Abstract
In this article, first of all, I point out the difference I perceive between the conception of social freedom Honneth delineates in Freedom’s Right and the one, inspired by the proto-socialists’ principle of fraternity, that I see operating in The Idea of Socialism (section I). Then, I discuss the advisability of envisaging the future socialist society, as Honneth does, in terms of a ‘fraternal coexistence’, in which a benevolent and fraternal attitude should guide everyone’s actions towards others (section II). Finally, I sketch out a conception that, in being compatible with Honneth’s idea of ‘social freedom’, does not need to rely on the decidedly substantive element of fraternity: thereby, it may prove itself more feasible and potentially attractive to the subjects of complex, pluralistic societies (section III).
I Social freedom in Freedom’s Right and in The Idea of Socialism
It is a great honour for me to present to Axel Honneth my reflections on his latest book, The Idea of Socialism; for this reason, I thank Professor Honneth and all the organizers of this seminar. I wish to start by saying that the objections I raise in this article, as well as my own proposal, are not aimed at denying the validity of Honneth’s project; rather, they are meant as a possible contribution to the ‘experimental research’ on the forms of a renewed socialism for which Honneth, in The Idea of Socialism, calls upon citizens and scholars.
In The Idea of Socialism, Axel Honneth aims at restoring the critical and normative potential of the socialist perspective: He wants to show that socialism, if adequately re-actualized, can still prove itself a valid alternative to a capitalism which has not stopped generating social suffering and severe inequalities. To recover the normative potentialities of the socialist tradition, Honneth gets back to the ‘original idea of socialism’ developed by proto-socialist authors such as Owen, Fourier, Proudhon and Saint Simon. The works of the first socialists, he observes, abound with references to the normative principles of freedom, equality and – most of all – fraternity affirmed in the French Revolution. 1 These principles, although proclaimed in legislations and declarations, at the times of their writing had been (and still are) only realized in a distorted and incomplete way: Freedom, up to today, in the capitalistic society is mainly conceived as the right of an individual to pursue his own profit; equality is limitedly understood as equality before the law; and fraternity’s place has been taken over by competition and individualism. The first socialists’ normative proposals, therefore, were aimed at ‘overcoming the individualism of capitalistic freedom and making it reconcilable with the demand for fraternity;’ 2 a goal that still characterizes Honneth’s re-actualization of socialism.
In this respect, it seems to me that, in The Idea of Socialism, Honneth bases his perspective on a fairly modified version of the concept of ‘social freedom’ that, while still advocating for a reformed capitalism, he had introduced in his 2011 book Freedom’s Right.
In Freedom’s Right, Honneth defined social freedom as a relational kind of freedom, taking place every time individuals voluntarily cooperate for common ends which require everyone’s cooperative action and whose results benefit everyone. 3 Individuals, in the spheres of social freedom (Honneth identifies as such the spheres of affective personal relationships, the market and democracy), are committed to the other’s well-being because they see the obligations associated with their social roles ‘as something that corresponds to the realization of their own aims, needs or interests’. 4 Every subject recognizes others as partners of a common enterprise in which, through cooperation for common ends, one can at the same time realize one’s own good and the good of others. The subjects’ awareness of their mutual dependence, and their commitment towards common ends, derive here from an institutionally mediated Bildung: thanks to the social institutions of cooperation and the Bildung they originate, ‘the ego can see an element of the external world in the strivings of its partners in interaction – an element that allows it to implement its autonomous aims objectively’. 5
In The Idea of Socialism, we do not find precisely the same concept of social freedom that Honneth expounded in Freedom’s Right: in his most recent book, he combines the idea of social freedom with the principle of fraternity deriving from his reconstruction of the proto-socialist perspectives. It is now a mutual disposition of fraternity, sympathy and benevolence that should lead subjects to cooperate with an attitude of concern for each other’s needs: ‘social freedom […] means taking part in the social life of a community whose members are so sympathetic to each other that they support the realization of each other’s justified needs for each other’s sake’ 6 (‘um des jeweils anderem willen’, in the original German edition). 7 Here, the focus of the individuals’ actions is directly, and from the start, the other subject.
Briefly: in Freedom’s Right, the driving force behind the individuals’ reflexive cooperation was the integrating, coordinating and ‘objective’ role of social institutions. Honneth centred his idea of social freedom on the coordinating role of institutions and on their capacity to bring every person to learn that society is a matter of reciprocal contribution. In The Idea of Socialism, instead, this place is taken by the presence in every individual of fraternal dispositions towards others. These dispositions are a ‘necessary condition’ 8 (in the German edition, ‘notwendige Voraussetzung’ and, in another occurrence, ‘notwendige Bedingung’) 9 for the actualization of social freedom.
‘Socialism, therefore, has always been based on the notion of a communitarian life-form’, 10 of a ‘community of solidarity’, 11 of a ‘fraternal coexistence’ 12 (‘brüderliches Zusammenleben’) 13 founded on the subjects’ dispositions of mutual sympathy and benevolence towards their fellow beings. It is beyond doubt, I think, that in The Idea of Socialism, we find a more substantive and communitarian conception than the one expounded in Freedom’s Right.
Here, unfortunately, I cannot go into detail with respect to the overall structuring of Honneth’s socialist proposal. Suffice to say that, in my opinion, the perspective Honneth expounds in The Idea of Socialism presents some very valuable aspects. First of all, it courageously attempts at imagining a social reality different from the capitalistic one, without receding in front of the undeniable practical and theoretical difficulties connected to this aim. Honneth, indeed, calls upon citizens and scholars for a common enterprise of reflection on the theoretical and practical forms of the socialism to come. Second, Honneth’s perspective resolutely brings front stage the finalistic dimension of politics: Politics is not only about determining the most efficient ways to achieve ends that have been already assumed as natural and necessary; rather, in the first instance, it concerns the collective decisions on how we want to live and which ends we wish to pursue in order to live better. Honneth, finally, sketches a form of deeply democratic socialism, attempting thereby to find the difficult conciliation between the requisites of pluralistic democracy and the extremely substantive principles of socialism.
In a sympathetic spirit with the project of a re-actualization of socialism, I will now raise some objections to Honneth’s perspective, concerning what appears to me as the hyper-substantivation of the idea of social freedom resulting from its conjunction with the principle of fraternity; I will then formulate a proposal that, while inspired by Honneth’s conception, at the same time modifies some of its relevant features.
II Objections to Honneth’s socialist ‘fraternal coexistence’
According to Honneth, one of the original defects of socialism is its determinist philosophy of history. In order to rescue the socialist idea from this untenable perspective, he adopts, on Dewey’s wake, a methodology of historical experimentalism based on the idea of ‘experimentally testing the spaces necessary for the realization of targeted transformations’. 14 In today’s capitalistic societies, writes Honneth, lie unexpressed potentials of cooperation, free communication and solidarity, which can be gradually realized by the individuals themselves in a historical process of ‘liberation from barriers to communication’. 15 By recourse to the method of historical experimentalism, it becomes possible to bridge the gap between the current capitalistic society, characterized by the forms of merely instrumental cooperation but also by potentials of cooperation and solidarity, and the idea of a solidary socialist society. To the extent that subjects explore, realize and concretely experiment new solidary and cooperative relationships, reciprocal dispositions of sympathy and benevolence can establish themselves in society. These dispositions, Honneth states, are able to ‘remove all the negative aspects of capitalist society. If subjects practice mutual sympathy, they will necessarily treat each other as equals and thus refrain from exploiting or instrumentalizing each other in any way’. 16
At a first glance, all this looks very appealing. Some objections, however, can be addressed at the idea of a socialist society resting so deeply on the diffusion of dispositions of fraternity and benevolence. These objections concern (a) the subjects’ relational well-being; (b) the feasibility of the socialist project and (c) its theoretical solidity. Honneth’s proposal has the advantage of implying reassuring, ‘warm’ social relationships. Everyone knows their needs are met with the other subjects’ benevolence and, on the basis of the fraternal attitude they share with them, can find delight not only in being helped, but also in helping others. On the other hand, subjects who do not manage to, or do not want to, develop the (extremely substantive) ethical dispositions requested by the model, would likely find themselves more or less excluded from society. Arguably, moreover, large-scale learning processes can model the deepest dispositions of the individuals only within certain limits. Many more factors, closer to the subjects’ emotional sphere, concur in moulding individual ethical orientations: the variability of individual life stories, the reactions of different subjects to contingent experiences, the personal fortunes and misfortunes that shape the gaze with which every individual looks at her/his life and at other subjects and so on. It is questionable whether a large-scale learning process can bring every subject, regardless of all these contingencies, to develop her innermost dispositions in the form of fraternal attitudes towards others. The universal diffusion of ethical dispositions of fraternity between subjects is a very ambitious and demanding objective. In the present situation of widespread disenchantment towards the possibility of radical social change, many subjects could easily doubt its feasibility. A less ethically demanding socialist proposal could probably appeal to a larger number of subjects, present itself as more attainable and, therefore, motivate a wider engagement for its realization. Honneth’s socialist perspective has the advantage of being congruent with all the attempts, old and new, of developing socialist conceptions based on ‘strong’, substantive ideas of community; all these versions of socialism can constitute potential allies in increasing the diffusion of Honneth’s project. At the same time, however, his perspective excludes just as many other versions of socialism, which, too, could increase its persuasive power: All those, namely, that do not rest on the ideals of community and fraternity (I will say more on this later).
Moreover, the conception proposed in The Idea of Socialism falls prey to a dichotomy that the concept of recognition and the idea of social freedom would, thanks to their very structure, be capable of overcoming: the one between egoism and altruism. Honneth prefigures a community in which the subjects are motivated to act in a solidary and cooperative way by a reciprocal feeling of fraternity. The alternative to this fraternal disposition, for Honneth as well as for the proto-socialists, is ‘individual egoism:’ 17 either subjects act altruistically due to their concern towards others, or they are egoists who only pursue their own advantage. The concept of recognition, however, has in itself the capacity of overcoming this dichotomy: In a relationship of recognition, all subjects know that their concern for their own good life implies the concern for everyone else’s good life and for the overall quality of social relations. Being attentive to every other person’s possibility to live a good life coincides with being concerned for one’s own good: according to the recognitional perspective, a good life cannot be lived in a context characterized by dissatisfaction, resentment, exploitation and wild competition.
A subject’s well-being is truly achieved only when it goes hand in hand with everyone else’s well-being, since happiness reached at the expense of another’s unhappiness will be tainted by feelings of guilt or regarded with hostility by those to whom it was denied; in any case, it will have to renounce the primary relational good of recognition. Similarly, according to the concept of social freedom, subjects take part in solidary cooperation in the awareness that the possibility of realizing their own ends depends on the success of the common enterprise, and that both, at the same time, imply everyone’s concern for each other’s needs and for the quality of social relationships. Being committed to others’ well-being and to the overall quality of social relations coincides with being concerned for one’s own well-being, from which, in turn, everyone else depends. Individuals, therefore, are free to keep their own self-interest without having to adopt the dispositions of fraternity requested in The Idea of Socialism.
As Marx and Engels state in The German Ideology: the communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically. […] They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc. […] This contradiction is only a seeming one because one side of it, what is called the ‘general interest’, is constantly being produced by the other side, private interest.
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III Socialism Through Convergence
The wide array of socialist elaborations, as well as the value horizon of modern societies, is extremely varied.
In basing his own conception on the ideal of fraternity, Honneth makes it incompatible with a number of socialist conceptions which do not adopt this ideal, but that, nonetheless, could have been good allies for the theoretical richness, the practical effectiveness and the capacity of democratic persuasion of a ‘new socialism’. Honneth’s proposal, moreover, rules out a number of motivations that could lead a person to embrace the socialist project, like her reaction to injustices damaging herself and her justified interests, or a commitment to the safeguard of suprapersonal common goods. My premise, therefore, is that an individual can legitimately approach or embrace a socialist perspective for many different reasons, be them primarily referred to her own good, to the good of the others or to collective goods. Accordingly, there are many socialist perspectives which do not presuppose or prefigure a community of fraternal life. For example: – An idea of socialism as ‘social justice’ grounded on equality of opportunity for self-realization and welfare, that, as for example in John Roemer’s perspective,
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explicitly abstracts from ethical-communitarian connotations. – A socialism understood as the reappropriation, on the part of the subjects, of a conscious and democratic control on the economy, versus the alienation characterizing capitalist society (e.g. Thornton, ‘Alienation and Socialism’)
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; here, subjects do not necessarily act out of benevolence for others, but, rather, on the awareness that a democratic control on the economy can only be realized collectively. – The desire, by the single person, of a fair recognition for herself and for her work in terms of status and economic retribution; a more just economic and relational order is possible, according to socialism, only between subjects that reciprocally recognize and relate to themselves as equals (e.g. Renault, L’expérience de l’injustice).
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– Conceptions that connect the idea of socialism with the Kantian moral principle that every human being must be treated as an end rather than as a means, against a capitalistic society based on exploitation and instrumentalization (e.g. Vorländer, Kant, Fichte, Hegel und der Sozialismus).
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– Feminist–socialist perspectives led by the principle of an abolishment of patriarchal domination, regarded as inherent to capitalism (e.g. Holmstrom, The Socialist Feminist Project).
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All of these perspectives are united, at the least, by the common denominator of social freedom as presented by Honneth in Freedom’s Right: They all imply that many of the subjects’ primary ends can better be achieved through a voluntary cooperation and on the condition that all individuals can enjoy its results. Social freedom, in other words, constitutes common ground between several different versions of socialism; these, in turn, represent just as many starting points from which, through a sort of overlapping consensus, a convergence can be conceived towards a pluralistic and internally diverse socialist project centred on the idea of social freedom. The general model I proposed here can thus be named ‘socialism through convergence’ (STC). According to it, different subjects, recognizing themselves in different versions of socialism and in the specific values these entail, can nonetheless agree on the basic principle of social freedom, shared by all of their different socialist conceptions; consequently, they can join their efforts in order to realize a socialist society based on social freedom, even while maintaining their different reasons to act and their particular, substantive values.
The principle of social freedom only requires subjects to be conscious that some of their own primary ends can only be fully realized through everyone’s voluntary cooperation and on the condition that all subjects can benefit from the results of said cooperation. STC is therefore capable of accommodating different conceptions of solidarity between subjects: from a ‘minimal’ solidarity among individuals who reciprocally recognize themselves as partners of the common enterprise, to substantive ideas of fraternity and benevolence between subjects.
Another advantage of STC lies in its frame-bridging capacity 24 : STC is potentially appealing to all subjects committed to a wide array of values linked to social freedom, such as radical democracy, conscious control on the economy and anti-sexism; this amounts, for the socialist project, to the possibility of gaining a wider support in pluralistic societies.
Moreover, if and when socialism is institutionalized (which will necessarily have to occur in a democratic way), some subjects will arguably remain unconvinced by it; STC does not require from all individuals, as a condition for them to integrate in society, the development of fraternal and sympathetic dispositions. They will be able to take part in society as full citizens, if they wish to, without having to adopt specific ethical attitudes, and on the only condition that they abstain from the exploitation, instrumentalization and domination of others.
The determination of the ends that will be concretely actualized in the social cooperation (i.e. whether the realized socialism will centre on the right to work, or on radical democracy, or even on a form of community of fraternal life, etc.) will be for the subjects to decide. Similarly, it will be up to the different perspectives converging in STC to convince the sceptics of their validity, just as, according to Honneth in The Idea of Socialism, socialism must strive to win the hearts and minds of people. The common ground of social freedom will also facilitate these perspectives in mutually exploring their differences, enriching one another and learning from each other. 25
Starting from Honneth’s socialist perspective, from my objections to it and from the idea of social freedom that Honneth himself expounded in Freedom’s Right, I have therefore delineated a model capable of making converge, under the common denominator of social freedom, a large variety of conceptions ascribable to the socialist galaxy. As I hope to have demonstrated, the model I propose – denominated STC – can include a wide range of different value orientations and reasons to act, gaining thereby attractiveness among the members of pluralistic societies. The STC model constitutes my attempt at contributing, in a sympathetic spirit to Honneth’s enterprise, to the project of a practical and theoretical re-actualization of socialism.