and promote private sector growth. In 2017, loan recipients from the World Bank were expected to meet an average of 9.6 “prior action” conditions per lending event (European Network on Debt and Development, 2019).

The IMF is the primary financial and lending body of the United Nations and is widely known as the “lender of last resort” because it focuses on providing emergency lending to states experiencing significant crises. The IMF frequently imposes prior action conditions, including financial consistency, budgeting, fiscal responsibility, and standard loan repayment terms. The IMF sets “indicative targets” to ensure timely loan repayment and revenue collection after loan dispersal and “structural benchmarks” that entail more complex expectations for social safeguards, transparency, and accountability in public finances (IMF, 2022).

Chinese foreign development banks, including China Exim Bank, CDB, and the Chinese-led multilateral development bank, AIIB, have historically focused on economic reform, repayment capacity, and trade considerations while largely disregarding social and environmental issues among foreign debtors (Prtoric, 2022). However, the Chinese lending model is evolving, with development banks increasingly prioritizing green finance and sustainability incentivization. As a result, these banks have begun to condition domestic and foreign development loans on environmental and green energy reforms. Recipient states and companies are incentivized to lower pollution emissions, increase environmental and biodiversity protections, increase their use of sustainable energy sources such as solar and wind, and engage in energy conservation practices (China Development Bank, 2017; Choi et al., 2020; PBOC, 2019). In 2021, China’s central bank, the PBOC, issued a lending package called the “carbon emission reduction facility” (PBOC, 2021), which, through low-cost lending to financial institutions, incentivizes energy savings, clean energy (primarily reductions in carbon emissions among core industries), environmental protections, and new-energy technologies (The State Council, 2021).

Financial disincentives are sometimes activated for entities failing to meet environmental conditions, such as losing Chinese government-provided interest rate subsidization and terminating lending relationships during prior action lending phases (Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China, 2022). For example, in 2022, China Exim Bank discontinued plans to finance a major coal-fired power plant in Bosnia and Herzegovina despite years of planning and preparation. The Commission for Concessions determined that a Russian-owned company central to the project failed to meet certain obligations and was repeatedly challenged by environmental NGOs (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2022; Prtoric, 2022; Republika Srpska, 2021).

Chinese state owned or controlled foreign development banks fund the infrastructure and other development projects of HSR partner states, often offering low- or zero-interest loans through Chinese government-provided interest rate subsidization. These loans are distributed to debtor domestic banks by the recipient governments, which oversee the lending for specific aspects of the projects. The debtor’s central government typically remains liable through guarantees. To complete development projects, the Chinese government sometimes allocates funding to train foreign banks in financial management, accountability, and supervision. In many cases, negotiations between Chinese foreign development banks and loan recipients result in agreements that direct capital to Chinese companies with overseas business interests rather than debtor domestic banks to build the infrastructure or provide other services.

For instance, Chinese construction companies have built railways, independently or jointly with recipient state companies, as part of BRI development projects in Pakistan (Reuters, 2015), Tanzania (Oirere, 2021), Indonesia (Taipei Times, 2015), Bangladesh (Zhou, 2016), among others. Under these circumstances, construction financing remains primarily between Chinese foreign development banks and Chinese companies (e.g., China Railway Group, China Railway Construction Corp., and China Railway International Co. Ltd.), with the recipient states repaying the total cost. Whether HSR funding is distributed among the recipient states’ domestic banks or to Chinese companies for infrastructure, technology, or other forms of development, narcotics conditions should apply similarly.

IMF Lending Conditionality as a Guiding Policy

The IMF typically prioritizes economic reforms as a precondition for lending. Such reforms enhance the debtor’s ability to recover from financial or economic crises and repay loans. The IMF also employs lending conditions for other non-financial sectors, examples of which provide precedents for narcotics conditions in HSR projects. The IMF sometimes requires that potential recipients institute legal and criminal justice reforms, or funding will be adjusted or denied. This includes “legal reforms (e.g., new civil code, bankruptcy laws, judicial system reforms); general anti-corruption measures (e.g., declarations of income sources for politicians, publishing tenders online); combating economic crimes (e.g., anti-money laundering laws, reforms against the financing of terrorism)…” (IMF Monitor, 2022, Sec. Institutional Reforms). Case examples include conditions for criminalizing electricity theft in the Dominican Republic, establishing commercial courts in Gambia, and enacting bankruptcy law in Latvia (IMF Monitor, 2022). The IMF also conditions loans on reforms involving public health, education, housing, and social safeguards. This includes controlling the retail price of maize meal in Zimbabwe and reforming health ministries in Haiti (IMF Monitor, 2022).

The IMF has highlighted the importance of loan recipients establishing statistical authorities to generate statistical measures of their economic conditions and collect demographic and social information (IMF, 2022). In many South and Southeast Asian drug-producing countries, there is a dearth of reliable data on critical issues such as domestic drug use, overdose deaths, HIV and HCV prevalence among drug users, and the quality and effectiveness of drug rehabilitation services (Hrishikesh, 2023). For example, data on drug use and rehabilitation in Pakistan is limited. The Nation (2020, para. 1) explains,

The Ministry of Narcotics Control, being lead department mandated to end the menace of narcotics in the country, and other state institutions apparently lack the capacity and will to compile fresh data on drug users in Pakistan as the last such exercise was held more than seven years ago in 2012.

Without accurate statistical measures, officials may incorrectly assess the number of harm reduction and rehabilitation services required to address drug-related issues. Moreover, detailed data on drug use and overdoses enable law enforcement to identify geographic hotspots that are most susceptible to drug overdoses (Des Jarlais et al., 2019). This information can help governments provide targeted medical services, drug awareness messaging, overdose reversal antidotes such as naloxone, and other harm reduction and rehabilitation options to minimize public health crises. Therefore, detailed data collection on crucial drug-related variables should be a central clause in HSR agreements for improving harm reduction and rehabilitation programs.

Feasibility Studies, Prior Actions, and Post-dispersal Actions

In feasibility studies, lenders, insurance agencies, governments, and consultants produce reports assessing the feasibility of potential foreign development projects, information of which is used to acquire access to credit and ensure projects. Feasibility studies identify ideal lending scenarios for prospective recipients and form a financial scaffolding for selecting appropriate lenders for different segments of projects. They incorporate primary and secondary data sources, complex and project-specific technical and engineering reports, and rigorous cost and benefit analyses (Green Climate Fund, 2019). Pistilli (2022, para. 10) explains the exacting nature of feasibility studies, “Feasibility studies cover many important points, including economic, legal, operational and scheduling issues…and feature information about the technical feasibility of a project, as well as how much it will cost, whether it’s in accordance with the law…” The results of these studies must be attuned to the recipient states’ actual conditions and requirements. Otherwise, projects may experience more extensive, costly, or fatal complications later in the lending, construction, or operations processes.

When conducting feasibility studies for HSR development projects in states recognized for their narcotics production and distribution, it is essential to thoroughly examine all aspects of the narcotics trade. This includes analyzing production levels, distribution networks, drug use, overdose death rates, law enforcement efforts, supervisory and anticorruption divisions, darknet activity, and citizens’ complaints and reporting systems. Additionally, it is important to consider harm reduction and rehabilitation services available in the region. Once all relevant information is gathered, clauses should be included in agreements and contracts to address these concerns.

After determining the feasibility of a project and identifying the relevant stakeholders, pre-lending reforms, also known as prior actions, are typically implemented. These reforms serve as a way for banks to assess the prospective recipient’s ability to meet the necessary lending conditions before any loans are distributed. As part of the prior action phase, potential recipients are expected to initiate necessary reforms and make any required changes before loan processing can proceed. Loans are only provided if the reforms are deemed satisfactory. Failure to reform or meet predetermined obligations during both the prior action and post-loan dispersal phases may result in increased interest rates on loans, accelerated interest or principal repayments, or even project termination (Prtoric, 2022).

During the post-loan dispersal phase, foreign development banks assess the recipient’s progress in fulfilling the conditions set during the loan repayment period. While loans are unlikely to be terminated for failure to comply with relatively peripheral narcotics conditions at this stage, significant punitive actions may still be imposed. Loan interest rates and repayment schedules may be adjusted to encourage compliance and ensure the conditions are followed as agreed upon.

BRI Telecommunications Development and Online Narcotics Distribution

Established in 2015, the “Digital Silk Road” is a division of the BRI covering telecommunications and information technology cooperation and development among BRI partner states. The Chinese government’s 2015 BRI charter describes how China and BRI partner states should prioritize cooperative efforts to increase internet access, “We should jointly advance the construction of cross-border optical cables and other communications networks…and create an Information Silk Road…to expand information exchanges and cooperation” (Belt and Road Portal, 2015, s. IV). While increased internet connectivity can provide significant benefits to developing states, China and notable BRI partner states known for narcotics production and distribution should also prepare for specific side effects.

One such consequence is the increased occurrence of online narcotics trafficking, mainly through illicit online marketplaces collectively known as the Dark Web. These markets are not accessible through regular search engines and require advanced anonymization and encryption software. Transactions are also carried out using cryptocurrency, making them difficult to trace (Bhaskar et al., 2019). Militias, cartels, and other narcotics dealers often use the Dark Web to market and distribute narcotics. International buyers, including gangs, distributors, and individual users, purchase illegal drugs on the Dark Web, which are typically shipped via air mail or express consignment carrier to international destinations (Westhoff, 2019).

For decades, Chinese, Pakistani, and Iranian dealers have exploited traditional internet channels and the Dark Web to sell extreme quantities of methamphetamine, synthetic opioids, and other narcotics internationally (Chauhan, 2021; Westhoff, 2019). Narcotics conditions within HSR development projects should include establishing or strengthening law enforcement divisions dedicated to prosecuting the marketing and distribution of narcotics online. Law enforcement units specializing in telecommunications should be established to locate domestic narcotics dealers operating online, track them to central distributors, and from the distributors to the manufacturers for neutralization.

For example, the United States has separate divisions dedicated to prosecuting different narcotics sold on the Dark Web, such as the DEA’s HIDTA Tactical Diversion Squad and the FBI’s Criminal Opioid Darknet Enforcement Team (J-CODE). The J-CODE unit has confiscated around 42 million dollars and 800 kg of narcotics and apprehended over 300 Dark Web narcotraffickers since its inception in 2018 (Hernandez, 2022). As internet development is a principal source of Chinese foreign development cooperation, establishing or strengthening drug enforcement divisions to combat the exploitation of online channels should be a condition within HSR projects.

Foreign Drug Enforcement Assistance to Fulfill Narcotics Conditions

In many cases, recipient states have the capacity to enhance their drug enforcement efforts and combat the illicit narcotics trade. However, they may choose not to do so for political or financial reasons. Often, politicians may hesitate to challenge powerful tribal groups, warlords, or militias that benefit from the drug trade. Furthermore, government officials may gain significant revenue from narcotics through formal or informal checkpoints, bribery, or other forms of taxation, thus supporting newly formed, struggling, incompetent, or corrupt regimes (Marhoon, 2020). For example, the Taliban regime, although supposedly minimizing domestic opium poppy cultivation as part of state policy in 2021 (Fazli, 2022), collects 200 million to 400 million USD in annual revenue by taxing poppy farmers, methamphetamine manufacturers, and narcotics distributors (Dawi, 2022; UNODC, 2008). According to the U.S. Inspector General for Afghanistan, up to 60% of the Taliban’s annual revenue is derived from illicit drugs (IGA, 2018).

Officials in Pakistan also have a long history of exploiting the drug trade. For decades, the Pakistani security establishment (law enforcement and military) has benefited financially from narcotics, regularly distributing opium, heroin, and other drugs, primarily imported from Afghanistan, to bankroll operations and for personal enrichment (Chandran, 1998). Pakistani law enforcement officials have “Direct involvement and protection of drug-related activities (involves kickbacks paid to senior officers to continue working in high drug-producing areas)” (Malik & Qureshi, 2021, pp. 1447–1448).

Myanmar’s military junta, acquiring power in a 2021 military coup, is hesitant to crack down on opium poppy cultivation and meth production in Myanmar’s isolated and mountainous Shan state for fear of antagonizing an assortment of powerful militias/armies, which heavily depend on narcotics production to exist (Butler, 2021). For officials in Myanmar to combat narcotics production in these politically complex and volatile areas is to risk social and economic instability and political overthrow.

For governments or officials wanting to implement narcotics reforms but are hamstrung by powerful domestic entities, fulfilling narcotics conditions in HSR projects offers a pretense for change. Agostino (2008, p. 1695) explains, “Conditionality may provide political cover for structural changes, which otherwise would not be carried out.”

In cases where recipient states lack the financial means to decommission drug production sites and implement effective harm reduction and rehabilitation programs, but are willing to reform, China and international organizations should negotiate funding for drug enforcement operations. This funding should cover training, technology, materials, and other necessary resources as part of HSR development agreements. Bilateral or multilateral law enforcement cooperation can also be established to assist economically stressed or unprepared recipient states. Such measures can ease the burden on recipient states and enhance their ability to combat drug trafficking effectively.

Bilateral and multilateral antinarcotics cooperation between Chinese and Southeast Asian drug enforcement agencies has been sporadic. China has contributed to the cause by providing law enforcement equipment such as boats, weapons, gear, and surveillance technology to monitor and dismantle Southeast Asian drug manufacturing and distribution networks. One example of a successful joint operation was in 2021 when Chinese and Cambodian drug enforcement agencies teamed up to shut down numerous large-scale illicit drug manufacturers and confiscated 2.95 tons of narcotics (Global Times, 2022). Additionally, monthly joint patrols conducted along the Mekong River by China, Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos have demonstrated the potential of a larger-scale effort with the appropriate incentives. Although these patrols have limited reach and intensity, they have reportedly helped to reduce narcotics trafficking and other criminal activity in the region (Xinhua, 2019).

China often protects its foreign development investments on-site; this includes cooperative law enforcement and security efforts with recipient states. Eder et al. (2017, p. 3) explain why protection is necessary:

The exposure of Chinese nationals and assets is especially acute in Eurasia and Pakistan where China promotes transnational connectivity through its “Belt and Road Initiative” along the old Silk Road. Recent attacks on the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and several Chinese-led infrastructure projects in Pakistan highlight these security risks.

In addition to protecting infrastructure projects and the attached Chinese staff, China provides law enforcement training for BRI partner states. For example, in 2018, 30 Kenyan police officers underwent railway-based law enforcement training in China (Zheng & Lagat, 2018). The objective was to better protect Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway, the centerpiece of China’s infrastructure development in East Africa. The Shandong Police College in Jinan, Shandong Province, also holds annual training sessions for African law enforcement officials, where Chinese and African law enforcement form a “platform for the sharing of experience, strengthening co-operation, coordination and mutual assistance on counter-terrorism issues” (African Union, 2014, para. 3). From 2016 to 2020 the Yunnan Police College in Kunming provided law enforcement training and academic degrees to police from ASEAN and other countries (ASEAN-China Centre, 2016).

China also offers anti-corruption training and seminars on bribery and asset recovery to foreign officials from BRI partner states (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and State Supervision, 2020; Tower & Staats, 2020). Chinese-led drug enforcement cooperation falls under the category of what the Chinese National Public Security International Cooperation Work Conference referred to as “Law enforcement and [international] security cooperation with Chinese characteristics” (Xinhua, 2017, para. 4). China should strengthen and expand these preexisting programs and law enforcement relationships to aid states in fulfilling narcotics conditions.

ASEAN and China also engage in regional cooperation to reduce narcotics through the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) initiative. Emmers (2007, p. 522) explains the value of ACCORD in combating narcotics in Southeast Asia, “It includes a functional approach to cooperation by concentrating on the sharing of information and best practices, the creation of communication networks among specialized agencies, as well as the promotion of better coordination.” ASEAN and ACCORD should assist in facilitating compliance with narcotics conditions. Many states are hesitant to participate in significant and extended bilateral law enforcement operations on their domestic territory. Therefore, assistance from intergovernmental and regional organizations can help allay concerns and facilitate effective anti-narcotics operations.

Pakistan, as the first stop for over 45% of the Afghan opium and heroin exported internationally (UNODC, 2013), is a central narcotics distribution hub. However, Pakistan’s narcotics enforcement is weak and corrupt (Abbas, 2011; Anderson & Khan, 1994; Sharma, 2022), enabling the import and export of extreme quantities of opioids and methamphetamine (George & Warrick, 2022). Moreover, Pakistan lacks harm reduction services for its sizeable population of opioid users (George & Warrick, 2022; Shabbir, 2018; The Express Tribune, 2015). Pakistan is also a leading recipient of Chinese foreign investments (The State Council, 2022), rendering it a key candidate for narcotics conditions in HSR agreements. Pakistani drug law has provisions allowing, provided Pakistani requests or acquiesces, other states to assist in drug enforcement cooperation with Pakistan. Chapter VIII, Section 56 of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act (1997) explains:

(2) The Federal Government may—

(a) make requests on behalf of Pakistan to the appropriate authority of a foreign State for mutual legal assistance in any investigation commenced, or proceeding instituted, in Pakistan relating to an offence committed, or suspected on reasonable grounds to have been committed, under Chapter II of this Act…

As Pakistan’s trusted “all-weather” partner and “iron friend,” these provisions and the potential for bilateral narcotics cooperation are most applicable to China (The Economic Times, 2014).

Criticism of Narcotics Conditions in Foreign Development Projects

Lending conditionality that imposes on other states’ social, political, or legal functions can compromise state sovereignty and self-determination, potentially weakening political institutions and leading to social and political instability. Foreign development banks and accompanying insurers often require debtors to implement economic reforms, which is understandable since these reforms increase the likelihood of loan repayment. However, expectations for both financial and social reforms can lead to social volatility when citizens resist social change, reject foreign dictates, and question their politicians’ leadership capabilities. Additionally, economically disadvantaged citizens and those on the fringes of society may experience increased destabilization when state equilibriums are disrupted through social or legal reforms.

Conclusion

The NDRC, China’s central macroeconomic policy planning agency, approves foreign development projects. The NDRC’s (2022, sec. 5) foreign investment responsibilities include “conducting overseas investment and achieving an aggregate balance and optimizing structure; to play a leading role in implementing the Belt and Road Initiative, and undertake and coordinate China’s ‘go global’ strategy.” This commission catalogs sensitive industries and other factors requiring consideration when entities seek approval for foreign development projects. The NDRC (2022, sec. 18(1)) collaborates with the Ministry of Commerce in “drafting and jointly releasing the…Catalog for the Guidance of Industries for Foreign Investment….” Candidate foreign development projects are separated into three categories: prohibited, restricted, and encouraged (Tower & Staats, 2020). Prohibited foreign investments threaten China’s national security, treaty obligations, or moral standards (e.g., pornography and gambling). Restricted foreign investments, which involve sensitive land and environmental issues, projects in war zones, and other potentially risky or problematic issues, require special approval from the NDRC. Narcotics-linked states receiving HSR investments or other development assistance, such as Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, should automatically be classified as “restricted,” allowing the NDRC to set narcotics conditions and coordinate the implementation and maintenance of narcotics reforms.

Proposed conditions for HSR agreements/contracts should include decommissioning all known illicit drug production sites, distributors, and online marketplaces, as identified by third-party regulatory entities; reducing the land used for narcotics cultivation, such as opium poppy, by specific proportions; prosecuting all illicit drug manufacturers and distributors impartially, professionally, rigorously, and following international standards and protocols (CAT, 1984; UNODC, 1961); expanding training for domestic drug enforcement agencies to meet or approach international standards; enforcing policies to prevent foreign narcotics manufacturers and narcotraffickers from entering the country; opening communication channels to share narcotics intelligence and coordinate regional drug enforcement efforts; establishing statistical authorities to measure drug-related issues; establishing harm reduction services for domestic drug users, including OST, opioid overdose reversal antidotes (naloxone), HIV testing services, drug awareness messaging, medically based detoxification units in jails/prisons, among others; establishing voluntary, compassionate, and evidence-based drug rehabilitation services for domestic drug users; instituting functioning and anonymous narcotics-related citizen complaint and reporting systems; and establishing or strengthening supervisory, disciplinary, and anti-corruption divisions modeled on entities such as China’s NSC (2022), England’s Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC, 2022) or His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and First and Rescue Services (HMICFRS, 2022), Australia’s Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission (IBAC, 2022), or Ontario’s Special Investigations Unit (SIU, 2022).

China should adopt a strict zero-tolerance drug policy toward foreign officials involved in HSR development projects. This should encompass all aspects of a project, including finances, construction, management, day-to-day operations, and regulation. It is crucial that anyone involved in these projects, in any official capacity, and found to have connections with militias, cartels, insurgents, narcoterrorism, or anyone engaged in narcotics production or distribution, will be swiftly and decisively removed from their position following a thorough and independent investigation. Additionally, they should be permanently prohibited from participating in any future HSR projects. If partner states fail to take appropriate action against narcotics-connected officials, financial disincentives should be imposed to ensure compliance with this policy.

Narcotics conditions within HSR projects should be made public to HSR partner state populations by Chinese foreign development banks. In addition to this, as part of China’s ongoing transparency reforms, there should be a continued effort to provide comprehensive transparency training to its state-owned enterprises and associated agencies involved in foreign development projects. It is also important to establish similar transparency training programs for HSR partner states receiving development investments from China (Tower & Staats, 2020).

The production and trafficking of narcotics in South and Southeast Asia have multifaceted impacts on China, including detrimental effects on its public health, safety, and global reputation. These activities also provide financial support to insurgents and terrorists, further compounding the effects. In addition, China faces accusations of illicit fentanyl production and distribution, underscoring the importance of regional counter-narcotics diplomacy. China can incorporate antidrug clauses in its existing HSR agreements without waiting for new development projects. Foreign development projects are often complex and require renegotiations at various stages of production, making it possible to include such clauses in the earliest possible renegotiation. While clauses within renegotiations may be limited, these narcotics control conditions can still serve as a meaningful step, albeit in abbreviated form. In conclusion, incorporating antidrug clauses in HSR agreements can help protect China’s interests and reduce the impact of narcotics production and distribution throughout South and Southeast Asia.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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