The International Olympic Committee–International Paralympic Committee Relationship

Introduction

The inclusion of athletes with a disability into the Olympic Games has been at the forefront of the disability sport movement since the inception of the Paralympic Games. The 2010 Vancouver and 2012 London Paralympic Games proved to be major stepping stones for the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) in its efforts to advance the Games as an emergent global brand (Mickle, 2012b). Metrics justifying this claim included excellent Games management under the auspices of the respective Organizing Committees, outstanding athlete and team performances, record-setting ticket sales, increased corporate sponsorship interest and revenues, as well as expanded media coverage including television, print, and social media (Burton & O’Reilly, 2010; “The Paralympics,” 2012; Pathak & Hall, 2012).

Perhaps as a result of this growth, discussions arose regarding the future of the Games. Former IPC President Robert Steadward (1989-2001) and current IPC President, Sir Philip Craven (2002-present), debated in the press during the 2010 Games over whether greater integration and inclusion of the Paralympic Games within the context of the Olympic Games was warranted (Gamesbids, 2010a). Further discussion about the International Olympic Committee (IOC)–IPC relationship then continued during the 2012 London Paralympic Games with one newspaper suggesting the possibility of an IOC takeover.

The IOC contributes around £1.26m ($2 million) a year to help fund the Paralympics Movement and it is understood to have offered to increase the annual subsidy by 50 per cent. In return the IOC wants a greater say in the staging of the Paralympics. The idea is for the IOC to effectively manage the Paralympic Games immediately after the Olympics and allow the IPC to focus on developing and nurturing the paralympian athlete pathways. Essentially the IPC would be contracting to the IOC their best para-athletes for the Paralympics. (Magnay, 2011)

Needless to say this proposed change has not occurred.

The relationship between the IOC and IPC is thus static, using an agreement lasting until 2020 to guide their relationships. Where it goes thereafter is unknown. This article will ultimately get to this point but first it will provide a historical narrative of inclusion of athletes with a disability. Second, the authors will use two frameworks created by Fay (1999) grounded in critical social theory and open systems theory perspectives. Third, the authors present five options as to how the relationship between the two organizations (and in particular how they host the Games) might evolve. Last, the authors build on this analysis to make recommendations for future research. The contribution that this article makes is first by providing a base for future studies on the Paralympic movement. Many of the contractual details of the relationship remain proprietary between the IOC and IPC and are therefore not available at this time. Thus lacking the ability to concretely cite these details, the authors hope to enable future research on this unique relationship through a foundational description. The second contribution is to enhance our understanding of how sport management academics and practitioners can utilize the two Fay (1999) models to better understand and explain the complex contractual interactions between two organizations.

Review of Literature

The Paralympic “movement” began with a desire to reintegrate persons with disabilities, particularly allied war veterans from World War II, Korea and Vietnam, into mainstream society (Brittain, 2010; Darcy, 2003; DePauw & Doll-Tepper, 2000; DePauw & Gavron, 2005; Guttmann, 1976; Peers, 2009; Purdue, 2013; Scruton, 1998; Thomas & Smith, 2009). Thus, for more than 50 years the issue of reintegration has held a significant place within the growth of disability sport including the development and the evolution of the Paralympic Games themselves.

Inclusion is a topic that inspires tremendous emotional undertones based on strong philosophical debate and practical issues related to autonomy, economies of scale, and equity (Cashman & Darcy, 2008; Fay, 2011a; Howe, 2008; McNamee, 2011; Miah, 2008). “Not surprisingly, inclusion has been one of the most discussed, debated, and contentious issues facing disability sport and the Paralympic Movement” (Steadward, 1996, p. 26). For the purposes of this study, inclusion is defined as the final stage along an organizational continuum in which a particular identity group is traditionally marginalized and discriminated against based on race, gender, disability or other determining characteristics (Fay, 1999, 2011; Fay & Wolff, 2009).

To better understand the inclusion process, we have chosen to use two frameworks of Fay (1999)—the Organizational Continuum for the Inclusion of Identity Groups in Sport (OCIIS) and the Critical Change Factors Model (CCFM; see Figure 2). As stated previously, these models were created using a critical social theory and Mintzberg’s open systems theory in an effort to effectively codify data to present patterns and factors necessary for change within sport organizations (Coakley, 2008; Mintzberg & Quinn, 1992; Moore & Lenir, 2011). The frameworks were also designed to plot a pattern of progression and/or regression with respect to inclusive practices that can be assessed relative to individual or organizational agency.

At one end of the OCIIS are organizations and governing systems that operate in Stages 1 and 2, which are virtually exclusive clubs that either overtly or covertly exclude members of particular identity groups or nominally pay lip service to inclusion. Stage 3 is described as an environment in which tokenism is acceptable, followed by Stage 4 where an emerging critical mass of a particular identity group grows in representation particularly at the athlete level, thus leading to greater tolerance of diversity within an organization in Stage 5 (Esty, Griffin, & Hirsch, 1995; Fay, 1999, 2011). Assessing where an organization fits on the scale depends on actions within the organization. At the other far end of this continuum is Stage 6, labeled valuing diversity, which for purposes of this article means the equivalent of full inclusion. This is further defined as when a particular identity group (i.e., race, gender, sexual orientation, or disability) is embraced and valued throughout all stakeholder levels of a given organizational structure (Fay, 1999, 2011; Fay & Wolff, 2009). For example, a sport organization could have integrated and supported a critical mass of athletes, while giving only lip service or exhibiting tokenism in regard to the concurrent integration of key support and management personnel of the same identity group (Fay, 1999, 2011).

Fay’s (1999) second model, referred to as the CCFM, was drawn using a comparative analysis of the integration histories of Blacks in Major League Baseball and women in intercollegiate athletics in the United States when compared with the integration history of athletes with a disability into Olympic sports and Olympic Games. The set of 10 core factors in the CCFM is drawn from equity, including distributive and participatory justice (Greenberg, 1987, 1990), critical social (Coakley, 2008; Sage, 1998), and open systems theories (Mintzberg & Quinn, 1992; Moore & Lenir, 2011; Porter, 1985). The prevailing logic behind the creation and selection of these specific factors was one of commonality or universality, rather than uniqueness to a specific identity group (e.g., race, gender, or disability), or specific type of organization.

The authors reviewed the recent works of Purdue and Howe (2012a, 2012b, 2013) who have both independently and collectively focused much of their work on the Paralympic Games and the Olympic–Paralympic relationship applying Bourdieu’s sociological lens. Purdue (2013) in his most recent work supports many of the contentions and issues raised in this article albeit from a different theoretical lens resulting in a different conclusion.

It is also apparent that research exists pertaining to the discussion of inclusion of athletes with a disability in a number of realms. These include ableism (Lord & Stein, 2009; Thomas & Smith, 2009; Wolbring, 2008, 2012), technology (Burkett, McNamee, & Potthost, 2011; Howe, 2011), ethics (Edwards, 2008; McNamee, 2011; Norman & Moola, 2011), physiology (Jones & Wilson, 2009; Weyand & Bundle, 2010), anthropology and sociology (Swartz & Watermeyer, 2008) and law (Friedman & Norman, 2009). Few authors, with the exception perhaps of Purdue (2013), however, have addressed the relationship of inclusion from an organizational perspective.

Method

Understanding the relationships between two organizations demands the examination of complex interdependencies. According to several authors (Maxwell, 1992; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Olafson, 1990), an appropriate methodology to choose under these circumstances is an intensive, multi-level, case-study analysis. Sport management academics could no longer study simple unidirectional problems or anticipate linear relationships or draw conclusions just for the sake of having one (Olafson, 1990). Based on this and after taking Guba’s (1981) recommendations into consideration regarding research methodology, it was decided that a qualitative, case-study approach would be both appropriate and desirable. By selecting a case-study approach, the authors relied on two types of data collection; archival analysis and observation as a means to support their thematic interpretation and analysis.

The authors engaged in a process of collecting IPC-and IOC-related archival materials and documents obtained from academic, media, the IPC and the IOC, as well as from personal documents and communication from selected stakeholders associated with the IPC and IOC. Using a document analysis structure as outlined by Glaser (1992) and Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt (1998) data collection continued until it reached a point where no new insights were found. The authors adopted a threshold based on the work of Leavy (1996), where formal analysis of the archival materials began when “the data collection process had reached a certain saturation level where the authors determined that the marginal utility of additional information was declining relative to the marginal cost of obtaining it (Leavy, 1996, p. 436).

The authors of this article thus used a mixed-methods approach. First, they drew on the written histories of the IOC–IPC relationship of other authors. Second, primary research was conducted during the 2010 and 2012 Paralympic Games focusing on document analysis and personal communication. Third, the authors reflected on their personal experiences. The result is that in some cases the authors have speculated with regard to motive or rationales at times without the requisite empirical evidence. The authors of this article, however, feel compelled to rely on these insights which include within their professional experiences a variety of roles such as former president of a National Paralympic Committee, Parlaympic athlete, guide, coach, official, and IPC Sport section chief/technical delegate/technical classifier. Cumulatively, the authors have participated in one capacity or another in 20 Paralympic Games starting in 1984 until 2012. The authors have also in their tenures interacted with many leaders in the IPC movement including several interviews with the founding IPC President, Dr. Robert Steadward. Thus, the analysis of the IOC–IPC relationship is potentially biased due to these experiences, but balanced by using the perspectives of other authors.

The first step in this article was to develop a historical narrative of the inclusion of athletes with a disability into the Olympic Games, which in many respects drove the evolving relationship between the IOC and IPC. The second step was to assess this history using principal–agent theory as the lens along with the two Fay models to better understand how the IOC–IPC relationship changed. Last, the four authors, based on their collective personal experiences, conferred to propose five alternatives for future IOC–IPC interactions. Where appropriate, these personal opinions are supported with external references.

Results and Discussion

For the purposes of this article, it is important to recognize the imbalance of power between the IOC and IPC. By deduction using publically available documents, the IPC has arguably ceded its substantive rights of the Paralympic Games including games management, marketing, and broadcast rights to the IOC. The IOC selects the host city and the IOC provides the host city evaluation team (the president of the IPC is an IOC member and one member of the host city evaluation committee represents the IPC). Thus, the principal or owner of a set of assets or rights (i.e., the Paralympic Games) has ceded its authority to arguably a more powerful agent (i.e., the IOC) through the means of a term contract for a given number of years at a given price. This apparent anomaly in the principal–agent relationship will be discussed in greater detail later in this article. In the meantime, it is important to understand the context in which the most recent IOC–IPC contractual agreement signed in 2012 evolved.

This section provides a brief historical narrative describing inclusion of athletes with a disability in the Olympic Games. The participation of these athletes has, in many cases, reflected the evolving relationship between the IOC and IPC. Using this historical lens, we can then better analyze the IOC–IPC cooperation, agreements, and conflicts.

From the inclusion of the first known Olympic athlete with a disability, U.S. gymnast and multiple gold medal winner George Eyser in the 1904 St. Louis Olympic Games (Haviland, 2010; Heacox, 2008; International Olympic Committee, 2008), to the most highly publicized track athlete with a disability, South African double amputee Oscar Pistorius at the 2012 London Olympic Games, lies a 108-year history of extraordinary athletes with a range of disabilities who competed in the Olympic Games (Fay, Legg, & Dryden, 2012; Legg, Burchell, Jarvis, & Sainsbury, 2009; Mascagni, 1996). Several individuals followed Eyser, but it was not until 1984 that the inclusion of persons with a disability into the Olympic movement became more systematic. Here, leaders of sport for athletes with a physical disability (the IPC was not formed until 1989 with Paralympic sport instead run by a number of disability sport federations and a coordinating committee) negotiated the inclusion of wheelchair racing events beginning with the 1984 Olympic Games as “exhibition” events. These events never made it onto the official Program of the Olympic Games and the results did not count into the medal total (Legg, Burchell, et al., 2009; Legg, Fay, Hums, & Wolff, 2009; Legg & Steadward, 2011). These exhibition-style events ended after the Athens 2004 Summer Olympic Games (International Association of Athletics Federations, 2008; Legg, Fay, et al., 2009).

In applying Fay’s (1999) models, the individual participation of athletes within the Olympic Games has been achieved through their own performance (CCF 3), but never reached a critical mass in the number of athletes with a disability (CCF 5), thus they did not produce any significant movement on the organizational continuum (OCIIS) beyond Stage 2 (tokenism). The exhibition events held from 1984 through 2004 were intended as more of an emergent/strategic approach toward inclusion. From a critical theory perspective, these efforts never moved beyond Stage 2 of Fay’s OCIIS model (tokenism/lip service), which ultimately failed to produce full inclusion in the Olympic Games (Legg, Fay et al., 2009). The Commission for Inclusion for Athletes With Disability (CIAD), an IPC committee chaired by Rick Hansen on the request from Dr. Steadward, had pursued the “full” inclusion of wheelchair athletes in the Olympic Games for many years with no success. “Full” referred to wheelchair athletes be recognized as official members of their country’s delegations and given the same rights and responsibilities as Olympic athlete peers. Specific examples included being able to march in the opening and closing ceremonies. In addition, CIAD also made recommendations to the IOC that other para-sports and different disabilities be included in the Olympic demonstration program but were unsuccessful. CIAD’s efforts, however, did result in full inclusion for athletes with disabilities within the Commonwealth Games starting in 1994 in Victoria, Canada. Whether as athletes competing in demonstration events or as athletes with a disability competing against their able-bodied peers, the increased number of Paralympians competing on the Olympic stage has generated interest and discussion as to the future of the two Games and organizations (Christie, 1997).

Given his past advocacy for inclusion into the Olympic Games, it was not surprising when Dr. Robert Steadward, the founding IPC President, suggested in 2010 that putting the Olympic and Paralympic Games together would create efficiencies and allow the Paralympic Games to take advantage of public support for the Olympic Games (Gamesbid, 2010a, R. Steadward, personal communication, March 2010). Correspondingly, Phil Craven, the second President for the IPC, rejected the idea of one mega-event. Craven, who became President in 2001, said that the Paralympic Games had become a force of their own over the last decade (2000-2010) and would be diminished if they were melded into the Olympic Games:

Any coming together would, I think, by its very nature, be restrictive from a logistics point of view. We have it as we like it at the moment, and we don’t see any need to change. We believe by having the Paralympics and the Olympics separate, we’re able to have our own identity while coming together in a festival of sport that gives a wonderful face to the world of what sport can do. (Gamesbids, 2010b)

Although not the purview of this manuscript, perhaps this divergence is due to context; Dr. Steadward being an able-bodied academic whereas Sir Craven is a Paralympian in wheelchair basketball. Regardless, the discordant perspectives of Steadward and Craven represent two different futures. As evidenced by Fay’s CCFs 5, 8, and 10 (see Figure 1), key stakeholders within power elites play a significant role. Thus, despite the efforts of athletes and other primary stakeholders (e.g., the past IPC president) the progression toward more full inclusion and a closer relationship between the IOC and IPC has remained static at a Stage 2 or 3 in the Organizational Continuum (see Figure 2). This is further reflected in the evolving formal contract between the two organizations and in particular the signing of their corresponding Partnership Agreement in May 2012.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 1.

Organizational Continuum for the Inclusion of Identity Groups in Sport (OCIIS).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 2.

Critical Change Factors Model (CCFM).

Since the Seoul Paralympic Games of 1988, many linkages between the Olympic and Paralympic Games merged organically, perhaps because of the personal relationship between Dr. Steadward and Juan Antonio Samaranch, the 6th President of the IOC (R. Steadward, personal communication, 2010). Although not required at the time, many Olympic host cities from 1992 to 2004 chose to have one host organizing committee that staged both the Olympic and Paralympic Games with Atlanta in 1996 being an exception. There was no formal relationship between the IPC and IOC until the first full agreement between the two organizations was signed in 2001. Subsequent agreements from 2003 to 2012 then began to address bidding and marketing, among other items. In between, these subtle changes in the IOC–IPC relationship occurred such as those evident at the 2010 Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Games. Here, the word “Paralympic” was included in the official name of the host Olympic Organizing Committee, a joint marketing agreement was created with the host National Paralympic Committee, and a member from the Canadian National Paralympic Committee was named to the Vancouver Organizing Committee’s (VANOC’s) Board of Directors. Other new Vancouver initiatives included creating a separate countdown clock for the Paralympic Games, and flying both Olympic and Paralympic flags side-by-side at the Olympic/Paralympic Village, the competition venues, as well as other official and Games support venues (International Paralympic Committee, 2012a; Legg & Steadward, 2011).

Another significant development occurred at the 2012 London Games when London Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) revealed its logos for the Olympic and Paralympic Games. A stylized “2012,” the logos were essentially the same, the only difference being that the five Olympic rings and the three Paralympic “agitos” were exchanged within the common logo itself (Legg & Steadward, 2011). The cooperation involving symbols and logos between the IOC, the OCOGs, and the IPC has not always been the case (Purdue, 2013). Following the 1988 Paralympic Games, the IPC was asked by the IOC to change its logo, which consisted of five Tae Geuks because of a complaint from the British Olympic Association that it resembled the Olympic rings too closely (R. Steadward, personal communication, 2010).

Similar challenges also arose regarding the relationship of Olympic and Paralympic mascots. Blaze, the dynamic phoenix-like bird created as the mascot for the 1996 Atlanta Paralympic Games was deemed so much more commercially viable than its Olympic counterpart, Izzy, that the Atlanta Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) filed a lawsuit against the separately incorporated Atlanta Paralympic Organizing Committee (APOC) to limit the impact of brand value of Blaze (Hums & Fay, 1995). Conversely, LOCOG did the opposite and intentionally created two companion mascots for 2012, Wenlock and Mandeville, whose names celebrated the towns in England that were the epicenters of British Olympic and Paralympic heritage, respectively (Polley, 2011). Although seemingly small in scope, symbols and logos are important representations of organizations and these reflect the ongoing evolution of the IOC–IPC relationship. On July 24, 2012, the President of the IOC, Jacques Rogge, and his counterpart Sir Philip Craven, President of the IPC, signed a Cooperation Agreement ensuring that the host cities of the Olympic Games through the year 2020 will host the corresponding Paralympic Games.

For each iteration of the IOC–IPC agreement, it has become more comprehensive as to the rights, requirements, and expectations of the two primary stakeholders, while also including the respective OCOGs, sponsors, and marketing and broadcast rights holders. These agreements can be described as having become more detailed over time designed to facilitate a closer and more precise relationship between the two organizations (Brittain, 2010; International Olympic Committee, 2012b; Purdue, 2013).

The initial 2000 agreement, signed by IPC President Steadward and IOC President Samaranch, was a simple two-page document stipulating that the IPC President would become an “ex officio” IOC Member. It also stated the IOC would provide financial support of US$400,000 per year to the IPC for administrative needs, development projects, plus additional financial support for athletes’ travel to the Winter Paralympic Games in Salt Lake City, USA in 2002 and the 2004 Summer Paralympic Games in Athens, Greece. In addition, there was agreement that a more detailed IOC–IPC contract covering Paralympic Games organization and host city bidding process needed to be created prior to the Winter Games in Salt Lake City (Brittain, 2010).

The 11-page agreement signed in 2001 has been described as the first truly detailed “Games Cooperation Agreement” setting out the basic conditions under which the Paralympic Games have been organized since 2002. The 2001 Agreement covered items such as the requirement for a common Organizing Committee with responsibility to organize both the Olympic and the Paralympic Games in the same Host City, and that the Paralympic Games would be organized according to similar principles and standards as the Olympic Games. The 2001 agreement also stated that the budget of the Paralympic Games would be integrated into the Olympic Games budget (Brittain, 2010; Purdue, 2013).

Over a 10-year period, the tone of the documents related to the IOC–IPC agreement continued to evolve. In a joint IOC–IPC press release dated July 24, 2012, IOC President Rogge recognized the growing importance of the Paralympic Games as

. . . an excellent partner Games [to the Olympic Games] exhibiting sporting and athletic excellence while at the same time sending a strong signal of corporate social responsibility, integration and inclusion in the world of sport and throughout the host city, country and communities and has also proven to be a technically and operationally efficient way to organize an event of such significant importance and magnitude. (International Olympic Committee, 2012b)

The current 2012 agreement has now grown to 20 pages. The implications of this are further elaborated in three documents: (a) the Games Cooperation Agreement, (b) the IOC/IPC Partnership Agreement, and (c) the Technical Manual on the Paralympic Games with a Marketing protocol annexed (Gamesmonitor, 2012).

The signing of the 2012 Agreement solidified the practice of “one bid, one city” that had been formally in place since the signing of the initial IOC–IPC Cooperation Agreement in 2001 and informally practiced by many Olympic host cities prior. As a result of the 2012 Agreement, the IPC will also be able to continue or begin participating on a number of IOC Commissions and Committees including (a) the IOC Athletes’ Committee, (b) the Co-ordination Commissions of the Olympic Games, (c) the IOC Medical Commission, (d) the Women and Sport Commission, (e) the Press Commission, and (f) the Radio and Television Commission. Last, this new agreement includes a significant increase in IOC funding for the IPC in the range of US$12 million per Games, thus providing a sense of stability, certainty, and sustainability with respect to the IPC as a world governing body and the continued growth and stature of the Paralympic Games as an emerging global brand (Gamesbids, 2012; International Olympic Committee, 2012b).

In applying Fay’s (1999) 2 models to these agreements, it becomes clear that over the past 25 years, all 10 CCF factors have now been actively engaged including factors 6, 7, 9, and 10 (see Figure 1). One could surmise that the IPC, at least from a management perspective, would have achieved Stage 5 in the progression along the Organizational Continuum in terms of the IOC’s tolerance and/or acceptance of the Paralympic Games within the Olympic Movement. However, it is debatable whether enough change has occurred to warrant such an assessment of progression as the Paralympic Games remain beside and not within the Olympic Games. Certainly, one could argue that the growth and stature of the Paralympic Games as an emerging global brand has benefited under the patronage of the IOC and its relation to the Olympic Games. On an individual level, however, Paralympic athletes remain at best at Stage 2 of the Continuum in a separate and not equal status relative to their Olympic peers unless they are like Oscar Pistorius and compete in both Games.

One example of how the relationship has changed is the co-bidding process required by IOC candidate cities, with Games management under the control of a single host OCOG. The increased investment in the Paralympic Games by the OCOGs in infrastructure and greater accessibility, and adoption of adaptive technical requirements in the IPC Technical Manual have thus led to an enhanced Games experience for Paralympic athletes (Gamesmonitor, 2012). In this regard, the IPC acts as a multi-sport international federation similar in scope and manner to what the IOC expects from other International Federations. Here, each Olympic international sport federation suspends and cedes its commercial marketing and broadcast rights to the IOC relative to inclusion of its sport involvement in the Olympic Games. This is done in lieu of a proportional share of the revenue from IOC’s sponsorship and broadcast rights agreements (Fay, 2011b; Fay et al., 2012; International Olympic Committee, 2012a).

The IPC has likewise ceded its sponsorship and broadcast rights to the IOC and its OCOGs for the Paralympic Games per the IOC–IPC Marketing Agreement, which began in 2003 (Brittain, 2010). Thus, through the process of ongoing agreements with the IOC and its respective OCOGs, the IPC must continue to negotiate for increased investment, more equal servicing, as well as recognition of the unique characteristics and requirements of Paralympic sport. The 2003 IOC–IPC Marketing Protocol articulated a more comprehensive and restricted environment in which IPC agreed to protect the IOC TOP partners in return for generous lump sum OCOG payments (International Olympic Committee, 2012a, International Paralympic Committee, 2012b).

In 2004, the IOC and the IPC saw the development and agreement of another important document, the Technical Manual on Paralympic Games (Gamesmonitor, 2012). This 143 page document contains a great deal of technical detail of how the Games are to be organized, the size and layout of the Paralympic Village, OCOG structure, IPC role and responsibilities, Games officials, sport program, competition, training and warm-up venues, accommodation, accreditation, technology, and games services and has a significant impact on how the respective OCOGs manage the Games (Gamesmonitor, 2012).

Although there is little question that the Winter and Summer Paralympic Games have grown in stature as well as an enhanced emerging global brand over the past 25 years, it is still difficult to equate the Paralympic Games and the IPC on the a same level as the Olympic Games and the IOC. It could be argued that this should be expected, however, noting the significantly longer history of the Olympic Games and financial success coming only after the 1984. Regardless, the IPC has been able to negotiate many enhancements to the Games management, marketing, sponsorship, and broadcasting of the Paralympic Games due to its IOC–IPC partnership, however, it does not control any of these elements (International Paralympic Committee, 2010). It could therefore be perceived as abdicating its role and entrusting the IOC, to do so. The IOC, however, does not operate with the same set of preference, incentives, or expectant reward as does the IPC. Nor do the two organizations share the same official values. Furthermore, the IOC controls what preference, incentives, and rewards are in place for the Paralympic Games, not the IPC. Due to this inverse relationship, the evolving emergent strategic processes of the IOC and the IPC are also different. Thus, the common change factors in Fay’s (1999) model, although present, are somewhat neutralized with respect to greater inclusion. This is due to the restrictions of the IOC–IPC agreement which give the IOC virtual veto power over all major elements the Paralympic Games, stopping any progression along the Continuum to Stage 3 (Lip Service to Inclusion).

One potential reason for a future change in the IOC–IPC relationships is an increased Paralympic brand value. This can be best understood from a historical perspective divided into three distinct periods. The first (1992-1999) can be described as the “Informal Period of Relationship” driven primarily by the Steadward–Samaranch relationship although discussions between the IOC and what would become the IPC in 1989 started much earlier. As reported by Brittain (2010), Samaranch met with the leadership of the International Coordinating Committee (ICC; which would form the foundation of the IPC in 1989) in the early 1980s leading ultimately to official Olympic patronage of the Winter Paralympic Games in 1984 in Innsbruck. The discussions between Samaranch and the ICC also led to the creation of the demonstration status events that began at the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles and Winter Games in Sarajevo. The second period (2000-2003), the “Transitional or Semi-Formal Relationship,” was an outgrowth of the signing of the initial two-page Cooperation Agreement in 2000 followed by the 2001 Agreement between Presidents Steadward and Samaranch (Legg & Steadward, 2011). These agreements were further reinforced by the IOC’s “2000” Commission’s report that set forth a framework for further codification of the IOC–IPC relationship (International Paralympic Committee, 2003). In the third phase of these agreements, the “Formal Relationship” period (2003-present), the parameters and expectations for the 2008, 2010, and 2012 Paralympic Games were laid out. Here, it became apparent the IOC and IPC needed to have a contract on Winter and Summer Games basis some 6 to 7 years in advance of an up-coming Games (International Olympic Committee, 2012b). Britain also argued that the IOC’s tarnished reputation as a result of scandals associated with bidding and hosting the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games may have encouraged them to search for ways to improve their public image and secure potentially disconcerted sponsors.

It is at this point that Fay’s (1999) CCFM may help explain why the IOC became interested in helping support the Paralympic Games and in so doing the evolution of the IPC as an international sport governing body. There has been a steady and growing change of public opinion toward athletes with disabilities as elite athletes (CCF 1; change occurrence of major societal event(s) affecting public opinion toward ID group). The Paralympic Movement was started, in part, as a response to the needs of war veterans. National and international laws and treaties (CCF 2; Change in laws, government and court action in changing public policies toward ID group) such as the Americans With Disabilities Act (Americans with Disabilities Act; 1990) and The UN Convention on Human Rights for Persons With a Disability (Convention on Human Rights for Persons with a Disability; 2007) also influenced key stakeholders within the IOC (Cody, personal communication, October 2012). The influence of high-profile Paralympians, along with changes in performance levels and corresponding media portrayals (CCF 3-5; Change in level of influence of high-profile ID group role models on public opinion, change in the level and nature of mainstream mass media’s portrayal of ID group, Change in the critical mass of ID group athletes attaining high athletic achievement), have also likely had an impact. The relationships of the IPC and IOC Presidents as well as other global sport leaders and stakeholders coupled with the perceived increasing economic value of the Paralympic Games (CCF 6 and 7; Change in attitudes of key leaders in power elites who act as catalysts for breakthroughs, change in perceived or real economic value of ID group as assets to the ruling power elite) has therefore been influential in creating an atmosphere of greater cooperation between the IOC and IPC (IOC, 2012b). High-profile athletes who use space-age prosthetics to reach high athletic achievement levels (CCF 8; Change in beliefs about the medical and intellectual stereotypes of ID group) have also helped change attitudes and stereotypes (Howe, 2008; Wolbring, 2012). Finally, the merging of these cooperative agreements have helped stimulate a process by which the IOC, OCOGs, and IPC can provide better coordination and Games management relative to the Paralympic Games (CCF 9 and 10; change in hiring practices toward ID group related to managerial and leadership roles, Change in use of strategic processes by power elites to effect greater integration).

The IOC–IPC relationship has also evolved with regard to marketing rights. The 2001 Contract defined IPC marketing rights with respect of the Paralympic Games differently from other IPC rights which involved the broader Paralympic movement. IPC was to assign its Paralympic Games rights to the 2004/2006 and 2008 OCOGs for a fee that was to be agreed on, but was not set out in this 2001 agreement. In 2001, the IPC was still free to secure its own commercial rights without IOC-imposed restrictions. The reality, however, was that there was little interest in the non-Olympic Games-related rights (Brittain, 2010; International Olympic Committee, 2012b; International Paralympic Committee, 2003, 2011).

The 2003 Agreement was actually an amendment to the 2001 Agreement in which the main provision was the stipulation of the 2008, 2010, and 2012 Host City payments, whereby Beijing (BOCOG [Beijing Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games]) would pay US$9 million, Vancouver (VANOC) would pay US$4 million, and London (LOCOG) would pay US$10 million to the IPC in return for the Paralympic Games Broadcasting and Marketing rights. These payments were tied to the IOC–IPC Marketing Protocol document that was agreed at the same time and became Appendix 1 to the 2003 amendment agreement. These restrictions also applied to all Paralympic Games marketing and broadcasting rights assigned to the OCOG through the IOC through which the IPC in return received a “Host City payment” (Brittain, 2010; International Olympic Committee, 2012b). The IOC arrangements set no limits on the goals and objectives of the Movement as long as the Movement held aspirations that were compatible with the Olympic ideals. As stated earlier, the IOC–IPC agreements in essence ceded all power to the IOC and its respective OCOGs. This is likely comparable with the owners in Major League Baseball and their power over Negro League Baseball for 50 years (Fay’s, 1999). The profile and status of Paralympic athletes relative to their Olympic peers is thus strongly influenced by the IOC and its respective OCOGs in terms of any progression on the OCIIS.

As defined in the 2001 Agreement and beginning with the 2008 Games in Beijing, all aspiring Olympic cities are required to submit a bid that includes a comprehensive plan to host both the Olympic and Paralympic Games. OCOGs do not negotiate a separate Host City Contract with the IPC and instead are required to submit their bid using a template IOC agreement and sign an “as is” IOC agreement if selected. As noted earlier to ensure sensitivity and awareness to the unique requirements and needs of athletes and individuals with disabilities in staging the Paralympic Games, the IOC has included an IPC representative on the IOC’s Bid Review team as well as other joint coordinating committees (International Olympic Committee, 2012b).

Broadcasting and sponsors have also been affected by the evolving IOC–IPC relationship. Based on joint statements by the IOC and IPC regarding marketing and broadcast rights, it appears that the current IOC TOP sponsors, OCOG sponsors and suppliers, and broadcast rights holders associated with the Olympic Games influence the development of these agreements based, in part, on their decisions to be also involved in the Paralympic Games. At the 2012 London Games, for example, 3 of the 12 IOC TOP Worldwide Sponsors (e.g., Visa, Atos, and Samsung) were also IPC global sponsors. The remaining TOP sponsors (Acer, Coca-cola, Dow, GE, McDonald’s, Omega, Panasonic, and Proctor & Gamble) signed on through LOCOG as local sponsors of the 2012 Paralympic Games (Mickle, 2012a). It should be noted that these sponsors were required to purchase Paralympic Games marketing rights separate from its IOC rights (International Paralympic Committee, 2011). These rights were controlled and negotiated through the IOC or OCOG and not by the IPC (Mickle, 2012a). The value of a local OCOG sponsorship was far lower than the cost of an IOC TOP sponsorship for the Olympic Games and by deduction would be even less for the Paralympic Games (Mickle, 2012a, 2012b; Pathak & Hall, 2012). Whereas, the marketing rights fees for TOP sponsorship exceeded US$100 million for a 4-year period, the rights fees associated with the Paralympic sponsorship were likely significantly less (Fay, 2011b).

With respect to broadcasting rights, the Agreements are clear that the OCOGs, through the IOC, hold the global rights to the Paralympic Games (Brittain, 2010; Gamesbids, 2012). Due to this clause, it becomes unclear how much leverage or influence the IPC can have on a given broadcast rights holder such as NBC in the United States when the rights holder has already spent millions or billions in USD for the right to broadcast the Olympic Games (Stewart - Robertson, 2012) The IPC position relative to international broadcast rights holders is further complicated by the necessity for a given IOC broadcast rights holder to commit to tie up major resources of staffing and equipment over a 2-month period to include the Paralympic Games.

This issue refers to the inconsistency and equity in broadcast accessibility of the Paralympic Games within different countries and different regions of the world as referenced in CCF 6 and 7 of Fay’s (1999) CCFM framework (see Figure 2). The power of corporate sponsors and the media cannot be underestimated in terms of further progression on the Organizational Continuum with respect to greater inclusion and respect for Paralympians and the Paralympic Games (Stewart-Robertson (2012). It remains to be seen whether the increase in sponsorship and worldwide media witnessed at the London 2012 Games can be sustained and increased. At this point, it could be argued that the Paralympic Games are thus reaching Stage 4 or a new critical mass of public awareness and corporate support.

Finally, the role of the IPC itself has changed relative to the IOC–IPC agreement. The IPC Governing Board and its advisers are responsible for all negotiations of the IOC–IPC Agreements and contracts as well as oversight in terms of the respective OCOG commitments to the Paralympic Games. The governing board is elected at the IPC Congress every 4 years with a member of the governing board being an athlete representative elected from the athlete’s commission.

In applying Fay’s (1999) CCF 6 (see Figure 2) related to the attitudes of key leaders in power elites, one needs to question whether there is a common set of preferences, incentives, and rewards between the IOC and IPC leaders that will lead to any further significant changes regarding the status of Paralympians or the Paralympic Games. Although still separate and not equal, what really are the incentives and rewards to the IPC leaders to seek full integration into the Olympic Games and thereby cede all of its remaining power and influence to the IOC?

It should be noted that whereas the elements of the 2000-2006 IOC–IPC Agreements, contracts, and technical manuals are well known, and the 2011-2014 IPC Strategic Plan exists as a public document, the 2012 IOC–IPC Agreements are proprietary and not available as public documents. It is important to reinforce that these documents have been confirmed to be only available to members of the IPC Governing Board and their IOC counterparts (Cody, personal communication, October 2013).

From the perspective of the IOC and IPC, one can surmise by the contents of their respective Agreements and by the laudatory statements of their respective Presidents that much has happened since the IPC’s inception in 1989. The overall interest in the Paralympic Games as supported by the IOC and OCOGs has significantly increased the viability of the IPC’s Paralympic brand. Applying Fay’s (1999) CCFM one can identify that all 10 critical change factors are now fully engaged at some level on the organizational continuum. However, when one looks at potential comparative models of systemic integration drawn from other identity group histories (e.g., race and gender) to put the IOC–IPC relationship in context, the authors are drawn to parallels with the racial re-integration of Major League Baseball (MLB) in the United States between 1947 and 1954 and gender integration of intercollegiate sports in the United States under the auspices of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) beginning in 1972, the year Title IX passed.

The governance structures that supported Blacks in professional baseball from 1918 to 1954 (the Negro Leagues of Professional Baseball) and college athletics for women from 1971 to 1982 (the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women [AIAW]) ceased to be economically viable or politically relevant to their constituencies within 7 to 10 years after the integration of athletes into Major League Baseball franchises or NCAA member institutions as evidenced by declining participation by these institutions in AIAW Championship events. Many owners, executives, coaches, and support staff involved in the Negro Leagues or in the AIAW strongly resisted integration fearing the loss of power and economic value of their respective franchises or sport governing system (O’Reilly & Cahn, 2007; Shropshire, 1996). Ultimately, the racial integration of Major League Baseball and the gender integration of the NCAA were centered on the athletes and their change of status rather than other stakeholders involved in the Negro Leagues or the AIAW (Davis, 2008; O’Reilly & Cahn, 2007; Shropshire, 1996).

Thus, with the exception of the inclusion of several prominent Paralympic athletes in the 2008, 2010, and 2012 Olympic Games, the status of Paralympic athletes, or the Games themselves, have not changed relative to the relationship with the Olympic Games. In fact, it would seem that little has changed since exhibition events for wheelchair athletes were introduced in the 1984 Olympic Summer Games and concluded in 2004 in Athens (Legg, Fay, et al., 2009). What happens over the next decade thus is open to debate. With this, five potential scenarios are presented with a breadth of options available to the evolving IOC–IPC relationship. The comments regarding the appropriateness of each scenario are those of the authors unless otherwise noted.

The first scenario predicts that the status quo will be maintained. The Olympic and Paralympic Games, under the management and control of the host Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games as outlined by the terms of 2012 IOC–IPC Cooperation and Partnership Agreements, would be separate events occurring 2 weeks apart. This option would serve the goals and objectives of the IOC executive and IPC governing boards, adding value by increasing the brand and marketing potential of the Paralympic Games.

. . . the staging of the Paralympic Games shortly after the Olympic Games has proven to be a strong signal of integration and inclusion in the world of sport and throughout the host city, country and communities. (Gamesbids, 2010b, p. 1)

Despite the IOC–IPC quote above, Scenario I represents a Stage 2 (Lip Service to Inclusion) or a Stage 3 (Tokenism) progression toward full inclusion into the Olympic Games when applying the OCIIS model. Even though the brand value of the Paralympic Games has increased significantly since the 2000 Sydney Summer Games, its total overall value is still a mere shadow of the Olympic Games and other major global sporting events (Burton, 2000; Cashman & Darcy, 2008; Clark, 2004; Fay, Burton, & Grevemberg, 2001).

Scenario II is similar to Scenario I except that it greatly increases the brand, market and broadcast potential for the Paralympic Games by positioning these events in the run up to the Olympic Games where there is more space for broadcasters to air coverage. Nonetheless, it remains at OCIIS–Stages 2 and 3 (lip service/tokenism). This could provide a more enticing and profitable time period for an American broadcaster to provide coverage without competing for viewers with other major global or national events in September (e.g., the U.S. Tennis Open, the start to the college and pro-football seasons, and the final month of professional baseball). We are not necessarily advocating changes to the Games simply to appease U.S. television audiences, but this could be one of many considerations. That being said, the challenges to move the Paralympic Games from an emerging brand to an established global brand depends greatly on the availability and commitment of digital, print, and broadcast media to cover the event. It is extraordinarily difficult to ask the IOC broadcast rights holders to commit the resources, equipment, staff, and other assets that would be required over a 2-month period (Mickle & Ourand, 2012; Ourand, 2012a, 2012b). Perhaps one solution could be moving both Games forward by 2 weeks.

An argument can also be made against this scenario as the two organizations have different core values and thus should remain separate. Also, the identities of each Games may be so divergent that the logistics of changeover from one to the other, and in particular for Paralympic unique sports such as goal ball, require the 2-week interlude. Others, meanwhile point to the Olympic founder Pierre de Coubertin’s vision for the Olympic Movement designed for all regardless of race, gender, and some could thus also infer disability. The latter, however, is a topic for another time.

This scenario is an adaptation of Scenario II, in that the main portion of the Paralympic Games would be staged immediately before or after the Olympic Games with some premium events scheduled within the Olympic Games. Identifying which events would be “premium” could provide difficult, however, mirroring the challenges of when the demonstration status wheelchair track events were first introduced into the Olympic Games in 1984. In this option, Paralympians would still be competing for Paralympic “status” medals that would be carried forward to the medal tallies during the Paralympic Games. The selection of events would need to have stringent criteria including level of competitiveness (depth of field), ease of accommodation into the Olympic Program, and international sport federations involvement in the event selection (Hums & MacLean, 2013). From a marketing and promotional perspective, these events could act as drivers for expanded broadcast of the Paralympic Games themselves as well as expanded sponsorship interest and support. Under this scenario, the IPC would continue to act in its role as an International Federation (IF) overseeing the technical conduct of the events within the Olympic Program (International Paralympic Committee, 2010). This scenario represents a progression toward Stage 4 (Critical Mass of Athlete Participation) although it falls short from being fully integrated.

Scenario IV would grant athletes with a disability full Olympic medal status which parallels what has already happened in the Commonwealth Games. Those Games have embraced the inclusion of a number of full medal status events since the 1994 Games in Victoria, Canada, and was formally confirmed at the 2002 Games held in Manchester (Commonwealth Games Federation, 2008; Fay et al., 2012). Decisions as to having a separate, overlapping or fully integrated Games period and event schedule would continue to be based on the practicalities and economies of scale relative to staging the Games (International Paralympic Committee, 2012a). The concern of course would be a necessary decrease in the total number of events, which occurs in the Commonwealth model where only five sports are on the summer sport schedule.

An equally radical step linked to this alternative is for the IOC to have the Paralympic Games as an official part of the designated Olympiad. Full inclusion of the Paralympic Games as having “Olympic status” would broaden the Olympic Games to include two sets of multi-sport events over a 1- or 2-month period in the same venues. National bragging rights for medal counts could be based on total medals won during both Games. The IPC would then be confronted as to its role and purpose as an organization relative to the Olympic Games, and vice versa (Denis, 2012; Miah, 2012; Tremonti, 2012). This would represent a move toward OCIIS Stage 6, which is valuing diversity. The challenge of maintaining media interest once the Olympic Games were over would not necessarily be addressed under this scenario although the pursuit of a total medal tally might create enough of an incentive.

To some athletes with a disability, Olympic status may be the ultimate recognition and end goal of legitimatization and equality. Other athletes with a disability and representatives of some disability sport organizations may disagree (Howe, 2008; Wolbring, 2012). Some athletes with a disability may argue that combining the Games only serves the interests of a select few athletes and exacerbates the risk of diminishing the significance of the Paralympic Games whereas other athletes with a disability might argue that anything other than complete inclusion only perpetuates the IOC’s “ableist” policies.

The final scenario describes a point in the future where the IOC and/or the IPC decide to dissolve their strategic alliance thus ending all Olympic support and involvement in the Paralympic Games after 2020. In this case, all aspects of staging a Paralympic Games would revert to the IPC representing OCIIS Stage 1, which is the Exclusive Club. The IPC also would be free to pursue its own commercial rights including sponsorship and broadcast revenue. In this scenario, the IPC would by default reclaim its control of any new emergent strategic developments. Clearly, the metrics of a comprehensive cost–benefit analysis might demonstrate there is little incentive for either party to pursue this option.

That being said perhaps an opportunity exists for the world’s second-largest multi-sport event to solicit bids from cities that cannot or choose not to bid for the Olympic Games. Cities wanting to capitalize on unique legacies of hosting Paralympic Games may see this as worthwhile. With the London 2012 Paralympic Games selling roughly 2.5 million tickets, this may be a tipping point at which cities see the economic “Handicapitalism” benefits of hosting a Paralympic Games (Legg, 2012).

In some ways, this situation is analogous to the dependent relationship many Negro League teams had with their Major League counterparts during the time MLB was fully segregated. Negro League teams competed in Major League ballparks with Black athletes performing at a Major League level but at the same time not accorded any sense of equity or equality with their White counterparts. A number of Negro League teams were profitable while paying exorbitant rents and conceding other commercial rights to their MLB counterpart teams (Davis, 2008; Fay, 1999). In this scenario, and as noted earlier, dissolution of the IPC–IOC strategic alliance would represent a regression on the Organizational Continuum back to Stage I–Exclusive Club based on Critical Change Factors 6, 7, and 10.

Conclusion and Future Research

The authors have described the historical context of the IOC–IPC relationship including both athlete participation and management interface with a focus on the Games themselves. Based on the 2012 IOC–IPC Agreement, it can be argued that the IPC has conceded its role to the IOC and its respective OCOGs. However, it can be argued that the evolving IOC–IPC relationship has led to many disability sports becoming more included into their respective able-bodied International Federations. This may have then resulted in greater recognition and thus reflects a greater valuing of diversity. The authors also note that they have not given credence to a multitude of other reasons for the changes to the IOC–IPC relationships. These include market expansion ambitions of the IOC, the desire by the media for more elite sport products to fill an ever-growing media demand and the attractiveness of disability sport for some businesses seeking corporate social responsibility opportunities are all open for further examination (Purdue, 2013; Purdue & Howe, 2012a, 2012b).

Another perspective not pursued in the article but certainly worth considering for future research is the potential results of evolving IOC–IPC relations to Paralympic athletes and people with disabilities in general. If the Games and organizations do move closer together, Purdue (2013) has suggested that to market Paralympians as the same as Olympians risks marginalizing certain individuals with impairments, and alienating people with disabilities in general. A human rights and social justice argument could also be applied to this assessment. Is it an “able-ist” perspective that purports the minority wants to become part of the majority (Legg, 2012)?

A final perspective worth pursuing in future research is the principle agency relationship between the IPC and IOC (Mason, Thibault, & Misener, 2006; Yeh & Taylor, 2009). Most of the principal–agent literature reviewed does not focus on sport, and the few articles that did dealt primarily with professional players, agents, and their teams relative to performance and incentive mechanisms and thus although contextual where not of direct import to this article. That being said to better understand the IOC–IPC relationship, principal–agent theory can enable recognition of how the two organizations (IOC and IPC) interact to create the results clarified using the two Fay continuums. “Principals” are defined to be an individual or organization that is in control or owns the “rights” to a particular asset or set of assets, whereas the “agent” is an individual or organization who or that is contracted to fulfill, leverage, or exercise those rights on behalf of the principal. Principal–agent theory suggests that agents and principals may differ in one of three ways. The first is based on preferences, the second on incentives, and the third on degree of stake or reward in the outcome. By using principal–agent theory, researchers may be better able to understand just how relationships such as the IOC–IPC and/or their respective relationships with the local OCOGs are actually constructed.

This article included a review of pertinent research and a historical overview of the IOC–IPC agreements followed by five scenarios for future changes to the two organizations’ relationship. It will be worth observing whether Sochi 2014, Rio de Janiero 2016, PyeongChang 2018, and Tokyo 2020 chose to carry forward the inclusion efforts of Vancouver 2010 and London 2012 while being mindful of the concerns raised by Purdue, Howe, and others over whether this is a “positive step for the Paralympic Games and Paralympic Movement (Purdue, 2013; Purdue and Howe (2012a, 2012b, 2013). It is at this point that further ongoing research would be important to analyze and debate any new patterns of progression or regression regarding further integration of the Olympic and Paralympic Games after the 2020 Games.