Reconsidering the Role of Intentionality in Deceptive Communication

In my opinion, the most important aspect of McCornack, Morrison, Paik, Wisner, and Zhu (2014) and Levine’s (2014) work is the complementary approach they take with respect to notions of intentionality underlying deceptive communication. According to the traditional model, deceptive message production occurs after a conscious, top-down decision has been made. While not dismissing the idea that deception can be the product of conscious forethought, McCornack et al. and Levine (2014) provide an additional point of view—awareness of the intent to deceive may also occur during and after behavioral attempts have been enacted.

This new approach to deceptive message production is consistent with an emerging, multidisciplinary perspective on goal-directed behavior (see Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Custers & Aarts, 2010). Complex goals can be unconsciously activated and carried out—“setting, pursuing, and realizing goals can occur without conscious interventions” (Custers & Aarts, 2010, p. 48). It has even been argued that the goal of interpersonal aggression can be nonconsciously triggered and performed (Leander & Chartrand, 2011). Yes, we can behave poorly without realizing it.

The idea that goal-directed behavior need not rise to the level of conscious awareness is based on several underlying assumptions. The mind monitors the environment, assesses opportunities and challenges, and begins executing behaviors before they rise to the level of conscious awareness, if at all (Custers & Aarts, 2010). Consistent with this perspective, some neuroscientists claim that our experience of conscious awareness can often be thought of as a “narrator”—a master storyteller making sense of the decisions that have already been made (Gazzaniga, 1998; Wegner, 2002).

McCornack et al. and Levine’s conceptual understanding of deceptive communication is not only congruent with this emerging perspective on goal-directed behavior but it is also consistent with prior research. When individuals were asked to pay close attention to the lies they told during naturally occurring conversations, participants reported being surprised at how often they lied (Lippard, 1988; Rodriguez & Ryave, 1990). Traditional, top-down models of deceptive message production have a difficult time explaining how we can be surprised by our own deceptive behavior.

Conceptual shifts matter. Theories not only provide insight into how the world may work but lay the foundation for the solutions we create. The better our theories become, the more likely we are to find productive ways of thinking about issues that cause us concern. From a relational perspective, shifting our notions of intentionality with respect to deceptive communication creates the intellectual workspace needed to develop potential solutions to common relational problems; two of which I would like to highlight here.

As Miller and Stiff (1993) note, our close relationships not only provide tremendous rewards, but interdependence entails enormous constraints, creating the perfect breeding ground where deceptive behavior is a virtual guarantee. If one’s desire is to create a more genuine relationship, where deception is less likely to occur (a debatable goal, see Bok, 1999, vs. Solomon, 1993), McCornack et al. and Levine’s conceptual view of deceptive behavior provides a theoretical pathway for doing so.

Rather than focusing on a partner’s intent, it might be more productive for couples to examine the situational and relational features that activate the goal to engage in deception. How do issues of power imbalances, unrealistic expectations, aggressive and negative responses to hearing the truth, just to name a few, lead to highly problematic decision-spaces where deceptive responses become an attractive option (see Cole, 2001). Moving away from a speaker-oriented view of deception may help couples see that such behavior is not necessarily a problem in and of itself, but rather a symptom of underlying issues that might warrant discussion.

Additionally, a conceptual shift in our understanding of speaker intent provides the intellectual legitimacy for developing interventions, which may help couples deal with the discovery of deception in a more constructive manner. Discovering deception in a close relationship can produce feelings of uncertainty and negative emotional reactions (McCornack & Levine, 1990; Planalp & Honeycutt, 1985). Such unexpected and negative events trigger attributional processes (Burgoon, 1993), leading people to ask, “How could you do this to me?” Notions of speaker intent influence our evaluation of deceptive behavior (Pope & Forsyth, 1986). We are quick to blame others when we discover that we have been lied to.

What if we could develop interventions to help individuals, who are dealing with the discovery of deception, shift their appraisal of the event away from notions of speaker intent to a more situationally based orientation. Research on conflict may serve as a useful analogy here. Like deception, conflict is inevitable in a close relationship. When it comes to conflict, what matters is how couples deal with it. Couples, who personalize conflict, that is, take a “you-versus-me” approach, are less likely to resolve issues and remain together (Gottman, 1999).

Finkel, Slotter, Luchies, Walton, and Gross (2013) recently developed and tested a simple, writing-based intervention designed to help couples engage in a cognitive reappraisal of conflict in their relationships. The intervention they created involved having individuals write about their experiences of conflict from a third-party point of view on three separate occasions over the course of a year. Essentially, participants were asked to think how an outsider would deal with the situation. Participants were also asked to take this third-party perspective into account during future disagreements. This simple intervention prevented couples from experiencing significant declines in relational satisfaction compared with a control group.

Our current, “conscious-centric” thinking (Bargh & Morsella, 2008, p. 78) about deceptive communication almost assuredly guarantees that people will try to assign blame when deception comes to light. Perhaps it is possible to develop cognitive reappraisal interventions, which will allow individuals, in some instances, to avoid the pitfalls that occur when relational problems are personalized rather than dealt with more holistically. Again, McCornack et al. and Levine’s work provides the necessary intellectual framework for designing such interventions.

I think it is important to reiterate that McCornack et al. and Levine are not arguing against notions of speaker intentionality—they are arguing for a more nuanced position. Situational complexity can sometimes govern the production of deceptive messages and intentional awareness can be brief and occur post facto. Again, this more holistic approach to understanding deceptive behavior may encourage scholars to identify the conditions that prompt misleading responses as well as help us develop interventions to help couples cope with the discovery of deception.

Of course, in some instances, assigning blame is ultimately the wisest course of action. But, by adopting a more nuanced perspective, we may be able to make finer distinctions about speaker intentionality. Given that a little negative affect goes a long way in most domains of life, and in particular our close relationships (Gottman, 1999), if we can find solutions to help couples reduce negative responses to common relational problems, like discovering deception, we should.

My commentary may seem full of contradictions. Essentially, I am proposing an intentional, top-down approach for dealing with the discovery of deception, which is almost certainly driven by automatic and unconscious processes. Scholars studying conscious and unconscious goal-directed behavior have argued that one way of looking at conscious awareness is to think of it as a “simulation environment” (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Schacter & Addis, 2007). My best friend is a systems analyst. Before he releases software updates out into the real world, he fine-tunes them in a simulation space. Activities, such as Finkel’s writing intervention, may serve a similar role. We can direct our conscious awareness to practice and rehearse desirable response tendencies in an environment where it is safe and easy to do so. This intentional, reflective practice can help us retrain automatic and unconscious responses (or at least help us catch them quicker once they have been triggered).

I hope that McCornack et al. and Levine’s ideas generate much needed debate and research about the role of intentionality underlying deceptive communication. I am also excited about the possibilities McCornack et al. and Levine’s work creates for scholars studying close relationships.